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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

HONOR, REPUTATION, AND CONFLICT:
GEORGE OF TREBIZOND AND
HUMANIST ACTS OF SELF-PRESENTATION
The present study investigates the verbal strategies of self-presentation that
humanist scholars employed in contests of honor during the early fifteenth century. The
focus of this study is George of Trebizond (1395-1472/3), a Cretan scholar who
emigrated to Italy in 1416, taught in Venice, Vicenza, and elsewhere, served as an
apostolic secretary in Rome, and composed the first major humanist treatise on rhetoric,
his Rhetoricorum libri quinque, in 1433/34. Trebizond feuded with many prominent
humanists during his career, including Guarino of Verona (1374-1460) and Poggio
Bracciolini (1380-1459). His quarrels with both men illustrate how humanist conflicts
were the sites upon which Quattrocento scholars won or lost honor via literary activities
designed to appeal to a public audience of peers and patrons. Humanists wrote to
denigrate publicly their competitors, casting them as ignorant and morally corrupt, and to
praise themselves as eloquent and virtuous. Although Renaissance scholarship has long
acknowledged the humanist pursuit of glory, the linguistic means by which humanists
contested honor remains understudied. The present study contends that Quattrocento
contests of honor were conducted using standard sets of oppositional categories, themes,
and literary models. Additionally, I argue that an analysis of the linguistic strategies of
self-presentation provides a more complex and complete picture of Quattrocento
humanism and of individual humanists as historical figures.
Following an introductory discussion of George of Trebizond and Quattrocento
humanism in Chapter One, the next three chapters of this dissertation address individual
themes evident in Trebizond’s correspondence. Chapter Two examines the anti-Greek
language that dominated Trebizond’s dispute with Guarino in 1437. Chapter Three
explores the language of restraint and rational self-control in Trebizond’s feud with
Poggio between 1452 and 1453. Chapter Four evaluates humanist concepts of
masculinity in Trebizond’s feuds with both men. Chapter Five steps back from a deep
thematic reading of Trebizond’s correspondence to consider invective as a literary genre
that was a preferred vehicle for humanist self-presentation. This final chapter studies two
additional feuds, between Guarino and Niccolò Niccoli, and Poggio and Lorenzo Valla,

to understand better Trebizond’s experiences as a reflection of the broader culture of
which he was a part.
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CHAPTER ONE
HUMANISM IN THE EARLY QUATTROCENTO
Introduction
Renaissance humanists worried a great deal about their reputations. Scholars have
long recognized humanists’ efforts to seek approbation from their peers and patrons, and
recent scholarship has turned its attention to a discussion of humanist anxiety—the
constant lamentations about the difficulties of being a professional scholar. 1 The present
study advances existing scholarship on humanist honor by examining conflicts between
scholars—the sites where honor was contested—and the written correspondence –
personal letters and invective—that feuding scholars exchanged. This study proposes to
move beyond the idea that humanists were concerned about honor to a consideration of
how and why they fought with one another as they did. What were the strategies
humanists employed to contest honor? As erudite, eloquent individuals, how did they
mobilize language to meet the demands of scholarly life? What concepts, themes, or
categories did they use to promote themselves and challenge the reputations of their
opponents? How did they address the problem of audience, namely that one secured
honor through one’s peers—some friendly, some not? What were the socio-economic
consequences of humanist contests and how did they influence the language that scholars
used? What meaning are we to take from the often aggressive and denigrating language
humanists used?
1

For the former, see Hanna H. Gray, “Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 24, no.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1963): 494-514. For the latter, see especially the works of Christopher
S. Celenza, including Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger’s
De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999) and The Lost Italian Renaissance:
Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
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In response to these questions, the present study makes the following contentions.
First, humanists employed identifiable strategies that involved standard sets of categories,
themes, and literary models to contest honor. In essence there was a language of honor
that humanists used, and that language is the focus of the present study. The language
consisted of contrasts between, for example, prudence and imprudence, honesty and
dishonesty, reason and emotion, as well as the contrast between manly behavior on the
one hand and womanish, childish or beast-like behavior on the other. Second, humanists
modeled their language on examples from the classical Latin tradition, including but not
limited to those drawn from rhetorical treatises. Fifteenth-century scholars adapted these
classical examples to the contemporary needs of their professional lives. Third, formal
scholarly disputes consisted of competing acts of self-presentation generally composed in
writing and circulated among an audience of an author’s peers. In these compositions,
humanists defined themselves in ways that would establish or defend their reputation and
defined their opponents in ways that would challenge their reputations. Humanists, then,
viewed themselves as exercising influence over public perception and thus as agents in
the construction of their own identities. Fourth, humanist self-presentation was a concrete
response to the anxiety scholars experienced about the highly competitive nature of
professional life in the early Quattrocento. To find meaning in humanist invective and to
make sense of the frequently insulting and aggressive language in these pieces, we ought
to view humanist self-presentation as a function of the times. Humanists were erudite
men with an eye towards their predecessors as well as men who prided themselves on
their learning and eloquence. They were well aware of the challenges that faced them in
building and maintaining a reputation as a professional scholar, and were more than
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capable of drawing on a host of models and concepts to influence how others perceived
them and their opponents.
My analysis of humanist self-presentation and honor focuses on the career of
George of Trebizond (1395-1472/3), a Cretan émigré to Italy who engaged in disputes
with some of the most prominent humanists of the day. To inform my arguments and to
establish a sense of time, place, and those involved in Trebizond’s disputes, I begin with
a series of brief discussions about Trebizond, his adversaries, and the socio-economic and
cultural circumstances of fifteenth-century humanism.
George of Trebizond and Humanist Contests of Honor
Trebizond—an accomplished scholar, respected educator, and a prolific translator
of Greek texts—is a useful lens through which to view humanist experiences during the
early Quattrocento. Trebizond arrived in Italy in 1416 at the behest of the Venetian
patrician Francesco Barbaro, and learned Latin from and did translation work for one of
the most renowned fifteenth-century humanist schoolmen, Vittorino da Feltre. He
composed the first major Renaissance treatise on rhetoric—the Rhetoricorum libri
quinque (hereafter RLV)—in 1433/34 and served in Rome as apostolic secretary to a
number of popes. 2 He worked in many key sites of patronage including Venice, Rome,
and Naples, and alongside some of the most brilliant lights of the Quattrocento—Guarino
of Verona, Poggio Bracciolini, Lorenzo Valla, Cardinal Bessarion, and Theodore Gaza
among others. He was a respected educator. He enjoyed the patronage of rulers such as
2

For Trebizond’s contributions, including the RLV, to Renaissance rhetoric see John Monfasani’s major
biography George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1976), 318-327 and Peter Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric, 1380-1620 (New York: Oxford
University Press), 39-47. For the RLV in the early modern classroom see Paul Grendler, Schooling in
Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989),
208-209 and 212.
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Alfonso of Aragon, King of Naples. He was friends with influential political figures
including Barbaro and fellow scholars such as Francesco Filelfo. Others, including Flavio
Biondo and Lorenzo Valla, with whom Trebizond engaged in public debates while in
Rome, held him in esteem. 3 Trebizond himself never attained the reputation of a
Leonardo Bruni or even of some of the men with whom he feuded, including Guarino and
Poggio. He was by most accounts, however, a success as he attained both patronage and
financial prosperity. 4 Like many of his contemporaries, he engaged in a number of
literary duels. The present study analyzes two of Trebizond’s major quarrels: the first
with Guarino of Verona (1374-1460) while Trebizond was in Venice in 1437, and the
second with Poggio Bracciolini (1380-1459) in Rome and Naples between 1452 and
1454.
The Trebizond-Guarino dispute began when Andreas Agaso, who claimed to be a
student of Guarino’s, took issue with passages in Trebizond’s RLV that criticized
Guarino’s rhetorical style. Agaso wrote about Trebizond to Paulus Regius, supposedly
another of Guarino’s students. He took up the defense of his instructor and attacked
Trebizond’s eloquence, knowledge of Latin, alleged abuse of Guarino, and the precepts
3

On Trebizond’s friendship with Barbaro and Filelfo as well as Valla’s comments, see Monfasani, 3, 104,
and 124-125.

4

Trebizond’s position in the curia was particularly lucrative. Peter Partner writes that “the fees due to the
secretaries were also substantial: the income enjoyed from his post by a secretary in the mid fifteenth
century was in the region of 250-300 florins annually…and George of Trebizond, at the end of a twelveyear tenure of the office, had over 4,000 florins placed in Roman banks, besides investments in real
property.” The Pope’s Men: The Papal Civil Service in the Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990),
54. Monfasani also addresses Trebizond’s substantial assets. Monfasani, 114-115 and 141-145.
Trebizond’s rivals were successful as well. Poggio Bracciolini, like Trebizond, turned his curial
post into financial success. Stephen Greenblatt writes “By the 1450s, along with a family palazzo and a
country estate, he had managed to acquire several farms, nineteen separate pieces of land, and two houses
in Florence, and he had made very large deposits in banking and business houses.” Greenblatt, The Swerve:
How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 22. For additional details about
Poggio’s holdings see Lauro Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 123-127. Guarino of Verona earned a salary of 300 ducats when he
became a public lecturer in Ferrara in 1435 under the patronage of the Este family. Grendler, 126-128.

4

of the RLV. Trebizond believed Guarino had written the Agaso letter and penned a
response three days later to Guarino himself. 5 He attacked Guarino for hiding behind the
Agaso pseudonym, reiterated his criticisms of Guarino’s style, and claimed to be the
superior orator and instructor. His response included a cover letter to the Ferraran prince
Leonello d’Este, Guarino’s student and patron. Trebizond urged Leonello to arrange a
public debate between Trebizond and Guarino to prove once and for all who the greater
scholar was. 6
The Trebizond-Poggio dispute, by contrast, was the result of a public, physical
altercation between the two in the papal chancery in May 1452. Both men were apostolic
secretaries at the time. Their altercation began as a fist fight but eventually Trebizond
drew a sword against Poggio, causing his opponent to flee. Afterwards, the cardinal in
charge of the chancery and then Nicholas V himself judged Trebizond to have acted
imprudently and without restraint. Trebizond was imprisoned for his actions and upon his
release not welcomed back to the chancery. He left Rome soon thereafter for the
patronage of Alfonso of Aragon in Naples. Over the next two years, Trebizond continued
to write about the chancery fight and Poggio. In January 1453, he presented his account
of the chancery fight—a story of self-defense—to Poggio. That same month, he wrote to
Nicholas V that Poggio had sent assassins to Naples to kill him. Responding in February

5

The authorship of the Agaso letter is not clear. Monfasani questions whether Agaso and Regius actually
existed. See Monfasani, 29-30.

6

For Leonello, the court of Ferrara, and Guarino’s role there, see Werner L. Gundersheimer, Ferrara: The
Style of a Renaissance Despotism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973); Marianne Pade,
“Guarino and Caesar at the Court of the Este,” in The Court of Ferrara and its Patronage, ed. Marianne
Pade (Modena: Edizioni Panini, 2001), 71-92 and The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century
Italy, vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), 231-239; Michael Baxandall, “A Dialogue
on Art from the Court of Leonello d’Este: Angelo Decembrio’s De Politia Litteraria Pars LXVIII,” Journal
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 26, no.3/4 (1963): 183-204 and “Guarino, Pisanello and Manuel
Chrysoloras,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 28 (1965): 304-326.

5

1453, Poggio rejected Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and the assassination
plot accusation. In June 1454, Trebizond added another charge, that Poggio and Giovanni
Aurispa had circulated forged letters to frame him for writing insultingly about the pope.
Each of Trebizond’s rivals was a well-known and widely respected fifteenthcentury humanist. 7 Guarino was one of the most significant humanist educators of the
century. His school in Ferrara under the patronage of the Este family was, alongside
Vittorino da Feltre’s school in Mantua, one of the best of its kind. 8 Guarino was also a
leading grammarian. His Regulae grammaticales, written while he was in Venice around
1418, remained in use until the seventeenth century and survives in almost forty
manuscripts. 9 His contributions to the revival of Greek studies in Italy were equally
important. Guarino was one of the eager Italian students—alongside Bruni, Ambrogio
Traversari, and others—of the Greek instructor Manuel Chrysoloras who reintroduced
Greek studies to Italy at the end of the fourteenth century. Guarino was in his early
twenties when Chrysoloras arrived in Italy in 1397, and he followed him back to
Constantinople in 1403. During his studies there, he translated Lucian’s Slander and The
Fly. After returning to Italy in 1417, he published an abridged version of Chrysoloras’s
manual on Greek inflections, the Erotemata, which became one of the standard Greek

7

I reserve more detailed discussions of pertinent biographical information of Guarino and Poggio for the
following chapters.

8

For Guarino, see first the works of Remigio Sabbadini including Vita di Guarino Veronese (Genoa:
Instituto Sordo-Mutti, 1891); Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, 3 vols. (Venice: A spese della Società,
1915-1919); La Scuola e gli studi di Guarino Guarini Veronese (Catania: F. Galati, 1896). Guarino’s
reputation as an educator is well documented. Grendler, 126-129; John Ward, “The Lectures of Guarino da
Verona on the Rhetorica ad Herennium: A Preliminary Discussion,” in Rhetoric and Pedagogy: Its
History, Philosophy, and Practice, ed. Winifred Brian Homer and Michael Leff, 97-127 (Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum, 1995); Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, “Humanism and the School of Guarino: A Problem of
Evaluation,” Past & Present 96 (Aug. 1982): 51-80 and From Humanism to the Humanities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986).
9

Grendler, 166-169, 191 and 194.

6

grammars of the fifteenth century, and translated Lucian’s The Parasite. 10 Guarino
settled in Ferrara in 1429 and taught there until his death in 1460.
Poggio rose from relatively obscure origins to the heights of humanist success by
his death in 1459. 11 Under the guidance of then-chancellor Coluccio Salutati, Poggio
worked alongside the likes of Leonardo Bruni and Niccolò Niccoli in Florence. In 1403,
at the age of twenty-three and with Salutati’s recommendation, Poggio entered the
service of Pope Boniface IX as a scribe. Poggio was perhaps best known for his
reputation as a book-hunter. In the summer of 1415, he discovered a codex in Cluny
containing seven Ciceronian orations, two of them hitherto unknown—the Pro Roscio
Amerino and Pro Murena. In the summer of 1416, he found in St. Gall Asconius’s
Commentary on five Ciceronian speeches, and, perhaps his best known discovery, the
complete text of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria. 12 In the 1430s, Poggio attained the
highest position in the papal service, apostolic secretary, which he maintained for the
next two decades under Eugenius IV and Nicholas V. Like his contemporaries, Poggio
composed a number of treatises and dialogues: De avaritia (1429), De nobilitate (1440),
De infelicitate principum (1440), De varietate fortunae (1448), and Contra hypocritas
10

Grendler, 265; Paul Botley, Learning Greek in Western Europe, 1396-1529 (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 2012), 2, 7-12; Federica Ciccolella, Donati Graeci: Learning Greek in the
Renaissance (Leiden: Brill, 2008),101, 130-131; David Marsh, Lucian and the Latins: Humor and
Humanism in the Early Renaissance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 1998), xi.

11

Poggio’s major biographers are William Shepherd, whose nineteenth-century work is still the most
complete biography of Poggio in English, and Ernst Walser. William Shepherd, The Life of Poggio
Bracciolini (London: Harris Brothers, 1837); Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus. Leben und Werke
(Leipzig-Berlin, 1914). For Poggio’s correspondence and writings, there is Poggio Bracciolini, Opera
Omnia, ed. T. Tonelli (Basel, 1538; rpt. Turin, 1964). For a recent account of Poggio’s life and career see
Greenblatt, The Swerve.

12

Grendler, 121-122. Poggio and Niccoli discussed the discoveries of these new texts excitedly in their
letters to each other. Two Renaissance Book Hunters: The Letters of Poggius Bracciolini to Nicolaus de
Niccolis, trans. Phyllis Walter Goodhart Gordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). In January
1417, Poggio discovered Lucretius’s De rerum natura in another monastic library, perhaps in Fulda. That
discovery is the focus of Greenblatt’s recent work. Greenblatt, 176-180.

7

(1447-8). Poggio’s Facetiae, a collection of jokes and anecdotes purportedly told by his
fellow curial servants and compiled between the 1430s and 1450s, was immensely
popular. Poggio was also an active polemicist. He engaged in a literary duel with
Guarino, the so-called Scipio-Caesar controversy of 1435, and a protracted debate with
Francesco Filelfo in the 1430s. His major feud, and the one that garnered the most
attention in Rome and throughout Italy, was his extremely vitriolic dispute with Lorenzo
Valla (1407-1457), another apostolic secretary, between 1452 and 1453. 13 Poggio’s
animosity towards Valla continued even after Poggio left Rome in 1453 to become
chancellor of Florence, a position he retained until he retired in 1458. He passed away the
following year.
Scholarly life at the turn of the Quattrocento was extremely competitive and rife
with conflicts among erudite men—including Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio—seeking
to build reputations and careers. Humanism was a movement still largely in its infancy.
Job prospects were limited and students of the studia humanitatis in cities throughout
Italy were dependent on patronage. Aspiring humanists taught the youths of wealthy,
powerful patricians in cities like Vicenza or Venice. 14 In Florence, figures including
Niccolò Niccoli and Poggio built lucrative relationships with the ruling Medici family. 15
The Roman curia became a center for humanist activity in the middle of the Quattrocento

13

Ennio Rao describes the Poggio-Valla feud as the high-water mark for humanist invective in
Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1452) (Messina: EDAS, 2007), 96-97.
14

For humanist patronage in Venice, see Margaret L. King, Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician
Dominance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

15

For humanism in Florence see Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists; George Holmes, The
Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-1450 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Ronald Witt, Hercules at the
Crossroads: The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio Salutati (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1983).
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under the papal patronage of Eugenius IV and Nicholas V. 16 Success as a humanist
required appealing to these patrons, presenting oneself as a skilled intellectual, and
distinguishing oneself from the competition. The relatively limited opportunities
available to humanists meant that reputation was crucial to their prospects as
professionals and to their financial stability. Bound by the demands of patronage,
scholars exhibited no small amount of anxiety about how others perceived them.
Humanists expressed their anxiety and carried out conflicts with one another
through their personal letters and by composing invective. Letters and invective were
each immensely popular during the fifteenth century and are of vital importance to
understanding how humanists viewed and responded to their socio-economic realities.
The Quattrocento saw a veritable boom in the composition of personal letters aided by
the recovery of Cicero’s letters to Atticus and Quintus in 1345 and his Epistolae ad
familiares in 1392. 17 The composition and circulation of one’s letters quickly became the
primary means by which humanists disseminated their ideas and cultivated reputation.
Letter collections became the sign of serious scholarship. 18 Furthermore, humanists
16

For humanism and the curia see John W. O’Malley, Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric,
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frequently used their personal letters as a vehicle for invective attacking their
competitors. In letter form, they addressed their invectives to a friend, patron, or
adversary. Fundamental to the act of composing invective was the author’s understanding
that his correspondence was anything but private. Ostensibly addressed to individuals,
writer and recipient alike expected that once they left the author’s hands his letters would
be read by a much wider audience. Letters were routinely collected, copied, and
disseminated within and between cities. Friends alerted each other to the goings-on of
notable scholars, advocated on behalf of each other, and criticized their own adversaries
as well as the adversaries of their allies. Humanist quarrels were public contests waged
before an audience of contemporaries to whom authors sometimes explicitly but always
implicitly appealed.
Historiography
My study of humanist self-presentation during the feuds of George of Trebizond
emerges from two specific historiographical conversations relative to the contextual
information just discussed. The first involves the competitive nature of Quattrocento
scholarly life, the anxiety this created among humanists, and the social practices they
adopted in response to their anxiety. Humanist anxiety has been the focus of a series of
recent works examining complaints or lamentations about the socio-economic situations
in which scholars found themselves. A representative and valuable example of this trend
is Christopher Celenza’s work on Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger. 19 In Renaissance
Humanism and the Papal Curia (1999), Celenza examined the career of Lapo (1406scholarship, see Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo
da Castiglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57, no.4 (Winter 2004): 1309-1310.
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1438), a Florentine scholar who was always on the verge of success. Lapo’s major work,
On the Benefits of the Curia [De curiae commodis], includes a portrait of life in the papal
court that reflects the difficulties of achieving and maintaining success as a scholar there.
Others, including Elizabeth May McCahill and Stephen Greenblatt, have followed
Celenza in identifying Lapo as a sort of cultural barometer for scholarly distress and
frustration in cultivating reputation and gaining entry into patronage networks. 20 Celenza
returned to Lapo in The Lost Italian Renaissance (2004) where he situated the
conversation about honor and reputation in an exploration of the intersection between the
social and intellectual worlds of humanists. He suggests examining humanist social
practices, specifically the composition and dissemination of their Latin writings, to
understand how they conceptualized and measured the honor they sought. He also
provides a model for doing so, noting how humanists used “gendered categories in an
oppositional way, so that a thinker, in order to emphasize the right kind of behavior or
action, will deploy the opposite in vilifying an opponent.” For Lapo, this meant charging
some in the curia of effeminate behavior—either in accusations of luxury or sexual
immorality—and employing a “feminizing antitype” that Celenza explains many
fifteenth-century polemicists used.
The present study uses Celenza’s discussion of oppositional categories as a
starting point and advances the study of humanist anxiety and social practices by
examining the verbal strategies evident during Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and
Poggio. The correspondence of these feuds reflects a shared set of standard categories
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used, as Celenza explains, in an oppositional manner to praise the author and vilify his
opponent. I add to Celenza’s account of gendered language a consideration of additional
categories, the examination of which can provide a richer sense of the social world of
humanist scholars. In Trebizond’s feuds, the categories each author employed depended
on the context of the particular dispute. Trebizond’s feud with Guarino was largely
defined by the fact that Andreas Agaso used anti-Greek language to denigrate Trebizond
as an ignorant, immoral Greek. Agaso attacked Trebizond’s learnedness by casting him
as a loquacious Greekling rather than an eloquent Latin, and he accused Trebizond of
immoral conduct by contrasting Roman gravitas with Greek levitas. The TrebizondPoggio feud was defined by the chancery fight and Trebizond’s imprisonment for
drawing a sword against his opponent. The ensuing dispute was conducted through a
language of restraint that contrasted prudence and imprudence, honesty and dishonesty,
and reason and emotion. The figures in both feuds also employed gendered categories
that included but were not limited to the feminizing antitype that Celenza has identified.
They contrasted masculinity with femininity, childishness, and animal or beast-like
behavior. These categories offer insight into what scholarly circles deemed appropriate
behavior as well as what they considered effective and suited to winning and maintaining
honor. My examination thus strives toward the richer, more detailed account of humanist
social practices and verbal strategies called for and begun by Celenza.
The present study is also situated in a second historiographical debate, a growing
field of works investigating Renaissance invective. Despite its popularity in the fifteenthcentury as a vehicle for self-presentation, invective has not received a great deal of
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attention by later scholars. 21 Studies of Quattrocento invective lag far behind more
extensive analyses of classical invective. 22 Scholars have, however, begun to take notice
of the historical value of Renaissance invective. There remain few analyses of humanist
invective but the number of editions and translations of these texts has increased since the
1970s. Important recent examples include David Rutherford’s edition and translation of
Antonio da Rho’s invectives and David Marsh’s edition and translation of Petrarch’s
invectives. Both authors include introductions containing brief assessments or overviews
of Renaissance invective. Their works are undoubtedly valuable but still offer
comparatively little in the way of analysis of the texts themselves. The most significant
analytical work done on Renaissance invective is that of Ennio Rao. His Curmudgeons in
High Dudgeon (2007) contains brief summations of notable humanist conflicts between
1352 and 1453. 23 Rao’s work, though, is limited as an analytical study. His survey offers
breadth but does not analyze any one conflict in great detail.
To the extent that existing studies have discussed or analyzed invective, they have
tended to cast it in a negative light and condemn its authors for their aggressive, harsh
21
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language. This was true of nineteenth-century writers who found it difficult to reconcile
the sometimes savage invectives of humanists with their stated goals, the high-minded
pursuit of honor, wisdom, and eloquence, and so criticized polemicists. In his biography
of Poggio, William Shepherd lamented that Poggio “unfortunately indulged, to the latest
period of his life, that bitterness of resentment, and that intemperance of language” that
characterized his professional feuds. 24 Even recent studies tend to draw moralizing
conclusions from invective, which they treat as a reflection of the author’s character.
Ennio Rao described humanist purveyors of invective as “curmudgeons” in the title of his
survey. In his assessment of the Poggio-Valla feud, one of the most explosive and public
feuds of the fifteenth-century, he characterized Poggio as “impatient and quick to anger”
and as someone who would “at the slightest provocation… unleash his attacks with
unprecedented fury.” 25
The offensive tone of invective has thus left us with somewhat distorted portraits
of individual figures. The tendency toward moralizing views of humanist polemics, then,
is an analytical problem in Renaissance studies. Trebizond was engaged in a number of
feuds during his career and so modern scholarship has cast him as bitter, morose, and
angry. Harold S. Wilson describes him as having “suffered from some very human
defects of character,” including being “moved by a vehement impatience for selfadvancement,” having a “high sense of his own merits and a somewhat vindictive
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temper” and an “impatient turbulence [which] made him influential enemies.” C. Joachim
Classen similarly characterizes Trebizond’s works, including the RLV, as suffering “from
the author’s arrogance and aggressiveness” and “presumptuousness,” and accuses
Trebizond of “hostility toward Italian teachers of rhetoric” and of a “polemical spirit” in
his works. Elsewhere, Trebizond has been characterized as “choleric,” “volatile,” as well
as arrogant, irritable, and paranoid. John Monfasani, Trebizond’s main biographer,
tempers these characterizations somewhat by noting that Trebizond was only rarely the
instigator in his conflicts. 26
By applying conclusions from recent investigations of humanist anxiety and
social practices, such as Celenza’s, we can shift the focus of studies of invective from
moralizing conclusions about humanist character to a greater consideration of humanist
context. I contend that a more fruitful approach to reading invective is not to ask what it
tells us about the conduct or character of the authors but to ask what it tells us about the
experiences of the authors. I do not mean to argue that negative portrayals of Trebizond
or of invectives such as those exchanged between Poggio-Valla are necessarily incorrect.
To reduce our understanding of invective to a question of character assessments alone,
though, unnecessarily narrows the value of invectives as historical evidence. Such a focus
obscures the social realities that bound and compelled the composition of invective and
leads to depictions of scholars as somehow naturally temperamental or irritable. It also
obscures the fact that humanists were erudite men well-aware of classical models of
invective and capable of applying those models to the needs of contemporary,
26
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professional life. I turn back here to Celenza’s call to examine humanist social practices.
As he writes, “we cannot properly understand these seemingly exaggerated, immensely
vitriolic Renaissance polemics…unless we situate the debates…in the social, political
context of the acquisition, protection, and maintenance of masculine honor.” 27 The shift I
describe not only allows us to explore additional levels of meaning in invective texts but
also to reconsider how we view humanist authors, including Trebizond.
George of Trebizond is a particularly interesting case study to use to bring
together studies of anxiety and invective given his place in the existing scholarship. The
main source for his career is still John Monfasani’s impressive biography, published in
1976. Beyond this, scholars of Renaissance education and rhetoric have recognized the
significance of his RLV. 28 Although his major contributions have been acknowledged,
nobody has thoroughly analyzed his correspondence since Monfasani’s biography. This
is surprising considering that Trebizond spent most of his career in the orbit of significant
figures and attained renown and financial success. It is also surprising given the amount
of material Monfasani has made available regarding Trebizond’s career. Monfasani’s
Collectanea Trapezuntiana not only identifies the extant manuscripts and printed editions
of Trebizond’s letters and speeches but also provides edited texts for many of them. 29
Only a handful of works since Monfasani have studied Trebizond and most of them have
been interested in his place in the history of rhetoric. 30 The present study of Trebizond’s
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career not only provides entry into a discussion of humanist honor and the verbal
strategies of self-presentation but also takes up the investigation of a figure whom
scholars—since Monfasani—have examined in a limited manner and whose character has
been frequently derided.
Trebizond also offers the opportunity to expand the conversation about humanist
anxiety, honor, and social practices in new ways and thus is a useful complement to
existing studies of figures such as Lapo. Lapo, as Celenza and others have noted, is an
interesting example of an individual perpetually on the outside of lucrative patronage
networks looking in. 31 Trebizond’s career can in some ways take us farther than Lapo’s.
First, Trebizond’s feuds take us beyond the confines of the Roman curia of which Lapo
struggled so mightily to become a part. The dispute with Poggio began in the curia of
course, as both men were serving as apostolic secretaries, but continued despite
Trebizond’s departure to Naples and Poggio’s return to Florence in the spring of 1453.
Trebizond’s earlier feud with Guarino moreover occurred while Trebizond was in
Venice. Second, Trebizond’s disputes allow us to explore social practices and verbal
strategies at two distinctly different points in a humanist’s career and under very different
circumstances. While Lapo failed to achieve success in the curia and ultimately died
young, Trebizond both achieved financial success and renown and lived a much longer
life. His experiences were more varied and thus so were his verbal strategies. The contest
with Guarino in 1437 occurred relatively early in Trebizond’s career. To build a
reputation for himself, Trebizond had in his RLV criticized respected rhetorical
D’Ascia, “La Retorica di Giorgio da Trebisonda e L’umaneismo Ciceroniano,” Rinascimento 29 (1989):
193-216; Classen, 75-84; Lucia Calboli Montefusco, “Ciceronian and Hermogenean Influences on George
of Trebizond’s Rhetoricorum Libri V,” Rhetorica 26, no.2 (2008): 139-164.
31
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authorities, Guarino included. 32 The feud with Poggio was not about gaining honor but
about mitigating damage done to his reputation. At that point, Trebizond was no longer
an aspiring humanist but a successful one and his changing circumstances are certainly
reflected in the correspondence of the dispute. With Trebizond, then, we can examine not
just the strategies of an aspiring scholar but also of one who had won, lost, and was trying
to regain honor.
Sources
The source material for the present investigation is, first of all, the correspondence
and invectives written during the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio feuds. The
sources for Trebizond’s feud with Guarino consist of three main pieces composed in
March 1437. These compositions include the letter from Andreas Agaso to Paulus
Regius, Trebizond’s response to the Agaso letter addressed to Guarino, and the cover
letter Trebizond attached to his response and addressed to Leonello d’Este. 33 My analysis
of the Trebizond-Guarino feud relies on critical editions of the letters of Agaso and
Trebizond in Monfasani’s Collectanea Trapezuntiana. The Collectanea also includes a
list and discussion of the extant manuscripts that provides a sense of how they were
transmitted. Monfasani reports that Agaso’s letter appears alongside Trebizond’s
response in all but two of the manuscripts. It is notable that the correspondence of the
dispute was preserved together given the importance that Renaissance figures ascribed to
32
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collecting and circulating personal letters. 34 Indeed, the Trebizond-Guarino affair was a
public one. In the fall of 1437, approximately five months after Trebizond wrote his
response to Guarino, Poggio Bracciolini wrote a letter to Christopher Cauchus thanking
his friend for sending to him the Agaso letter and Trebizond’s response. 35 Poggio’s letter
attests to the public nature of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute, the manner in which the
texts of the feud circulated—hand to hand from friend to friend—and the speed by which
the texts were transmitted.
The correspondence of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute consists of five main pieces
written between 1453 and 1454. These include Trebizond’s letters to Poggio and
Nicholas V in January 1453, Poggio’s response to Trebizond in February, Trebizond’s
reply to Poggio in March, and a letter from Trebizond to his son Andreas in June 1454.
Each of these pieces fundamentally dealt with the chancery fight of May 1452. Ernst
Walser’s Poggius Florentinus contains Trebizond’s January letters to Poggio and to
Nicholas as well as Trebizond’s March reply to Poggio, though the letters have not been
edited. Poggio’s February response to Trebizond, also unedited, is in Thomas Tonelli’s
collection of Poggio’s correspondence. Monfasani provides Trebizond’s 1454 letter to
Andreas, based on the sole Renaissance copy, in his Collectanea. 36
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In addition to these sources, I also explore two additional invectives, the first
written by Guarino against Niccolò Niccoli in 1413, and the second written by Poggio
against Lorenzo Valla in 1452. These sources not only demonstrate how Trebizond’s
opponents expressed the same kind of anxiety regarding audience and reputation as he
did, but also show how they relied on the same verbal strategies to contest honor.
Guarino composed his invective against Niccoli, originally written as a letter to
Guarino’s friend Biagio Guasconi, in response to the alleged abuse he had suffered from
Niccoli while working with the man in Florence. He later revised his letter for a wider
circulation and titled it Against the Fake Poet [In auripellem poetam]. Guarino’s
invective is in Remigio Sabbadini’s collection of Guarino’s letters. 37 Poggio wrote four
invectives against Valla during their dispute between 1452 and 1453 in response to what
he claimed to be Valla’s attacks on his writing style. I analyze the first of these, available
in Poggio’s Opera and edited by Tonelli. 38
Chapter Outline
The present study is divided into four main chapters, each of which explores from
a different perspective how scholars used language to present themselves to humanist
readers, aggrandizing themselves while denigrating others, all in the pursuit of honor and
esteem in the humanist community. The first three chapters are devoted to analyses of the
specific concepts, language, and themes that framed Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and
Poggio. Chapter Two addresses anti-Greek slander and cultural stereotypes during the
37
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Trebizond-Guarino dispute and the challenges facing Greek émigrés in the West during
the early fifteenth century. Agaso composed a letter in 1437 notable for its frequent use
of anti-Greek language which he used to criticize Trebizond’s knowledge of the Latin
language and moral conduct. The chapter contends that Agaso’s anti-Greek slander was a
conscious verbal strategy based on classical and early modern Greek stereotypes and
intended to cast Trebizond as an incompetent, immoral Greekling. Trebizond believed
Guarino himself to have penned the Agaso letter and responded to him directly in a letter
of his own. He refuted “Agaso’s” anti-Greek language but engaged with Guarino using
the same oppositional categories—including eloquence and loquaciousness as well as
gravitas and levitas—contained in the Agaso letter. Trebizond used these categories as
Agaso had, to praise himself and vilify his opponent, Guarino.
Chapter Three is an analysis of the interrelated humanist concepts of reason and
restraint in the aftermath of Trebizond’s fist fight with Poggio in the papal chancery in
May 1452. Chapter Three argues that Trebizond’s correspondence from Naples reflects a
consistent effort to reframe the events in the chancery and present himself as having acted
reasonably and with restraint. A language of restraint was therefore the foundation of
Trebizond’s dispute with Poggio and of his attempts to mitigate the damage done to his
reputation. As with his earlier feud with Guarino, both Trebizond and Poggio employed
similar verbal strategies and categories to defend themselves and defame their opponent.
Trebizond and Poggio conducted their dispute by means of oppositional categories
including reason and emotion, prudence and imprudence, and honesty and dishonesty.
Both men demonstrated a concern for their reputations and how others viewed their
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actions, and both men strove to influence how their peers would view the chancery fight
and their relationship after that event.
Chapter Four considers both the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio
feuds as evidence for the humanist use of concepts of masculinity in acts of selfpresentation. The chapter argues that the humanist understanding of manhood, derived
from classical and medieval antecedents, considered reason as the identifying quality of
manhood and that humanists used gendered language to verbally emasculate their
opponents in the public eye. Gendered language was prominent in the insults exchanged
during both feuds and was used to advance characterizations of oneself as learned,
knowledgeable, prudent, honest, and restrained, as well as to denigrate one’s opponent as
unlearned, lacking eloquence, imprudent, dishonest, and emotional. The analysis of
Chapter Four, like that of Chapter Two, is organized around the two main avenues of
attack employed by the figures involved: insults involving either an opponent’s
knowledge or his moral conduct. Whether attacking an opponent’s learning or conduct,
humanists used categories related to gender to give shape and substance to their invective
and contrasted concepts of manhood with concepts of the child, woman, and beast.
The fifth and final chapter steps back from a deep thematic analysis of
Trebizond’s feuds to consider the vehicle for humanist self-presentation: invective. The
focus shifts to two additional feuds, Guarino’s dispute with Niccolò Niccoli in 1413 and
Poggio’s conflict with Valla between 1452 and 1453, adding analytical breadth to the
depth of the preceding chapters. In expanding beyond Trebizond’s feuds, the final chapter
contextualizes Trebizond’s experiences—his anxiety about public perception and
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reputation, his pursuit of honor, the strategies he used to achieve his goals and challenge
his adversaries—in the broader community of humanist scholars. Chapter Five argues
that invective was one of the primary modes of expression available to humanists for the
rhetorical presentation of self. Humanists understood invective to have discernible
guidelines and limitations, a sense of which they derived from the classical Latin
oratorical tradition and adapted to contemporary contests of honor. The chapter examines
some of the staples of invective—the concept of provocation, the standard sets of tropes
and issues humanists drew upon, and the use of wit and humor—that characterized the
genre. The chapter demonstrates that our understanding of invective and its authors is
best situated in a consideration of the socio-economic and professional stressors and
anxiety about reputation that defined humanist life in the Quattrocento.
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CHAPTER TWO
ANTI-GREEK LANGUAGE
AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
GEORGE OF TREBIZOND AND GUARINO OF VERONA
Introduction
The dispute between George of Trebizond and Guarino of Verona was a product
of the publication of Trebizond’s Rhetoricorum libri quinque (RLV), the first Renaissance
treatise on rhetoric, in 1434. In the preface, he lamented what he described as a severe
decline in the study of rhetoric and took aim at a host of medieval rhetorical authorities as
well as those who continued to teach them. His argument was not new. He had argued
much the same in a speech in Venice shortly before the publication of the RLV. In the
fifth book of his treatise, he offered explicit criticism of one current instructor when he
analyzed an encomium in praise of the condotierre Carmagnola. Guarino of Verona, one
of the foremost humanist schoolmen of the fifteenth century and one of Trebizond’s own
former Latin instructors, composed the encomium. Trebizond’s challenges to medieval
and Renaissance authorities, including Guarino, were very public attempts to better his
reputation as a rhetorical authority. In fact, he sent a copy of the RLV to Guarino himself.
In 1437, he came into possession of a letter circulating under the name Andreas Agaso
and addressed to Paulus Regius. Both men were supposedly students of Guarino. The
Agaso letter contained a stalwart defense of Guarino and a scathing criticism of the RLV,
especially Trebizond’s rhetorical knowledge and style. Trebizond responded within days
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with a letter addressed to Leonello d’Este, son of the Ferraran ruler and Guarino’s
student, which blamed Guarino for adopting the Agaso pseudonym and attacking him. 1
One of the most prominent features of the Agaso letter is the extent to which the
author expresses his arguments through anti-Greek language. Agaso criticizes
Trebizond’s knowledge of the Latin language and casts aspersions on his moral character
by employing an array of negative cultural stereotypes with roots in classical Roman as
well as contemporary thought. This chapter contends that Agaso’s anti-Greek language
was a deliberate verbal strategy crafted to contest honor and reputation. His attacks on
Trebizond as a Greek were attempts to undermine his authority as a rhetorician and
defend Guarino’s honor in a public manner by writing a letter he intended to be seen by
others. 2 These anti-Greek attacks were intended to define Trebizond as an incompetent
and immoral Greekling rather than as a skilled Latinist and reliable rhetorical authority.
Cultural stereotypes were so central to Agaso’s arguments that Trebizond was forced to
respond to them in his own letter to Guarino. Trebizond countered with his own acts of
self-presentation, defending both his Latinity—his skill and eloquence as a Latinist—and
his moral rectitude. He was as intent as Agaso in making his acts of self-presentation a
public matter, an intention perhaps nowhere more evident than in his cover letter to
Leonello d’Este, where Trebizond called upon the Ferraran patron to arrange a public
1

For the sources for the dispute see Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of
George of Trebizond, ed. John Monfasani (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies,
1984), 360-411. For Trebizond’s initial criticisms of Guarino in the RLV, see ibid., 360-364. For the letter
of Andreas Agaso to Paulus Regius, see ibid., 364-376. For Trebizond’s cover letter to Leonello d’Este and
the Responsio to Guarino, see ibid., 377-411.
2

The correspondence of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute was intended for and read by a public audience
beyond the recipients of the original letters. Monfasani notes that in all but two of the manuscripts of
Agaso’s letter, it accompanies Trebizond’s Responsio. The texts, after leaving their authors’s hands, were
copied, circulated, and read together. Trebizond’s interest in public opinion is evident in the revisions he
made both to Agaso’s letter and to his own Responsio. He was clearly interested in how the feud was
viewed by others. For a discussion of the existing manuscripts, see ibid., 364 and 377.
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oratorical exhibition between Guarino and himself to prove once and for all who was the
more eloquent man. 3 The Agaso letter and Trebizond’s Responsio to Guarino represented
competing attempts to sway public perception and persuade an audience composed of
fellow scholars and potential patrons.
An analysis of the anti-Greek language in this correspondence advances our
understanding of fifteenth-century humanism and the experience of Greek émigrés in
Italy. Such an analysis illustrates for instance the need for a reconsideration of the
traditional narrative of the experience of Greek scholars during the Renaissance. This
narrative focuses on how the west embraced Greeks and Greek learning in the first half of
the fifteenth century. It explains how the arrival of Manuel Chrysoloras (1355-1415) in
Florence in 1397 inspired Italians to an interest in Greek studies and sparked a wave of
philhellenism. John Monfasani describes how it was Chrysoloras’s pupils who “almost
immediately inaugurated the Renaissance absorption of the Byzantine rhetorical
tradition.” 4 Some of these men, most notably Francesco Filelfo and Guarino himself,
travelled to Constantinople for additional training. 5 This interest in Greek studies
expanded to include powerful Italian patrons, including the papacy. Fifteenth-century
Rome became a hub for Greek cultural activity, where émigrés such as Cardinal

3

Ibid., 379 (9). …si multis etatibus omissum pravitate morum et ignorantia declamandi usum, ut debes,
revocare cupis, me tibi dedo. Paratus adero quandocumque iusseris. Hortare Guarinum ad hoc tam
preclarum munus subeundum, quod apud maiores tanti fuit ut etiam seniores iam et defuncti non nunquam
honoribus oratores domi ad excitandum ingenium declamarent.
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John Monfasani, “The Byzantine Rhetorical Tradition and the Renaissance,” in Byzantine Scholars in
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the Italian Renaissance,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 100 (1956): 1-76. For a
succinct example of the narrative, see L.D. Reynolds and N.G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to
the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 146-154.

26

Bessarion facilitated the copying, translation, and transmission of Greek texts in Italy. A
substantial strain of existing scholarship focuses on identifying Greek scholars in Italy
and tracking their contributions to Italian humanism in an era actively cultivating
antiquarian interests. Deno Geanakoplos’s work on Byzantine scholars is representative
of this approach, as is John Monfasani’s, including his major biography of Trebizond. 6
Studies of Byzantine contributions have been invaluable in their own right, but
scholars have recently begun to look at some of the problems Greeks faced in Italy as
well. The result has been a growing realization that Byzantine experiences were more
complex than the traditional narrative suggests. Monfasani’s recent works are an
excellent example of this scholarly turn. He warns that merely listing the achievements of
émigré Greeks misleads us into believing that Byzantines “started” the Renaissance. He
does not deny the formative influence of Byzantines but notes that “despite all the
glamour that attaches to them today and despite the clear success some of them enjoyed,”
many struggled in Italy. 7 Others have noted these struggles as well and offered
qualifications or changes to the traditional narrative. James Hankins, in his work on
Renaissance crusading literature, suggests that Italian philhellenism was largely restricted
to intellectuals and elites and that the west received Greeks less favorably than humanist

6

John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1976) and Byzantine Scholars in Renaissance Italy. For Deno Geanakoplos, see his Greek Scholars in
Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to Western Europe (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in the
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University Press, 1976).
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John Monfasani, “Greek Renaissance Migrations,” Italian History and Culture 8 (2002): 5-7 and “The
Pro-Latin Apologetics of the Greek Émigrés to Quattrocento Italy,” in Byzantine Theology and its
Philosophical Background, ed. Antonio Rigo (Turnhout: Brepolis, 2011), 160.
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accounts indicate. 8 Jonathan Harris has also spoken about biases against Greeks in the
west but does not address how these biases functioned among intellectuals. 9 Some
scholars have discussed the increasing troubles that Greeks faced particularly in the
second half of the fifteenth century, as the number of Greek teachers increased and as
Latins became increasingly capable of teaching the language independent of Greeks. 10
Monfasani’s description of the “Latin chauvinism” of Angelo Poliziano is an example of
this, though he does not explore the implications of anti-Greek bias in detail. 11
Though scholars have begun to address the problems with the traditional
narrative, neither anti-Greek language nor the impact of Greek biases on fifteenth-century
humanism have received sufficient attention. The Trebizond-Guarino correspondence
demonstrates how anti-Greek attacks functioned prominently in contests of honor and
illustrates how Greek biases were evident even among Renaissance intellectuals at the
height of the philhellenic movement in the early fifteenth century. Even as scholars were
genuinely excited about a resurgence in Greek learning, Greeks faced barriers to
cultivating their reputation that their Italian counterparts did not. An Italy becoming open
to the study of Greek letters and an Italy with a pro-Latin bias were not mutually
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10

Paul Botley, Learning Greek in Western Europe, 1396-1529: Grammars, Lexica, and Classroom Texts
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2010), 115-116; Federica Ciccolella, Donati Graeci:
Learning Greek in the Renaissance (Boston: Brill, 2008), 121; Monfasani, “Migrations,” 11.

11

John Monfasani, “Angelo Poliziano, Aldo Manuzio, Theodore Gaza, George of Trebizond, and Chapter
90 of the Miscellaneorum Centuria Prima (with an Edition and Translation),” in Interpretations of
Renaissance Humanism, ed. Angelo Mazzoco (Boston: Brill, 2006), 243-265.

28

exclusive. The Agaso letter speaks to a pro-Latin bias in the culture of fifteenth-century
humanism. In challenging Trebizond’s Latinity, Agaso articulated a standard of
intellectual excellence rooted in the Latin language, not Greek. Agaso also employed
negative cultural stereotypes depicting Greeks as dishonest, treacherous, arrogant,
heretical, and devoid of honor. These stereotypes had roots in classical Roman thought as
well as in the history of crusading, attempts to unify the Greek and Roman churches, and
the tension between Latins and Greeks that developed over time because of these issues.
They also forced Trebizond to craft a presentation of himself that could counter Agaso’s
claims. His response illustrates the pressure he felt as a member of a minority to prove his
Latinity, defend his Greek heritage, and defend the value of Greek learning more broadly.
An analysis of anti-Greek language also allows us to understand better
Trebizond’s career. In his biography, Monfasani rightly argues that even as he struggled
to assimilate to life in Italy, Trebizond remained a Greek patriot. 12 Monfasani
emphasized Trebizond’s complex attitudes toward his homeland, and with good reason.
Trebizond frequently appears torn between his Latin and Greek identities in his response
to Guarino. Their correspondence allows us to advance Monfasani’s analysis by
understanding why a balance between Latin assimilation and Greek patriotism had to be
struck. Agaso’s vehement criticism of Trebizond’s Latinity makes clear how essential
proficiency in Latin was to a humanist’s reputation and identity. At the same time,
Trebizond’s Greek background afforded him opportunities among Italians interested in
the resurgence of Greek. It is notable that in defending the value of Greek to Guarino, he
makes the same arguments that fifteenth-century Italian philhellenes employed. To the
typical stresses associated with contesting honor and building a reputation, he had the
12

Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 128-130 and 139.
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added pressure of demonstrating the appropriate balance between his Greek background
and his Latinity. He could not afford to be cast as an incompetent Greekling but neither
could he simply accept wholesale the premise that Greeks were unlearned. The result is
that Trebizond is at times inconsistent, wavering between depictions of himself as a
Latinist so skilled he could be mistaken for a contemporary of Cicero, and as an ardent
defender of the Greek language struggling to help it attain a place of prominence on par
with Latin.
The Trebizond-Guarino correspondence also raises questions about Guarino
himself, although any conclusions here must be tentative. The authorship of the Agaso
letter is by no means clear. 13 Trebizond argued that nobody had ever heard of an
“Andreas Agaso,” and maintained even decades later that Guarino had written the letter.
Monfasani adds that nobody since then has managed to find Agaso, and that he, like
Trebizond, believes Guarino was the author. 14 At least one other Greek émigré,
Andronicus Contoblacas, suggested, in the middle of his own feud with the man years
later, that Guarino had written as Agaso. 15 The evidence to the contrary rests on the
13

The question of Agaso’s existence complicates a discussion of the texts of the Trebizond-Guarino
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testimony of Poggio Bracciolini. Poggio argued in September 1437 that the letter was not
written in Guarino’s style and that Guarino would have defended himself openly rather
than hiding behind a pseudonym or one of his students. 16 Poggio’s testimony was a point
of contention in his later feud with Trebizond but there was no evident animosity between
the two at this earlier date. There is no reason to doubt Poggio’s sincerity regarding the
Agaso letter.
Although there is ultimately no incontrovertible evidence identifying Agaso as
Guarino, the Agaso letter complicates the image of Guarino as a devoted philhellene.
Guarino’s philhellenic reputation is truly difficult to overstate, as is his role in the spread
of Greek learning. Chrysoloras, his Greek instructor, gave a major impetus to this
movement but wrote little. By 1417, Guarino had produced an abridged version of
Chrysoloras’s most notable piece, a manual on Greek inflections, which became one of
the standard Greek grammars of the fifteenth century. 17 If Guarino wrote the Agaso
letter, it serves as evidence that even one of the most renowned and ardent philhellenes of
the early fifteenth century employed anti-Greek language to undermine the credibility of
a Byzantine rival. Whether Guarino truly believed the stereotypes is a separate question.
He and Trebizond were both engaging in a process of self-fashioning that required them
to use a variety of rhetorical strategies to define themselves and each other. The Agaso
attacks may simply have been attempts to use stereotypes to appeal to existing pro-Latin,
anti-Greek biases. Even so, this interpretation is difficult to square with an image of
Guarino as the devoted student of Chrysoloras, as a man who ventured to Constantinople,
16
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and one who wrote extensively about the importance of Greek literature. If Guarino wrote
the letter, his anti-Greek attacks indicate limits to the acceptance of Byzantines in Italy,
even among those who supported the spread of Greek studies. If there really was an
Andreas Agaso, the question becomes why Guarino remained silent when Trebizond
wrote against him. He could simply have rejected his student’s attacks against
Trebizond’s Greekness. That he did not may indicate complicity. It could however
equally well indicate Guarino’s unwillingness to engage in a dispute with someone he
considered beneath him. For my part, I follow Monfasani in believing that Guarino wrote
the letter, and find compelling the question he raises: Why did Andreas Agaso not step
forward and prove Trebizond wrong about Guarino? 18 Moreover, I tend also to agree
with Trebizond’s assessment—and disagree with Poggio’s—that the Agaso letter bears
Guarino’s hallmarks, a point to which I will return throughout this chapter. Regardless of
the question of authorship, at the very least, the extensive use of anti-Greek language in
the Agaso letter indicates that Greek émigrés faced challenges even among intellectuals.
The structure of this chapter is derived from the two main types of attacks in the
Agaso letter, one against Trebizond’s knowledge of Latin and the other against his moral
character. In both cases, Agaso explains Trebizond’s flaws as a function of his
Greekness. The first argument relies on ancient Roman stereotypes of the Greek as
ineptus and loquax to characterize Trebizond as ignorant of the Latin language and
incapable of understanding the art of speaking, much less of teaching it to others. These
characterizations are primarily framed as challenges to Trebizond’s Latinity and are the
subject of the first part of the present analysis. The second argument and the second part
of the present analysis consist of Agaso’s challenges to Trebizond’s moral conduct.
18

Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 30-31.

32

Agaso relies on the classical Roman distinction between Roman gravitas and Greek
levitas to cast Trebizond as audacious, arrogant, ungrateful, and shameless. The two
arguments—against knowledge and moral conduct—are not mutually exclusive, as when
Agaso argues that Trebizond’s faulty teachings and attacks on learned authorities are
signs of both his ignorance and arrogance. I divide my treatment of these two kinds of
arguments for the sake of clarity, but point to areas where they overlap as well. At its
heart, I offer an analysis of concepts of Greekness and how they serve as the foundation
for anti-Greek attacks in this contest of honor. Given the debt Agaso and Trebizond owe
to the classical Roman discussion of Greeks, I begin with a discussion of the models from
which they drew.
The Classical Roman Precedent
In casting Trebizond as an ignorant and immoral Greekling, Agaso was taking
part in a very old conversation about the differences between Latins and Greeks, one in
which a number of Roman authors of the late Republic and empire engaged. 19 Many of
Agaso’s more explicit anti-Greek attacks rely on Cicero. 20 His works are a useful lens
through which to understand the classical Roman conception of Greekness, which could
at times be decidedly negative. The De oratore, for instance, describes Greeks as ineptus
and loquax. The former suggests a lack of tact or impertinence while the latter indicates a
19
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concern with argumentation rather than truth, with loquaciousness, not eloquence. 21
Cicero has Crassus describe the Greeks thus in discussing Plato’s Gorgias, noting, “in
fact controversy about a word has long tormented those Greeklings, fonder as they are of
argument than of truth.” 22 He maintains this position when Sulpicius asks him whether
there is an art of oratory: “Do you think I am some idle talkative [loquax] Greekling that
you propound to me a petty question on which to talk as I will?” Mucius replies by
contrasting loquaciousness with eloquence: “It is for you, Crassus, to comply with the
wishes of young men, who do not want the everyday chatter [loquacitas] of some
unpracticed Greek…but something from the wisest and most eloquent man in the
world.” 23 In the second book of the dialogue, Catulus describes the ineptus man as
someone who “fails to realize the demands of the occasion, or talks too much, or
advertises himself, or ignores the prestige or convenience of those with whom he has to
deal, or, in short, is in any way awkward or tedious.” He then relates this to the entire
“Greek nation,” which
with all its learning, abounds in this fault…but, of all the countless forms assumed
by want of tact, I rather think that the grossest is the Greeks’ habit, in any place
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and any company they like, of plunging into the most subtle dialectic concerning
subjects that present extreme difficulty, or at any rate do not call for discussion. 24
Whatever Cicero’s own opinion on the matter, his dialogue suggests that for at least some
Romans, Greek learning was characterized by a combination of loquaciousness—
certainly not eloquence—and ineptia.
Loquacitas and ineptia also served as signs of Greek arrogance in Cicero’s
works. Some argued that by claiming to know more than they do and by speaking
endlessly about all issues, Greeks overreached themselves. In De oratore, Catulus
articulates the connection between loquaciousness and arrogance when he asks: “What
can be more arrogant [arrogans], more loquacious [loquax]…than for a Greek, who has
never seen a foeman or a camp…to lecture on military matters to Hannibal?” 25 In his
defense of Flaccus, Cicero takes aim at the alleged levitas of the Greek witnesses and
accusers. 26 He refers to them as impudent, unlettered, and leves, and speaks about the
levitas and crudelitas of the Greeks as a people. 27 Cicero makes clear their lack of
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gravitas, thus establishing a contrast between levitas and gravitas and linking both to
honor. 28 In this context, levitas indicates actions or individuals lacking dignity. It readily
encompasses concepts such as arrogance, selfishness, shamelessness, or
presumptuousness. 29 Cicero offers Heraclides, whom he describes as utterly without
honor, as a specific example of Greek levitas. He borrowed money on the endorsement of
a good and honest man, Hermippus, secretly left Rome “after cheating many persons out
of small loans,” later lied and claimed he had repaid the money, and then lied again about
the loan at trial, where he “heaped all sorts of insults and curses on Hermippus.” 30 Not
only does Cicero portray Heraclides as a selfish liar and characterize him as audax and
loquax, he contrasts him with Hermippus, a pudens and optimus vir. Cicero’s application
of the concept of levitas suggests that the levis Graecus homo was as much a classical
stereotype as the ineptus or loquax Graecus homo.
Despite the negative depiction of Greeks in the passages above, Cicero’s
treatment of Greeks was by no means wholly negative. This is even the case in the Pro
Flacco. The severity of Cicero’s treatment of Greek morality in that speech is largely a
function of the Greek witnesses and accusers at the trial. This becomes clear when Cicero
describes himself as “not unsympathetic to that race” and notes that there are among the
Greeks “many honorable [bonus], learned [doctus], [and] modest [pudens] men.” Cicero

hominibus levitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris civem ac supplicem vestrum dederetis, ne periculosam
imitationem exempli reliquis in posterum proderetis; Cic., Flac. 61. liceat mihi potius de levitate
Graecorum queri quam de crudelitate… .
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does not count the Greek witnesses and accusers at Flaccus’s trial among them, however.
He praises Greek learning by stating, “I grant them literature, I grant them a knowledge
of many arts, I do not deny the charm of their speech, the keenness of their intellects, the
richness of their diction.” He adds, however, that Greeks lack “truth and honour in giving
testimony,” an understandable position given his role defending Flaccus against Greek
witnesses and accusers. 31 Cicero is generally positive about Greek learning even if he is
less glowing in his estimation of Greek conduct. The same is true when he pauses to
consider Athens, “where men think humanity, learning, religion, grain, rights, and laws
were born, and whence they were spread through all the earth.” The chronological
distinction allows Cicero to praise Greek learning and past contributions to the arts while
setting aside present-day Greek arrogance, loquaciousness, and the like. The narrative
that emerges—a model of the degradation of Greek culture over time—is of an older
Greece with something to offer contemporary Rome. 32 It suggests that over time Greek
learning had declined and Greek men had become prone to vice. Even so, the memory of
Athens retained “such renown that the now shattered and weakened name of Greece is
supported by the reputation of this city.” 33 Cicero was not alone in struggling to
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multi impudentes, illiterati, leves, quos variis de causis video concitatos. Verum tamen hoc dico de toto
genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem,
ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam, denique etiam, si qua sibi alia sumunt non repugno…
Sutton translates pudens as “wise” but “modest” is more appropriate given the impudens that
follows and the discussion about the Greek lack of honor in giving testimony.
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The term “degradation model” is my own means of conveying Cicero’s complex views regarding Greece.
I refer to the fifteenth-century use of the degradation model below, pages 63-66 specifically as a strategy of
Trebizond’s to defend Greece and Greek scholars.
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Cic., Flac. 62-64.
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appropriate Greek culture, nor was he alone in articulating anti-Greek stereotypes even as
he acknowledged the contributions of Greeks to the arts. 34
Cicero’s description of Greeks illustrates the complexities of the Roman concept
of Greekness. That concept established a precedent for the linguistic strategies fifteenthcentury scholars employed to characterize the Byzantine émigrés of their own day. Agaso
drew extensively from these ideas in his 1437 letter to Paulus Regius to construct his
presentation of Trebizond, his Latinity, and the RLV.
Latinity Challenged: Ineptia, Loquentia, et Arrogantia
The Trebizond depicted in the Agaso letter is the prototypical ineptus, loquax,
arrogans Graeculus of Cicero. Agaso condemns the Cretan’s understanding of Latin,
knowledge of rhetorical authorities, and the precepts and style in the RLV. In the process,
he characterizes Trebizond as arrogant in believing himself an expert in subjects he does
not understand and shameless in his criticisms of truly learned authorities past and
present. Agaso’s purpose is to undermine Trebizond’s credibility, a goal he makes clear
from the beginning of his letter to Regius by explaining how he is sending his friend a
work, Trebizond’s RLV, “suitable only for either your derision or vexation, more stinking
of chattering loquaciousness than eloquence.” The opening passages of Agaso’s letter
introduce the main aspects of his portrayal of Trebizond and offer a concise overview of
the arguments he unfolds throughout. 35 He adds how “absurd and most shameful to Latin
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On the Hellenization of Rome and anti-Greek stereotypes see Momigliano, 16-21; Spawforth, 3-18;
Elizabeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1985), 7-13; and Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2011), 1-4, 344-345, 357.
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Whether Agaso and Regius truly existed, the Agaso letter accurately depicts how humanists spread
texts—here, Trebizond’s RLV—and discussed them by means of their correspondence. Texts were
exchanged hand to hand and circulated among friends, who made copies of their own. For an additional
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studies it is to receive instruction in speaking Latin from a Greek,” who scarcely knows
how to speak Greek and knows Latin even less well. 36 Trebizond’s ignorance, Agaso
continues, is no obstacle to either his arrogance or shamelessness. “This man,” he
explains, “stupid, impertinent, and without honor” wrote “an altogether vulgar
introduction” lamenting the collapse of oratory, criticizing medieval commentators, and
promising to revive and sustain eloquence himself. 37 Agaso contends that eloquence is
more than sufficiently sustained by a host of erudite men among whom Trebizond, an
indecorous man, does not “blush to thrust his nose.” 38 Agaso leans heavily on the
classical Roman concept of Greeks in these passages. He characterizes Trebizond as
loquacious rather than eloquent and as a man lacking in honor, and implies his arrogance

example, see note 89 and Leonardo Bruni’s request of Guarino during the controversy surrounding Lorenzo
da Monachi in 1416.
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Collectanea, 364-365. (1) Tuorum nequaquam mandatorum oblitus…Nihil adhuc quod nostra magnopere
studia postulent comperi cum aut vulgaria sint aut illis abundes. Ne tamen vacuam et inanem sumpsisse
legationem videar, aliquid quo iocari aut subirasci liceat audias interim faxo. (2) Unum enim tuo vel
cachinno vel stomacho dignum opus in manus incidit, cazambanicam redolens loquacitatem verius quam
eloquentiam, quo cum auctor Greculus Latinis dicendi rationem aperire profiteatur (est enim De rhetorica
liber inscriptus). Ita egregie, vel e grege potius, disserit ut tam facile ei Latine sciendi consuetudinem
ademeris quam eloquentie peritiam denegaris. Non dicam quam absurdum sit et Latinis studiis turpissimum
ab Greco Latine dicendi rationem accipere, qui vix Grece, male autem Latine sciat.
Monfasani speculates that “Cazambanica is an adjective, perhaps related to gazza (in Italian, a
“female chatterbox”), or to cazabàn, a river in Crete.” Ibid., 372.
37

Ibid., 365. (3) Ceterum prohemium tractandis de artis preceptis insulsus homo atque ineptus nulla cum
dignitate, vulgare ferme, premittit, in quo, cum eloquentiam et eius facultatis libros hisce temporibus
fugisse ac cecidisse deploret, eam restituere ac fulcire promittit, presertim cum Alanos Bertolinosque
nimium vigere in pretioque esse queratur et accuset. Evas columbas, Prosperos, Chartulas annumerare
videtur, oblitus quibus adducere poterat et Bononie natos, Ethiopum terras, Fabasque Guidones. Sed enim
incautus homo id non accusat quod est accusandum.
Monfasani explains how “Agaso is listing the standard texts of the medieval Italian curriculum
in Latin and the greatest authorities in medieval rhetoric.” He identifies “Evas columbas” as the incipit of
the Dittochaeon of Prudentius, attributes ‘Prosperos’ to Prosper of Aquitaine, and notes “Chartulas” as the
opening of the Carmen de contemptu mundi, “Ethiopum terras” as the beginning of Theodulus’s Ecloga,
“Bononie natos” as the opening words of the ars dictaminis of Giovanni di Bonandrea, and Guido Faba,
“the most famous of the Bolognese dictatores.” Ibid., 373. See also Grendler, 116 and 123.

38

Collectanea, 366. (7) Tamen inter tantos artis scriptores doctissimosque viventes nasum ingerere
importunus homo non erubuit, Aristotelem imitatus, qui cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloria, dicere
etiam cepit adolescentes docere et prudentiam cum eloquentia iungere.
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by casting him as indecorous in his attacks on learned men. Each of these
characterizations is furthermore intended to demonstrate the “absurdity” of accepting
instruction from a Greek man lacking knowledge of the Latin language.
Agaso’s continued reliance on classical stereotypes is evident as he outlines what
he proclaims to be the foolish principles in the RLV, which he explains as functions of the
author’s background as an ineptus and arrogans Greekling more interested in fame than
truth. He criticizes, for example, Trebizond’s definition of demonstrative oratory as a
“genre assigned to the praise or blame of a particular person.” “That much,” he explains,
is “the complete and pure definition of Cicero. But this is not enough for this particular
magister. He added, so foolishly and stupidly, ‘cum amplificatione.’” The addition,
Agaso argues, was solely so Trebizond might appear to have contributed something of his
own. 39 Agaso likewise criticizes Trebizond’s classification of four parts of an oration as
opposed to six, “contrary to every authority ancient and subsequent.” He labels Trebizond
a sciolus of the Latin language, one whose knowledge is pretentious and superficial, and
cites Cicero to brand him as one of “those Greeklings, fonder of argument than truth.” 40
This is a common refrain. Elsewhere, he accuses Trebizond of foolishly blurting out, no
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Ibid., 366. (9) Mox desumpto in manus codice, artis precepta percurrenti quot occurrunt ineptie! Verbi
gratia: “demonstrativum genus est,” inquit, “quod tribuitur in alicuius certe persone laudem vel
vituperationem.” Hactenus Ciceronis absoluta et integra diffinitio est. Verum ea huic ipsi magistro non satis
est. Adiecit quam insipienter et insipide: “cum amplificatione”…(10) Hic itidem, ne Ciceronis credatur
assertio et aliquid sui videatur afferre, etiam recta premutans, “cum amplificatione” supplevit. Cf. Rhet.
Her. 1.2.
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Collectanea, 366-367. (11) Inde non longe post Neptunius hic magister inventionem divisurus contra
veterum omnium et posterorum auctoritatem atque sententiam, quattuor tantum partes enumerat, cum sex
esse nemo sanus eat inficias. Sic enim partitur in exordium, narrationem, contentionem, et perorationem.
Primum quidem non mediocri vitio conflictatur is qui genus aliquid divisurus in species, in genus potius
speciemque partitur, ut si quis dicat: animalia quedam aquatilia sunt, nonnulla terrestria, alia corpus esse
constat, cum et hic divisionem, confirmationem et confutationem contentionis esse velit tres unius loci
partes. (12) Deinde Latine lingue sciolus parum advertit contentionem, etsi aliud alias, controversiam vel
causam vel concertationem appellari, quomodo in Oratore usus est Tullius: “omnem esse contentionem
inter homines doctos in verbi controversia positam et Greculos magis contentionis cupidos quam veritatis.”
Cf. Cic., De or. 1.47.
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less shamelessly than unwisely, hundreds of things contrary to the custom of the most
learned men. He characterizes Trebizond as ignorant of these authorities, brilliant authors
of whom he is a mere copyist. 41 He explains that Trebizond’s arrogance leads him to
attack these men in pursuit of his own glory. Trebizond is a “public censor” who,
refusing to spare anything “to claim for himself from the unlearned a bit of glory,”
censures Quintilian, “a most learned rhetor and orator.” 42 The end result is a portrayal of
Trebizond as a tyrant, an “unskilled and ineptus [man] who thinks nothing correct except
what he himself made.” 43
Agaso counts Guarino as one of the learned authorities whom Trebizond unjustly
attacks. 44 His discussion of the two men presents further evidence of Trebizond’s lack of
Latinity—as well as his lack of honor—by contrasting Trebizond’s loquacity with
Guarino’s eloquence. The distinction follows the classical model and throws into relief
some of Agaso’s implicit anti-Greek attacks. Despite Guarino’s ornate words and sweet
style, he explains, Trebizond wrongly attacks the smallest things. 45 He was wrong, for
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Collectanea, 366. (6) Sin in tanta dicendi copia, doctrina ordine, subtilitate, dulcedine tam preclara
negliguntur auctores, a quibus librarius ipse, si que eruditius ab eo dicta sunt, cuncta transcripsit verius
quam excogitavit, quis sua legere volet? I take the description of Trebizond as a copyist as evidence of antiGreek language. See pages 52-55 below.
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Collectanea, 367. (16) Dein, ne ullis parcat huius publici lingua censoris et ab imperitis gloriolam
aucupetur, Quintiliano, doctissimo et rhetori et oratori, turpes ignorationis notas conatur iniicere ut sibi
decus intercipiat. Quintilianus ab ironia Ciceronem pro Q. Ligarii defensione exordium sumpsisse ait, quod
hic noster negat, maleque sensisse Quintilianum Diogenes ipse iactat, quamquam et Martianum et alios
peritissimos viros Quintiliano adstipulari certum sit. Cf. Quint., Inst. 4.1.38-39.
43

Collectanea, 371. (33) Homine enim imperito et inepto nunquam quicquam iniustius est, qui nisi quod
ipse fecit nil rectum putat.
44

Ibid., 368. (19) Cernere est sexcenta que sibi fingit in somnia queque contra doctissimorum veterum
usum et auctoritatem impudenter non minus quam imprudenter effutit. Hec tibi eam ob causam dixerim ut
equo patiaris animo quia Guarino, preceptori nostro, eodem in libro non parcit, harum omnium rerum
ignaro et, quod indignius est, hunc talem collaudanti.
45

Ibid., 369. (25) “Nam que illius carpende orationis ratio extitit in Franciscum Carmegnolam edite
amplissima cum senatus Veneti gloria, que satis pro dignitate laudari non potest? Ornatissima verba, idonea
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instance, to argue Guarino ought to have used scribentium in his encomium rather than
scriptorum. 46 Agaso cites Livy as evidence of the correctness of Guarino’s usage and
adds a further example “lest our Lycurgus or Minos of the Latin language suppose this
was said here by chance rather than deliberate choice.” Indeed, Agaso offers a variety of
examples—from Cicero’s Ad Herennium and Pro Archia, Servius’ Georgics, Virgil, and
Nonius Marcellus—to prove Trebizond wrong. 47 His appeal to these authorities is
intended to demonstrate Trebizond’s ignorance, but it also reinforces the difference
between a man who chatters on about things he does not understand and Guarino, whose
style is sweet and well informed.
Agaso’s anti-Greek language is explicit when he names Trebizond as the author
of the criticisms against Guarino. The passage appears roughly half way through his
letter, before which point he had referred to Trebizond only as a “Greekling author,” a
rhetorical slight suggesting Trebizond’s name was not worth mentioning. When Agaso
finally names Trebizond, he does so via his Greek origins. Noting that Trebizond hailed
from Crete, he adds that he will forego personally commenting on the “men of this island
sententiarum frequentia, stilus perquam suavis, enucleatus ad rem atque personam virtutum numerus et
ordo, quamquam inexpertus homo Trapezuntius minima carpat, araneas imitatus que muscis aucupandis
inhiant.
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For Trebizond’s initial comment in the RLV, see ibid., 363. (8) Cur etiam “scribentium,” non
“scriptorum” dixerit non intelligo, nisi quod timidum in dicendo hominem, ne a “scripto” “scriptorum”
dicere videretur, inscitia deterruit. Sed hec infinita sunt atque idcirco pretermittenda.
47

Ibid., 370. (27) Et, ne noster hic lingue Latine Lycurgus aut Minos dictum hoc fortuito potius quam
iudicio censeat, legat et Livium primo de secundo bello Punico: ‘neque ulla, que in tali re memorabilis
scribentibus videri solet, pretermissa clades est,’ scribentibus, non scriptoribus dixit…(28) Et quoniam
pervicaces non facile cedere solent nisi multis obruantur exemplis, legisse debet apud Ciceronem ad
Herennium: ‘inimicorum persequentissimum,’ non persecutorem; et in oratione Pro Archia: ‘populus enim
Romanus aperuit Lucullo imperante Pontum,’ potius quam Lucullo imperatore. (29) Accedit et Servius,
non minus rhetor facundus quam grammaticus eruditus, qui in tertio Georgicorum commento: ‘scimus,’
inquit, ‘esse concessum scribentibus ut iteratione prohemii legentium reficiant interdum laborem,’ magis
quam scriptoribus et lectorum, ut magister imperat Trapezuntius Num Iuvenalis quoque: ‘culpa docentis
scilicet arguitur,’ magis quam doctoris; Ovidius: ‘primi vidistis amantes,’ non amatores; Virgilius: ‘et
amans et femina Dido;’ utque Trapezuntio familiarius inducatur exemplum: ‘quinque greges illi balantum,’
non balantricum. Non. Marcellus, ‘venantium telum,’ non venatorum esse declaravit?
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and their character, lest I appear to revile the learning of the man.” Instead, he cites Paul:
“A Cretan is a liar, an evil beast, slothful, and a glutton.” 48 Agaso casts Trebizond’s
attacks here as typical of his culture, an argument to which he returns shortly while
discussing again his ineptia and loquentia. Accusing Trebizond of rendering Cicero
“rough and unrefined,” all the while “knowing less of Latin,” Agaso comments that the
man is surely aware of Cicero’s warning to Quintus regarding “shameless Greeklings like
him”:
And even among the Greeks themselves you must be on your guard against
admitting close intimacies, except in the case of the very few, if such are to be
found, who are worthy of ancient Greece. As things now stand, indeed, too many
of them are untrustworthy, false, and schooled by long servitude in the arts of
extravagant adulation. My advice is that these men should all be entertained with
courtesy, but that close ties of hospitality or friendship should only be formed
with the best of them: excessive intimacies with them are not very trustworthy—
for they do not venture to oppose our wishes—and they are not only jealous of
our countrymen, but of their own as well. 49
Agaso makes explicit here what he implies elsewhere, and by citing Cicero he makes
clear his debt to the classical Roman model for anti-Greek sentiment. Trebizond, like the
Greeks Cicero describes, is untrustworthy, boastful, shameless, and interested more in
argument than in truth.
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Ibid., 368. (19) Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat homines? E Creta dudum
advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. (20) De cuius insule hominibus et eorum ingenio tacebo ipse, ne
homini litterato conviciari videar, sed beatum Paulum audies, qui acceptum ab vetusto poeta versum
hexametrum de illis breviter explicat: “Cretensis mendax, mala bestia, segnis, et alvus.” Cf. Titus 1:12.
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Collectanea, 370. (27) “Infortunatum Ciceronem qui non hec in tempora reservatus es ut Trapezuntius te
rudem et impolitum expoliret ac doceret minus Latine scientem, qui tuis in Tusculanis nescio quo pacto
effunderis, ‘itaque industrios homines illi studiosos vel potius amantes doloris appellant, qui amatores
dicere formidasti, quamquam haud sciam te ne docturus esset! Non enim ignorat quam improbis suique
similibus Greculis gravis homo semper obstiteris. (28) Meminit nanque ad Q. fratrem te ita scripsisse:
‘atque etiam e Grecis ipsis diligenter cavende sunt familiaritates preter hominum perpaucorum, si qui sunt
vetere Grecia digni. Sic vero fallaces sunt permulti et leves et diuturna servitute ad nimiam assentationem
eruditi. Nimie familiaritates eorum neque tam fideles sunt (non enim audent adversari nostris voluntatibus)
et vero invident non nostris solum verum etiam suis.’” Cf. Cic., Q. Fr. 1.16. For the preceding text, see note
47.
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The characterizations Agaso outlines lead him to argue that Trebizond is unfit to
instruct anyone in the study of rhetoric. It is an assertion with significant implications.
There is too often a tendency in reading humanist invective to consider such attacks petty
or meaningless. Humanist strategies to cultivate honor could have significant
consequences and Agaso indicates the implications of his criticisms when he argues that
Trebizond is likely to leave his students less knowledgeable—“dumber by half”—for
having had him as their instructor. He suggests instead that Trebizond should be removed
from teaching and that his salary should be “vomited back up again.” The precedent had
already been set, he explains, years earlier when Trebizond had taught in Vicenza. During
that time, he furnished his pupils “with stories and foolishness” and was cast out of the
city. 50 Whether this is true is unknown. Trebizond did leave his position in Vicenza in
1428 and later blamed Guarino for driving him out. 51 Whether the assertion was true or
not, Agaso’s letter suggests the very real implications of these contests. Agaso not only
defends Guarino but questions Trebizond’s aptitude for instructing patrician youths, a
main source of income for humanists.
Agaso’s comment on Trebizond’s aptitude as an instructor is also an allusion to
a figure who, in the Pro Flacco, epitomizes the ineptus and loquax Greek: Heraclides. 52
Monfasani does not cite the reference, but the parallels are clear and amplify Agaso’s
preceding characterizations of Trebizond. Heraclides was “the chief man instigating all
50

Collectanea, 367. (15) Eat igitur Greculus ipse, et discipulus esse discat qui magister esse nescit.
Alioquin dimidio stultiores redditurus est discipulos quam accepit. Et intercepta salaria revomenda; Ibid.,
368. (20) Hic est qui aliquot ante annis Vicentiam, oppidum vetus ac nobile, publico salario conductus,
dum fabulis iuventutem implet et ineptiis, explosus et exibilatus est.
51

Ibid., 405. (102) Explosum me quondam e Vincentia exibilatumque dicis. Tua opera qui me vicinum
nolebas.
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Cic., Flac. 42-49. Rawson cites Heraclides as an example of how easy it was “to stir up distrust of a
Greek rhetor in the courts.” Rawson, 77.
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the Greeks” against Flaccus. Cicero describes him as ineptus et loquax, eager for
recognition [ambitiosus], and later, both audax and again loquax. He was a rhetor and
teacher who was overly confident of his learning and who “claimed he could teach others
the art of speaking.” 53 Cicero also describes Heraclides as one accused and convicted of
numerous charges, including his slander of Hermippus. 54 Heraclides was for Agaso the
perfect figure to signify Greek loquacity, arrogance, and abuse. Like Cicero’s description
of Heraclides, Agaso portrays Trebizond as ineptus and loquax. Like Heraclides,
Trebizond arrogantly believes himself capable of teaching the art of speaking. Both men
are eager for recognition and Agaso cites Trebizond’s pursuit of glory as the reason he
attacks authorities such as Quintilian. 55 That Agaso intended his comment regarding
Trebizond’s instruction as an allusion to Heraclides is evident in that he quotes Cicero’s
descriptions almost verbatim. Despite his criticisms of Heraclides’s abilities, Cicero
acknowledges that “this professor of oratory did have some rich young pupils, whom he
made dumber by half than when he had taken them.” 56 Trebizond too has some wealthy
pupils, as Agaso makes clear. When he calls for Trebizond to be removed from his
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Cic., Flac. 42. Caput est omnium Graecorum concitandorum, qui cum accusatoribus sedet, Heraclides
ille Temnites, homo ineptus et loquax, sed ut sibi videtur, ita doctus ut etiam magistrum illorum se esse
dicat. At, qui ita sit ambitiosus ut omnis vos nosque cotidie persalutet, Temni usque ad illam aetatem in
senatum venire non potuit et qui se artem dicendi traditurum etiam ceteris profiteatur, ipse omnibus
turpissimis iudiciis victus est; Cic., Flac. 48. Sed cum se homo volubilis quadam praecipiti celeritate
dicendi in illa oratione iactaret, repente testimoniis Fufiorum nominibusque recitatis homo audacissimus
pertimuit, loquacissimus obmutuit.
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For the abuse of Hermippus, see page 36 above.
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For Agaso’s discussion of Trebizond as ineptus and loquax, his criticisms of Trebizond’s claims that he
can teach the art of speaking, and his characterization of Trebizond’s pursuit of glory see pages 38-41.
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I retain Sutton’s translation in the first part of the sentence but offer my own translation of the latter part
to make clear how Agaso’s criticism of Trebizond parallels Cicero’s characterization of Heraclides. Cic.,
Flac. 47. Habebat enim rhetor iste adulescentis quosdam locupletis, quos dimidio redderet stultiores quam
acceperat…
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teaching position to avoid rendering his students “dumber by half,” it is to Heraclides, the
quintessential ineptus, loquax, and arrogans Greek that Agaso alludes.
Agaso uses the Heraclides allusion as a cautionary tale that fifteenth-century
pedagogues would have understood well. His suggestion that Trebizond should have his
salary revoked and his discussion of the expulsion from Vicenza reflect the seriousness
with which humanist educators viewed poor instructors who greatly complicated the
learning process. Guarino himself accepted this premise. Battista Guarino (1434-1513),
Guarino’s son, penned an educational treatise he describes as “the program of teaching
and the precepts of study which my father, who was as learned as he was excellent…used
to teach his pupils.” 57 His arguments can be understood as indicative of his father’s
program of study. Quoting the Pro Flacco, Battista Guarino argues “it is of capital
importance not to hand over beginning pupils to coarse and uneducated teachers. For the
pupils of such men as Cicero says, return ‘dumber by half’ than when they left.” The
danger lay not only in leading students astray but also in the effort required to undo the
damage done by an unlearned teacher. 58 Similarly, Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444) also
argued for the importance of youths becoming “accustomed to the best” teachers from the
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This and all subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of the treatises in Kallendorf’s edited
collection, I cite the section numbers provided by Kallendorf. Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et
studendi, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf, in Humanist Educational Treatises (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39.
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Ibid., 4. In primis autem id cavendum erit ne rudibus et indoctis ab initio praeceptoribus tradantur
erudiendi, a quibus illud Ciceronis consequantur, ut ‘dimidio stultiores,’ redeant quam accesserint. Ut enim
tempus taceam quid amittunt: efficitur profecto illud Timoethei musici, ut postea duplex suscipiendus sit
labor: alter quo ea quae didicerunt oblivioni tradant—quid sane difficillimum…alter, ut ad meliores
praeceptiones evehantur, quod etiam eo tardius fit, quo in prioribus illis obliterandis necesse est operam
tempusque consumere. Kallendorf notes the references to Cic., Flac. 47 and to Quint., Inst. 2.3.2-3.
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beginning. He explained that if “they imbibe any errors, twice as much time will be
needed: to shake out errors, and then to inculcate true precepts.” 59
The Agaso letter defined the terms of the conflict between the two men.
Trebizond’s task in his response to Guarino was to answer the challenges laid at his feet.
This meant addressing the accusations regarding his learning and Latinity as well as the
resultant claims regarding his aptitude as an instructor and authority of rhetoric. It also
meant grappling with the anti-Greek language Agaso used and the stereotypes that
informed that language.
Latinity Defended
Trebizond’s 1437 Responsio to Guarino was his chance to construct an alternative
definition of himself to counter Agaso’s characterization of him as an ineptus, loquax,
arrogans Graeculus. To do so he had to demonstrate a mastery of Latin and prove his
Latinity. That the majority of his effort was spent defending his Latinity indicates how
important he considered that strategy to his self-presentation. He struggled with Agaso’s
labels and his response illustrates the pressure he felt as a Greek to establish his Latin
bona fides. To that end, he directly engaged Agaso on the technical arguments Agaso had
raised against him, much as Agaso had considered Trebizond’s specific criticisms of
Guarino. A few examples suffice to demonstrate this. To the accusation that in lamenting
the collapse of rhetorical study he had disparaged a host of venerated authors, Trebizond
makes a distinction between speaking with the art and speaking about the art. True, he
acknowledges, the authors Agaso cites are examples of good rhetorical practice, but they
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Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist
Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 49. Ergo si melioribus initio assueverint, illos habebunt praecipuos
et veluti ducibus semper utentur. Sin vero errores ullos imbiberint, his duplici tempore opus erit, primum ut
errores excutiant, ac deinde ut vera praecepta condiscant.
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contributed nothing to a discussion of the art itself. 60 In response to Agaso’s criticisms of
his grammatical usage, he recalls Guarino’s previous feud with Poggio regarding Caesar
and Scipio. Here, Trebizond mocks Guarino’s misinterpretation of Livy and likens his
comprehension of the text and his ability to discuss it to that of a student. 61 To Agaso’s
complaint that he identifies four rather than six parts of an oration, Trebizond explains
that Cicero himself eventually rejected the six-part scheme laid out in De oratore in favor
of four parts. 62 In each case, Trebizond’s efforts serve dual purposes, to undermine
Guarino’s claims of knowledge while making clear his own skill as a Latinist.
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Collectanea, 383. (9) Cum autem nobis in illis libris, ut orationes declamationesque maiorum intelligere
ac imitari valeamus, non ex arte, sed de arte dicere propositum sit, que duo inter se adeo differre asserit
Cicero ut multi de arte bene, nihil ex arte dicere potuerint, cur tu Isocratem ac Demosthenem, quos nihil de
arte scripsisse constat, nobis obiicis? Aut cur declamationes nescio cuius orationesque Ciceronis, que nobis
multa huius artifcii ornamenta perperunt, in medium profers?...(10) Tu ipse fateris Ciceronem sua
retractasse quoniam adolescenti vel “inchoata vel rudia exciderunt.” Itaque fit ut nisi ad Grecos refugias,
nihil habeas. Non dico hec quod mihi plurima Cicero artis principia non tradiderit, sed tuis verbis ostendo
partim que retractata ab auctore suo predicas, ea tibi sic magna videri non debere ut, nisi mente captus sis,
alia non querites, partim nihil tibi fere ex tam multis reliqui fieri, quod probes, ut videas deplorandum
profecto nobis fuisse quod tantos optimorum librorum cumulos amiserimus et meos codices ut animo, sic
sermone amplectaris. Cf. Agaso’s argument, pages 39-40 above and Collectanea, 365. (4) Nam Aristotelis,
Isocratis, Hermogenis, Demosthenis, Victorini, Boetii, Augustini, Quintiliani, Ciceronis, aliorumque
complurimum omissa recordatio <est>, quorum volumina, Rhetorica, Orator, De oratore, Partitiones,
Institutiones oratorie, Declamationes, orationes, commentaria satis superque ad fulciendam eloquentiam
forent nisi tempora vel mores sic adversarentur ut nos potius libris quam libri nobis defuisse videantur.
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Collectanea, 386. (22) Et cum testem T. Livium citares, quod pusillanimis civis fuisset Scipio, in te
ipsum adduxisti. Quid enim rudius quam cum scribat Livius prestantem fuisse virum P. Scipionem, belli
tamen artibus quam pacis prestantiorem, his verbis, ‘pacis artibus,’ pusillanimem illum putare neque videre
prestantiam in omnibus attestatum homini Livium? Que cum in pacis et belli artibus ei partita sit, si utraque
in re qualis fuerit Scipio scire cupis, prestans, inquit; si in utra prestantior, in belli artibus, inquit. Tu
prestans illud, quod Livius quasi genus posuerat, pro pusillanimo interpretaris. Ita litteraturam tenes. Sic
textus discipulis exponis. For the Scipio-Caesar controversy between Guarino and Poggio see Chapter
Three, pages 108-109.
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Collectanea, 388. (30) “At veteres et posteriores sexpartito partiuntur.” Audite, audite, omnes, atque
attendite quanta sit Guarini peritia. Cicero in his voluminibus que ipso teste retractavit sex, in Partitionibus
statim in principio nobis his verbis astipulatur: “quatuor orationis sunt partes,” inquit, “exordium, narratio,
concertatio, peroratio.” Audis, Guarine? Vidisti unquam hunc locum? Centies oculis scio, sed mente
nunquam. Si Ciceronis ergo auctoritate, Aristotelis, Grecorumque omnium movemur, quatuor, sin aliorum
quorumcunque vis, sex existimabimus.Verum qui sex dicunt, percipiendi commoditatem, non rei veritatem
secuti sunt. Ergo nos et cur quatuor et quomodo sex aperuimus ut et Ciceronem in Partitionibus intelligas et
ceteros non asperneris. For Agaso’s complaint, see page 40 above. Cf. Cic., De or. 1.47 and Cic., Part. or.
4, 27.
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In articulating these technical arguments, Trebizond sometimes explicitly
recognizes Agaso’s accusations as anti-Greek. In fact, he pauses at one point to justify his
criticisms of Guarino and his defense of the RLV, and in doing so he outlines the dilemma
facing him by referring directly to the concept of Greek levitas:
What should I say? What should I do? To whom should I turn? If I say I
discovered many things [in Guarino’s writing], changed them for the better and
made them clearer, although this is true, I will nevertheless be blamed for
arrogance, and Guarino will exclaim about the “levitas” of the Greek man! 63
Trebizond acknowledges here the conundrum posed by his Greekness. If he defends
himself, he risks living up to Agaso’s characterization of him as a stereotypical arrogant
Greek interested only in seeking glory for himself at the expense of others. It is worth
noting, however, that Agaso never explicitly accuses the Greeks or Trebizond of
levitas. 64 Trebizond’s use of the term suggests that he recognizes the totality of Agaso’s
case against him—in essence a series of accusations that his behavior lacks honor and
dignity—as Agaso acting out an overarching stereotype of levitas. It also indicates that
Trebizond is clearly aware of how much that stereotype complicates his defense.
To combat accusations of arrogance and levitas, Trebizond repeatedly claims
that what he has written about the art of speaking, including his criticisms of Guarino’s
style, has value for general use [communis utilitas]. The emphasis he places on his
contributions to Latin studies is also an important part of his defense of his Latinity. He
begins the letter to Guarino by noting that when he received the Agaso letter, he did not
respond by retracting what he had said, “those things we wrote for general use [communis

63

Collectanea, 393. (48) Quid dicam? Quid faciam? Quo me vertam? Si me multa invenisse, multa in
melius mutasse, multa illustrasse dixero, etsi id verum sit, culpabitur tamen arrogantia, et ‘Greci hominis
levitatem!’ Guarinus exclamabit.
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The exception is when Agaso quotes Cicero. See page 43 above.
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utilitas].” 65 In the middle of the letter, he explains that if he allows Agaso’s criticisms of
his books—“which many eminent men judge pertain to general use [communis
utilitas]”—to stand, he fears that “the false accusations of my enemies [will] detract more
from the general good [commune commodum] than from me.” He maintains that his work
is useful for his contemporaries and for posterity. 66 The work, he continues, demonstrates
how much he has to offer to orators and to the art of speaking. 67
Trebizond’s technical arguments represent one set of strategies he employs to
demonstrate his Latinity, but he also appeals to his spoken eloquence. This too is
evidence of his direct engagement with Agaso, who had had a number of unflattering
things to say about Trebizond’s speaking style. For example, Agaso recalls a story an
unnamed patrician told to him wherein a crowd of Guarino’s former students and
supporters confronted Trebizond. 68 Many in the crowd, the patrician reported, spoke at
length about Guarino’s prudence and the elegance, sweetness, and clarity of his speech.
In a Homeric reference that seems an implicit slight of Trebizond, the patrician told
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Collectanea, 381. (1) Postquam vero ad me tua oratiuncula vix delata est, non his que scripsimus tantum,
hoc est, communi utilitati, indigne detrahi, sed librorum quoque auctorem contumeliis peti abste iniuria
perspexi, quodque iniquissimum est et tibi vel tuorum iudicio turpissimum, non tuo in me aperte sed, ne
commodius me defendam, occulte ac timide sub Agasonis nomine invectus es.
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Ibid., 393. (48) Sin libros, quos non nihil ad utilitatem communem et multi et preclari viri pertinere
arbitrantur, non tutabor, ambigam oportet ne invidorum calumnia plus communi commodo quam mihi
detraxerit. Quin ego me balantum familiarem, ut Guarinus dicit, esse fatebor, si, cum inimicum videam in
Agasonem versum ut ut et mihi licentius ac tutius convicietur, et sibi tum multa alia falso arroget, tum vel
maxime illud de Nestore Homericum ad se transferat, cuius e lingua melle dulcior fluebat oratio, nequid
ipse, qui ad communem usum et equalibus et posteris non nulla contuli, de me ipso dicam? See note 63 for
the preceding text.
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Collectanea, 394. (52) Me vero multa quoque peperisse ac usu oratorum animadvertisse utilia robustaque
dicendi precepta ipse codex demonstrat.
68

For more on the patrician’s testimony see pages 52-53 and 74-75 below. The patrician’s testimony is an
interesting component of the Agaso letter that reflects the importance of audience in acts of selfpresentation. By drawing upon supposed third-party accounts, Agaso suggests that Trebizond’s reputation,
in this case his lack of eloquence, is well known. Agaso’s letter was meant to be circulated and read and the
patrician’s testimony amplifies his criticisms by making them seem consistent with the judgments of others.
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Agaso how Guarino’s supporters described how “from his [Guarino’s] tongue, as Homer
said about Nestor, speech flowed sweeter than honey.” Trebizond did not fare as well
when the patrician compared his speech to Guarino’s. According to him, whenever
Trebizond speaks, he chews his words, speaks with a snort, and mumbles like “a thick
swarm of bees in a hollow oak.” 69
The passage is interesting because of the bold response it elicits from Trebizond,
which illustrates how crucial Latinity was to his self-presentation. He argues that if
Guarino had ever heard him speak or had asked anybody who had, he “would praise my
voice as much as my spirit and my Latinity, and would proclaim I had been born not in
Greece but in Rome, not in these times but in the age of Cicero.” Monfasani considers
this passage representative of the “braggadocio and buffoonery” of the letter, and cites as
evidence Trebizond’s description of how Guarino would marvel at the sweetness of his
composition, be overwhelmed by his skills and would finally, with creaking knees and
blushing face, acknowledge his eloquence. 70 At the same time, Trebizond mocks
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Ibid., 368-369. (22) Tum frequentes ad eum, ut pharmacopolam, auditores accurrebant, recentem adhuc
Guarini cum caritate memoriam disciplinamque retinentes. Proinde audire erat varias de Guarino
predicationes: alius prudentiam, ille comitate conditam gravitatem, nonnulli ingenium et legendi suavitatem
ac evidentiam, quidam scribendi facundiam nec minus orandi dulcedinem extollebant, cum ex eius lingua,
ut de Nestore dixit Homerus, melle dulcior flueret oratio. Quas ob laudes animosus in primis homo
Trapezuntius eum sibi parem ferre non valens absentis honori detractare cepit et invidie stimulis agitatus et
emulationis facibus incensus ista in eum maledicta scriptis evomuit, quasi vel Guarinum, qui docta per ora
volitat, sua spoliare commendatione queat vel se alienis conviciis in peioris comparatione adornare, qui
quotiens lectionem exponendam aggreditur, verba mandit, balba de nare loquitur, vocem suffocat et,
urentes quasi fabas, infringat, non tam profert quam immurmurat; credas densum crabronum examen intra
cavam quercum instrepere.
Cf. Hom., Il. 2.87. The bee imagery may be an extension of the Homeric reference to Nestor and
an allusion to Homer describing the Greeks gathering for assembly as a dense swarms of bees. The
characterization may suggest that Trebizond has all the eloquence of a dense, incoherent mob. It may also
suggest Trebizond is like the Greek warriors in the mob Homer describes, the intent being to focus on
Trebizond’s aggression and anger. Agaso’s likening of Guarino to Nestor emphasizes Guarino’s eloquence
but may also suggest his wise counsel, as Nestor had advised reconciliation between Agamemnon and
Achilles. The contrast could distinguish Guarino’s wisdom, eloquence, and modesty from Trebizond’s
aggression, violence, and Achilles-like rage.
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Guarino’s distorted speech and pronunciation. 71 Although the passage is deliberately
boastful, it is more than just buffoonery. It is part of Trebizond’s consistent effort to
defend his eloquence and reputation to a community that required Latin eloquence. It is
not without reason that he twice refers to his Latinity here—first when he argues that
Guarino would praise him for his Latinity and again when he claims Guarino would think
Trebizond had been born in Cicero’s Rome. This is not the only time he adamantly
defends his eloquence. Early on, he accuses Guarino of creating the Agaso pseudonym
because “you cannot endure George’s eloquence,” which had long left him trembling. 72
Here, however, Trebizond defends his speech as a specifically Latin eloquence.
The importance of Latin eloquence is also clear in Agaso’s attempt to label
Trebizond as a copyist, one of his implicitly anti-Greek attacks. He makes this charge
when questioning the value of the RLV. If, Agaso asks, one accepts Trebizond’s premise
that the works of so many brilliant men and the study of rhetoric have been neglected,
why would anybody choose to read the RLV, the work of a copyist [librarius], over the
originals? 73 Agaso’s question casts doubt on the value of the copyist, the most common
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Collectanea, 386-387. (23) Deinde balbutire audes in exponenda lectione, verba me mandere, balba de
nare loqui, vocem suffocare, nec tam proferre quam immurmurare. Si audisses tu me, Guarine, aut si saltem
ab iis qui audiverunt querere voluisses (dicam aperte non ut me laudem, sed ut iniuria circumventum
defendam), tam vocem, quam spiritum, quam Latinitatem laudares, nec me in Grecia ortum, sed Rome, nec
his temporibus, sed Ciceronis etate natum predicares. Nam suavitate compositionis premulsus, verborum
gravitate contusus, scientiarum oppressus pondere, pronuntiatione attonitus, vi denique argumentorum
perterritus, etiam si tacere cuperes, tremore tamen genuum, trepidatione vocis, et vultus confusione quid
sentires animo spiritu, Stentore sonantius conclamares. Proinde, irride tu quidem et detorque os, ac verba
comprime, ut soles, lipposque oculos tuos anteaquam tenacissimis e dentibus syllaba elabatur, huc atque
illuc, quasi rabie concitus, centies circumferas, ac in singulis pronunciandis verbis non parva temporum
spatia interpone ut que in scribendo tam tarditas quam incommoditas tibi inest, ea etiam in dicendo inesse
videatur.
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Ibid., 382. (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem Georgii
ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses.
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Ibid., 366. (6). See note 41.
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literary position open to and filled by Byzantine émigrés. 74 Agaso suggests that the role
was hardly impressive, a point he makes again when offering the patrician’s testimony.
The patrician, Agaso reports, had praised Trebizond specifically for his ability to rise
above the role of copyist: “And no small amount of esteem and praise ought to be given
to Trebizond as is fitting for one who, once a copyist drawn from Crete to the eminent
nobility of the patrician order, secured for himself a greater position by means of his
virtue and the strength of his talent.” 75 Though it is clear from Agaso’s earlier comments
that he is not willing—whereas the patrician is willing—to accept Trebizond as anything
more than a copyist, the patrician’s testimony does reinforce Agaso’s underlying premise
that copyists held a lower status than other men of learning. 76 The role of copyist offered
opportunity, but there was an assumption that true talent allowed one to attain positions
of greater prestige. Agaso uses that assumption as means to undermine Trebizond’s
Latinity and RLV.
Trebizond’s response indicates that he understood public perceptions regarding
copyists and the underlying standard of Latin eloquence to which humanists were held.
That he felt anxiety about being labeled a copyist is clear from the fact that he replies
directly to the label when describing his early education in Italy. He admits that when he
74

Harris, 124; Reynolds and Wilson, 148.
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Collectanea, 368. (21) Huius bellissimi viri ingratitudinem et de preceptore maledicta cum in aliquorem
cetu patriciorum nuper increparem, hoc ab eorum uno et quidem excellentissimo eidemque familiarissimo
responsum accepi: “Hic est, si forte, hospes, ignoras, Georgius Trapezuntius nomine,” inquit, “qui superiori
[sic] tempore, cum ludum aperiret, modo non eloquentie fontes polliceri coepit. Et sane Trapezuntio non
parva commendatio laudesque debentur ut qui librarius olim ad insignem patricii ordinis virum e Creta
conductus pro ipsius virtute ac ingenii ardore maiorem sibi gradum adoptavit.”
Monfasani’s edition reads “cum in aliquorem cetu patriciorum.” The aliquorem must be an
aliquorum and taken with the patriciorum. I do not know if this is a mistake in the manuscripts or in
Monfasani’s edition. He does not note the spelling in his apparatus.
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Agaso also includes the patrician’s comment because the patrician went on to describe how he had
supposedly witnessed Guarino’s students speak in defense of their instructor and Trebizond publicly
slander Guarino. See pages 74-75.
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had arrived in Italy at the behest of Francesco Barbaro, Barbaro had asked him if he
would be willing to transcribe Greek codices. Trebizond had replied that he “preferred to
devote my efforts to my Latin letters.” 77 Monfasani rightly reads this commitment to
Latin studies as evidence of Trebizond’s attempts to assimilate to Latin culture. 78
Trebizond’s descriptions of his early Latin education are clear attempts to present himself
as a skilled Latinist. He explains how he was unable to speak or understand a word of
Latin upon his arrival and elsewhere describes how he “scarcely knew the shape of the
Latin letters.” He boasts that after a few years he was able to “keep two very fast scribes
busy while speaking on two subjects at the same time.” 79 He describes his rapid progress
as a result of his diligence and a series of important instructors. He credits Barbaro, the
“most brilliant physician” Nicholas Leonardus, and finally Vittorino da Feltre, whom he
names as his true Latin instructor. 80 The latter figure is of particular importance. By
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Collectanea, 397. (67) “Venisti de Grecia missus librarius,” inquit, “ad insignem virum patricii ordinis,”
quem non nominas, veritus ne tua fallatia sinceritate ipsius evertatur. (68) Ego nomen apponam, quoniam
post deum preclarissimam genere, virtute, doctrina militem Franciscum Barbarum huius quicquid in me est
auctorem habeo, apud quem te monstrante, cum vix figuras Latinarum litterarum pernoscerem, prima didici
rudimenta…(69) Illico enim cum venissem, interrogatus ab eo, te presente, si vellem Grecos codices
transcribere, Latinis me dare operam letteris velle dixi. Cui actutum ille: et ego tibi, ut discas, optimam
commoditatem prestabo. Ita librarium me missum usque ad hos dies ignorabam; Guarinus sciebat, qui
consuluit.
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Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 11.
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Collectanea, 394. (53) Nam eius vires quante sint nos tibi exemplo sumus, qui maiusculi quam vigennes
cum in Italiam venissemus, monstro multis fuimus cum nec dicere nec percipere quicquam a quoquam
possemus. Paucissimis deinde annis et Latine ita locuti sumus ut in duabus causis duobus velocissimis in
scribendo librariis eodem tempore dicendo suffecerimus, et <precepta> doctrinarum omnium bonarumque
artium, addam etiam, ut magis doleas, ipsius theologie, cui relique omnes administrantur (pauca quidem,
sed tamen que tibi ad celos usque coacervata viderentur) percepimus, et, nisi onere filiorum oppressi et
valitudine deiecti, litterarum studia pene liquissemus. Singulare iam ingenii specimen invidorum victa
protervia de nobis edere facile possemus.
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I use Vittorino’s Italian name. Trebizond uses his Latin name Victorinus Feltrensis. Ibid., 397. (67)
Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a Victorino Feltrensi acceperim; Ibid.,
398 (72) Vix duorum mensium illa tua fuit doctrina in transcribendo, non in discendo me penitus occupato,
si tamen doctrina sit appellanda primorum elementorum confusa cognitio. Postquam inde ad clarissimi
physici Nicolai de Leonardis domum profectus sum, duce illo ad quem missus fueram, ut domum, ita
doctorem mutavi.
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naming Vittorino, an Italian, as his Latin instructor, Trebizond was implicitly attempting
to strengthen his claims of eloquence and prove his Latin bona fides against Agaso’s
claims that he was no more than a Greekling copyist. In fact, Trebizond implies, he is a
skilled Latinist precisely because Vittorino—a learned, eloquent Italian—instructed him.
Trebizond’s description of this period stresses his desire to attain glory through Latin but
should also be read as a clear repudiation of Agaso’s attempt to limit him to the role of
copyist. Trebizond is clear here that his interest had always been in honing his Latin
skills, not in copying Greek texts, and perhaps even more importantly that he had
developed the skill set required of a master Latinist. He recognized the danger of being
pigeonholed as a copyist and relegated to the status of a second-class scholar.
In Defense of Greece
In addition to defending his Latinity, Trebizond often goes to great lengths to
defend the value of Greeks and their literature in response to Agaso’s anti-Greek
language. Trebizond’s defense of Greece appears at times to contradict his defense of his
Latinity. This is the case when he distances himself from the role of the Greek copyist
and implies a tacit acceptance of a standard of learning that values Latinity over
Greekness. The two strategies make clear the complicated experiences of Greek émigrés
as individuals torn between two worlds. Trebizond clearly felt pressured to assimilate to
life in Italy but could not distance himself completely from his background. Agaso’s
letter indicates that certain individuals would not allow him to do so. Beyond that,
Trebizond’s background did create professional opportunities. His defense of Greek
studies shows that he wanted to take advantage of these opportunities, but struggled with
how to do so. His struggle explains Monfasani’s correct observation that as much as
55

Trebizond assimilated to Latin culture, he never abandoned his Greek patriotism. 81
Trebizond’s defense of Greek studies is also indicative of how early fifteenth-century
humanism simultaneously articulated an anti-Greek bias and an argument in favor of
Greek learning.
There was a firm foundation in Quattrocento Italy on which Trebizond could draw
to justify the value of Greek learning in response to the Agaso letter in 1437. A useful
pair of examples are the letters of Guarino and his student Francesco Barbaro in response
to Lorenzo da Monachi’s 1416 public condemnation of Greek studies as fruitless. 82
Lorenzo was then secretary to the Venetian Senate, chancellor of Crete, and a friend of
both Leonardo Bruni and Barbaro. Barbaro’s perspective is of particular interest because,
if we accept the premise that Agaso was really one of Guarino’s students, Barbaro’s
steadfast defense of Greek studies is inconsistent with Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks. That
one of Guarino’s students (Barbaro) so resolutely defended Greek learning makes it
difficult to understand why Agaso (supposedly another of Guarino’s students) used such
forceful anti-Greek language against Trebizond. His language is even harder to fathom
because Agaso did not qualify it, as for instance Cicero did, by distinguishing between
the general benefits of Greek learning on the one hand and specific “bad” Greeks on the
other. 83 Though hardly conclusive evidence, this inconsistency makes it plausible that
Agaso was, as Trebizond believed, not really Guarino’s student. The inconsistency
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Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 130.
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Deno Geanakoplos discusses the context of the da Monachi comments in “The Discourse of Demetrius
Chalcondyles on the Inauguration of Greek Studies at the University of Padua in 1463,” Studies in the
Renaissance 21 (1974): 130-1. See also Sarah Stever Gravelle, “Lorenzo Valla’s Comparison of Latin and
Greek and the Humanist Background,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 44, no.2 (1982): 269273.
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See my discussion of the “degradation model” above, note 32. Although Agaso makes no such
distinction, I argue Trebizond does follow Cicero when arguing in defense of Greece. See pages 63-66.
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remains, of course, if Guarino really did compose the letter. In that case, Agaso’s
language could be understood as a deliberate attempt of Guarino’s to attack Trebizond as
a Greek without attaching his own name to anti-Greek slander. As a learned orator,
Guarino would have been able to argue both sides of the issue, in this case marshaling
anti-Greek language to attack a Greek opponent while himself believing in the
importance of Greek literature. Speculation aside, Trebizond, firmly believing Agaso to
be Guarino, later employed a defense of Greek learning similar to the one Guarino and
Barbaro had articulated.
Guarino responds to da Monachi’s comments and defends Greek studies in a 1416
letter to Nicholas Perondolus with the argument that Greek studies are useful and
necessary to Latin studies. 84 He characterizes Greek letters as both joyful and useful to
Latins and “bound to Latin letters by such an affinity and necessity that you would not
unreasonably call them mother and daughter.” He cites their utility for “all the liberal arts
and sciences,” suggesting that some things can only be conveyed properly in Greek, and
quotes Horace’s exhortation: “page through the Greek models day and night…the Muse
gave genius to the Greeks; to the Greeks she gave the ability to speak with smoothness
and polish.” 85 Ancient Romans, Guarino contends, so valued Greek letters that nearly all
were learned in them. He concludes by appealing to his own famous Greek instructor,
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Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Perondolo, Venice, 1416, in Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, ed. Remigio
Sabbadini, vol. 1, Testo (Venice: A spese della Società, 1915), 98-99.
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Ibid., 98-99. Gaudeo et magnopere te collaudo, quod summa cum ratione ad graecarum studia litterarum
te vehementer anhelantem aspicio; quae tam iocundae tam utiles nostris hominibus sunt et latinis litteris
tanta cognatione ac necessitudine devinctae, ut matrem ac filiam non iniuria dixeris et “qui utramvis norit,
ambas ferme norit.” Id adeo verum est, ut omnes liberales artes, omnes scientiae, quibus latinitas utitur,
graeca prae se ferant nomina, immo si latinis appellentur vocabulis, quasi mutata veste ac habitu, vix
dignosci queant. Quocirca non absurdum illud Horatii praeceptum: “vos exemplaria graeca nocturna
versate manu versate diurna;” quidni? “Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo musa loqui.” Cf. Hor.,
Ars. P. 208 and 323.
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Chrysoloras, who explained that the decline in Latin studies was a result of the decline in
Greek. 86 Further evidence of Guarino’s position can be found in his son’s educational
treatise. Battista Guarino is even more emphatic than his father on the importance of
Greek, arguing:
I shall proclaim it loudly: no one can get completely to the bottom and into the
marrow, so to speak, of prosody without knowledge of Greek. I know there are
many people who say it is unnecessary for Latin literature. These are people who
are themselves ignorant of Greek and want everyone else to be equally ignorant,
so that if they may not be judged superior to others, at least they can avoid being
thought inferior. For my part…I shall believe that Greek is not only useful but
absolutely essential for Latin letters. 87
and:
We follow the example of the learned men of old, none of whom were ignorant of
Greek; and the authority of Quintilian, who says that our literature flowed from
the Greek; and of Cicero, who holds that Greek literature should receive the credit
if Cato speaks with more learning in [Cicero’s] book On Old Age than he had
been used to do in his own books; and the exhortation of Horace… 88
Battista Guarino’s defense is important not only as evidence of his father’s position but as
evidence of the codification of that position into educational precept.
Barbaro, unlike Guarino, wrote directly to da Monachi, and his response offers a
similar though more extensive set of arguments than Guarino’s. 89 He argues that today’s
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Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Perondolo, Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 99. Quod apud maiores nostros ita
servatum est, ut neminem ferme sine graecarum eruditione litterarum comperias: adeo ut Mario clarissimo
imperatori vitio et infamiae obiecta sit graecae ignoratio litteraturae. Et profecto verum est quod a
clarissimo philosopho et huius aetatis lumine Manuele Chrysolora dici saepenumero audiebam, a quo
manavit quicquid graecorum hodie studiorum ad nostrates derivatum est homines. Is crebro commemorare
solebat maximarum rerum scientiam et doctissimos illos apud nostros defecisse viros, cum graeca defecere
studia.
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Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 16.
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Ibid., 17. Kallendorf notes the comparisons to Quint., Inst., 1.1.12; Cic., Acad. 2.2.5; Sen. 8.26.
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Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, vol. 2, La
raccolta canonica delle Epistole (Florence: L.S. Olschiki, 1999), 3-18. The letter is undated. Given the date
of Guarino’s letter to Perondolo and the time of the controversy it was likely also written in 1416. Gravelle
notes that Bruni praised Barbaro’s letter and wrote to Guarino for a copy of da Monachi’s comments so he
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erudite men ought to value Greek studies, “since they always held the greatest influence
among the wisest of our ancestors.” 90 Erudition was contingent upon knowledge of
Greek. 91 Like Guarino, he argues that classical Romans were well-versed in Greek and
considered it a fundamental part of education. 92 These men “watered their gardens with
the rivers of the Greeks.” 93 Barbaro offers as evidence Cicero’s estimation of Greek
learning in his otherwise decidedly anti-Greek defense of Flaccus: “I do not deny the
charms of their speech, the keenness of their intellects. Finally, I do not deny to them any

too could compose a response. Leonardo Bruni to Guarino of Verona, Florence, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini
Epistolarum libri VIII, ed. Lorenzo Mehus (Florence: 1741), 4:125-126. Bruni’s request is another
indication of how texts circulated among humanists, passed hand to hand among friends, and how literary
controversies spread and were sustained. See note 35.
90

Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, 6. Quod tametsi
adeo perspicuum sit, ut in contrarium neminem verbum esse facturum existimem, nisi qui contentiosus ac
indoctus quam gravis et eruditus haberi malit, tamen de utroque dicam et de litteris grecis prius, que
magnum apud eruditos homines pondus habere debent, cum apud sapientissimos viros maiores nostros
maximum semper habuerint.
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Ibid., 6. Et ut reliquas nationes in presentia missas faciam, in omnibus enim gentibus greca hec litteratura
singulari in admiratione fuit, apud Latinos tantum habuit auctoritatis eo tempore quo grecis in philosophia
litteris Romanos non eguisse a Cicerone scriptum est, ut quisquis eruditionem huius sermonis non calleret
sine ulla dubitatione indoctus haberetur; Ibid., 10-11. Quid plura? Nisi me fallit animus, facile perspiciemus
neminem qui de his litterature partibus cum ingenio et industria versatus sit, a nobis nisi per tenebras
intelligi posse, si grecarum litterarum lumen non accesserit; Ibid., 11. si denique ipsi rei que valet plurimum
et commoditati atque necessitati studiorum nostrorum credere voluerimus, certo nobis persuadebimus
grecas litteras cum latinis habere strictissimum et necessarium quoddam vinculum et tanto nobis usui ac
honori esse posse, ut nemo sine hoc instrumento in ullis illustrioribus artibus satis instructus, satis ornatus
habendus sit.
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Ibid., 7-8. Quid in singulis moror? Omnes qui in ampla laude nati, in amplissima vixerunt, ita grecis
litteris ornatos fuisse legimus, ut non modo que in illis continentur cognovisse constet, sed etiam verba et
versus memoria tenuisse manifestum sit. Sic Cesares consulares triumphales pretorios senatorios patritios
equites et reliquos qui ullo numero essent, ex tempore aliquid homericum aut sophocleum et aliorum
exprompsisse et eleganter multa grece scripsisse proditum est. Quid Catones Scipiones Emilios Brutos
Servilios Scevolas Pomponios Marcellos Hortensios Metellos et reliqua superioris etatis lumina
commemorem? Mitto Aulum Albinum Asinium Pollionem Cor. Nepotem qui latinas historias grece
scriptas reliquerunt, cum exiguis finibus, quibus latinitas ipsa continetur, contenti non fuissent. Quid
posteriores Plinios Suetonios Tacitos Spurinnas Lactantios Cyprianos Florios Servios Favorinos Gellios et
innumberabiles alios?; Ibid., 8. Quamobrem si diligenter ea que litterarum monumentis tradita sunt
attendere voluerimus, neminem inveniemus qui doctis illis temporibus eruditus habitus sit qui in his litteris,
de quibus in presentiarum verba facimus, non iecerit fundamenta doctrine sue.
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Ibid., 11. Que tametsi minus ingenii minus admirationis minus dignitatis habeat, ut copiosissime a te
demonstratum est, quam si iisdem de rebus, exemplo maiorum qui ex fluminibus grecorum hortulos suos
irrigabant…
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other claims.” 94 Barbaro considers it important that even Cicero, the “keenest defender of
the Latin name,” acknowledges the impressiveness of Greek learning. Quintilian, he
continues, wanted his ideal orator educated in Greek letters. Like Guarino, he offers
Horace and Virgil as additional evidence. 95 Barbaro adds that Roman authors were
praised for modeling their work on that of the Greeks. He cites the Antiope of Pacuvius
and the Medea of Ennius (both modeled on Euripides) and the works of Terence as
examples. 96 Barbaro and Guarino thus articulate similar arguments about the utility and
classical Roman praise of Greek literature.
Trebizond had already voiced many of these same ideas years before responding
to the Agaso letter in 1437. His Oratio de laudibus Ciceronis, delivered in Venice in
1421, emphasizes Greek learning in his narrative of Cicero’s life and discusses Cicero’s
education under Philo, his studies of Plato, and his study of philosophy in Athens. 97
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Ibid., 6-7. Quamobrem, quia non modo studia hec humanitatis apud Grecos, sed ab ipsis ad ceteros
homines pervenisse putaverunt, ipse M.T. Cicero, qui ut latini nominis patronus acerrimus, sic greci iudex
parum equus creditus est, tribuit Grecis litteras, dat multarum artium disciplinam, “non adimit sermonis
leporem, ingeniorum acumen. Deinde etiam alia quecumque sibi sumunt non repugnat”… Cf. to Cic.,
Flac., 9. See note 31.
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Francesco Barbaro to Lorenzo da Monachi, Venice, in Epistolario, ed. Claudio Griggio, 9-10.
Quintilianus etiam, eruditissimus ac diligentissimus scriptor, cum ab incunabulis oratorem instituit, in
primis sibi grecas litteras proposuit, a quibus nostre fluxerunt, ut facile intelligi posset quantum ornamenti
et adiumenti afferant oratori, cum ad collocandum et stabiliendum fundamenta laudis oratorie principem
sibi locum resignaverit.Quid Oratius familiaris tuus velit, iam me intelligis: “vos exemplaria greca/nocturna
versate manu, versate diurna.” Quidni? “Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo/Musa loqui.” Virgilius
noster preterea, qui etiam post illam etatem fuit qua, ut tu vis, philosophia et omnes bone artes illustrate
latinis litteris erant ut grecis studiis Romanis opus non esset; quid Maro sentiat clara voce testatur:
‘Excudent alii spirantia mollius era…’
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Ibid., 12. Quis enim vel eo tempore fuit quo in homine romano etiam satis pauce littere multe putabantur,
qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii sperneret atque reiceret? Quis etiam posteaquam greca magis
familiaria Latinis fuerunt quam ipsa latina nostris hominbus nunc sunt, quis, inquam, easdem fabulas
latinas ad verbum ex Eurypede expressas non legerit et auctores non laudaverit? Quem mihi dabis, qui ea
que Terentius ex Menandro et Plautus et Cecilius ex veteribus comicis in latinum verbis electis graviter et
ornate convertit non admiretur et eos multa cum venustate et omni sale interpretum munere functos esse
non asseveret?
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Collectanea, 345. (7) Liberalibus ergo studiis se sub Philone illo Rome exercuit, quem ex genere constat
<H>ebreorum fuisse et ad tantum philosophie pervenisse ut solus alter Plato appellari meruerit, cuius

60

Trebizond tells his audience that when Cicero returned to Rome he vowed to bring Greek
eloquence with him. This marked an important transition in the Republic whereby Roman
glory came to be won by eloquence rather than arms. Trebizond articulates the idea that
learning flows from Greece, a position both Guarino and Barbaro had argued. He links
Greek studies with knowledge of the most important topics, a position that Quattrocento
advocates of Greek studies voiced. 98 He revisits these positions to defend himself from
Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks in 1437.
Like his contemporaries, Trebizond defended the importance of Greece by
arguing for the value of Greek learning to all studies. Trebizond’s most adamant and
explicit defense of Greek learning in his Responsio to Guarino occurs at the conclusion.
Greece, he explains, is the “inventor of all the good arts” and “more than other regions,
produces men better in all things.” 99 He argues here for the utility and primacy of Greek
in the same way as Guarino and Barbaro linked Greek studies to Latin and in the same
way as Battista Guarino described how Latin studies flow from Greek.

quidem egregia opera in omni disciplinarum genere adhuc apud Grecos multis magnisque voluminibus
explicata feruntur. Hoc ille doctore et ingenio acutissimo ad philosophie brevi speculationes erectus, statuit
militarem quoque doctrinam eo magis complecti quo arma litteris, litteras autem armis facilius
decorasset… Athenas autem profectus, tantum opere philosophie dedit ut eam iam merito profiteri posset.
In qua persistere cogitabat perpetuo nisi redire et capescere rempublicam crebris amici cogerent litteris.
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Ibid., 345. (8) Eloquentiam enim, maximam Grecie laudem, in Italiam eum traducere affirmavit, cum iam
Romani militaris rei gloriam transtulissent. (9) Sed quid omnium singulatim eum dixi laudes superasse cum
ipsius populi Romani tot annis comparatam armis gloriam antecelluerit? Nam populus Romanus ab urbe
condita gravissimis bellis perfectis in potentissimis populis illustrissimisque subactis regibus continua
exercitatione armorum post multos annos tandem rei militaris palmam a Grecis accepisse videbatur; Tullius
brevi, imo minimo, temporis momento (sic enim, si comparare voluerimus, ferme videbitur) eloquentiam,
que rerum omnium scientiam comprehendit, et ipsius Academie gloriam et dignitatem ab Grecia in Italiam
Apollonii, Greci hominis, traduxit iudicio. Cf. Plut., Cic. 4.3-5.
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Collectanea, 406. (107) Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu
omnium, in Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem…. inveheris; Ibid., 407. (109) O patria, patria,
ostendes profecto, si unquam liberaberis, quanto ceteris tu regionibus meliores omnibus rebus viros
procrees.
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These were common arguments for other Byzantines as well. In his 1449 address
inaugurating Greek studies at Ferrara, Theodore Gaza claimed that Latin studies began to
decline when people abandoned the study of Greek. 100 In an oration inaugurating Greek
studies at the University of Padua in 1463/4, Demetrius Chalcondyles stated that “no one
is ignorant that the Latins received every kind of the liberal arts from the Greeks” and
added that because of this “the study of Greek letters offers much fruit to the Latins in
every kind of learning.” 101 In the 1460s, Andronicus Contoblacas, a prominent member
of Cardinal Bessarion’s circle of Byzantine scholars, similarly identified Greeks as the
“inventors of all the good arts.” 102 Like his Italian and Byzantine contemporaries,
Trebizond appeals to classical Roman authorities—including Horace and Vergil—to
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Theodore Gaza, Oratio de Litteris Graecis in Aus Bessarions Gelehrtenkreis, by Ludwig Mohler
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1942), 254. Non enim Romanis Graecae litterae alienae erant a quibus fere omnia
latinae litteraturae ac disciplinae non modo carptim accepta, verum et plerumque ordine translata
videntur… Hunc tamen tam frequentem litterarum graecarum usum fortuna primum, quae mutationibus
rerum gaudet, prohibere ac paulatim auferre coepit, hominum deinde negligentia accedens penitus
delevit… Etenim tamdiu graecae litterae in Italia sunt conservatae, quamdiu in ea latina elegantia viguit.
Cum vero haec deseri coepit, litterae quoque graecae simul neglectae sunt, amboque praeclara haec studia
multos iam per annos tamquam duo clarissima lumina sunt exstincta.
The address was “the earliest surviving inaugural discourse on the importance of Greek studies
given by a Byzantine émigré scholar in Italy.” See Deno Geanakoplos, Constantinople and the West:
Essays on the Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissances and the Byzantine and Roman Churches
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 73-74 and Gravelle, 276-277.
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Geanakoplos provides the Latin from the sole extant manuscript. Geanakoplos, “Demetrius,” 132 n. 42.
MS. fs. 3v-4r: Nemini credo vestrum esse ignotum omne genus liberalium artium a grecis latinos accepisse
et cum auctores omnium istarum arcium grecos et ipsa nomina artibus indicta greca fuisse constat… Cum
itaque et studia litterarum et omnes artes ab eis accepissent auctoresque ipsos sequuntur, nemo inficias ibit,
quin studia litterarum grecarum plurimum fructus latinis in omni genere doctrine afferant.
Chalcondyles also describes how classical Romans venerated Greek literature. Ibid., 133 n. 48.
MS. f. 4v: Quorum nullum ignarum litterarum grecarum fuisse constat. Quin complures eorum adeo bene
pleneque eas venerasse, ut dubium esset an litteras grecas vel latinas melius scirent.
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Peter Bravus criticizes Contoblacas for doing so. Petrus Bravus Veronensis, Invectiva in Andronicum
Callistum, in Hankins, “Renaissance Crusaders,” 203-204. I cite the text with the author’s name and the
line numbers provided by Hankins. Bravus, 31-33. Nunc inter rosas ac lilia iocaris; audes preterea Graecos
religionis excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inuentores appellare.
Monfasani has since corrected Hankins, who originally identified Andronicus Callistus as the
object of Bravus’ invective. Monfasani, “The Pro-Latin Apologetics,” 182. Hankins offers the invective as
an example of prejudice against Byzantine émigrés and provides the tentative date.
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assert that it is by “the authority of the [Greek] ancients” that the “spirit of Greece is
strong.” 103
This latter argument illustrates how Trebizond defends Greeks by citing the
Latinists’ own authorities against them. This is also how he responds to Agaso’s
contention that Cicero warned Quintus against association with Greeks, and is a sign that
Trebizond struggled with characterizations of Greek vice. He circumvents these
characterizations, as Cicero did, by drawing a distinction between past and present
Greeks. Trebizond notes that even in warning Quintus that many Greeks “are deceitful
[fallaces] and unreliable [leves],” Cicero “at the same time excuses them” explaining they
had been “trained by a long course of servitude to show an excess of sycophancy.” 104
Trebizond’s interpretation of the passage maintains an idyllic ancient Greece “by whose
strengths the spirit of Greece is strong.” This passage was not the only time Cicero had
questioned contemporary Greek morality even while distinguishing it from the heritage
of ancient Greece. His praise of ancient Athens in the Pro Flacco, discussed above, is an
example. In that speech, Cicero also argues “This later Greece has long been troubled and
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Collectanea, 406. (108) Neque advertis quid a Cicerone in testimonium assumis.“Diuturna,” inquit
“servitute ad nimiam assentationem eruditi.” Aderas cum hec transcriberes? Corpore scio; animo sentio te
oppressum vi. Sed quid oportet conviciari cum multa tibi huiuscemodi dicta imprudenter comperiantur?
Accusat Cicero Grecos et excusat simul. Nam diuturna servitus maxima vitia parit; proxima, paupertas; que
duo fortune incommoda maxime animum deiiciunt, ingenii vires deprimunt, totum hominem simul semper
oppugnant, sepe expugnant ea diuturna durioraque; modo cum sint, vastarunt Greciam. Quare non a
presenti fortuna, verum veterum auctoritate quibus animi viribus polleat Grecia querere debuisti. “Grecis,”
quidam ait, “ingenium Grecis dedit musa rotundo ore loqui.” Et poeta maximus omniumque
prestantissimus: “excudent alii spirantia, melius era, credo, equidem vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius.” Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 323 and Verg., Aen. 6.847-849. Trebizond’s quotation of the
Aeneid differs from the original line, which reads “excudent alii spirantia mollius aera (credo equidem)…”
See the substitution of melius for mollius, which Monfasani notes in his apparatus, and that Trebizond does
not retain the dipthong in aera.
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See previous note, “Accusat Cicero...vastarunt Greciam.” Cf. Cic., Q. Fr. 1.16. The translation is
Williams’, though I have translated leves as “unreliable” as it better represents the context of the passage as
a warning against close intimacies with people who are naturally untrustworthy. Cicero, Epistulae ad
Quintum Fratrem, in Cicero: Letters to Quintus, Brutus, and Others, trans. W. Glynn Williams
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972). See note 49.
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vexed by its own devices,” while “that older Greece, which once was so notable for its
resources, its powers, its glory, fell because of…the undue freedom and irresponsibility
of its assemblies.” 105 In each case, Cicero emphasizes the degradation of Greek culture
over time. It is a narrative that fixes firmly in the past a Greek culture that can still
contribute to contemporary concerns.
Trebizond’s appeal to the degradation model—perplexing at first since he was
not himself an ancient Greek—can be read as an attempt to depict himself as a “good”
rather than a “bad” Greek. Even in lamenting Greek levitas, Cicero did admit the
existence of learned and honorable “contemporary” Greeks. 106 Trebizond’s
contemporaries also articulated that position. At the end of his scathing letter against
Contoblacas, Peter Bravus noted that his anti-Greek invective was not directed “against
all Greeks (for I believe some good men can be found among them), but against the
shameful and those like you [Contoblacas]).” 107 Trebizond, as has been discussed, went
to great lengths to deny Agaso’s accusations of arrogance and levitas and to prove
himself a learned rhetorician. His efforts should be considered attempts to present himself
as the exception, a “good” Greek. Trebizond’s use of the degradation model allows him
to maintain the value of Greek studies and turn Agaso’s appeal to Cicero against Guarino.
Trebizond’s application of the model also works because he exploits the
ambiguity in Agaso’s letter and at times actively misrepresents portions of it. An example
of the latter is when he chides Agaso for claiming “the most shameful thing of all is to
105

Cic., Flac. 16-17 and 62. For the earlier discussion of the degradation model see pages 37-38.
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See pages 36-37.
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Bravus, 60-64. Finem igitur scribendi faciam, si te prius hoc unum monuero, ut, etsi pro summa tua
impudentia ne nimia quidem Latinorum latratus tuos maledicos, non propria illis, existimandum effugere
uoluisti, hoc modestiae meae tribuas, quod verba mea non in omnes Graecorum (credo enim ex eis
nonnullos reperiri bonos), sed in flagiciosos et tui similes fecisse uelim.
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receive a method of speaking in Latin from a Greek man.” Agaso had in fact written that
it was both absurd and shameful “to receive instruction in speaking Latin from a Greek”
who hardly knows how to speak Greek, much less Latin. 108 Trebizond essentially
changes the terms of the dispute by interpreting Agaso’s statement not as an attack
against a specific individual but as an attack against Greeks in general. Agaso’s
ambiguous language leaves open the possibility that he intends to offer a blanket
indictment of Greeks. That ambiguity allows Trebizond to characterize Agaso’s attacks
as generally anti-Greek rather than specifically anti-Trebizond, and to accuse Agaso of
inconsistency. “Agaso,” Trebizond explains, “scornfully refuses to learn from the
Greeks” and yet argues that the RLV is inconsequential because a number of Greek
authorities already sustain the study of eloquence. “If you read and approve Greek
authors,” Trebizond asks, “why do you disparage me as a Greek?” He casts himself here
alongside ancient Greeks who made valuable contributions to rhetoric. He even
anticipates Guarino’s retort—that those men were learned whereas Trebizond himself is
not—only to counter that if Guarino wants to claim Trebizond is unlearned he needs to
prove it. Unlike the more general defense of Greek learning at the conclusion of the
letter, this section is an explicit defense of Trebizond’s own credibility as a Greek
scholar. It makes clear that, in addition to defending his Latinity, his defense of his Greek
learning functions as a second way to justify his scholarly contributions.
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Collectanea, 383. (8) Primum omnium turpissimum esse Latinis a Greco ais homine rationem dicendi
accipere. Deinde tui oblitus, non multo post subdis non fuisse mihi deplorandum si multi maioribus editi de
disceptandi ratione codices amissi negligentia sunt quoniam Aristotelem, Isocratem, Hermogenem,
Demosthenemque habeamus. O vere Agasonem, qui, cum a Grecis discere dedignetur, ad Grecos confugiat,
claraque voce predicare non erubescat dedecori esse Latinis si quicquam ex Greco audiant cum habeant
unde discant plerosque Grecie auctores! Nonne pro scriptis rectius nostris id dici videtur? Nam si Grecos
legis et probas, cur me quasi Grecum contemnis? Si Georgium, quoniam Grecus est, spernis, cur
Aristotelem, Isocratem, Hermogenem, Demosthenem Latinis legendos illico subiungis? Sed illi docti
fuerunt, inquies, tu rudis. Illud ergo tibi tacendum fuerat; hoc comprobandum. Cf. Agaso’s comments,
ibid., 365. See notes 36 and 60 above.
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A Classical Alternative
If Trebizond’s defense of his Latinity was one strategy for countering Agaso’s
anti-Greek attacks and his defense of Greek learning marks a second, his attempt to place
Greek on the same level as Latin marks a third. Agaso’s attacks, as has been discussed,
are based on an assumption regarding Latinity as the measure of true eloquence. At times,
when he was not fervently defending his Latinity, Trebizond actually privileges Greek
over Latin. On more than one occasion he chides Guarino’s shortcomings in Greek. The
first instance occurs as Trebizond discusses his early education in Italy. Guarino was
reading Pindar at the time, Trebizond recalls, and asked the young Cretan about Greek
meter. He was so pleased with Trebizond’s ability to speak on the subject, for a period of
two days no less, that he asked Trebizond to write down his thoughts because he “could
not remember so many and such great ideas.” 109 The second instance occurs later when
Trebizond returns to a consideration of Greek poetry and admonishes Guarino for daring
to say that Greeks—including Trebizond—know little. He issues a challenge in response:
“If you form one [Latin] word from any Greek poet, I will acknowledge you are not
completely unacquainted with Greek!” To emphasize the point, Trebizond recalls another
conversation he had had with Guarino, again during his early years in Italy, about the
Greeks and poetic license, word choice, and meter. Here, as in their discussion of Pindar,
Trebizond had proven himself to be the more knowledgeable man. 110
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Collectanea, 398. (72) Quo quidem tempore memini tibi Pindarum legenti ac a me petenti quidnam aut
de illo poeta aut de metris suis sentirem, biduo me de metrorum omnium genere disseruisse, teque subinde
flagitasse ut siquid haberem de his rebus, scriptis traderem quoniam tot tantaque memoria tenere non
posses. Fecimus et obtulimus. See note 80 for the preceding text.
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Collectanea, 406. (105) Et tu Grecos homines Greca, in quibus nati, in quibus educati sumus, quibus
etiam Latina illustravimus, parum scire audes dicere? Qui si unum verbum ex aliquo Greco poeta flexeris,
fatebor te Greca non omnino ignorare! (106) Num venit tibi in mentem primis illis annis cum e Grecia
venissem ac de poetica licentia sermo haberetur, asserentem te maximam habere Grecorum poetas
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Trebizond does more than merely point out Guarino’s shortcomings; he builds
an alternate model of erudition based on knowledge of both Latin and Greek. It is the
combination of both, he asserts, that makes him so formidable. To Guarino, he writes:
“The copiousness of my speech is such that I do not fear you; the flood of my genius is
such that I think little of you; this erudition in Greek as much as Latin is such that I can
criticize you easily.” It is the breadth of his education, he continues, that will allow him,
like a knight, to topple Guarino. 111 Unlike his later boast proclaiming that his Latin
eloquence is suited to Cicero’s Rome, Trebizond describes here the importance of both
languages. The argument was surely familiar to Guarino, who argued similarly in
response to da Monachi. Trebizond wields this standard of erudition against Guarino. At
times, he yields a measure of Greek learning to the other man. Trebizond cites the “Greek
manner of speech” in the Agaso letter as evidence of Guarino’s authorship, since “there is
no one besides yourself who, learned in both languages, is a bit angry with me.” 112 He
later explains Guarino’s reputation as a function of the Italian’s Greek education, arguing
“if you had not been instructed by Greeks, you would have languished in the dark.” Even
so, Trebizond’s characterization of Guarino’s shortcomings in Greek allows him to argue

licentiam quod omnia verba metri causa, ut vellent, commutarent, increpatum fuisse a me modestius
quoniam rarissime poete nostri ea re quicquam permutent, sed linquarum esse rationem, quas, cum esse
quinque constet, in unum confundere omnes liceat, ut Homerus precipue factitat, <et> quod ipsis non
muniatur rarissime inveniri?
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Ibid., 382. (7) Nam, Guarine, nec enim molestum cuiquam futurum puto, quod multi preclarique viri
natura ipsa duce fecerunt, si ad meam defensionem me laudavero, presertim cum tu in persequendo id
facias. Ea mihi orationis copia est ut te non pertimescam; id ingenii flumen ut contemnam; ea tam Greca,
quam Latina eruditio ut te facile possim exagitare; ea denique maiorum rerum doctrina ut, ne grande quid
dicam, tanquam catafractus eques, insidentem te asino non hasta, sed solo afflatu currendi precipitem
valeam deturbare.
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Ibid., 382. (4) Quasobres, Guarine…si statim ex inscriptione Grecum sermonem ostentasti, nec mihi
utraque lingua doctus preter te subiratus est quispiam, et horum omnium uno aut altero posses argumento
deprehendi, cum hec inter se mirifice sibi cuncta conveniant, multaque alia, que nunc enumerare longum
esset, concurrant, audebis te illum non esse Agasonem qui hec ediderit impudenter asserere?
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that he had surpassed the man by virtue of his skill in both languages. 113 Not only does
Trebizond contend that he is a skilled Latinist—contrary to Agaso’s accusations—but
that he is a stronger Latinist, better educated and more eloquent, than Guarino is a student
of Greek. It is a remarkably bold claim levied against one of a small number of men—
alongside Francesco Filelfo and Leonardo Bruni—renowned for their skill in both Greek
and Latin.
On the whole, Trebizond’s defense of Greek and his arguments in favor of a
combined knowledge of Greek and Latin are difficult to reconcile with those sections in
which he so adamantly defends his Latinity. Given Trebizond’s clear struggles with
Agaso’s anti-Greek attacks, the inconsistency in his response can be read as a result of
the pressure that Greek stereotypes imposed. As a Greek, Trebizond felt the greatest
amount of pressure to prove his Latinity and so that is where most of his effort went. This
explains some of the inner conflict in his response but not all of it. His contemporaries—
including Guarino—had provided him a blueprint, based on classical Roman arguments
on the need to study both Greek and Latin, with which he might defend himself.
Trebizond, however, so overcompensates in his defense of his Latinity that his arguments
about Greek studies are overshadowed. The irony is that Guarino and Barbaro ultimately
make Trebizond’s argument better than he does. It is interesting to think—albeit
counterfactual and ahistorical—that Guarino may have constructed a stouter defense of
Trebizond against Agaso than Trebizond himself did.
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Ibid., 406. (107) in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine dignissimus, in Greciam
inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est, qui, nisi a Grecis institutus
fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie increpas?
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The Immoral Greek
This analysis began by identifying Agaso’s two main strategies of attack: against
Trebizond’s Latinity and against his moral character. The two, of course, are not mutually
exclusive. We have already seen how Agaso employs both in characterizing Trebizond as
not only ineptus and loquax but also as arrogans. 114 His descriptions of Trebizond’s
conduct are, however, a more integral part of his attacks than has so far been discussed.
Agaso casts Trebizond as obstinate, untrustworthy, disloyal, and immodest, all of which
contribute to his portrayal of Greek levitas and serve as key concepts in the dispute. The
contrast between Roman gravitas on the one hand and Greek levitas on the other
undergirds significant portions of Agaso’s letter. Trebizond addresses this contrast in his
response to Guarino by means of the same attendant moral concepts, including honesty,
fidelity, piety, and loyalty. For both Agaso and Trebizond, questions of moral rectitude,
like questions of learning, were of paramount importance for humanists, particularly
given their role as educators.
The Immoral Student
Perhaps the clearest example of Agaso’s contrast between gravitas and levitas is
his accusation that Trebizond had mistreated Guarino. Agaso gives the topic ample
consideration and casts him as an immoral Greekling—treacherous, dishonest, and
shameless—in contrast to the morally upright Guarino. His argument is predicated on the
premise that Trebizond “first formed an understanding of the Latin language, with
Guarino instructing him.” Despite Guarino’s efforts, time that Agaso explains Guarino
spent in vain on an ungrateful student, Trebizond slandered him in the RLV. That Agaso
114

See page 39 and Agaso’s description of Trebizond as “stupid and impertinent, and without honor.”
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considers these attacks a function of the author’s Greekness is implied by a reference to
Paul calling Cretans liars and beasts, made in the context of a comment about “the men of
this island and their character.” 115 Agaso proceeds to detail Trebizond’s dishonorable
actions including how he attacked Guarino without provocation or warning. He accuses
Trebizond of pursuing an unknowing Guarino with his traps. 116 Agaso describes him as
an impetuous and rash reviler who uses slanderous language. 117 “In the manner of a
deceitful brigand,” he “ambushes his instructor unawares…with slanderous speech.”
Agaso emphasizes that Guarino knew nothing of these attacks and in fact continued to
commend the other man. 118 He thus contrasts Guarino’s innate modesty, “by which he is
accustomed to make light of revilers as he makes light of asses,” with “this Greekling’s”
obstinacy, slander, and temerity. 119 He also faults Trebizond with a failure to apologize
for his insults, to recant them, and to admit his wrongs, “since the greater evidence of a
good man is to prevent oneself from error rather than persist in it, and the path to good
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Collectanea, 368. (20) Hic idem est qui Latine lingue primum, Guarino docente cognitionem imbibit, in
quo erudiendo oleum, ut dicitur, perdidit et impensam. Nam inania sunt beneficia que mortuo pariter et
ingrato conferuntur. For the reference to Paul, see note 48.
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Collectanea, 370. (30) “Que si ab illo aut discendi aut docendi gratia dicebantur, cur non Guarino potius
denuntiabat quam ignarum insidiis insectabatur, presertim ne verbo quidem lacessitus ab eo, nisi quod se ab
illo cultum honoratumque noverat?”
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Ibid., 371. (34) “Cum igitur orationis eius initium tam acute, tam artificiose, ut studiosis videre licet,
contextum sit (est enim, ni fallor, iambici metri ratione inchoatum), impetuosus conviciator ac temerarius
irruit et, modo maledicam exerceat linguam, nihil quod dicat, advertit.”
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Ibid., 371-372. (36) “Plura refellenda restabant, viri patricii, que Guarino remittenda sunt. Namque ut ea
rescierit, suam rem, si mihi audierit, suo, ut dicitur, marte decernet. Is enim, horum ignarus omnium,
Trapezuntium commendare non desinit, ab quo et laudes expectare debuit, cum interim insidiosi more
latronis Trapezuntius suum preceptorem, suum, inquam, preceptorem excipit incautum et maledictis
insectatur.”

119

Ibid., 372. (38) Tu vero Guarinum pro tua in eum fide et consuetudine hortare, immo urge, incende,
anima ut huius Trapezuntii contumaciam confutet et discipulum preceptoris auctoritate castiget ne pro
innata sibi modestia, qua velut asinos solet conviciatores parvi facere, tam honoris et fame negligens, huic
ipsi Greculo maledicentiam, temeritatem, contumaciam sinat increscere quod studiorum non mediocre
dedecus avertendum est.
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mores is never too late.” He suggests Trebizond could recant “his wicked lies” easily in a
short letter. 120 It is for this reason that he solicits aid in leading Trebizond to “repair his
mores” and “restore that student, ungrateful to his instructor, to observable gratitude, by
which he may acquire for himself glory and praise.” 121
Agaso’s arguments are based on an assumption that as a student of Guarino’s,
Trebizond is especially indebted to him. He is very clear that Guarino had a right to
expect his student to praise and honor him. 122 The instructor-student relationship was
much valued in classical and early modern pedagogy, a reality that informs Agaso’s
attacks. Quintilian, for instance, argues that since an instructor must inculcate morals as
well as knowledge, it is crucial that he has an “impeccable character” by which he can
“preserve the young pupils from injury” and “deter the more aggressive from licentious
behavior.” 123 This only works if the student loves and respects his teacher and is willing
to listen to his lessons and imitate his character. “Better nourishment,” Quintilian
explains, “comes…from a teacher whom, if they are properly taught, the pupils love and
respect. It is difficult to overestimate how much readier we are to imitate those whom we
120

Agaso writes that he suggested this in response to the patrician’s story which alleged Trebizond had
publicly slandered Guarino. For the patrician’s story, see note 69. Collectanea, 369. (23) “Cur,” inquam,
“Trapezuntius probra non retractat cum maius viri boni argumentum sit sese ab errato deterrere quam in
errato perstare, et nunquam sera sit ad bonos mores via?” “Verecundia,” inquit, “impedimento est et, cum
tot exscripta sint sue Rhetoric volumina, emendandi labor.” “Alia quaedam via restat,” dixi, “ut parvam per
epistolam impia revocet mendacia, que in ipsum tandem conviciatorem retundentur.”
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Ibid., 371. (33) “Quod si tanta Trapezuntium cura solicitat ut inepta coaptare, turbata disponere, male
posita struere conetur, queso ut discordem totamque sub arma coactam componat Italiam. Que si maiora
viribus abnuat, hominem rogate, viri patricii, ut portus vestri latiorem reddat alveum et ituris rediturisque
navibus utiliora concinnet hostia. Quod si rursum maius humeris opus respuet, suos concinnet mores et
obliquam linguam dirrigat et ingratum sese preceptori discipulum gratum observantemque formet ac
reficiat, que sibi decus laudemque parient.”
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Ibid., 371-372. (36) Trapezuntium commendare non desinit… . See note 118.
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The translations are Russell’s. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2.2.3-4. Nam et adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores
transferuntur et apud eos iuvenes etiam facti perseverant, ideoque maior adhibenda tum cura est ut et
teneriores annos ab iniuria sanctitas docentis custodiat et ferociores a licentia gravitas deterreat.
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like.” 124 To that end, he exhorts the instructor to “adopt a paternal attitude towards his
pupils, and regard himself as taking the place of those whose children are entrusted to
him.” 125 The bond between instructor and student had to be sufficiently close, like that
between parent and child, to create the best possible educational environment.
The classical ideal that an instructor should function in loco parentis was well
established in fifteenth-century pedagogy. Writing in 1450, Aeneas Silvius
Piccolomini—the future Pope Pius II—echoes Quintilian in arguing that instructors
should lead their students to a moral life “with teachings in keeping with a praiseworthy
life and with admonitions from which the shoots of the most correct morals will
germinate.” 126 The goal, he explains, is to “incite [youths] to virtuous deeds” and
“restrain them from disgraceful behavior.” 127 “If you [the student] wish to act rightly,” he
contends “you should love them [instructors] not less than your studies themselves, and
you will consider them as parents, not of your body, but of your mind.” He emphasizes
the point by citing Juvenal: “May fragrant saffrons and perpetual spring bloom over the
ashes of those who deemed that a teacher should hold the place of a revered parent.” 128
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Quint., Inst. 2.2.8. tamen viva illa, ut dicitur, vox alit plenius, praecipueque praeceptoris quem discipuli,
si modo recte sunt instituti, et amant et verentur. Vix autem dici potest quanto libentius imitemur eos
quibus favemus.
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Quint., Inst. 2.2.4-5. Sumat igitur ante omnia parentis erga discipulos suos animum, ac succedere se in
eorum locum a quibus sibi liberi tradantur existimet.
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Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed.
Kallendorf, 10. Horum officum est, ut sicut coloni suis arbusculis circumponunt saepes, sic tibi consona
laudabilis vitae instituta admonitionesque circumferant, unde rectissima morum germina pullulent,
honestatis enim fons atque radix est legitima disciplina.
127

Ibid., 10. Nobilibus pueris et maxime regibus maiorum laudes ac vituperia quam verbera commoditatem
magis afferunt. Illae ad honesta concitant, haec a turpitudine cohibent; in utrisque tamen adhibendus est
modus, ne quid nimis sit.
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Ibid., 10. Discenti autem nihil magis adversum est, quam praeceptores odisse, quos tu, si recte facere
volueris, non minus amabis quam ipsa studia, et parentes esse, non quidem corporis sed mentis tuae
iudicabis. Multum haec pietas studio confert. Audi rursus Iuvenalem: dii maiorum umbris tenuem et sine
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Battista Guarino argues similarly: “Let us not think our ancestors were rash when they
deemed that a teacher should stand in the place of a venerated parent.” In this way “a
teacher would instruct his pupils with greater care and good will, and his pupils would
respect his words reverently as though they flowed from paternal affection.” The opposite
also holds true, “if they scorn him [their instructor], they will also necessarily scorn his
teaching.” He cites Plutarch’s example of Alexander the Great, “who used to declare that
he owed no less to his teacher Aristotle than to Philip his father, because from the latter
he had only received life, but from the former he had received the good life.” 129 Agaso
too clearly embraces the notion of an instructor functioning in loco parentis according to
the will of “our venerable ancestors.” 130 He, like Battista Guarino, offers the example of
Alexander the Great to urge students to protect their instructors “like second parents.” 131
Agaso not only chastises Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino, he provides a clear
indication of the moral obligations a student owes his instructor by describing those

pondere terram spirantesque crocos et in urna perpetuum ver, qui praeceptorem sancti voluere parentis esse
loco. Cf. Juv., 7.207-210.
129

Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, ed. Kallendorf, 4.
Deinde in praeceptore colendo paternam sibi constituant sanctitatem; nam si eum contempserint, eius
quoque praeceptionem contemnant necesse est. Neque enim existimandum est maiores illos temere
praeceptorem sancti voluisse parentis esse loco; sed ut ille maiore cum diligentia benivolentiaque eos
instrueret, ipsi autem venerabundi eius dicta velut a paterna quadam affectione manantia observanda esse
crederent. Quocirca ea in re Alexandri magni exemplum imitabuntur, qui non minus se Aristoteli
praeceptori quam Philippo patri debere praedicabat, propterea quod ab hoc esse tantum, ab illo et bene esse
accepisset. Cf. Plut., Alex. 8.3.
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Collectanea, 370. (30) “Num censetis, inquam, viri patricii causas fuisse Trapezuntio quibus in eius
preceptorem inveheretur, quem maiores nostri sancti voluere parentis esse loco?” See note 116 for the rest
of the passage.
131

Collectanea, 372. (39) Vos etiam adolescentes et litterarie militie tyrones, alacres in hunc invadendum
insurgite. Ubinam melius dicendi artem, cui nunc insudetis, exercere potestis quam ut bonos probetis,
malignos accusetis, et doctores vestros quasi secundos parentes, pro vestra pietate tutemini? Octavianum
Augustum ante oculos proponite, qui Athenodorum magistrum non minus quam Octavium observare,
collaudare, defensare visus est. Idem ab Alexandro Magno factitatum est, qui Aristotelis pietatem vel
anteponere vel equare Philippi caritati pre se tulit.
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students of Guarino who show him the proper respect and affection. The discussion
allows Agaso to cast in clearer terms Trebizond’s lack of honor. This is most evident
when Agaso relates the testimony of the unnamed patrician. Agaso recalls first the
patrician’s description of how quickly a crowd of Guarino’s students and supporters, in
the presence of Trebizond, spoke in defense of their instructor. “Retaining still the recent
memory and teaching of Guarino with affection,” they in turn proclaimed Guarino’s
prudence, his elegance, his gravitas, the sweetness and clarity of his speech and his
eloquence.” 132 Agaso uses the patrician’s testimony to imply that such behavior was to be
expected of morally upright students. He argues this more explicitly when expressing
surprise that “since so many of Guarino’s students flourish” anybody could think
Trebizond’s insults against Guarino would go unchallenged. These students, he suggests,
were obligated to respond to Trebizond’s insults by returning like for like. 133 He
reiterates his surprise later and wonders why “since so many upright citizens and youths
are bound to Guarino by the bond of an instructor and by intimate affection nobody
stands forth to restrain the reviler.” 134 He then urges Paulus Regius—the letter’s
recipient, whom Agaso describes as a fellow student of Guarino’s—“because of [his]
faith in [Guarino] and friendship,” to encourage Guarino to defend himself. 135
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Ibid., 368-369. See note 69.
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Collectanea, 369. (24) “An quispiam existimet, cum tot etiam docti quidem viri auditores Guarini
vigeant, hac impunita relicturos esse maledicta, quin par pari referant quod Trapezuntium remordeant?”
This is part of Agaso’s argument that Trebizond should write a letter recanting his lies. See pages 70-71.

134

Collectanea, 372. (36) “Nec satis mirari queo, cum hac in urbe tot cives integerrimi, tot adolescentes
Guarino litteraria necessitudine et intima caritate devincti sint, extare neminem qui conviciatorem reprimat,
memorem, qui non vetat peccare cum possit, iubet.”
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For the identity of Regius, see note 13 above. For Agaso’s exhortation to Regius, see note 119.
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As with the arguments regarding Latinity, Agaso’s accusation that he is an
immoral student forces Trebizond to defend himself against allegations of moral wrongdoing and levitas. He begins by rejecting the premise that Guarino provided him with any
meaningful instruction in Latin: “You make yourself out to be my teacher, although…I
received my Latin from Vittorino da Feltre.” 136 Trebizond counters Agaso’s claim that
Guarino taught him upon his arrival in Italy by explaining that initial instruction “hardly
lasted two months.” During that time, he contends that he was “occupied in transcription,
not in learning,” adding “if a confused examination of the most basic topics can even be
called instruction.” 137 Trebizond continues to belittle Guarino’s instruction as “some of
the basic lessons which are usually given by women rather than men.” 138 On the other
hand, Trebizond praises himself for learning Latin in spite of this poor instruction and
argues he learned nothing from Guarino, whom he describes as unskilled. 139 These insults
regarding Guarino’s lessons are likely indicative of the growing Quattrocento tendency to
consider the teaching of grammar a less prestigious career, particularly compared to the
136

Collectanea, 397. (67) Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a Victorino
Feltrensi acceperim.

137

Ibid., 398. See note 80. (72) Vix duorum mensium…confusa cognitio.
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Collectanea, 398. (73) Videntur hec magna, preceptor, que abste accepimus? Communisima quedam,
que femine magis quam viri monstrare solent, tradidisti. Oleum ac impensam amisisse quereris. Ego (ita me
deus amet) pluris unicum ex his verbulum que tibi de metris subieci quam universam illam elementorum
cognitionem facio. Hoc enim vulgo habetur; illud antequam invenies, et oleum multum profecto et
impensam expones. Cf. Agaso’s claim, note 115.
Monfasani does not note Trebizond’s abste but I follow Christopher Celenza in taking it as the
combination of abs and te. See Celenza, Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da
Castiglionchio the Younger’s De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 100.
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The passage is part of an apostrophe to Vittorino whom Trebizond cites as his true Latin instructor.
Collectanea, 398. (75) Guarinus tibi magis quam mihi invidet. Imo vero tibi soli hoc loco iniuriatur. Tuam
enim in se, non meam, transferre gloriam nititur. Ego, Grecus homo, Latinas didici litteras. A quo nihil ad
me. Quanto ab imperitiore didicerim, tanto mihi maior laus debetur, si bene didici. Ego te Guarino
doctiorem et quidem multum duco, vel potius te doctissimum, illum ignorantissimum. Si fallor, mea hec est
culpa. Nihil ad modestiam tuam. Illud dico: maiori mihi futurum laudi, si bene Latinitatem teneo, cum a
Guarino, non abste me doctum dixero. Mentiri non est meum. Tacere honeste possum. Non taceo. Pietate in
te mea cogor, qua non aliter ac parentem sancte te colui.
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teaching of rhetoric. 140 As Guarino was a renowned authority on grammar and Trebizond
had recently published his own major rhetorical treatise, the slight would have provided
Trebizond with another way to denigrate Guarino’s learning and applaud his own. 141 By
rejecting the premise that Guarino was his instructor, though, Trebizond also refutes
Agaso’s depiction of him as an immoral student. In Trebizond’s account, he was not a
bad student so much as Guarino was a bad teacher.
By naming Vittorino as his true Latin instructor, Trebizond also embraces the
language of the instructor-student bond. It is an implicit response to Agaso’s criticisms
that allows him to demonstrate that he actually is a grateful and respectful student to his
true instructor. It also allows him to make his own accusations about Guarino’s immoral
behavior. Trebizond employs the same set of concepts as Agaso—arrogance, dishonesty,
and glory-seeking—although he cannot, as a foreigner in Italy, express them with a
corresponding ethnic stereotype. He sharply criticizes Guarino for passing himself off as
his teacher, a criticism he levies first by addressing Guarino and then in an apostrophe to
Vittorino himself. 142 Addressing Vittorino, Trebizond argues that Guarino “envies you
140

Robert Black argues that the social and professional status of grammarians declined in the Quattrocento
compared to professors of rhetoric and poetry. Robert Black, Humanism and Education in Medieval and
Renaissance Italy: Tradition and Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth to the Fifteenth Century
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31-33. There is evidence of bias in the 1431/32 invective
of Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, edited by David Rutherford. Rho frequently mocks
Panormita as a “measly teacher of ABCs [grammaticus]” and a “teacher of childish ABCs [litterator et
paedagogus].” I cite the section numbers that Rutherford provides. Antonio da Rho, The Philippic of
Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, in Early Renaissance Invective and the Controversies of
Antonio da Rho, ed. and trans. David Rutherford (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance
Texts and Studies, 2005), 27 and 145.
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Guarino’s grammatical manual, the Regulae grammaticales, was composed prior to 1418, survives in
almost forty manuscripts, and remained in use into the seventeenth century. Grendler, noting as Black does
a shift in the status of grammar in the Renaissance curriculum, identifies Guarino as one of the last major
figures to compose and publish a grammar text. Grendler, 166-169 and 194. Guarino also played an
important role in the teaching of Greek grammar. See page 31 above.
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For the apostrophe as a rhetorical figure of speech see Rhet. Her. 4.22; Quint., Inst. 4.1.63-70, 9.2.38-40,
and 9.3.26-28.
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more than me” and “injures you alone.” He explains that by trying to claim him as his
student, Guarino “struggles to claim your glory, not mine, for himself.” 143 He
characterizes Guarino’s attacks on the RLV as, by extension, criticisms of Vittorino as
well, whom he urges to curb Guarino’s “obstinacy and arrogance…lest all those whom
you teach are torn to pieces by your courteousness.” Trebizond relies on the instructorstudent bond to argue that it is Vittorino’s responsibility to defend his students. His
appeal indicates that the commitments of that relationship work both ways. On the one
hand, he adopts the in loco parentis language to describe the obligation he feels toward
Vittorino, “by which I honor you no differently and piously than a parent.” He likens
himself to one of Vittorino’s sons, whom “you begat for yourself by means of your
instruction.” On the other hand, as one of Vittorino’s “sons,” Trebizond can expect
support from his “father” and protection from “rapacious wolves” like Guarino. 144
As in Agaso’s characterization of Guarino’s students, Trebizond’s discussion of
his own students plays a role in his self-presentation and his efforts to define Guarino as
dishonorable. This discussion represents a direct response to Agaso’s claim that
143

Collectanea, 397. (67) Nam scripta nostra huiscemodi sunt ut tu ipse, tu, inquam, ipse, ingenti
admiratione perculsus, laudis ac gloriole nostre, quam sic solidiorem esse tua vides ut eterniorem futuram,
aliquid callide coneris aucupari. Preceptorem enim te meum fingis, cum ego Greca a meis, Latina a
Victorino Feltrensi acceperim. Deus mihi est testis, Guarine, contempsissem te, non vexassem, neque tam
rudi homini respondere voluissem nisi et scriptis meis, quibus doctior factus es, et Victorino preceptori, a
quo, ut scis, cuncta que ad Latinitatem pertinent hausimus, et universe Grecie propter nos animo et
voluntate detraxisses; Ibid., 398. (74) Sed te nunc appello, Victorine. Defende ac protege partes tuas. Siquid
Latine lingue in me est, te doctore post deum est. Insurgit Guarinus et, quoniam prima elementa monstravit,
maiorum quoque rerum scientiam se duce nos imbibisse proclamat. See also note 139, Guarinus…didici.
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Collectanea, 398-399. (76) Tu tacebis et Guarini amentiam non redargues tua rapientis, si non re, at
minis, litteris, nuntiis? Si de hoc, cum ipso non egeris, si de hoc non questus fueris, si tantam huius
impudentiam non castigabis, si contumaciam, si arrogantiam non infinges atque retundes, cave ne omnes
quos doces facilitate tua distrahantur. O confidentiam hominis inauditam! O temeritatem incredibilem!
Quod multi sciunt—multi? quin vero omnes ferme qui me cognoscunt et te, Victorine, in se transferre
impudens homo conatur hinc atque illinc per maiorem invective partem. Hoc in loco moratur. Preceptorem
se Georgio fuisse mentitur. Tu veritatem tacebis ac me deseres? Si liberos genuisses rapientibus traderes
lupis? Non protegeres? Natura impulses, dices? Nunc quos doctrina filios tibi peperisti, qui, cum liberi non
sunt, liberis etiam ipsis, maxime si quicquam de se pollicentur magni, cariores atque iocundiores esse
solent, destitues et parvipendes? See note 139 for the preceding text.
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Trebizond wrote against Guarino without provocation and therefore dishonorably.
Trebizond explains that he had, in fact, been provoked on two separate occasions when
advocates of Guarino had publicly proclaimed before his students the eloquence of their
master above Trebizond’s. 145 Clericinus Vincentinus was the first to do so. He brought
one of Guarino’s orations with him and after it was read aloud he praised it and
announced that “if he were able to command all Italy, nobody other than Guarino would
be appointed to teach rhetoric.” Trebizond’s description of the scene makes clear that he
and his students viewed it as an act of aggression and arrogance. His students were
angered at Clericinus’ audacity and surprised that Guarino could think Trebizond “so
lowly and common…that even in my own home you believed your unjust and fallacious
attack would be tolerated.” Like Agaso’s discussion of Guarino’s patrician students,
Trebizond’s students actively defended their instructor against what they perceived to be
unjust and slanderous attacks. One of them came forth at Trebizond’s behest to read an
oration in the same category, the exordium of which was compared to the exordium of
Guarino’s speech. Trebizond’s description of this episode seems an implicit refutation of
Agaso’s claims that he was a poor and unloved instructor. 146 The story casts Trebizond as
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This passage and the ones in the next two notes are consecutive. Collectanea, 405. (101) “At ne verbo
quidem fuisti lacessitus.” Ego si lacessitus non fuissem, res ipsa, quam verissime scripseram, mihi
satisfaceret. Nunquam enim a vero, presertim si ad utilitatem communem pertinet, ulla virum bonum
voluptas vel dolor deflectet. Verum si lacessitum quoque demonstrem iam ipso Guarino iudice, omni
molestia liberatus sum. (102) Explosum me quondam e Vincentia exibilatumque dicis. Tua opera qui me
vicinum nolebas. Multa mihi fuerunt argumenta, que non scribo vel ut brevior sim, vel quoniam ad hanc
urbem venire cupienti minus acerba. Hic rursus mihi molestiam afferre per tuos non cessabas, sed unum
dicam e multis. Cf. note 116 for Agaso’s claim that Trebizond had not been provoked. See also note 49 for
Agaso’s use of a Ciceronian cultural stereotype to make a similar but more general point about Greeks
attacking learned men.
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Collectanea, 405-406. (103) Clericinus Vincentinus domum meam venit, apportans secum in
Theodoram, ut opinor, nescio quam laudes. Perlecta oratio est, qua nescio siquid aridius atque squalidius
unquam scripseris. Summis eam Clericinus efferebat laudibus, probus quidem vir, sed qui nimio in te
studio aberraret. Nam ut odium, sic voluntas nimia et amor vel acutissimorum hominum iudicia corrumpere
solet, itaque adiecit se, si toti posset imperare Italie, iussurum nequis preter Guarinum in ea rhetoricam
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so loved that his students drove Clericinus away, speechless, perplexed, and embarrassed.
Gerardus, Guarino’s secretary from Ferrara, arrived a few days later and “with many in
attendance” voiced his master’s displeasure at the way Clericinus had been treated.
Having rejected the claim that he was an ungrateful student, Trebizond presents the
arrivals of Clericinus and Gerardus as unjust incursions to illustrate Guarino’s own
dishonorable behavior. 147
Guarino the Philhellene
Agaso’s characterization of Trebizond as an immoral student is only one of the
ways by which he argues for his Greek levitas. A second strategy involves a story about
Trebizond’s brother which, although it receives only a brief mention, he intends as
another testament to the Cretan’s Greek conduct. The latter point is evident in that he
follows the story immediately with his comment on the character of Cretan men. 148
Agaso alleges that Trebizond drove away his brother, “a good boy indeed,” and “reduced
him, wandering, to beg through foreign cities.” It is hardly surprising, the passage
doceret. Hec non tam me quam meos qui aderant pertulerant. Circunspiciebant, murmurabant. Exarsi,
fateor. An ita demissus ego et abiectus tibi et tuis visus sum ut etiam domi mee iniquum atque fallacem
impetum vestrum laturum credideritis? Iubeo afferri orationem adolescentuli cuiusdam in eodem
conscriptam genere. Legebatur; exordium conferebantur cum tuo. In singulis elegantius, significantius,
expressius, et, quod permagnum est, prudentius te dicebat adolescentulus. Obmutuit Clericinus.Vultu
confusus, abiit. Hec ego te duce fecisse ipsum suspicabar. Recens enim erat Vincentie memoria. Cf. pages
44-46 above.
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Collectanea, 405-406. (104) Post paucos deinde dies venit Gerardus, librarius tuus, e Ferraria. Multis
audientibus velle se dicere ait, que tu referenda mihi tradidisti: que Clericinus dixit aut audivit, tibi, narrat,
litteris significata fuisse; dolere te mihique succensere quod ita de te sentiam. Ingentem vero regem!
Regem, inquam, an tyrannum, qui vel domi sue homines aggreditur, petit, exagitat? Se solum dignum esse
qui doceat denuntiet. Ceteros iubeat, si possit, tacere. Et cum re, quantum valeat, vexet, ne verbo quidem
lacessere credi vult! Quod si tunc obticuissem, nonne (quod Vincentie mihi accidit) a meis ipsis Clericini
verbis assensisse iudicarer? An uni mihi meorum de me existimationem domi in esse retinere non licebit?
Tunc ergo certior factus de tuis insidiis, inimicum te mihi cognovi et, ut decet, ingenium aperta fronte
odisse cepi. Odisse, dixi? Imo vero magis amare. Nam vitia tua in dicendo vere predicare id est, si sapis,
meliorem te facere.
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That Agaso intends the story as further evidence of Trebizond’s Greekness is evident in that he follows
it with his comment on the character of Cretan men. See pages 42-43 above.
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suggests, that Trebizond would mistreat his instructor, a man whom he should respect but
to whom he offers only a “chick-pea thanks,” if he showed such little regard for his own
brother. 149 Worse, Agaso seems to imply that Trebizond’s supposed ill-treatment of his
brother was the reason for the younger man’s eventual death. “Do you want to know,”
Agaso asks, “who this man is who so demolishes men deceased and living?” Guarino
clearly was one of the living men, leaving Trebizond’s brother to represent the deceased
men whom he demolishes. While Agaso clearly blames Trebizond for turning his brother
away and forcing him to become a beggar, his phrasing suggests he may also be
implicating Trebizond in his brother’s death.
Whether or not the Agaso letter was truly blaming Trebizond for the death of his
brother, Trebizond responds as if it had. He categorically denies Agaso’s version of
events, both the explicit accusations and what he perceived to be the implicit allegations
regarding his brother’s death, and offers his own version of his brother’s travels in Italy.
In Trebizond’s hands, his younger brother’s story becomes part of a larger argument
that—sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly—challenges Guarino’s morality and his
philhellenic reputation. Here he portrays Guarino as an abuser of foreigners. He describes
how his brother was “enticed from Crete” with hopes of serving as a papal secretary and
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Collectanea, 368. (19) Testis ipse sum quotiens ab Guarino in sermonibus amicorum et litteris, que
complures extant, precipuis adornetur laudibus. Quid frontem caperasti? Num et fratem probum quidem
adolescentem sua extruxit importunitate et alienas coegit errabundum per urbes mendicare ut minus mirer
et preceptori suo arietinas referre gratias? Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat
homines? E Creta dudum advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. For the surrounding text, including the
description of the time and effort Guarino had expended on teaching Trebizond and Agaso’s contention that
Trebizond should honor Guarino, see notes 44 and 48.
Monfasani’s apparatus notes that in one of the manuscripts Trebizond corrected Agaso’s fratem
to fratrem and replaced extruxit with detrusit, which makes Agaso’s accusation clearer. Collectanea, 375. I
take arietina gratia, “a chick-pea thanks,” as a reference to size that denotes the very little gratitude
Trebizond offers his instructor. It is consistent with Agaso’s use of chick-pea elsewhere, as when he
describes Trebizond not as a novus Cicero, an exceptional and eloquent man, but as a “chick-pea” [cicer],
as unexceptional and ordinary. See Collectanea, 365 (2) Videre licet…alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel
cicer, magis sua quadam usurpat inscitia?

80

ventured to Rome at the behest of the pope. Unfortunately, Trebizond explains, he was
too poor at the time to support his brother’s journey financially. Instead, he provided him
with several Greek codices to sell to fund his way to Rome. That is why his brother
stopped first at Ferrara and visited Guarino, who, Trebizond continues, “snatched up the
books at a cheap price.” Far from helping his brother, Guarino cheated him. Now,
Trebizond fumes, in the Agaso letter Guarino accuses him of having relegated his own
brother to begging. 150 Trebizond’s reworking of the tale shifts the responsibility for his
brother’s plight and death back onto Guarino. The implication that Guarino contributed to
his brother’s demise by rendering him penniless underscores his characterization of
Guarino’s immorality. Trebizond’s accusations may very well also be read as implicit
challenges to Guarino’s sincerity as a philhellene. Certainly, Guarino’s contemporaries,
including Trebizond, were well aware of his interests in Greek studies. 151 This is why, in
Trebizond’s version, his brother stopped at Ferrara. Guarino would have been an obvious
contact for someone interested in selling Greek codices. Guarino’s aid would have been
invaluable to Trebizond’s brother because Byzantine émigrés depended so much on the
support of influential Italians. 152 Though he does not make the case explicitly, it is
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Collectanea, 397-398. (70) Ad hec extrusisse me fratrem arguit. Quis hoc unquam suspicari posset
preter Guarinum? Fratrem habuisse me multi sciunt. Is clericorum spe illectus e Creta abiit invito patre ut
Romam iret. Venit ad me priusquam Romam isset. Hoc quoque multi. Discedenti pecunias tenuis ego
conferre ad iter non potui, fraterna caritate motus, non nullos codices Grecos dedi. Quos ut venderet,
Ferraria<m> iter faciens, venit ad Guarinum, qui minimo pretio adolescenti libros eripuit. Ac ideo
mendicare per alienas urbes putat eum qui eodem ipso anno diem suum obit.
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On Guarino’s philhellenic reputation and on Italian philhellenism in general, see pages 26-27 and 31-32.
On Guarino’s stance regarding the importance of Greek studies, see pages 57-58.
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Trebizond acknowledges himself to have been a beneficiary when describing the support he received
from individuals such as Barbaro. Other Byzantines enjoyed similar support, most notably the circle of
scholars around Bessarion in Rome. He supported Trebizond for a time, as well as Theodore Gaza,
Andronicus Callistus, Andronicus Contoblacas and others. Harris, 101, 128-140, and 189.
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reasonable to conclude that Trebizond is challenging Guarino’s reputation by casting him
not as a supporter or ally of Greek émigrés but as a predator of vulnerable foreigners.
This interpretation gains credence when examining the conclusion of Trebizond’s
letter—his defense of Greece and Greek learning—where he addresses Guarino’s
philhellenic reputation and castigates his deceit, hypocrisy, and audacity. He laments that
Guarino, of all men, attacks Greece and argues that “if Greece has deserved well from
any Italian, from you certainly it has deserved the best, you who, if you had not been
instructed by Greeks, would have languished in the dark.” He accuses Guarino of having
the audacity to build a reputation for Greek studies and yet to cast aspersions on Greek
culture. The passage is another of his attempts to portray Agaso’s attacks as against
Greeks in general rather than Trebizond in particular. It is also another engagement with
anti-Greek language and accusations of Greek levitas. 153 Here he mocks Guarino’s
hypocrisy and deceit—“you faultless man”—for reproving “the levitas and deceit of
Greece.” 154 The line turns Agaso’s arguments about Trebizond’s levitas against Guarino.
Trebizond implies that in criticizing Greeks as deceitful and dishonorable, Guarino
proved himself to be exactly those things. It is for good reason that Trebizond ends his
response by taking aim at Guarino’s levitas—his deceit, audacity, and hypocrisy—since
Agaso’s description of Guarino focused so much on his gravitas. According to
Trebizond, Guarino was hardly in a position to judge anybody for levitas. Guarino’s
career was built on Greek studies, Trebizond argues, yet he criticizes Greek culture,
attacks scholars including Trebizond himself for being Greek, and, as the earlier story
153

See pages 63-65 above.
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Collectanea, 406. (107) Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu
omnium…inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est, qui, nisi a
Grecis institutus fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie increpas?
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involving Trebizond’s brother suggests, abuses foreigners. Trebizond’s response to the
numerous anti-Greek attacks of the Agaso letter thus at times engages directly with and
seeks to undermine Guarino’s well-known philhellenic reputation.
Greek Heterodoxy
The question of Trebizond’s Greek morality functions in yet another way during
the Guarino dispute, relative to fifteenth-century views of Greek religion. In his
Responsio, Trebizond devotes a prolonged section to defending himself from what he
claims was Agaso’s attempt to defame his religion. The anti-Greek language discussed
thus far has been predominantly classical in its construction because of the frequency
with which Agaso and Trebizond appeal explicitly and implicitly to classical Roman
arguments, tropes, and authors. Religion, however, was a thoroughly current issue that
deeply tinged attitudes toward Greeks in the west. To contextualize the conversation
about religion it is necessary to consider long-standing medieval and early modern
cultural assumptions about Greeks. In truth, the distinction between classical and postclassical Greek stereotypes is slightly misleading. Classical conceptions of Greek levitas
continued to inform anti-Greek perceptions long into the future. Eventually, however,
additional stressors between the Byzantine Empire and the west began to add to these
stereotypes. Not the least important of these was the divergence between Greek and Latin
Christian doctrine and practices and the concept of the Greek heretic.
By the fifteenth century, there was a mutual distrust between Latins and Greeks
rooted in religious issues dating back centuries. The Latin addition of the Filioque clause
to the Nicene creed in the ninth century served as a significant doctrinal and
ecclesiological division between the Greek and Latin churches. Tia Kolbaba argues that
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the ensuing debates about the clause served as the impetus for a good bit of “wallbuilding” by both Latins and Greeks as each side developed arguments about the
supposed heresies of the other. The debate effectively “created,” Kolbaba argues, both
the Latin and the Greek heretic. 155 Joseph Gill argues that the first three crusades created
additional divisions and contributed to suspicion and distrust. 156 Westerners blamed
Greeks for the failure to recapture Jerusalem. Jonathan Harris describes how the
Byzantine alliance with Saladin during the Third Crusade contributed to the western
notion “of Greeks as scheming and untrustworthy.” 157 On the other hand, the Fourth
Crusade, the sack of Constantinople, the fifty-seven years of Latin occupation afterward,
and the resultant Latinization of Greek religious rites contributed greatly to Greek
antipathy toward the west. 158 The outcome was the development of an anti-Latinism
among Greeks that remained centuries later and included mistrust, suspicion, prejudices,
and a consideration of racial differences. 159 Mutual distrust hindered attempts to unify the
Byzantine and Roman churches. The two sides were unable to overcome their differences
at the Council of Lyons in 1274 or the Council of Florence in 1438-9. 160 Gill gives antiLatin sentiment as the reason why the Greeks rejected union after the Council of Florence
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Tia M. Kolbaba, Inventing Latin Heretics: Byzantines and the Filioque in the Ninth Century
(Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2008), 1-3 and 131-139.
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Joseph Gill, The Council of Florence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 8.
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Harris, Greek Émigrés, 39.
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Gill, 13; Deno Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence (1438-1439) and the Problem of Union between
the Greek and Latin Churches,” Church History 24, no.4 (Dec. 1955): 332.
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Gill, 396; Donald Nicol, “The Byzantine View of Western Europe,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine
Studies 8, no.4 (Winter 1967): 329-330, 338.
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Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence,” 324-5.
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and in the face of encroaching Turkish forces. 161 When the Greeks at Florence first
accepted union only to return to Constantinople and reject it, the action reinforced
stereotypes among Latins who had long viewed Greeks as heretics, schismatics,
untrustworthy, and deceitful. 162
Fifteenth-century Latin-Greek religious tension sometimes manifested itself in
Latin texts as anti-Greek language. This is evident in the reactions to the fall of
Constantinople in 1453 which raised the question of whether the west would, or should,
launch a crusade. Some blamed the Greeks for the disaster. Poggio Bracciolini’s On the
Misery of the Human Condition (1455) offers an example of this position. Although most
in the dialogue grieve the loss of the city— “no previous century had ever witnessed such
a terrible and dangerous fall of a city”—Matteo Palmieri blames the Greeks:
I think simple humanity demands our sympathy at the fall of such a city. But if
you consider the nature and customs of the Greeks, their treachery, idleness and
avarice, it seems to me they deserved their punishment. As to the first, their nature
and manner of life are sufficiently explained in Cicero’s speech for Flaccus. As to
their trustworthiness and devoutness, the attitude they have always taken towards
Christians is made clear above all by the destruction of Christian armies which
Greek treachery wiped out as they made their way to recover the Holy Land. They
have twice now abjured professions of Catholic faith made in church councils
[Lyons, Florence]…They were forever imploring the popes for assistance in their
hour of need: the help they could very easily have given themselves they sought
of others, with the result that the disaster seems to have taken place not through
chance but by divine judgment. 163
Palmieri’s response merges classical and post-classical Greek stereotypes. He advances
characterizations of Greek treachery and untrustworthiness through Cicero and Greek
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Gill, 396; Geanakoplos, “The Council of Florence,” 324-5.
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Gill, 349.
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Poggio Bracciolini, On the Misery of the Human Condition, trans. Martin Davies, in Cambridge
Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, ed. Jill Kraye, vol. 1, Moral Philosophy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20-21.
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impiety through the councils of Lyons and Florence. Moreover, his position regarding
divine punishment was not unique. 164
Bravus’ invective against Contoblacas includes allegations of divine punishment
and accuses Greeks of disgraceful wickedness, perfidy, and heretical depravity. Greeks
like Contoblacas, Bravus argues, “dare to mangle Christ with snarling teeth” and their
minds are corrupt and entangled in heretical beliefs. Bravus describes them as heretics,
schismatics, and inventors of wickedness. He criticizes Greeks for defending their false
beliefs, which attests that “you are barbarians, not, as you say, Latins.” It is for this
reason “and by the just judgment of God” that Constantinople was destroyed and its
people were massacred or left to wander and pay the price for their beliefs. Even this
catastrophe, he continues, does not “deter your obstinate minds from false beliefs, to
which indeed you return like a dog to vomit.” 165 As these fifteenth-century texts
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Hankins speaks at length about the notion of divine punishment. See also Arabatzis, 478-479 and Harris,
41.
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Bravus, 21-45. Quo fit ut magis tibi et petulantiae tuae ignoscendum putem, si garrulis et ineptis
quibusdam uerbis latinum genus lacessere non dubitaueris, quandoquidem Christus noster, cuius
sacratissimam et integerrimam fidem tuis caninis morsibus lacerare ausus es, te superstitem patitur et terra
ipsa te factoris sui hostem publicum ex hominum oculis non absorbet. Horum autem quae merito pateris
malorum non tibi, ut affirmas, Latini causa fuere nec in eos tam precipiti et petulanti lingua maledicere
debueras, uerum fedissima scelera tua, uel te potius ipsum (qui ad ea perpetranda quam facile currebas) ac
perfidiam et hereticam prauitatem tuam tibi accusandum erat, ob que in huiusmodi non immerito
calamitates incidisti. Et, nisi corruptam hactenus et hereticis opinionibus irretitam mentem omni falsitate
penitus exueris, duriora (mihi crede) supplicia tibi subeundum erit. Nunc inter rosas ac lilia iocaris; audes
preterea Graecos religionis excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inuentores appellare. Hoc profecto tibi
lubenter concesserim: illos semper religionis—sed heretice et scismatice—fuisse uerso excultores, bonarum
artium a nonnullis Grecorum optimis uiris inuentarum corruptores et omnium demum scelerum inuentores,
quod et Virgilius noster testatur: Scelerumque inuentor Ulixes. Hec tibi numquam negauerim. Compertum
enim omnibus est quantum ecclesiae sacrosancte Romane rebelles semper extitistis, quae sepenumero, cum
genus uestrum caeteris fidelibus aggregare uoluerit, uos hereses fallacesque opiniones uestras pro uiribus
semper defensare studuistis. Que quidem omnia uos barbaros, non aut<em> Latinos ut ais, esse
comprobant. Quamobrem et iusto Dei iudicio factum est ut, diruta Constantinopolis urbe non sine preu<i>a
uestri generis strage, huc atque illuc uagantes pertinaciae uestre penas luatis. Neque hoc quoque tam dirum
supplicium obstinatas mentes uestras adhuc a falsis sententiis ita deterrere potuit, quin ueluti canes ad
uomitum redeatis.
The likening of Contoblacas to a dog returning to vomit derives from Proverbs 26.11 and is a
staple of invective. Cf. Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 1.39-40. Among humanists, see the use in Petrarch, On His Own
Ignorance and That of Many Others, in Francesco Petrarca: Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh
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illustrate, east-west religious differences factored into the Renaissance Italian concepts of
Greek morality.
The issue of Greek religion emerges in the Trebizond-Guarino quarrel from
Agaso’s passing remark criticizing Trebizond for using language “completely
unbecoming of a Christian man” who “ought to both be and appear to be a good man”
and “who professes to instill good mores in his students.” The problem was that a
Christian, Trebizond, made a reference to plural gods by using the word “deorumque.”
Agaso makes clear his disapproval by arguing first that “these utterances reflect a
particular frame of mind” and then that it is “a sin to use [the name of God] even in
jest. 166 It is a short but potentially meaningful passage. On the one hand, it clearly
questions Trebizond’s ability to serve as an instructor. It appeals to the early modern
expectation that instructors were “both to be and appear to be” good men to inculcate
morals and lead their students to virtuous lives. 167 On the other hand, it may have been
intended as yet another Greek slur in an attack that would have been wholly consistent
with his other anti-Greek attacks. The evidence on this point is undoubtedly more
tentative. There is nothing overtly anti-Greek about Agaso’s remark. Understood against
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 64 and Antonio da Rho, The Philippic of Antonio da
Rho against Antonio Panormita, in Early Renaissance Invective, ed. and trans. Rutherford, 189. For each
work, I cite the section numbers provided by the editors.
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Collectanea, 366. (8) Eodem in prohemio doctrinas ab auctore ac donatore laudaturus, cum deum
hominum patrem satis esset dicere, adiecit “deorumque,” credo, ne ranarum patrem aut fortassis cicadarum
aut asinorum lector minus cautus intelligeret. Nam vocales he sunt animantes. Verbum profecto Christiano
indignum homine, cui deorum nomen vel ioco usurpare nefas est, nedum cum serio et in veritate dicit aut
scribit is qui vir bonus et esse et videri debet et probos instillare discipulis suis mores pre se fert.
Agaso is referring to a passage from Trebizond’s preface to the reader for the RLV. Monfasani has
edited the section. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 370-71. Ego id existimo nisi Bertolini, Alani,
aliorumque huiusmodi libros nescio an satis utiles transcribere ab his qui docent coacta esset posteritas, aut
loco harum nugarum bonorum auctorum opera invenirentur aut saltem auditores non imbuti his
delirationibus nudos animos ad humanitatis doctrinas facilius applicarent, quibus nihil unquam utilius, nihil
dignius homini a patre hominumque deorumque tributum est.
167

See pages 71-72 above.
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a backdrop of fifteenth-century characterizations of Greek religion, Agaso may have
intended his comment as an attack against Greek heterodoxy. Such an attack would have
allowed him to imply a host of attendant cultural vices—treachery, dishonesty,
untrustworthiness, and obstinacy—that he charged against Trebizond elsewhere.
Regardless of whether Agaso intended his comments as an anti-Greek attack,
Trebizond responded as though they were. The question is why he chose to take Agaso’s
remark as seriously as he did. Certainly, even Italian humanists could be and were
accused of unchristian language. 168 I argue that Trebizond felt pressured to respond to
charges about his religion because he perceived them as implicit anti-Greek attacks.
Given the variety of explicit anti-Greek attacks in the Agaso letter, it would be difficult to
blame Trebizond for drawing this conclusion. Furthermore, as a foreigner in Italy, his
religious beliefs had already factored into his self-presentation when he had converted to
Catholicism years earlier. The pressure to convert can be viewed as another of the
stressors Byzantine émigrés experienced. 169 Moreover, the forcefulness of Trebizond’s
reply amplified his characterization of Guarino’s aggression and the injustice of his
attacks. He questioned Guarino’s motives for commenting on his religion. 170 He has an
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Poggio Bracciolini accused Lorenzo Valla of heresy during their dispute. Christopher S. Celenza, The
Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2004), 130.
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Trebizond had to explain this decision to his family outside of Italy. Monfasani, George of Trebizond,
22. Monfasani argues that Byzantine scholars were all but required to convert as a part of assimilating to
life in Italy. He adds that while Latins learning Greek simply had to add a new element to their professional
competence, Greeks in Italy had to change their personal lives. He knows of no Latin figure who converted
to Greek Orthodoxy. Monfasani, “Migrations,” 10.
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The passage in this note and the next are consecutive. Collectanea, 392. (45) Illud mirari non desino
unde tu tam repente theologus factus sis, qui me deum patrem hominumque deorumque dicentem velut
impium arguis. Tantane, Guarine, indomita tibi maledicendi libido inest ut cum asinos, pecudes, sues,
canes, qui nasum inter doctores homines, qualis tu es, ingeramus, aliaque huiuscemodi superbia turbatus ac
iracundia, quam biennio lenire non potuisti, nos monstra nomines, satiatus non sis, sed tanquam impiis ob
illud verbum nobis insultes? Tanta tibi religionis est cura nostre quem omnes norunt, ‘deorum’ a Christiano
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“indomitable desire for slander,” Trebizond argued, and is so “shaken by arrogance and
anger” that he issues insults and claims of impiety.
In replying to Agaso’s comments about his religion, Trebizond relied on the same
strategies he used to defend his Latinity and RLV. The first and most prevalent of these
was an appeal to authority. He argued that religious authorities including Dionysius the
Areopagite—a “holy man and martyr” whom the “church honors as the highest master of
theology”— justified his usage of ‘deorum.’ Trebizond described Dionysius as an
“honest man” and “truly a Christian” and suggested that he himself was both honest and
Christian for following Dionysius’ usage. 171 This emphasis on honesty, holiness, and
“true Christianity” was an implicit engagement with Latin characterizations of Greek
dishonesty and impiety. Additionally, as he did when defending his Latinity, Trebizond
chided Guarino for being unfamiliar with established authorities and for not following the
example of Dionysius. 172 He also appealed to his education, noting in a fairly offhand
manner—“to make [Guarino] grieve more”—how he learned “the precepts of theology”
during his early years in Italy and almost took holy orders. This comment appears almost

dici homine non potest? Saltem adiecisses: nisi ea mente dixerim qua illud edidit propheta, ‘ego dixi dii
estis.’ Sed vide quam multa tibi perlecta sunt theologorum volumina. Cf. Ps. 81.6 and John 10:34.
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Collectanea, 392. (46) Dionysius Ariopagita, quem tam ut summum theologie magistrum, quam ut
sanctum virum et martyrem ecclesia colit, cuius nomen nescio an tibi, homini religioso et Christiane
veritatis doctissimo, notum sit, is igitur Dionysius in XII De celesti hierarchia circa finem tam sanctos viros
quam celorum virtutes non ab homine quodam qui errare possit, verum ab ipsa theologia deos non
nunquam appellari his verbis ostendit: “invenies autem celestes etiam que super nos sunt, essentias et viros
sacros deos a theologia vocari.” Audis, Guarine? Cernis oculis cuius auctoritate obrutus es? Viros sacros,
inquit, ipsa theologia deos non nunquam vocat. Ego eloquenti homine, quem virum probum, idest, vere
Christianum, esse volo, nullum magis sacrum duco, quem theologia eique similes cum deos nominet
quoniam uni deo, quoad eius fieri possit, coniunguntur. Cf. De cael. hier. 12.3. Trebizond might also have
mentioned Ps. 82. He does include an allusion to Cato’s definition of the orator as a “good man [vir bonus]
skilled in speaking.” Quint., Inst. 12.1.1.

172

Collectanea, 393. (47) Quod si forte credis non ea me mente deos scripsisse qua theologia dicit et
Dionysius exponit, erras ignorantia. Nec enim maledicta, non dicam proferre ac scribere, sed ne cogitare
quidem probo viro licet nisi prius exquirat, examinet, percipiat quid sit, quod dicitur. Quare, si tibi
consultum vis, vita, fide, moribus Christianorum vive; priscorum linqua loquere.
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as an aside. Coming so soon after a discussion of his piety, however, the implication is
clear. 173 Lastly, Trebizond’s defense of Greece at the end of the letter makes clear that he
was treating Agaso’s attack as not just personal, but cultural. He articulated a position for
which Bravus mocked Contoblacas, the idea that Greeks are truly pious, and referred to
the “heroes” and “holy men” of his homeland, worshippers of true religion, men precise
in their doctrines, upright in morals, and more pious than any others in the world. 174
Though a relatively small part of their dispute, the question of Trebizond’s piety
reflects well the dynamics of the feud as a whole. Agaso’s criticisms drove the dialogue
between the two; Trebizond responded in a way that acknowledged the cultural capital of
anti-Greek biases. He challenged Guarino using many of the concepts used against him
but faced additional obstacles in defending himself. Certainly charges of ingratitude,
arrogance, and impiety were levied against Italians. Trebizond, though, had to fend off
the added weight of classical and early modern stereotypes about Greek culture.
Trebizond’s response therefore reflects his anxiety about his reputation as well as how
best to combat the culturally loaded, anti-Greek attacks in the Agaso letter.
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Ibid., 394. (53) Paucissimis deinde annis et Latine ita locuti sumus ut in duabus causis duobus
velocissimis in scribendo librariis eodem tempore dicendo suffecerimus, et <precepta> doctrinarum
omnium bonarumque artium, addam etiam, ut magis doleas, ipsius theologie, cui relique omnes
administrantur (pauca quidem, sed tamen que tibi ad celos usque coacervata viderentur) percepimus, et, nisi
onere filiorum oppressi et valitudine deiecti, litterarum studia pene liquissemus.
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Ibid., 406. (107). Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu omnium, in
Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem, in Greciam, deorum olim domicilium, non Iovis dico et
Iunonis (non ad fabulas refugio), sed multorum heroum et sanctorum virorum (sive vetustissimos ac
remotissimos a nostra etate consideres sive nostre, idest, vere, religionis cultores, quos numero plures,
doctrinis subtiliores, eloquentia graviores, moribus probatiores, religione sanctiores quam ex reliquo
terrarum orbe invenies), in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine dignissimus, in
Greciam inveheris. Cf. note 165. Bravus criticizes Contoblacas for daring to call Greeks “religionis
excultores ac bonarum artium et omnium inventores.”
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Conclusion
The criticisms leveled against Trebizond in the Agaso letter were in many ways
typical of the humanist invective that defined contests of honor. The characterizations of
Trebizond as ignorant, arrogant, audacious, shameless, impious, and immoral were verbal
strategies crafted to challenge his faculty with the Latin language, question his moral
rectitude, and undermine his authority as a rhetorician and instructor. That these were
common enough accusations against a professional competitor is evident in that
Trebizond counters them by casting Guarino in the same negative lights. He chides
Guarino for not understanding classical rhetorical authorities, he questions his knowledge
of rhetorical precepts and grammatical usage, and he accuses him of slander, envy,
jealousy, and arrogance. The Agaso letter is notable, however, for the extent to which it
employs anti-Greek language and stereotypes. Anti-Greek language is in fact an integral
part and defining characteristic of the Trebizond-Guarino feud.
This chapter has analyzed the cultural stereotypes employed against Trebizond to
demonstrate how anti-Greek language functioned in contests of honor. The purpose of
this analysis has been to understand better the strategies of self-presentation and modes of
expression available to competing scholars. Agaso used anti-Greek language to tap into a
tradition of anti-Greek sentiment with roots in classical Roman literature—especially
Cicero—as well as contemporary fifteenth-century thought. It allowed him to define—
both explicitly and implicitly—Trebizond as the “typical” loquacious, inept, dishonest
Greekling, a man lacking honor, and the kind of man about whom Cicero warned his
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brother Quintus. Trebizond recognized how damaging these accusations could be and
struggled with how to counter charges of Greek levitas.
Agaso’s letter and Trebizond’s response are valuable indications of how antiGreek language and a pro-Latin bias affected the experiences of Greek émigrés in early
Quattrocento Italy. The present analysis has offered a different perspective from the
prevailing arguments that have long focused on the resurgence and embrace of Greek
learning during this period. It has argued that there were more obstacles to the acceptance
of Greeks in Italy, even among humanists and so-called “elites,” than has been
acknowledged. Skill in Greek absolutely created opportunities for émigrés but that same
background also created additional problems that Italian scholars did not face. Like his
Latin peers, Trebizond lived in a world defined by patronage and strove to cultivate a
reputation as a knowledgeable rhetorician and teacher. His experiences, however,
demonstrate how centuries of negative stereotypes resulted in additional stressors for
Greeks fashioning their identities. Agaso labeled him as an inept, loquacious copyist and
as another in a long line of deceitful, treacherous Greeklings. Trebizond not only had to
prove his worth but he also had to contend with these stereotypes. Moreover, Agaso was
able to use a verbal strategy Trebizond could not. Agaso could attack Trebizond as a
Greek, but Trebizond could not attack Guarino as a Latin.
The correspondence also encourages a reconsideration of the feud itself and of the
individuals involved. At least one of his contemporaries, Poggio, chastised Trebizond for
writing so aggressively and with so little evidence against Guarino. Modern
commentators have also judged Trebizond to be morose, bitter, and angry. Trebizond’s
response seems far less aggressive than it might have been given Agaso’s criticisms and
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that Trebizond was still relatively early in his career. The RLV was a major treatise and a
capstone for the work he had done since arriving in Italy. Trebizond hoped it would
elevate him beyond the instruction of youths and afford him the financial security to
which all humanists aspired. 175 It is unsurprising that he responded vehemently in selfdefense, especially in light of the anti-Greek language used against him. These letters
help us understand Trebizond’s more bombastic claims. When he proclaimed to Guarino
that he speaks eloquently enough to have been born in Ciceronian Rome, this was more
than simple boasting. It was an important statement about his Latinity to a culture that
defined professional competency by ability in the language and characterized Greeks not
as eloquent but as loquacious, not as knowledgeable but as inept.
The most intriguing part of Guarino’s role in the dispute is that he never weighed
in under his own name. He may or may not have written the Agaso letter. There are
enough interesting parallels between that letter and other works—Guarino’s response to
the da Monachi comments and Battista Guarino’s educational treatise—to suggest that
Guarino may have written it. It is of course possible that these parallels were simply
common literary tropes. Still, the idea that Agaso was a student of Guarino’s seems
unlikely. His attitude toward Greeks seems inconsistent with what we know of Guarino’s
other students, either Barbaro in writing to da Monachi or Battista Guarino in treating
Greek learning in his treatise. It is hard to believe that a student of one of the most
acclaimed philhellenes would publicly voice the kind of arguments that Agaso makes.
Guarino, however, hiding his identity, might have been willing to do so to undermine a
competing scholar who had recently challenged his reputation. This makes Guarino’s
silence even more fascinating. Even if he did not write the letter, he made no attempt to
175

Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 25-27 and 68.
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defend himself against Trebizond nor did he say anything about Agaso’s anti-Greek
attacks. Perhaps Guarino simply thought it beneath him to engage in the dispute, or
perhaps by never speaking in defense of “Agaso” his silence should be read as a tacit
rejection of the Agaso letter. It seems to me, though, that Guarino had some culpability
for his silence given the pretense that Agaso was his student, that the real “Agaso” never
stepped forward to prove Trebizond wrong, that the whole exchange grew out of
Trebizond’s criticisms of Guarino, and that the dispute was public knowledge. Guarino
could have simply issued a brief response producing Agaso, distancing himself from his
pupil’s comments, and moderately censuring Trebizond for jumping to conclusions. To
do so would not have required him to stoop to engaging in a controversy with a man he
judged his inferior, but it would have allowed him to end it conclusively. Any
conclusions about Guarino have to be tentative because his role in the dispute is far from
clear, but the circumstances of this exchange raise questions about the nature and limits
of Guarino’s philhellenism. It is possible, and I argue likely, that Guarino is a major
example of an “elite” humanist who, despite his reputation as a philhellene, employed—
or condoned the use of—anti-Greek language to contest honor and reputation.
The Trebizond-Guarino dispute occurred relatively early in Trebizond’s career in
Italy. He had been in the west for approximately twenty years by the publication of his
major rhetorical treatise, but had not yet achieved the kind of renown, professional
position, and financial security he sought. The RLV was intended to elevate his status and
his criticisms of Guarino can rightly be considered an attempt to carve a space for himself
in the competitive community of humanist scholars. Eventually, though, Trebizond
attained the reputation and position he sought. By 1443, he had arrived in Rome and
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begun his service in the papal curia under Eugenius IV. In February 1444 he was sworn
in as an apostolic secretary, a position highly coveted by his fellow humanists. He
continued to serve Eugenius’s successor, Nicholas V, in that same position. Even having
achieved this success, however, Trebizond continued to take an active part in the
construction and perception of his reputation. Doing so became particularly important
after a very public confrontation with a fellow secretary, Poggio Bracciolini, in the
middle of the curia in May 1452. If Trebizond’s dispute with Guarino provides evidence
of acts of self-presentation for a figure on the rise, someone seeking to establish and
solidify his reputation, the conflict with Poggio illustrates the strategies of a figure
desperately fighting to mitigate damage done to his reputation.
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CHAPTER THREE
TREBIZOND, POGGIO BRACCIOLINI,
AND THE LANGUAGE OF RESTRAINT
Introduction
On May 4, 1452, George of Trebizond, then a papal secretary in the employ of
Pope Nicholas V, engaged in a fist-fight in the middle of the chancery with one of his
colleagues, Poggio Bracciolini. Conversing with another of his colleagues that day,
Trebizond said something less than flattering about Poggio, though he later claimed not
to remember what he had said. Poggio, who happened to be walking nearby, clearly
overheard whatever it was Trebizond said and crossed the chancery to confront him. The
two men came to blows, and the fight ended only when Trebizond reached for a sword
from a bystander, sending Poggio into flight. For having threatened his colleague with a
sword, Trebizond was imprisoned in the Castel Sant’ Angelo. He was released on May 9
after composing a letter of apology, but was not welcomed back to the chancery. He tells
us that he spent the next forty days seeking an audience with the pope. After failing to be
admitted and after a return to the chancery resulted only in Poggio speaking publicly and
adamantly for his expulsion, Trebizond left the curia and Rome. He spent the following
years until 1455 in Naples under the patronage of King Alfonso of Aragon, during which
time he wrote about the fight and Poggio in an attempt to mitigate the damage done to his
reputation. 1

1

This chapter examines five letters related to the Trebizond-Poggio dispute. In January 1453, Trebizond
composed letters to Poggio and Nicholas V, the former addressing the chancery fight and the latter
Trebizond’s accusation that Poggio had sent assassins to Naples to kill him. Poggio renounced the
assassination plot in a letter to Trebizond in February and Trebizond replied with a second letter to Poggio
in March. For Trebizond’s letters, see Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus: Leben und Werke (Leipzig:
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The conflict in the chancery has been a popular topic, particularly in recent years.
John Monfasani established the details of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute in the 1970s. In
2004, Christopher Celenza briefly discussed the chancery fight to construct his argument
about the agonistic nature of the humanist community. In 2011, Stephen Greenblatt
discussed the fight while examining the competitive nature of the curia in the early
Quattrocento. The latter two are excellent examples of recent attempts to develop an
understanding of the social practices of humanist scholars, of how they presented
themselves to their peers and consciously acted to shape their reputations. 2 Both works
accurately identify the importance of the composition and circulation of humanist writing
and the manner in which it was subjected to the consideration of one’s contemporaries.
Humanist self-presentation emerged out of concern for financial security but also for
popular approbation and honor that came from one’s peers. 3
The present chapter argues that Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and of
his relationship with Poggio afterward was a deliberate act of self-presentation derived
from a concern about public perception and reputation. Trebizond was no different from
his peers in cultivating honor and carefully crafting his reputation, as his dispute with

Teubner, 1914), 501-514. For Poggio’s February letter see Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols.
(Florence, 1832-1861), 3:49-52. In June 1454, Trebizond wrote to his son Andreas accusing Poggio of a
plot to frame Trebizond for writing letters insulting to the pope. For the letter to Andreas, see Collectanea
Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond, ed. John Monfasani
(Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984), 117-124.
2

John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1976), 109-113; Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and
Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 125-126; Stephen Greenblatt, The
Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 145-146.

3

The financial benefits of working in the curia were substantial. On humanism and the secretariat see John
D’Amico, Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome: Humanists and Churchmen on the Eve of the
Reformation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 31-34; Christopher S. Celenza,
Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the Younger’s De curiae commodis
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 12-13. See also Chapter One, note 4.
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Guarino in the 1430s illustrated, and it was for this reason that the fight in the chancery
proved to be problematic for him. The vice chancellor investigating the fight concluded
that Trebizond had acted inappropriately in wielding the weapon, and Nicholas agreed.
Over the next two years, Trebizond embarked on a campaign to revise the public
perception of his actions. His correspondence during this period—letters to Poggio, to
Nicholas V, and to his son Andreas—lamented the harm done to his reputation.
Trebizond frequently portrayed himself as the victim of Poggio’s attacks. At the heart of
his defense of himself and criticisms of Poggio was a cultural ideal identifying emotional
restraint and rational self-control as the keys to virtuous decision-making and action. The
correspondence between 1453 and 1454, including an exchange with Poggio himself,
centered on a dispute about emotion, reason, and restraint.
The Trebizond-Poggio dispute offers a means to advance recent scholarship about
the experiences of fifteenth-century humanists. The notion that humanists were
concerned with status is long-standing, as is the idea that honor was won from one’s
peers. 4 Celenza’s recent work on the “lost Italian Renaissance” explains this process well,
describing how humanists employed “oppositional categories” to vilify their opponents.
The present chapter, like the preceding one, builds on existing studies that emphasize the
importance of honor by examining how honor was contested. 5 Chapter Two addressed
this question by examining how anti-Greek language functioned in the experience of
Greek émigrés like Trebizond. In Chapter Three, I expand the conversation about how
4

See especially Hanna H. Gray, “Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 24, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1963): 497-514.

5

Lapo da Castligionchio the Younger, who wrote about the constraints placed on aspiring scholars, has
been a popular figure in recent studies. See especially Celenza’s Renaissance Humanism and the Papal
Curia and The Lost Italian Renaissance, 123-127. See also Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a
Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo da Castliglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57,
no. 4 (Winter 2004): 1308-1345; Greenblatt, 138-142.
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and why humanists expressed themselves as they did through a consideration of some of
Celenza’s “oppositional categories.” 6 The Trebizond-Poggio correspondence offers the
chance to observe the language and categories humanists relied upon to make their
arguments, and therefore the terms of engagement that shaped their contest. An
examination of their correspondence allows us to peel back another layer in our
understanding of humanist texts and learn more about the concepts and cultural
expectations that undergirded the actions of their authors.
Trebizond and Poggio each articulate their arguments about rational self-control
and restraint with a similar set of oppositional categories that amounts to a language of
restraint. Such language allows them to establish markers for the ideal, the man whose
actions are governed by reason, and the opposite, the individual who is driven to action
by unrestrained emotion. Three sets of oppositional categories guided the dialogue
between the two men. First, prudence and imprudence served as identifying
characteristics of the rational and emotional man respectively. Second, honesty and
dishonesty functioned in the same manner. When action was guided by reason, a man and
his actions were considered honest, forthright, and true. Lying, deception, plots, snares,
and traps were the fruit of emotion, the sign of a man lacking self-control. Third, both
men identified forgiveness as a marker of rational self-governance and resentment and
the pursuit of revenge as indicators of failed restraint. Each man argued that the other’s
attacks against him constituted revenge, that as revenge these attacks were impelled by
emotion and thus irrational, and that his opponent’s behavior violated the bounds of
propriety.

6

Celenza, Lost, 121.
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A long tradition of classical and medieval thought informed the ideal of restraint
that Trebizond and Poggio articulated. Aristotle, Cicero, and the Stoics all wrote about
rational self-governance and control of the passions. William Bouwsma laid out the
humanist interest in Stoic thought and the role of reason in governing personal and social
order in the 1970s in his essay “The Two Faces of Humanism.” Recent scholarship
concerned with early modern identity has also explored Renaissance consideration of the
passions. Michael Schoenfeldt has argued that the control of desire and discipline of the
body became primary means for individuals to define themselves. This regulatory ideal
had its foundation in the Stoic belief that, as Schoenfeldt states it, “all emotion is to be
routed out, so that the rational self may rule unfettered by the claims of emotion.” 7 Early
modern concepts of self-control became the foundation for the rules of courtly etiquette
that writers such as Baldassare Castiglione codified in the sixteenth century. 8 An analysis
of Trebizond’s feud with Poggio, though, reveals that this discourse on restraint was a
vehicle for contesting honor in the fifteenth-century curia as well. There were definite
rules governing the behavior of curial humanists, even if they had not yet been as clearly
formalized as they would be in the next century.

7

William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance
Thought,” reprinted in A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990), 19-73; Michael Carl Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England:
Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 17 and 42; Unhae Park Langis, Passion, Prudence, and Virtue in Shakespearean
Drama (New York: Continuum, 2011), 2. The early modern concept of restraint has figured in studies on a
number of topics. On the role of restraint in the family, see Steven E. Ozment, When Fathers Ruled: Family
Life in Reformation Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 135-141. On the emotions
and early modern masculinity, see Todd W. Reeser, Moderating Masculinity in Early Modern Culture
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). I explore the connection between restraint and
masculinity in Chapter Four.

8

Douglas Biow, In Your Face: Professional Improprieties and the Art of Being Conspicuous in SixteenthCentury Italy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
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I also argue that both Trebizond and Poggio understood themselves to be active
participants, agents, in the shaping of their identities. Trebizond’s earlier feud with
Guarino upholds such an argument as well, as Trebizond was clearly anxious about
Agaso’s attacks and invested in responding to them to influence public perception of his
Latinity and moral conduct. The fight in the chancery, imprisonment, and flight from
Rome were, however, far more damaging moments for Trebizond than Agaso’s
criticisms. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence therefore offers a chance to examine
humanist self-presentation and thus agency from the perspective of one who was seeking
not only to contest honor but also to regain lost honor.
In making the argument for humanist agency, the present analysis lends credence
to recent attempts to modify the discussion of Renaissance self-fashioning introduced by
Stephen Greenblatt and furthered by New Historicism. Douglas Biow’s study of
professional etiquette in the sixteenth century is of interest given how prominently
propriety figured in the Trebizond-Poggio dispute. He rejects the notion that early
modern figures lacked agency. Instead he offers a “flexible” self that “was embedded in a
host of social activities…all of which required negotiation of competing, interpersonal
social obligations in a manner that enhanced self-hood, rather than completely
determining it.” 9 Social realities and cultural ideals clearly influenced their writing, but
Trebizond and Poggio express not only a conscious awareness of these factors but also an
9

Ibid., 26-27. Biow argues that viewing the self “as a mere shackled historical and discursive construct,”
or “as an empty cipher onto which familial, political, social, educational, and economic forces have freely
inscribed themselves,” renders “the self merely the product of those forces” and void of agency. Biow
follows two of John Martin’s studies in offering a modified version of Renaissance self-fashioning. See
John Jeffries Martin, “Inventing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the Individual in
Renaissance Europe,” The American Historical Review 102, no. 5 (Dec., 1997): 1309-1342 and Myths of
Renaissance Individualism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). For Renaissance self-fashioning, see
Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980). See especially Martin’s discussion of Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning.
Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1314-1315.
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ability to use them to advance their own interests. They understood identity as tenuous
and malleable. For them, identity was the product of how one presents oneself as well as
how one is viewed by others. They each articulate anxiety about the effect that lies and
rumor could have on public perception, and the consequences of these for financial
security and honor. Their anxiety bubbles up in the language they use, in attempts to
present the other man as a liar, angry, bereft of reason, and as a slanderer. Accusations of
deceptions or plots all are inherently active expressions. Both men also saw themselves as
active participants in the process. They consistently incorporated ideals about virtuous
behavior—prudence, honesty, and forgiveness—into acts of self-presentation. In doing
so, they sought to defuse their anxiety about the impact that others could have on their
reputation. Their writings reveal a sense of self that operated with agency, and their
struggles to define themselves and others in a contentious professional world. Trebizond
and Poggio each viewed themselves as agents, as active participants, in the shaping of
their reputations and identities.
Although Trebizond and Poggio exercised agency in their dispute and their letters
should be read as deliberate acts of self-presentation, their attempts to mobilize cultural
ideals of restraint were not without problems. Their correspondence also reveals a tension
between cultural expectations and the pressures associated with public contests.
Contesting honor meant, as Celenza noted, vilifying one’s opponent. It was not always
easy to do this while maintaining the mantle of self-control. One had to appear rational
and restrained in responding to attacks or risk being labeled the opposite. What
constituted restraint, however, was debatable, and Poggio and Trebizond attacked one
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another for perceived offenses and allegedly immoderate behavior. Both men exploited
the tension between ideal and reality in their acts of self-presentation.
The Trebizond-Poggio correspondence can certainly contribute to a more
thorough understanding of humanist modes of expression, but it also helps us better
assess a feud that has largely been reduced to the outrageous details of the chancery fight
itself. Although the fight has garnered attention in recent studies, the correspondence as a
whole has not been examined in detail since Monfasani. An examination of the scope of
the dispute places us in a better position to understand why each man wrote as he did,
Trebizond in particular. While Chapter Two situated Trebizond’s reply to Guarino in a
context of humanist professional development and the challenges facing Greek émigrés,
Chapter Three suggests additional modifications to Trebizond’s reputation are in order.
Greenblatt, for instance, has described Trebizond as “notoriously morose” and both bitter
and resentful after the chancery fight. 10 Much of this comes from the fact that
Trebizond’s letters were often insulting, abrasive, and self-pitying. Greenblatt’s
conclusion, though, risks obscuring the circumstances that bound Trebizond’s actions.
Many humanists struck a resentful tone when they encountered obstacles to financial
success or honor, and the curia was particularly competitive. 11 Trebizond’s
correspondence certainly does reflect bitterness and not a small amount of resentment.
This should not distract from the fact that reputation was a constant concern and that
while in Naples he was arguing from a position of weakness. The most notable aspect of

10

Greenblatt, The Swerve, 145-146. Greenblatt is only one example of a long-standing depiction of
Trebizond as having had a difficult personality. Monfasani discusses this as well, though softens his
assessment by noting that of the many feuds Trebizond engaged in, his opponents were often the
aggressors. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 103-105.

11

See the studies regarding Lapo in note 5.
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this correspondence, however, is the extent to which he and Poggio engaged with one
another by means of the same concepts. Their shared strategies may not allow for a full
revision of Trebizond’s personality, but they do help us understand better why he made
the claims he did—outrageous though they may seem—and I argue that they help
normalize his behavior. This can be seen in an examination of the shared language of
restraint both men employ, the first example of which is their concept of prudence.
Restraint and Prudence
Prudence is an important marker of restraint and rational self-control in the
writings of both Trebizond and Poggio. It is one of the most frequently used concepts
each man marshals to defend himself and vilify his opponent. Their concept of prudence
is also extremely flexible, as it intersects with a host of other markers of restraint.
Prudence is an especially useful starting point to a discussion of their dispute because
much of the backlash against Trebizond in the aftermath of their fight was rooted in the
judgment that he had acted imprudently. The chancery fight, though, was not the first
disagreement the men had had, nor was it the first time Trebizond had been accused of
acting imprudently. Poggio had criticized him for having acted imprudently during the
Guarino feud in 1437. In January 1453 and again in March, when he wrote to Poggio
about their fight in the chancery the previous May, Trebizond recalls Poggio’s earlier
criticism. Poggio’s judgment regarding the Trebizond-Guarino dispute and Trebizond’s
response to it illustrates how each man understood prudence, reason, and restraint.
Poggio, Trebizond, and their contemporaries had a wealth of classical and
medieval authorities to draw upon in conceptualizing reason, prudence, and restraint.
This included Aristotle’s discussion of prudence as practical reason guiding ethical
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decision-making. For Aristotle, prudence entailed the use of reason to select the most
ethical course of action when responding to events. 12 Among Roman authors, Cicero also
links reason and ethics. 13 The De inventione lists prudence [prudentia]—defined as
“knowledge of what is good, what is bad, and what is neither good nor bad”—as one of
the four cardinal virtues. Another of the four, temperance [temperantia]—the parts of
which include “continence, clemency, and modesty [modestia]”—is defined as “a firm
and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust and other impulses of the
mind.” 14 The De officiis lists both “the full perception and intelligent development of the
true”—“in which we place wisdom [sapientia] and prudence [prudentia]”—and “the
orderliness and moderation of everything that is said and done”—“wherein consist
temperance [temperantia] and self-control [modestia]”—among the four cardinal virtues.
It also advocates the “subjection of all the passions, and moderation in all things” and
identifies as “proper” to “employ reason and speech rationally, to do with careful
consideration whatever one does, and in everything to discern the truth and to uphold
it.” 15 Among medieval authors, Thomas Aquinas identifies prudence as virtue necessary
to leading a good life. He describes it as the application of reason to action that helps stop
one from acting out of impulse or passion. Likewise, he defines temperance as a virtue
12

Arist., Eth. Nic. 6.5 1140a2-1140b2.

13

For an excellent overview of Cicero’s views of prudence and of the importance of Cicero to Quattrocento
concepts of prudence see Robert Cape Jr., “Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice at Rome,” in
Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, ed. Robert Hariman (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2003), 35-66.

14

Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.159-160 and 164. This and subsequent translations are Hubbell’s. Cicero, De inventione,
trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949).
The Rhetorica ad Herennium likewise defines prudentia as “intelligence capable, by a certain
judicious method, of distinguishing good and bad.” Temperance—here modestia—is “self-control that
moderates our desires.” Rhet. Her. 3.3-5. This and subsequent translations are Caplan’s. Rhetorica ad
Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

15

Cic., Off. 1.15; 1.18-19; 1.93-94; 1.152-153.
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that inclines man to act in accordance with reason and to moderate the passions. 16 In each
case, the emphasis fell upon the use of reason to guide decision-making, the goal being to
discern the good from the bad and to select the good.
The classical and medieval combination of reasoned decision-making and ethical
behavior was evident in the writings of fifteenth-century humanist educators,
contemporaries of Trebizond and Poggio. The humanist educational program asserted
that instructors could guide their students not only through their studies, but also to
virtue. The key was control of the emotions. Pier Paulo Vergerio (1370-1444), drawing
on Aristotle, describes the weakness of the rational powers in the young:
excessively credulous, for lacking worldly experience, they believe that whatever
they hear is true. Also, their opinions change easily, since their humors are in
motion due to growth and they have in abundance the heat which is the principle
cause of motion. The soul, in fact, follows the complexion of the body, and thus,
just as those who lack something are quick to desire it, so they are swiftly
satisfied once they have obtained what they want. The young follow their
passions above all and do everything with great vigor because they have keen
desires which their bodily heat spurs on, while the rational powers [ratio] and
prudence [prudentia] that could moderate their desires are weak. 17
Vergerio’s characterization, that emotion rather than reason governed behavior and that
desire had to be moderated, was not uncommon. 18 Renaissance figures understood a clear
connection between prudence, reason, and virtue. 19 When he described Trebizond’s

16

Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IIa, q. 57, a5; IIb, q.47, a1, a4, a8; IIb, q. 141, a1 and a3.

17

This and subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of Kallendorf’s edited texts, I cite the section
numbers he provides. Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in
Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2002), 19; Cf. Arist., Rh. 2.12.7.
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See also Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises,
trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 21; Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 3.
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Renaissance authors, as Vergerio indicates, also viewed prudence and rational self-control as a sign of
manhood. They considered imprudence and emotional behavior as a sign of childishness. I return to these
ideas in Chapter Four when discussing the concept of masculinity in humanist contests.
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actions as imprudent in 1437, then, Poggio was stating that his opponent’s actions lacked
reason and virtue. He was not only saying that Trebizond’s actions were inappropriate,
but also that they were also literally irrational. 20
Poggio, Trebizond and the consultus homo
In September 1437, Poggio wrote to Christopher Cauchus about Trebizond’s
recent letter to Guarino in response to the letter written by “Andreas Agaso.” 21 He argued
that Trebizond’s reaction—including his assumption that Guarino had adopted the Agaso
pseudonym to attack him—was unreasonable, unethical, and therefore inconsistent with
the behavior of a prudent man, a consultus homo. 22 He defined the consultus homo by
virtue of the two main aspects of classical prudence, reason and ethics. Trebizond, he
argued, responded to the Agaso letter by writing insultingly to Guarino based on mere
conjecture. The implication was that the truly prudent man, by contrast, perceives
circumstances well, considers them carefully, and does not respond to offenses
insultingly. Poggio expressed confidence that Guarino had not written the letter, noting
that it was composed in a manner inconsistent with the man’s eloquence, learning,

20

Eventually the concept of prudence would change. Martin describes a shift in the concept over the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries leading eventually to Machiavelli in the sixteenth century and the divorce
of prudence from ethics. Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1323-1324 and Martin, Myths, 49-53.

21

Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861), 2:125-128. Tonelli’s edition is reprinted
in Poggio, Opera Omnia, vol. 3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964). I cite Poggio’s sources as Poggii Epistolae.
Poggio’s letter is an indication of the public nature of humanist disputes and the interest humanists took in
the conflicts and reputations of others. Trebizond came upon the Agaso letter in February 1437, composed
his response to Guarino in March, and by September Poggio was writing to Cauchus that he had received
and read through both letters. Poggio was not directly involved in the dispute but he knew about it, wrote
about it in his own letters, and even passed judgment on those involved. Just as the Trebizond-Guarino
correspondence circulated among friends like Poggio and Cauchus, so did discussion of ongoing feuds. For
an overview of the Trebizond-Guarino dispute, see Chapter Two, pages 24-25 and 30-31.
22

Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 70. I follow Monfasani in reading consultus as prudent. Here and in
subsequent correspondence, Poggio and Trebizond both articulate an ideal situated in reasoned decisionmaking and thus prudence.
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prudence, and style. He speculated instead that it was written “by one of [Guarino’s]
students, or by anybody who loves Guarino and hates George.” He added that it would
have been unlike Guarino to hide his identity or seek another’s protection rather than to
defend himself openly. Poggio was critical of Trebizond’s belief that Guarino composed
the letter given the lack of evidence to support the position: “To write with so many
words and so insultingly, as though arguing against a clear crime, about which you offer
no evidence except an opinion, and indeed an incorrect opinion—by the judgment and
belief of others—does not seem to be truly the behavior of a prudent man [consultus
homo].” 23
Much of Poggio’s rebuke centered on the manner in which Trebizond had
responded to Guarino, a manner Poggio considered insulting, lacking restraint, and
unethical. Even as he identified Trebizond as a “most learned man and exceedingly
eloquent,” Poggio argued he would prefer him “to expend his effort on a more honorable
cause [causa honesta].” He lamented that Trebizond had chosen contempt and abuse
rather than reasoned argumentation. He made clear the link between prudence and selfcontrol by offering an example of appropriate behavior drawn from his own prior dispute

23

Poggii Epistolae, 2:126-127. Libellum quem ad me misisti perlegi diligenter: epistolam, quae Guarino
ascribitur, procul dubio affirmarim non esse Guarini; cujus genus dicendi satis mihi est cognitum. Novi
ingenium, novi eloquentiam, novi doctrinam, et scribendi morem, ut nihil in illa sit, quod ulla ex parte
redoleat Guarinum. Epistolam vero illam arbitror esse conscriptam ab aliquo ex suis discipulis, vel altero
quopiam, qui et Guarinum diligat, et odiat Georgium, ut uni se gratificari velit, alterum exagitare: nam
plura in ea scribuntur, pace dixerim scribentis, quae ornatius, eloquentius, copiosius, prudentius, ut opinor,
per Guarinum scripta, et objecta fuissent, sive vera, sive falsa existant. Neque etiam Guarinum adeo
timidum ac formidolosum judico, vel ita jejunum in scribendo, ut aut sibi dubitandum fuerit, suscipere
palam suam defensionem, aut ad alterius praesidia confugiendum. Trapezuntium vero doctissimum video
hominem, et admodum eloquentem, cujus scripta mihi admodum placent. Sed mallem eum impendisse
operam in causa magis honesta, magisque accomodata ad explicandas ingenii vires. Conjectura vult
assequi, ut Guarinus auctor et scriptor extiterit epistolae conscribendae. At hoc neque me judice, neque
quovis alio, qui recte Guarinum norit, unquam probabit, cum absint plurimum a scripturis suis; scribere tam
multis verbis, tam contumeliose, tanquam in reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas praeter
opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti hominis
esse videtur.
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with Guarino. When Guarino had rebuked him for saying he preferred Scipio to Caesar,
Poggio had defended himself in such a way as to offend his opponent as little as possible
and had replied more moderately than Guarino’s initial comments. 24 Poggio
acknowledged that some offenses must be contested. The question was how to do so. He
was clear on this point: “For when something ought to be fought with reason and
arguments, voices bursting with insults and abuses, which to those listening are
unpleasant, are completely rejected and render our case less commendable.” 25
Trebizond’s response was not only a sign of failed reason, according to Poggio, but of
failed ethics.

24

Poggio was referring to the “Scipio-Caesar controversy” of 1435. During that conflict, the participants
disputed the relative merits of Scipio Africanus, defended by Poggio, and Caesar, defended by Guarino.
The dispute was well-known in Ferrara, given Guarino’s school there and his friendship with Leonello
d’Este, and in Florence, Poggio’s home. For Poggio’s initial letter in April 1435, see Poggio, Opera Omnia,
1:357-365. Guarino’s responses in June 1435 are ep. 669 to Leonello and ep. 670 to Poggio in Epistolario
di Guarino Veronese, ed Remigio Sabbadini, 3 vols. (Venice: A spese della Società, 1915-1919), 2:220254. Davide Canfora edited and included an introduction for these texts in La controversia di Poggio
Bracciolini e Guarino Veronese su Cesare e Scipione (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2001). Much of the
scholarship on the dispute has centered on its political ramifications relative to a discussion of tyranny and
republicanism and the respective governments of Ferrara and Florence. See for example Hans Baron, The
Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism
and Tyranny (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 66-67 and 407-408. Others have followed
in this vein: John W. Oppel, “Peace vs. Liberty in the Quattrocento: Poggio, Guarino, and the ScipioCaesar Controversy,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1974): 221-265 and Mark Jurdjevic,
“Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no.4 (1999): 994-1020. More
recently there are the works of Marianne Pade: “Guarino and Caesar at the Court of the Este,” in The Court
of Ferrara and its Patronage, ed. Marianne Pade (Modena: Edizioni Panini, 2001), 71-92 and Pade, The
Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy, vol.1 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press,
2007), 233-247.
In his response to the Agaso letter, Trebizond had criticized what he portrayed as Guarino’s habit
of disparaging his opponents, and cited Guarino’s treatment of Poggio during the Scipio-Caesar
controversy. Collectanea, 382. Caperare vero frontem aut detrahere tuum non est? At cum in doctissimum
Poggium scriberes, tale quid tunc posuisti, ut et hic facis, cum opus acrimonia esse videretur? Multa sunt
quibus irretitus teneris.
25

Poggii Epistolae, 2:127-128. Quod autem is me suis verbis honorat, esset mihi gratius, si non vergeret in
contemptum Guarini, cujus honori a me semper consultum fuit, et praesertim in nostra controversia, qua ei
respondi, cum is me paulum lacessisset, quod Scipionem suo praetulerim Caesari. Egi tamen ita meam
defensionem, ut eum minime offenderem, nisi ubi causa id necessario postularet. Hoc certe recte videor
posse dicere, me parcius quam acceperim, nonnulla retulisse. Ubi enim ratione pugnandum est et
argumentis, sunt omnino rejiciendae voces contumeliis et jurgiis refertae, quae et auditoribus sunt ingratae,
et causam nostram minime reddunt probabiliorem. See note 16 for the preceeding material.
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Poggio composed a second letter about the Trebizond-Guarino dispute in early
1450, years removed from the letter to Cauchus, yet still before his chancery fight with
Trebizond. 26 The relationship between Poggio and Trebizond had changed by this point.
Both served the papacy and they had worked closely in the translation of a pair of Greek
texts, Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (1446) and Diodorus Siculus’s Bibliotheca Historica
(1447-1449). In 1450, Poggio wrote of his appreciation for Trebizond’s aid with these
translations. 27 Still, when looking back on the letter to Cauchus, Poggio maintained his
assessment that Trebizond had acted on conjecture, written insultingly, and that his
actions did not seem consistent with the behavior of a prudent man. He promised
Trebizond, however, on their friendship, that he intended no indignity, no slander, nor
any dishonor against him, and stated simply that he thought Trebizond had acted
wrongly. 28 Poggio did admit he had not spoken carefully enough. He had not meant to
imply that Trebizond was an imprudent man but merely that he had acted imprudently in
that particular situation. He had, he explains, “slipped into writing those words that could
approach the temerity of a false accuser.” 29 Even this acknowledgment, though, sustained
26

Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 70. The letter is not dated but Monfasani follows Tonelli in dating it in
the beginning of 1450. Poggii Epistolae, 3:21-24.
27

Poggii Epistolae, 3:23. Ego enim nedum tuo honori velim in aliquo detractum, sed accumulatiorem reddi
mea opera, si fieri posset, cupio, atque etiam ampliorem. Debeo enim tibi plurimum, qui mihi adjutor
praecipuus fueris in traductionibus meis.
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Ibid., 3:21-22. Scripsi olim Christophoro Cauco Veneto, cum mihi libellum quemdam destinasset, in quo
epistola, quam Guarini existimas, adversus te scripta, et tua responsio continebatur, me procul dubio
affirmare illam non esse Guarini, idque multis ex causis mihi persuadens, existimansque solummodo te
conjectura moveri, addidi in epistolae meae calce, scribere tam multis verbis, tam contumeliose tanquam in
reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas praeter opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione
et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti hominis esse videri. Hoc tibi ex animo, proque nostra amicitia
affirmo, mi Trapezunti, in nullam tuam contumeliam, nullam detractionem, nullum in dedecus ea verba me
fuisse compulsum; putavi non recte a te factum, qui rem incertam pro certo crimine insectareris.
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Ibid., 3:23. Ego, ut dixi, existimans te non manifesto crimine, ut asseris, sed conjectura motum illam
epistolam confutasse, dixi non videri mihi id recte consulti hominis fuisse, non quia recto fueris consilio
usus, sed quia dum scriberem ita mihi videbatur, lapsus scribendo in ea verba, quae possent calumniatoris
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the opinion that Trebizond lacked prudence. He had acted on impulse rather than reason
and attacked a man without proof.
Poggio’s semi-apology failed to persuade Trebizond, and his comments continued
to be a point of contention during the following years. In a March 1453 letter to Poggio,
Trebizond scoffed at the idea that Poggio’s apology in 1450 had satisfied him, and wrote
that the only thing he desired from Poggio was that the man recant what he had said. 30
More importantly, the concepts of prudence and self-control that Poggio employed in
1437 and 1450 figured prominently in the Trebizond-Poggio dispute, particularly in
Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight.
Trebizond’s Account of the Chancery Fight
In January 1453, Trebizond, writing from Naples, composed a letter to Poggio
with his own account of their chancery fight. 31 The letter was his first attempt to revisit
the events of the previous May and to revise how his actions that day were viewed. He
delivered his account via a language of prudence and restraint. It is clear that Poggio’s
past condemnation was at the forefront of his mind, but the concept of prudence was also
more immediately relevant for him. Trebizond had been judged—first by the vice
chancellor of the curia, and subsequently by Nicholas V—to have acted imprudently by

temeritatem subire. Non enim ad quadram philosophorum verba illa redegi, sed more hominum scripsi, qui
libere, nec semper accurate, loquuntur.
30

Walser, 511. Quod ais, credebam tibi esse ex mea defensione abunde satisfactum, quoniam scilicet alias
epistolam ad me de iniuria tecum questum conscripseris. Vehementer erras et res forsan excidit ex tuo
animo penitus. Nullam enim epistolam ipse abs te volui nisi que primam omnino ut falsam revocaret.
Trebizond was responding to Poggio’s claim in February 1453 that he thought his 1450 apology
would be enough to satisfy Trebizond. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. See note 58.
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For the unedited letter, see Walser, 501-504.
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drawing a sword against Poggio. 32 The similarities between his current situation and past
dispute with Guarino were not lost on him, either. Indeed, he made a direct reference to
Poggio’s earlier criticisms at the beginning of his letter. Reminding Poggio of all the help
he had lent him in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus—by which Poggio
“acquired both money and everlasting honor”—Trebizond censured his opponent for
thanking him with a letter “in which you write that I am a man too little prudent and
provoked easily and without any reason.” 33 It is this depiction of himself as a man easily
provoked, whose actions lack careful consideration, which Trebizond sought to overturn.
At the same time, he expressed his arguments more explicitly than Poggio did in 1437
and 1450. Poggio’s discussion of prudence included no overt discussion of emotional
restraint, even though it was clearly an implicit repudiation of what he considered to be
Trebizond’s irrational—that is, lacking in reason—actions. Trebizond, on the other hand,
consistently portrayed Poggio as rash and impelled by emotion. This can be made clear
by parsing his description of the chancery fight and noting the markers of prudence he
used to defend himself and defame Poggio. My purpose is not to establish what actually
happened that day but to see how Trebizond described what happened. In relating the
fight as it unfolded, Trebizond drew clear distinctions between what he claimed was his
own prudent, restrained behavior and the emotional, imprudent behavior of his opponent.
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Trebizond does not explicitly state he was judged imprudent, but implies it based on how he describes
the judgment against him and how he justifies his behavior. See note 39. Walser, 503. Nam si
statim…cardinalis predicavit verbis tuis confusus…
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Walser, 501. Nunc autem econtra si conscientiam tuam scrutaberis aut si ab universa Cancellaria
apostolica quesieris maxima invenies beneficia in te a Georgio profecta fuisse. Quis enim eorum qui cum
locum petere hunc solebant, ignorat et Xenophontem et Diodorum te magnis meis ex Graeco in latinum
laboribus vertisse? Unde tibi et pecunia accessit et honor sempiternus. Quibus pro maximis beneficiis quid
retulisti, edidisti epistolam que ad manus meas pervenit, ubi scribis parum me consultum hominem esse et
leviter et absque ulla ratione moveri.
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Trebizond situates the related contrasts between prudence and imprudence as well
as reason and emotion at the center of his account of the beginning of the fight. He was
conversing with a colleague, he writes, when he said something against Poggio, who was
walking nearby. Poggio overheard the comment and “answered with a shout” that he was
lying. He rushed toward Trebizond “with a hurried step” and “in haste” and “with a burst
of anger” shouted again that he was lying. The emphasis here is on Poggio’s emotion and
aggression. He overheard a private conversation—albeit in a public place—and
responded by shouting and charging across the chancery. Trebizond describes Poggio’s
movements as swift, hasty, and angry. In contrast, he emphasizes his deliberate response
and self-control. He claims he would simply have weathered Poggio’s accusations—
which he calls “slander” [maledicta]—“with patience, like a parent,” except that Poggio
then rushed toward him. He stood to meet the man’s charge but only so that he would not
be overpowered. Claiming self-defense, he recalls how he braced himself against
Poggio’s charge by remaining fixed in his steps and holding out a hand to keep him at
bay. This, he contends, was perfectly justifiable, “for everybody knows that violence
ought to be fended off.” 34
Trebizond relies on a language of restraint and prudence to present the details of
this initial encounter. He claims that Poggio approached him first and was the only one to

34

Ibid., 502. Cur enim ipse magis quam tu deliqui? Dimidium facti qui cepit habet sed dices me incepisse.
Verbis fateor nam cum omnes socii conquererentur de computo rationis communis, dixi nescio quid in te
longius a consessu nostro per atria magna deambulantem. Quod certe non putavi ad aures tuas
perventurum, audisti tamen et: Mentiri me magna voce respondisti. Utinam alia quoque huiusmodi
congessisses nihil ego penitus replicassem. Sed maledicta tua magno animo quasi parentis audissem. Sed tu
forsan quia ego silui, neque ipsum compressi contraxique sedens, putasti me timuisse. Citato enim gradu
cursim irruisti adversus me, ego ne sedens opprimerer surrexi, nec vestigia movi, sed steti eisdem in
vestigiis quasi fixus. Tu cursim atque impetu irruisti ad me clamitans Mentiris. Sicut ego ipse primus
verbum dixi adversus te: quod nec auditurum quidem credidi sic tu primus impetum fecisti, immo solus.
Nam ego in iisdem steti vestigiis ac ut impetum tuum repellerem manum protendi, et tu in ipsam incurristi.
Quid ergo peccavi, profecto nihil.
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land a blow. Trebizond twice addresses the question of who hit whom. The first time,
toward the beginning of the letter, he claims “I did not go for you with a fist, Poggio, but
instead you ran into a fist.” He denies having struck a blow again, later: “Just as I spoke a
word against you first (which I believed would not be heard), so you struck a blow first,
or rather you alone struck a blow.” Instead, Trebizond claims “how moderately I held you
off, for I extended a bare hand against your attack.” He makes an explicit argument that
his actions were in fact prudent—here “moderate”—which he reiterates shortly thereafter
when he asks Poggio to “consider with what dignity” he acted in remaining fixed in his
steps and stretching a hand to fend him off. 35 Each of Trebizond’s claims about who
struck whom reflect his anxiety about the perception that he had acted imprudently. 36
Trebizond’s concept of prudence—linking practical reason and ethical decisionmaking—and efforts to present himself as a consultus homo are evident again when he
addresses the possibility that Poggio never intended to strike him. “Perhaps you will
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Ibid., 502. Vera sunt hec dices, sed tamen pugno postea me petiisti. Non petii ego te pugno, Poggi, sed tu
incurristi in pugnum; Ibid., 502. Quid ergo peccavi, profecto nihil. Sed hoc aliorum et conscientie tue
iudicium sit. Nemo enim est qui nesciat vim esse repellendam. Repuli et quam moderatissime, manum
enim extendi nudam in irruentem. Si hec vera non sunt, precor ut omnia mala que dici fingique possunt
veniant in me et in liberos meos. See note 34 for the preceding text; Ibid., 503. Vide quam graviter feci, non
mutavi vestigia, sed ne me pulsares (ad id enim te irruere natura me ita docente putavi) manum ad
propulsandum impetum protendi.
Monfasani writes that Trebizond “stopped him [Poggio]with a punch,” citing Lorenzo Valla’s
account of the fight as evidence. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 110. For Valla’s account, see Lorenzo
Valla, Opera Omnia, 2 vols. (Basel: 1540; repr., Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1962), 273-274. Valla, it should
be noted, was not present for the chancery fight and wrote of Trebizond’s punch while in the middle of his
own feud with Poggio. The Poggio-Valla feud is discussed below, pages 136-138. Trebizond may very well
have punched Poggio but whatever the facts the key issue for my analysis is how Trebizond relates the
events in a way that challenges the perception of him as imprudent.
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Trebizond repeats his claims in subsequent letters. In his March 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond
maintains that he had simply fended Poggio off. Walser, 509. Tunc ego fateor culpam in te retulisse qui
longe aliquantulum a nobis deambulabas. Audisti verba mea et clamans: mentiris irruisti in me. Ego
manum ad reppellendum te natura duce protendi.
In June 1454, Trebizond argued the same in a letter to his son Andreas. Collectanea, 120. Nec
dubitabant posse hoc se calumnia id facere, qui iam bis fallaciis me suis indicta causa oppresserunt:
primum, quando irruentem in me Pogium manu repuli; deinde, cum me secretariatu privassent. On
Trebizond’s spelling of Pogius, see note 88.
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claim,” he writes to Poggio, that “yes, you did charge at me, but not with the intention of
striking.” Trebizond counters that he had no way of knowing what Poggio was thinking
but could only react to the evidence before him: “Was I so divine as to know in what
spirit you charged against me? I heard you shout loudly ‘You lie, you lie,’ and I saw you
advancing rapidly, even at a run.” 37 Regardless of the accuracy of his account, he
describes the fight in this manner to present himself as reasonable. Even as his colleague
ran toward him shouting, Trebizond notes he had the rational state of mind not to attack,
but to defend himself merely by putting his hand out.
Trebizond focuses just as intently on his thought processes in describing the key
moment in the conflict, his decision to use a sword. That decision led the vice chancellor
to decide against Trebizond—who repeatedly laments that he was never allowed to
explain his side of the story—and call for his imprisonment. 38 Given his imprisonment
and exit from Rome, Trebizond expends a great deal of effort explaining why he had
wielded the sword. After fending off Poggio’s initial attack, Trebizond explains,
Trebizond was helped to his desk by his colleagues. Poggio, however, continued his
assault. Poggio stretched out a hand and stuck the index finger into Trebizond’s mouth
while grasping his cheek with his thumb. With his other hand, Poggio stretched out his
fingers “to dig out both my eyes,” even as Trebizond twisted in his seat to evade the
attempt. Trebizond casts his response as prudent:

37

Walser, 502-503. Id tu similiter non predicabis, sed dices forsan, quod prudenter se hic putavit quidam et
quidem in cetu doctissimorum hominum pro te dixisse, te irruisse quidem sed non pulsandi animo. Deusne
ego eram ut scire possem quo animo irrueres. Tonare te verbis audiebam Mentiris, mentiris, citatoque gradu
immo cursim ferri videbam. See note 35 for the preceeding and following text.
38

Monfasani speculates that the cardinal in question was Francesco Condulmer. Monfasani, George of
Trebizond, 110. Trebizond also alleges that Poggio tricked the others in the curia into believing him, and
claims this was why his side of the story was not heard. See pages 119-122.
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O poor, unlucky me, how prudently I acted at that time and how irresponsibly I
was judged to have acted. I could have justly bitten the finger driven into my
mouth: I did not. It occurred to me, since I was sitting and you were standing, to
crush your testicles with both hands and to lay you flat in this way: I did not. I
asked for a sword from those present so that I might drive you away by fear of it.
And this idea did not disappoint me. For in fact, you immediately hurried away
from that place like a Florentine woman in flight. What wrong, then, did I do if I
requested a sword to drive you away? 39
Restraint and prudence are crucial to Trebizond’s explanation. He claims he did not rush
to action and was not impelled by his emotions, adding that he did not immediately reach
for the sword when Poggio first charged him. Instead, he surveyed his options and chose
to frighten the man rather than to harm him. Trebizond’s focus again falls on his thought
process, which allows him to emphasize his reason, and on his action, which allows him
to assert his ethical behavior. Like his account of the rest of the fight, his discussion of
the sword was not simply a plea of self-defense, nor was it merely the bitter complaint of
a man who had been judged guilty. It was a deliberate framing of his choices intended to
refute the public perception of his actions as imprudent.
Restraint and Deception
Prudence and imprudence mark rational self-control or its lack, but honesty and
dishonesty are equally markers of restraint and failed restraint. Each man used the
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Walser, 503. Cumque postea multis accurrentibus resedissem, tu dextra protensa indicem digitum in os
meum immisisti et cum pollice simul teneram partem faciei tenebas. Aliam vero manum ad eruendos
utrosque oculos duobus digitis protensis in ipsos circa meum caput vitantis et huc atque illuc caput
circumferentis immitebas…O meme miserum, o me infelicem quam gravissime tunc feci et quam levissime
fecisse iudicatus sum. Potui digitum in os immissum meum dentibus iure concidere: non feci. Venit in
mentem, cum ego sederem et tu stares, utrisque manibus testes tuos comprimere ac te ita prosternere: non
feci. Gladium a circumstantibus quesivi, ut eius timore te pellerem. Nec me fefellit opinio. Illico enim ut
Florentina femina fuga inde te rapuisti. Quid ergo mali feci si gladium petii, ut te fugarem? Nam si statim a
principio cum te impetum in me ferri vidissem, gladium quesiissem: faterer a me peius factum fuisse, quam
quidam cardinalis predicavit verbis tuis confusus…
Perhaps because of the absurd details of the fight, this passage has proven popular in recent
studies. Greenblatt notes Trebizond’s attempt to present himself “as having acted with exemplary restraint,”
although he addresses the issue of restraint only briefly. I argue that prudence and restraint were key parts
of Trebizond’s self-presentation. Greenblatt, The Swerve, 145-146.
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additional set of oppositional categories in a variety of ways, including of course
accusations of lying, but also in references to deceptions, traps, snares, or plots.
Trebizond and Poggio characterize honesty as the conformity of statement and action to
fact and as an open and straightforward manner of behavior. They portray dishonesty as
the disjunction between statement, action, and fact as well as a manner of behavior that
obscures and hides rather than operating openly. Their language of honesty is rooted in
the decision-making process. Trebizond and Poggio both describe dishonesty as an
irrational and unethical reaction to events, and a sign of an emotional nature. Anger,
cruelty, and savagery indicate a lack of reason and self-control and explain why an
individual lies, deceives, and plots against others. Dishonesty is thus a marker of failed
self-control and failed prudence.
It is in articulating this combination of honesty, prudence, and restraint that
Trebizond and Poggio most clearly demonstrate their interest in self-presentation. Both
men express anxiety about how lies and deception can influence public perception. The
model of ethical prudence allows them to combat these effects. Each presents himself as
mobilizing practical reason for ethical ends, to dispel lies and reveal rather than obscure
the truth. Their arguments are also an indication of the tensions between the ideals and
realities of the humanist experience. Practical reason and ethical decision-making may
have been the ideal, but the worries of both men suggest this was not always upheld.
Their correspondence allows for some modification of recent analyses that note a
change in the early modern concept of prudence. Recent studies take Machiavelli’s The
Prince and Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier as evidence of a sixteenthcentury shift from a prudence rooted in ethics toward what John Martin has termed a
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“prudential rhetoric.” The phrase prudential rhetoric, as Martin explains it, denotes a shift
from the classical conception of ethical prudence to a point when prudence became “an
ethical strategy that gave new emphasis to the individual’s will” and was “divorced
entirely from ethics.” Martin then cites Machiavelli and Castiglione on the importance of
lying, dissimulation, and concealing one’s true beliefs in everyday interactions. The
emphasis regarding prudence remained on deliberation, reason, and reaction to
circumstance, but early modern authors began to embrace different actions—including
dissimulation and craftiness—to attain one’s goals. 40 As recent examinations of the curia
have demonstrated, however, lying and dissimulation were characteristic of, and much
lamented by, Quattrocento humanists. Trebizond and Poggio were not alone in their
concern about dishonesty. 41 Despite whatever changes were occurring in the Renaissance
concept of prudence, ethical prudence and its qualms with lying and dissimulation
remained a key part of the strategies of Trebizond and Poggio.
Dishonesty figures prominently in Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight
in January 1453 and Poggio’s response the following month. This is especially true of a
pair of accusations Trebizond levies against Poggio. First, he accuses Poggio of lying
about his own role in the fight, of misleading the curia afterwards, and of engineering
Trebizond’s expulsion from the chancery. Second, he accuses Poggio of having sent
assassins to Naples to kill him. Trebizond warns Poggio that he wrote about the latter
allegation to the pope himself in another letter of January 1453. Poggio’s February
40

See the works of John Martin in note 9. Martin, “Inventing Sincerity,” 1324-1325. On the shift regarding
prudence see Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1985) and Nancy S. Struever, Theory as Practice: Ethical Inquiry in the Renaissance
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). On Machiavelli and the new notion of prudence see Eugene
Garver, Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

41

See Greenblatt’s chapter on the “Lie Factory.” Greenblatt, The Swerve, 135-155. See too the studies on
Lapo in note 5.
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response directly addresses these allegations and, like Trebizond’s January letter, relies
largely on a language of dishonesty and imprudence.
The Exit from Rome and the Assassination Plot
Trebizond devotes much of his January letter to claiming that his imprisonment
and eventual departure from Rome were because of Poggio’s anger and lies. He makes a
case for Poggio’s lack of restraint and unethical behavior by linking these lies to his
emotions, including anger, rage, and cruelty. The crux of his argument is that Poggio
misled the curia into believing that Trebizond bore sole responsibility for their conflict.
Trebizond establishes this argument early, asking Poggio whether he is ashamed “to have
so confused the whole truth that you flung me down into that foulest prison.” Trebizond
accuses him of having tricked the curia, men who believed Poggio to be an honest man,
and of having so confused the matter that Trebizond’s side of the story was never heard.
He attributes Poggio’s deception to his emotional state, arguing that if he “had not been at
that time completely unreasonable on account of [his] rage [furor],” he would have
admitted his part in the fight. 42 Poggio’s alleged dishonesty also allows him to explain
how the vice chancellor, an otherwise “venerable and prudent man,” would render a
verdict against him. The vice chancellor “erred greatly in this matter” “because, deceived
[deceptus] by you, he refused to listen to the other [Trebizond’s] side.” He adds that
Poggio’s influence over the vice chancellor convinced the pope that Trebizond’s
testimony was unnecessary and then repeats his allegation that Poggio “misled him and
42

Walser, 502. Nam per Deum immortalem Poggi, ut amicus enim te colloquor, non pudet te ita veritatem
tunc omnem confudisse, ut in fedissimum me conieceris carcerem nec interrogatum quidem contemptum
enim fuit clamoribus nonnullorum potentium qui cum te probum virum crederent, decepti fuerunt;
contemptum inquam fuit illud aureum preceptum: audi alteram partem. Quod tu ideo fecisti quia non
ignorabas quomodo res se habuit. Certe Poggi nisi pre furore omni tunc ratione caruisses te ipsum magis
quam Georgium accusasses. See note 34 for the following text.
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several other cardinals, who either think you are a good man, or love you by virtue of a
prior relationship.” He ends the passage commenting on Poggio’s cruelty [crudelitas] and
blaming his imprisonment on how Poggio had obscured the truth. 43
Trebizond claims Poggio’s lies were also instrumental in his exit from Rome. At
the beginning of his January letter, he argues that Poggio “cast [him] down into the
filthiest prison” and also “shamefully drove [him] from the apostolic chancery.” After
their fight, Trebizond explains, he “conceded the matter to [Poggio] and left Rome with
the greatest loss of honor and property.” 44 Trebizond’s concern for honor is clear but he
also indicates the financial consequences of humanist contests. He reiterates these points
in his letter to Nicholas V composed at the same time as his January letter to Poggio. The
letter juxtaposes Poggio’s supposed anger and dishonesty with Trebizond’s own prudence
and self-control. Trebizond left, he tells Nicholas, for fear of what Poggio might devise
against him. 45 He claims again that Poggio manipulated the curia against him and
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Walser, 503. Qui cum sit vir gravis et prudens in hoc tamen maxime erravit, quod alteram partem audire
abs te deceptus neglexit. Non enim dubito, si audisset quod non tanto furore dominum nostrum decepisset.
Sed tu illum et nonnullos alios cardinales qui te vel bonum virum putant, vel prisca coniunctione affinitatis
diligunt, confudisti. Illi una tecum dominum nostrum nec mirum si multi unum sic, incitastis ut altera pars
nec interrogata quidem fuerit. Sed de his satis. Non enim ut corrigantur, quod res preterite fere nequeunt,
narravi: sed ut ostendam quanta sit crudelitas tua, hominem de te bene meritum et in carcerem per iniuriam
obfuscata veritate per te coniectum. See note 39 above for the preceding text.
Cf. Trebizond’s June 1454 letter to Andreas, where he accuses Poggio and Giovanni Aurispa of
circulating forged letters—purportedly written by the king of the Turks and insulting of Nicholas V—to
block Trebizond’s return to papal service and see him imprisoned again. I return to the forged letter plot
below, pages 139-146. Collectanea, 120. Quare sic? Ut cum omnes intelligant qui eas legunt non esse a
rege Turcorum conscriptas, Georgius, qui Neapoli habitat, scripsisse criminaretur, et indicta causa vel furca
vel perpetuis vinculis damnaretur.Unde id patet? Coniecerunt me biennio antea Aurispa et Pogius in
vincula et quidem indicta causa. Liberatus ad optimum omnium regum Alfonsum Neapolim profugi.
44

Walser, 501. Tantusne Poggi adversus me furor tibi conceptus est, ut cum et fedissimo carcere afflixeris
et ignominiose quantum ad te attinet e Cancellaria expuleris apostolica, cumque preterea ego ipse re tibi
cesserim atque Roma cum maximo tam honoris quam rei familiaris detrimento abierim, tam longo tempore
transacto non deferbueris?
Trebizond’s claim that he lost property likely refers to his loss of the salary associated with his
position as apostolic secretary. Monfasani reports no official move to strip Trebizond of his position, yet by
being refused reentry to the chancery Trebizond had essentially lost that income. I know of no actual
property that Trebizond lost. On the contrary, we know from a letter in June 1454 that his son Andreas
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explains that Poggio’s anger still had not abated. 46 He had tried to reconcile with Poggio
after their fight, he writes, but was hesitant to do so in the chancery because he had heard
a rumor that he would be expelled if he returned. Poggio refused to meet him anywhere
else. Trebizond takes this as proof of his opponent’s insincere interest in reconciliation
and continued animosity. 47 He then describes how he had returned to the chancery after
forty days to see whether Poggio was still angry. Upon his arrival, those in attendance
sent for Poggio, who spoke publicly with the vice chancellor about expelling Trebizond.
Rather than wait for the decision, Trebizond left the chancery and Rome. He “decided it
was prudent to depart,” he explains, “because I understood [Poggio’s] mind was
implacable [animus implacabilis], and because I saw that several cardinals said and did
everything he wanted.” 48 Trebizond emphasizes his own reasoning and prudence here

continued working in the curia after his father left for Naples. Trebizond urges Andreas to leave Rome at
the end of that letter. I think it likely that Trebizond retained holdings in Rome after his departure.
Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 113-115 and 137
45

For the letter to Nicholas see Walser, 504-506.
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Trebizond emphasizes the conflict with Poggio in his decision to leave Rome but also tells Nicholas he
had previously considered leaving because he felt he was not receiving the proper respect for his translation
work. See Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 109-113. Cf. Walser, 505. Quod libentius feci quantum id
ipsum iam antea cogitaram propter iniurias improbissimi hominis Jacobi Cremonensis, quem non
ignorabam aperte conari labores meos in se ipsum transferre. Sed postea B.P. Sanct. Tua que veritatis
vicarius est omnem mihi certius aperuit veritatem, que humanitate insita sibi et veritatis manifestande
amore commentarios meos ab ipso scedularum appositione fedatos cum affixis scedulis misit. Quarum
alique aperte significant nonnulla me bona ab idoneis ut verbo suo utar auctoribus sumpsisse que cum ipse
non intellexerim, se melius illa expositurum quando tempus dabitur. Ita vir bonus clam mihi insidiabatur
perfecissetque nisi S. Tua luce hac clariores improbi atque ignorantis hominis insidias fecerit, ita ut negare
nullo pacto possit. His ergo rationibus libenter Poggio cessi, presertim cum non minus Rome quam hic
essem peregrinus, sed non sufficiunt hec omnia Poggio.
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This section is also an example of the related theme of resentment, discussed below, pages 130-146.
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Walser, 504-505. Ego sanct. Pater, nulla re alia magis istinc abii quam timore ne durities Poggii
Florentini quicquam durius atque asperius adversus me innovaret. Nam post illum casum qui mihi culpa
sua invectus fuit, quamvis rogatus litteris meis quas ex fedissimo carcere ad ipsum scripseram veniam
dederit. Intellexi tamen ipsum ficto animo, quoniam tua S. ita volebat fecisse. Nam cum paratum me
semper ad reconciliationem ubicumque preter quam in Apostolica cancelleria non ignoraret, ipse
sepenumero simulavit se quoque paratum, sed non alibi quam in cancellaria. Cujus rei testis est Marcellus
Rusticus. Id ego idcirco recusavi, quoniam certior factus rumoribus iam eram quod ignominiose
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and throughout his January letters to Poggio and Nicholas. He conceded the matter to
Poggio—at the loss of honor and property—because he understood that the man was
unable to control his anger, that his lies had been effective, that the men of the curia
believed Poggio to be honest, and that they would continue to take Poggio’s word over
his own.
Trebizond’s narrative of his departure from Rome is essentially an amplification
of his description of the chancery fight, where he argues that Poggio’s anger clouded his
reason and impelled him to violence. When he discusses his imprisonment and departure,
Trebizond speaks in greater detail about Poggio’s character. This is an important shift
from describing an isolated outburst of emotion to a more substantial statement about the
man’s very nature. Poggio attacked him, but then lied about it afterwards, confused the
cardinals, feigned an interest in reconciliation, and even forty days later spoke publicly
for Trebizond’s expulsion. The implacability of Poggio’s anger and his consistent
dishonesty allows Trebizond to cast him not just as prone to emotion and deception but as
defined by them.
Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio’s anger is a critical component of his third
example of his opponent’s dishonesty and lack of restraint: the assassination plot. He
writes about the supposed plot to both Poggio and Nicholas in January 1453. To
Nicholas, Trebizond relates the details of one of what he alleges were Poggio’s three

Vicecancellarius inde me expulsurus erat. Deinde cum propter peccata mea nullus mihi aditus ad S.T.
daretur nec aliquis cubicularius vellet me cum aliis secretariis admittere, post XL dies experiri volui si iam
furor in me suus deferbuisset. Petii ergo cancellariam. Et statim a nonnullis et quidem aperte missum fuit
pro eo. Venit et cum Vicecancellario aperte de ignominiosa expulsione mea peregit. Quid statuerit nescio.
Nam postquam Poggius inde abiit, ego etiam timens ne post abitum ipsius fieret, quod optabat, abii statim,
non inde solum sed eodem ipso die ex Roma Neapolim versus. Nam quoniam vidi animum eius
implacabilem vidique nonnullos cardinales omnia dicere ac facere, que ipse vellet, magni animi esse putavi,
cedere. For the following material, see note 46.
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attempts to send assassins to Naples to kill him. 49 Trebizond’s focus shifts here from
Poggio’s lies and obfuscation after their fight to the plots Poggio developed over time. He
twice comments to Poggio on the duration of the man’s anger and dishonesty, first noting
Poggio’s efforts to ruin him with plots and then his attempt to pursue him with a sword. 50
I read the latter as a comparison to the charges against Trebizond after their fight.
Trebizond is suggesting that even though his prudence had been questioned for using a
sword that day, it was Poggio who continued to threaten him in a similar manner long
after the fight. The phrasing is undoubtedly exaggerative, as Poggio was not personally
wielding a sword against him, but rather, if Trebizond’s accusation is to be believed, he
hired men to do so. The statement amplifies Poggio’s error, though, and makes
Trebizond’s own decision seem the less egregious of the two offenses. Poggio, after all,
had had plenty of time to cool his anger. Trebizond implies the same to Nicholas, arguing
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The assassination accusation may sound outrageous but physical violence was not unheard of among
fifteenth-century humanists. In May 1433 Francesco Filelfo was scarred by a knife attack from an assailant
hired by an associate of Cosimo de ’Medici in Florence. Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian
Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 213. Trebizond, however, was likely
trying to capitalize on public knowledge of Poggio’s vitriolic feud with Lorenzo Valla, another curialist.
Trebizond hoped that the Poggio-Valla feud would help convince Nicholas and any who read his letter that
Poggio capable of violence. In his March 1453 letter, Trebizond reminds Poggio of the man’s own
proclamation that he intended to see Valla killed. See page 136.
The Poggio-Valla feud was still ongoing when Trebizond wrote to Nicholas in January 1453.
Poggio eventually left Rome after becoming the chancellor of Florence in April 1453 but that did not lessen
the animosity between them. Monfasani reports how Niccolò Perotti—one of Valla’s supporters and the
secretary of Cardinal Bessarion—sent an assassin to Florence to murder Poggio. The Florentine
government sent a letter of protest to Bessarion and Perotti was forced to write a “humble apology.”
Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 122. Poggio continued to bear ill-will toward Valla while in Florence.
Writing to Pietro Tommasi in 1454, he cast Valla as a beast and a heretic who ought to be whipped,
imprisoned, and burned at the stake. Celenza, Lost, 130; Salvatore Camporeale, “Poggio Bracciolini versus
Lorenzo Valla: The Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern
Intellectual History, ed. Joseph Marino and Melinda W. Schlitt (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester
Press, 2001), 31.
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Walser, 501. Sed per insidias me coneris occidere, ita nullum omnis honesta cogitatio de rebus humanis
locum in te habet, ut non possis cogitare mortalem te quoque esse, divinique auxilii sicut omnes homines
egere. For the preceeding text, see note 44; Walser, 503. Cuius iura qualiacumque sint: nunquam audita
fuerunt, qui cum detrimento tam honoris quam rei familiaris tibi cessit adhuc longo tempore transacto longe
absentem gladio prosequeris. For the preceeding text, see note 43.
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that Poggio was dissatisfied with his departure and that “the arrogant mind [superbus
animus] of that man” could not be quelled even months later. 51
Trebizond’s account to Nicholas of the assassination plot contrasts Poggio’s
plotting and implacable anger with his own rational self-control. He relates how on
December 15, 1452, he was studying when he was told that two armed men wished to
speak with him. Trebizond notes that he thought this odd. He had the men told he was in
the Castel and sent a member of his household to follow them. The men went
immediately to the Castel, where they waited for the rest of the day. They came again
another day, and Trebizond had them told he was at Sant’ Agostino, a nearby monastery.
This time, however, they recognized Trebizond’s servant following them and retreated.
Fearing they had been discovered, they reached out to Trebizond. They admitted to
having been asked to kill him but contended they had agreed only in order to warn him.
Although he had considered legal charges—he met with three people to discuss the
option—Trebizond pardoned the men for fear that public opinion about the affair, even if
false, would turn against Nicholas. 52 Trebizond’s argument is predicated on the fact that
51

Walser, 505. Nec semestri et ultra spatio temporis superbus hominis animus potui mitigari, sed mittit
satellites hucusque ad occidendum me quam rem ter iam tentavit. Primo manifestissime Novembri mense
deinde XV die Decembris et his diebus Tercio quamvis huius tertii aggressus coniecturalia signa non
necessaria fuerint. Aliorum duorum manifesta necessariaque. Sed ne longior sim, secundum aggressum
tantummodo narrabo. For the preceding material, see note 46.
52

Walser, 505-506. Quintodecimo Decembris S.P. studenti mihi nuntiatum fuit, venisse duos armigeros qui
mecum loqui vellent. Ego ipsa conditione, atque arte hominum perculsus responderi feci, quod essem in
castello et statim misi qui eos sequerentur. Recta via petierunt castellum. Expectaveruntque ad primam
usque horam noctis altero die similiter venerunt, responsumque ipsis a me per nuntium fuit quod essem in
sancto A<u>gustino quod monasterium non minus quam mille passibus distat a domo mea. Misique
similiter qui eos per totam diem illam observaret. Recto itinere Sancti A<u>gustini monasterium illi
petierunt, collocaveruntque se in locis unde possent a monasterio exeuntem videre. Sed minister meus non
potuit caute diutius eos observare. Nam post horam unam circiter ab illis perspectus fuit. Et statim inde
recesserunt. Cognoverant enim illum esse ministrum meum, per quem sibi responsum fuit domi mee. Unde
timore perculsi anteaquam ego de capiendis ipsis ordinem dedissem, prevenerunt et per quendam
venerabilem fratrem et sacre Regie Maiestati in primis dilectum mihi nuntiarunt quod ipsi me ad salutem
quesivissent meam: rogatos se fuisse Rome cum istac transirent ut me occiderent seque assensisse non ut
facerent, sed quo me admonerent, ut caveam. Ita ego non precibus illorum magis victus quam quod viderem
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Poggio was still working in the curia. He is suggesting that Poggio’s behavior, if it
became public knowledge, could reflect poorly on Nicholas himself. Trebizond casts his
actions as rational and restrained by relating how he accurately perceived the danger of
the armed men and by framing his pardoning of them as an act of discretion. He brought
the situation to Nicholas, he writes, so that a proper solution could be arranged. 53
Trebizond’s reassessment of the fight, his imprisonment, his exit from Rome,
and the assassination plot all reinforce his contention that Poggio was dishonest. He uses
Poggio’s supposed dishonesty as an illustration that Poggio had acted wrongly in their
dispute, that his actions were the result of failed restraint, and that his actions indicated an
individual driven to action by emotion. Trebizond’s narrative is a complex account rooted
in the charges against him after the fight—imprudence, the use of the sword—and in
Poggio’s previous criticisms of Trebizond’s response to the Agaso letter. Poggio
challenged this narrative and each of Trebizond’s allegations in his February 1453 letter.
Poggio’s Response: Trebizond’s Pattern of Abuse
Poggio’s response offers radically different accounts of the chancery fight and the
assassination plot. 54 Much of his letter consists of a rejection of Trebizond’s allegations,
which he dismisses as clear lies. He denies ever having done anything offensive to

hanc rem si patefieret nonnihil etiam ad Sanctitatem Tuam quanvis falso opinione tamen multorum
pertinere libenter ipsis ignovi, nec ex me Deum testor et conscientiam meam quispiam aliquid hac de re
percepit, preter tres apud regem non infimos quorum consilio usus sum de querendis capiendisque ipsis.
For the preceding material, see the previous note.
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Walser, 504. Post oscula beatorum pedum sanctiss. pater. Audeo nonnihil fretus inaudita Tue Sanctitatis
mirabilique humanitate referre. Que postquam pepercerit Sanctitas tua supplico ut dignetur oportunum
remedium adhibere; Ibid., 506. Ita res se habuit Beatissime Pater quare S. Tue supplico ut primo propter
deum, deinde propter te et conscientiam tuam, tercio propter homines (non enim omnino fama et
existimatio negligenda est). Dignetur Georgii humillimi fidelisque servitoris ac filiorum suorum, et in hac
re et in ceteris iura et rationes propius aspicere.
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For Poggio’s February 1453 response see Poggii Epistolae, 3:49-52.
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Trebizond, disparaging him, or standing in the way of his interests. 55 He argues that he
had no part in the supposed assassination plot, and that Trebizond had so escaped his
attention that he was unsure whether he was alive or dead. Poggio claims the very
allegation is absurd. “Do you really think me so stupid, so imprudent [imprudens],” he
asks, “as to be willing to commit my reputation [fama] and good name [existimatio]” in
such a plot? 56 Poggio’s disavowal is a clear articulation of his concern for reputation. He
repeatedly characterizes Trebizond’s claims as false, unjust, slanderous, and ridiculous.
The entire assassination plot is “nothing.” It is a “false and ridiculous complaint.”
Nicholas knows him too well to believe such an accusation, and surely he is not “so noted
an assassin and so occupied in the murder of men” that anybody else would believe him
to have taken part in such a plot. 57

55

Ibid., 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non litteris tibi
unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam obstiti, sed dilexi ut virum doctum usque ad eam diem, qua tu
acceptam de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti, quae nostri discidii causa fuit. Nunquam aliquid de
te cogitavi, quod non solum tibi, quamvis iniquus sis judex, sed cuiquam bono viro debeat displicere: tu an
idem feceris, tuae litterae satis impudenter scriptae testantur.
Poggio levies a new charge in claiming that Trebizond had committed fraud. Trebizond denies the
allegation in March 1453 and casts it as another example of Poggio’s attempts to ruin him. Walser, 509.
Sed ad veritatem quam modo dixiti, falsum illud statim addidisti: usque ad eam diem ais, qua tu acceptam
de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti: que nostri discidii causa fuit. Acceptam ego pecuniam
negavi? Quis hoc preter te unquam dixit? aut quando tu id quod ego resciverim nisi modo? Nec fuit causa
discidii ut tu appellas nostri. Non pudet te tam aperte mentiri? …Vide igitur prudentiam tuam ne stultitiam
dicam. Furem me modo facis, quod nec tunc quidem quando pugno repulsus exarsisti adversus me dicere
ausus fuisti.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Ego tibi persancte possum jurare, non solum tui tollendi consilium non coepisse,
sed te ita excidisse ex animo, ut vivus ne, an mortuus esses non satis memoria tenerem: nimium,
mehercules, ocio inerti abundarem, si de Trapezuntio cogitarem. Itaque neque fuit unquam, neque est ulla
in me cura tale facinus perpetrandi; quippe qui multis de causis optem, ut diutius vivas, praesertim per
foenus amissis pecuniis, quae tibi tantam superbiam subministrabant. An vero ita me stultum putas, ita
imprudentem, ut nescio quibus vanis hominibus, qui te inani ostentione terrerent, meam famam et
existimationem, ut de animae salute omittam, committere voluisse? Absit a me talis cogitatio, nedum opus.
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Ibid., 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te ad me
lacerandum impulisset; sed in copia litterarum, quas ad Pontificem scribis, cognovi quid quereris, me
scilicet percussores ad te occidendum ex Urbe misisse mense Decembris; quod totum cum nihil sit,
honestum foret nihil quoque tibi a me responderi. Veruntamen rectius fuisset id facinus in tuis litteris inseri,
ut a te ipso cognoscerem in quo me tam acerbe accusares. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et
infamiam adversus me excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri? Nunquid ita sum
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Poggio renounced Trebizond’s charge as a falsehood contrived by a man who
continued to harbor an enmity against him. He argued that Trebizond had concocted his
false accusation to ruin Poggio’s reputation. His motive, according to Poggio, was
Poggio’s prior comments about Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino in 1437. Even though
he had later apologized and indeed praised Trebizond—a reference to his letter in 1450—
Poggio writes that Trebizond was dissatisfied. Still aggravated and unable to control his
anger, Poggio continues, Trebizond made his false allegations about the chancery fight
and the assassination plot. Regarding the former, Poggio claims that Trebizond “recounts
a lengthy story” to blame him for the fight and accuses Trebizond of unjustly twisting
events to support his weaker position. 58 Regarding the latter, Poggio states that the
assassination charge was Trebizond’s obvious attempt to harm his reputation: “For what
need was there, except to excite ill-will and dishonor against me, for a false and
ridiculous complaint to be brought to the pontiff?” 59 Although he expressed confidence
that Nicholas knew him too well to believe the accusation, Poggio understood and labeled
it as Trebizond’s attempt to turn public opinion against him. Like Trebizond, he
expressed anxiety about the effect that lies could have on reputation.
ignotus Pontifici, aut notus sicarius, et in caede hominum hactenus versatus, ut existimes Pontificem, aut
alios, credere me talium insidiarum fuisse auctorem?
58

Ibid., 3:49-50. Arguis me ob rem antiquam, quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans,
parum bene consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam contumeliam scriptum putas. Quam rem alias et verbis,
et per epistolam apud te purgavi; scribens multa in tuam laudem, quae rectius tacuissem, credebam tibi ex
mea defensione abunde satisfactum. Sed animus tuus, ut video, exulceratus, quoniam alia desunt, ex inanire
jurgandi causam quaerens, conceptum contra me odium nequivit continere, ne dum in Trapezuntio, sed ne
in Catone quidem fuissent ea verba contumeliosa. Si tantum in te consilii esse putas, ut errare nequeas,
nimis tibi omnium judicio arrogas; si errare te posse fateris, non mireris id de te dictum, quod
sapientissimis quoque viris aliquando videmus objici, cum dicantur ea egisse, quae non bene consulti
hominis esse videantur. Narras longam fabulam in rejiciendo in me praeteritorum culpam, quae
existimabam tibi jam ex animo, prout mihi acciderat, excidisse; quae acta sunt, nequeunt immutari: sed ab
iniquo interprete saepius in malam partem vertuntur. Cf. Poggio’s 1450 letter, pages 109-111.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et infamiam adversus me excitandam,
falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri? See note 57.
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In dismissing Trebizond’s accusations, Poggio expands on his previous
assessment of his opponent’s prudence with a consideration of what Trebizond’s lies
reveal about his character. In 1437 and 1450, Poggio had criticized Trebizond for having
acted rashly and without evidence in writing insultingly against Guarino. Poggio argues
similarly here about the assassination plot, claiming that posterity would prove Trebizond
had perceived the situation wrongly and lashed out without evidence. 60 Now, though,
Poggio draws substantive conclusions about Trebizond’s character. He describes
Trebizond’s letter to him as “extremely insulting and insolent beyond what is proper of
your habits and learning,” and proclaims that he forgives Trebizond for his nature and the
perturbation of his mind. 61 This statement establishes a connection between emotion—
Trebizond’s perturbation—and the resultant action—the writing of insulting letters—but
also connects to his adversary’s nature. His characterization of Trebizond is similar to
Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio the previous month. Each man casts the other as captive
to emotion in the moment as well as over time, a sure sign of someone whose very nature
is lacking in self-control. They both portray the other’s anger as manifesting itself in lies
or plots. Poggio proceeds to argue that the failure of his 1450 apology to satisfy
Trebizond indicates his opponent’s arrogance. Even the wisest men, Poggio lectures,
occasionally act in a way unbefitting a consultus homo, but he implies that Trebizond
believes he ought not be held to that level of scrutiny. The truth, he continues, is that
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Persuade tibi quod libet: futurum tempus te ostendet male sensisse, et incertam
suspitionem pro certo maleficio accepisse. Cf. Poggio’s similar assertions in 1437 and 1450, pages 107111.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Recepi tuas litteras, ultraquam mores tuos et doctrinam deceat, contumeliosas
nimium ac petulantes: ignosco naturae tuae et animi perturbationi, in qua ex tuis verbis intelligo te versari.
Sed ne videar tacendo, vel assentiri, vel contemnere quae scribis, et ut me purgem in eo, quo me inique et
falso accusas, respondebo paucis, et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar
imitari.
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Trebizond is simply an irascible man [iracundus homo] who lies to avenge an old grudge.
It is for this reason that Poggio dismisses Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight, at
the same time claiming for himself the mantle of restraint by refusing to stoop to
disgraceful language, as he accuses Trebizond of doing. 62
Poggio juxtaposes a depiction of Trebizond’s enduring anger, lack of restraint,
and lies with a characterization of his own rational moderation. His strategies are similar
to Trebizond’s, who defended his actions as reasoned in contrast to Poggio’s alleged
dishonesty. Poggio claims that his response will be more moderate than Trebizond’s
insulting letter and that he refuses to alter his habits and use abusive language. 63 He also
declares that if Trebizond had imitated his moderation [modestia] in handling the
assassination issue, he might have freed both men from having to deal with the
accusation of a plot. As an example of his moderation, Poggio writes about a rumor he
claims to have heard recently, that Trebizond had requested and procured from King
Alfonso of Aragon Poggio’s property in Naples. Despite the report, Poggio continues, he
neither complained nor wrote insulting letters to Trebizond. Instead, trusting in Alfonso’s
prudence, he merely assumed the story was false. 64 Whether true or not, and Monfasani
believes it was not, the purported rumor fits well with Poggio’s characterization of
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Ibid., 3:50. Tua tamen verba tanti faciam, quanti hominis iracundi, et hac in re non rectum judicium
sequentis: neque vero propter tuas calumnias mutabo mores meos, neque tecum verborum turpitudine, sed
virtute contendam. See note 58 for the preceeding text.
63

For Poggio’s claims of moderation, see the previous two notes.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:51-52. Tuum est credere ut voles; ego mea conscientia contentus ero: si tamen
modestiam a me praestitam, in qua me laudo, fuisses imitatus, et te, et me inani labore et molestia
liberasses. Nam cum ad me, dum essem nuper Florentiae, a pluribus scriptum esset, te possessiones meas a
rege inclito Aragonum dono postulasse, atque impetrasse, non sum tecum eam injuriam questus, neque
quicquam ad te scripsi contumeliosum, existimans famam, quae ferebatur, non esse veram, et id factum a
prudentia tanti principis alienum.

129

Trebizond as rash. 65 Unlike Trebizond, Poggio implies, he does not leap to conclusions
and attack others based on false allegations. Alongside his comments about Trebizond’s
past impulsive behavior, Poggio’s response to the rumor, based on what he knows of
Alfonso, is intended to demonstrate his own restraint.
Poggio and Trebizond employed very similar strategies in accusing each other
of dishonesty and praising themselves for their own reasoned prudence. Dishonesty
served as another marker of failed self-control, but over a long period of time, especially
as a part of a pattern of abuse, dishonesty represented a substantial character flaw. Their
concept of dishonesty also brings into sharper relief their anxiety about reputation and
identity. Each presented the other as a deliberate actor whose lies were intended to distort
public opinion. They understood that their identities were contingent on how others
viewed them. Their language of dishonesty further reflects an underlying tension in
humanist interactions. Both men condemn dishonesty, but in seeing it as a part of the
other’s strategies, they illustrate that it remained a part of contests of honor.
Restraint and Forgiveness
Poggio’s February 1453 letter pushes to the forefront another significant marker
of restraint, forgiveness. Here and in Trebizond’s March response, forgiveness functions
as a sign of reasoned self-control. The concept of forgiveness in fact dominates the
dispute from February into March. Each man emphasizes his ability to forgive offenses
while claiming the other is unable to do so. Their discussion on this point intersects with
their concepts of prudence and honesty. They each characterize those who are able to
forgive as prudent and honest and those who are unwilling or unable to forgive as
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Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 123.
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imprudent and dishonest. For both men, forgiveness serves as an ideal mode of conflict
resolution. The expectation was that one responds to offenses by either forgetting or
forgiving. A public display of forgiveness could also demonstrate the forgiver’s honor,
while the refusal to forgive could be condemned as a sign of dishonor. 66
The concept of forgiveness that Trebizond and Poggio articulated was
problematic for them both. The imperative to forget injuries does not in and of itself
allow for the contests of honor that were so important to humanists. Each man struggles
to balance the ideal to forgive with an impulse to respond to an opponent’s accusations
that he worries could tarnish his reputation. Anxiety about reputation results in some
moments of uncomfortable rationalization for both men. Each man leaves room in his
concept of forgiveness to accommodate necessary responses to injury. The compromise
involves issuing a moderate response. This compromise too, though, is problematic for
both. It creates an ambiguity in the ideal, since what constitutes an injury, whether a
response to an injury is actually necessary, and what qualifies as a moderate response all
become subjective and a matter of perspective. Each man exploits this ambiguity to
characterize his opponent not simply as dishonest or imprudent, but as hypocritical.
Defining the Ideal
Poggio’s renunciation of the assassination plot in February 1453 offers the
clearest articulation of the ideal of forgiveness. Forgiveness is evident, of course, when
he forgives Trebizond’s “nature and perturbation,” which led him to send Poggio
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Poggio had tried just such a public display when he wrote his letter of apology to Trebizond in 1450.
When he wrote again to Trebizond in February 1453, he mentions that he thought his letter would have
satisfied Trebizond. That it did not, Poggio implies, is a sign of Trebizond’s dishonor. See note 58.
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“insulting and petulant” letters. 67 Later, in addressing the assassination charge, Poggio
claims that rather than taking part in such a plot, it is his habit to follow the teachings of
wise men that injuries ought to be forgotten rather than avenged by force or violence. 68
This position differs from the one he had expressed during the Trebizond-Guarino feud,
when he had declared that certain offenses can and ought to be answered with “reason
and arguments.” Dealing with offenses was not as simple as merely forgiving, it seems.
In the 1437 letter to Cauchus, Poggio noted that the appropriate way to respond was not
in the insulting fashion in which Trebizond had attacked Guarino, but in a moderate
manner, as he himself had done during his own dispute with Guarino. There is a practical
purpose for doing so, as insults make one’s case appear less commendable, but he also
argued that a prudent man should be mindful of an opponent’s honor. 69 These two
approaches, forgetting injuries or responding moderately, assume that a proper response
requires rational self-control. Poggio vacillates between both in his February letter. First,
he expresses his intent to respond to Trebizond—a necessary response, Poggio argues, so
that his silence will not be misconstrued as assent—more moderately than Trebizond
wrote to him. He adds to this his refusal to use shameful language. Second, his reference
to the advice of wise men, that one should simply forget offenses, frames his discussion
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In January 1453, Trebizond sent Poggio two letters. The first was addressed to Poggio and included
Trebizond’s reassessment of the chancery fight. The second was a copy of the letter Trebizond sent to
Nicholas V detailing the supposed assassination plot. Ibid., 3:49. See note 61.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:51. Est moris mei, tum reliquis in rebus, tum in hoc sequi praecepta sapientum, quae
jubent oblivione potius, injurias esse, quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas. For the preceding text, see note
56. For the following text, see note 60.
69

For Poggio’s 1437 letter to Cauchus and the reiteration of his ideas in 1450 see pages 107-111.
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of how he dismissed the rumor of Trebizond’s alleged acquisition of Poggio’s property in
Naples. 70
Though Poggio shifts between the two responses, he also struggles to integrate
them effectively, which suggests his awareness of and difficulties with the tension
between them. Poggio’s inconsistency is evident in one extended passage. First, he
attempts to craft a moderate response that avoids insults and abuse. Here he dismisses
Trebizond as an irascible man and proclaims that he will not betray his standards and
employ shameful language because of his opponent’s false accusations. Still, he stops to
make one point and issues a suggestion: “See that you do not make false accusations
against another that, once thrown back against you and yours by no means falsely, would
cover you with disgrace.” Poggio’s statement serves as a warning to Trebizond that, if
pressed, Poggio would take more drastic action. The possibility of a threat aside, even as
a mere suggestion the statement seems condescending. Poggio prefaces it with dismissive
name-calling, calling Trebizond irascible, that is consistent in its condescension with his
assertions elsewhere that he had given Trebizond so little thought since their fight that he
knew not whether he was alive or dead. 71
Second and immediately thereafter, Poggio appears unsure how to reconcile his
repeated protests that Trebizond’s assassination accusation is absurd with the act of
responding to it. The most telling example occurs when he explicitly states that since the
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. See note 61; Poggii Epistolae, 3:51-2. See notes 64 and 68.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:50. Tua tamen verba tanti faciam, quanti hominis iracundi, et hac in re non rectum
judicium sequentis: neque vero propter tuas calumnias mutabo mores meos, neque tecum verborum
turpitudine, sed virtute contendam. Unum tamen dicam: vide ne alteri falso objicias, quae in te et tuos haud
falso rejecta, te rubore perfunderent.
See note 56. Poggio adds that if he had given any thought to Trebizond, it would have been a
sign that he had too much free time on his hands. Poggio’s sarcasm is inconsistent with a moderate
response that avoids insults.
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whole accusation is nothing, it may be more honorable not to respond at all. He does not
resolve the tension here, but instead simply moves past it to label the charge as false and
ridiculous again. 72 One might forgive Poggio’s response given that, as he points out,
Trebizond made the assassination accusation to the pope without telling Poggio first, but
the manner in which Trebizond made his accusation does not make Poggio’s response
any less contradictory. If Trebizond’s claim was false and ridiculous and it would have
been more honorable not to respond to it, then by his own standards Poggio ought not
have responded. In both cases, Poggio gestures to the cultural ideal, outright forgiveness
or at least a moderate response, but chooses to ignore it, even if to make just one point.
Poggio’s inconsistency was indicative of a fundamental problem facing humanists
contesting honor in the court of public opinion. Restraint may have been the ideal but it
was not always easy to maintain in the face of challenges to one’s honor or, as in
Poggio’s case, allegations of murderous plots. Poggio’s tenuous incorporation of these
two models of conflict resolution became a focal point of Trebizond’s March letter.
Poggio and Failed Forgiveness
Trebizond’s March 1453 response exploits the tensions in the humanist concept of
forgiveness to construct a portrait of Poggian hypocrisy. He is highly critical of what he
argues is Poggio’s inability to abide by the ideal of forgiveness he espouses and takes
advantage of the ambiguity concerning what qualifies as a moderate response. Trebizond
begins his letter by challenging Poggio’s claims that he forgave Trebizond and that he
72

Poggii Epistolae, 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te
ad me lacerandum impulisset; sed in copia litterarum, quas ad Pontificem scribis, cognovi quid quereris, me
scilicet percussores ad te occidendum ex Urbe misisse mense Decembris; quod totum cum nihil sit,
honestum foret nihil quoque tibi a me responderi. Veruntamen rectius fuisset id facinus in tuis litteris inseri,
ut a te ipso cognoscerem in quo me tam acerbe accusares. Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et
infamiam adversus me excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri?
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would write more moderately than Trebizond himself had. 73 To the former, Trebizond
asks why Poggio had responded at all, suggesting that the very act of response was a
failure to forgive. “Does he forgive,” he asks, “who returns like for like?” 74 To the latter,
he argues that although Poggio had complained about his “insolent and insulting”
language, he had himself used insulting language. “From the start,” he accuses Poggio,
“you declare my letters to be insulting and insolent and by doing so declare I am as well.”
He remarks later that hurling insults [convicior] hardly qualifies as replying more
moderately than one’s opponent. 75 Moreover, Trebizond denies Poggio’s premise that he
had written insultingly and counters that he had spoken as the gravity of the assassination
plot demanded. He contends that he had brought a fair complaint before Poggio, who
responded by labeling his writing—and therefore himself—as insolent and insulting and
dismissing the complaint as a lie. By Trebizond’s estimation, not only had Poggio failed
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For the March letter see Walser, 506-514. Walser, 507. Contumeliosas petulantesque ais a me recepisse
litteras, deinde addis: Ignosco nature tue, et animi perturbationi, sed ne videar tacendo assentiri respondebo.
Quid ais Poggi? Si ignoscis cur respondes? Ego nihil aliud quam litteras ad te misi, conquestusque sum de
iniuriis a te mihi illatis. Tu respondes et quidem contumeliose et primum dicis, te ignoscere deinde
respondes. Non exclamabo hic ignorantiam, nec conscientie stimulos convocabo. Omnem enim vim
orationis modo tibi condono. Sed te moneo ut iterum atque iterum consideres, quid dicas. Igoscit qui par
pari refert? Ubi hec didicisti? quis id te docuit? Nec certe id dicere potes, ideo te mihi ignovisse, quod non
ita contumeliose scripseris. Nam ego nihil in te dixi contumeliose, sed acriter et vehementer ut res
flagitabat. Tu statim incipiens, contumeliosas et petulantes litteras meas hoc est me ipsum appellas. Sed
mee an tue littere petulantes, ut verbo utar tuo, magisque contumeliose sint, aliorum sit iudicium, devenient
enim ad posteros usque. Ego id contendo non ignoscere ipsum, qui eo modo ulciscitur, quo lesum se putat
etiam si minus reddat, sed cum non propter impotentiam sed propter modestiam nihil refert. Tu litteras
accepisti, tu litteras reddis. Verbis te lesum conquereris et verbis falso ledis et ignoscis?
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Trebizond also articulated a moral imperative to forgive wrongs in his January 1453 letter as well, stating
that even if he had wronged Poggio, his aid in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus would have
required Poggio to forgive him. Walser, 501. Si maxime in te deliquissem, si maximas tibi contulissem
iniurias, fuisset tamen humanitatis tue ignoscere presertim cedenti. See note 33 for the following text.
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Walser, 508. Respondebo, ais, paucis et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar
imitari. Modestius respondet qui nec respondet quidem sed conviciatur?
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to truly forgive by responding at all, but he had also failed to reply moderately. Poggio
had failed on both accounts. 76
Poggio’s failed forgiveness figures prominently in Trebizond’s defense of the
assassination plot accusation. He wrote to Nicholas, he tells Poggio, because he was
aware of Poggio’s past refusal to forgive injuries and tendency toward irrational
aggression. He presents Poggio’s feud with Lorenzo Valla, still ongoing at the time of the
March letter, as evidence. 77 Trebizond characterizes the dispute as a childish affair, and
nineteenth-century accounts and recent studies have made similar assessments of
Poggio’s lack of restraint. 78 In a sign of the importance of audience in humanist contests,
Trebizond appeals to the public Poggio-Valla dispute to denigrate Poggio. Such an appeal
indicates how humanists read about, discussed, and even participated in each other’s
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Ibid., 510. Spondeamus igitur ut paulo ante dixi aut quavis alia grandi sponsione, que victum aut omnino
perdat aut miserum perpetue faciat. Ego mediusfidius antea et te et me salvum volebam. Nunc his tuis
litteris quibus furor tuus in me magis aperitur, quam purgetur, sic accensus sum ut nihil magis optem quam
ut hac conditione turpissimam alter nostrum obeat mortem. Falso me scripsisse ais ergo, hanc epistolam
testor, si hanc conditionem non acceptaveris, daturum me operam et scribendo et dicendo ut omnes si fieri
potest homicidam, te sicarium mendacem, impudentem, iniquum, furiosum, ingratum, asinum et sentiant et
predicent. Hec ita scribo, quia equam conditionem tibi affero, falsa me scripsisse dicis.
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The Poggio-Valla feud took place in Rome, as both worked in the curia, until Poggio left in April 1453 to
become the Florentine chancellor. Occurring between 1452 and 1453 the dispute was one of the most
vitriolic of the fifteenth century. The standard account is still Salvatore Camporeale’s biography of Valla,
Lorenzo Valla: Umanessimo e Teologia (Florence, 1972). For his analysis from Poggio’s perspective, see
“Poggio Bracciolini versus Lorenzo Valla: The Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early
Modern and Modern Intellectual History, ed. Marino and Schlitt. For a shorter overview, see Ennio I. Rao,
Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1453) (Messina: EDAS, 2007), 87-97. I
examine Trebizond’s accusations that the feud was childish in my analysis of masculinity in Chapter Four,
page 191, and in Chapter Five I analyze the first of Poggio’s four invectives against Valla.
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In the nineteenth century, John Addington Symonds described Poggio as a “fiery scholar” who
“discharged his usual missile, a furious invective, against Valla” and added “nor did the quarrel end till he
had added five of these disgusting compositions to his achievements in the same style, and had drawn a
young Latinist of promise, Niccolo Perotti, into the disgraceful fray.” John Addington Symonds,
Renaissance in Italy, vol. 2, The Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder, 1897), 174-175. In his recent
description of the dispute as the high-water mark of humanist invective, Ennio Rao describes how Poggio
and Valla “had scoured the Latin language and exhausted it in their search for obscene words with which to
hail down scorn upon one another.” Rao, 96-97.
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feuds. 79 The dispute was quite the cause célèbre, dividing humanists in and beyond
Rome into camps supporting the two men, and Trebizond almost certainly understood the
resonance his comments would have. 80 Poggio, he claims, had been rebuked by Valla and
had become so enraged that he had resolved to end the man’s life. Trebizond, describing
himself as a confidant of Poggio’s at that time, had urged him not to worry, counseling
that a mind’s greatness is perceived in neglecting—or forgetting—an offense rather than
in seeking revenge. He had added that if Poggio was intent on responding, he ought to do
so in writing. Since Valla had castigated him in writing, this would be a fair manner of
reply. Trebizond had laid out both models of conflict resolution here, but Poggio, captive
to his resentment, had chosen neither. He had protested instead that Valla ought to be
pursued with the sword, not the pen. 81 Trebizond recalls this conflict to express his
concern that Poggio would do the same in their feud. He had written to Nicholas, he
contends, because the pope’s intervention had stopped Poggio from carrying out his plans
against Valla, and he was hopeful that the same might be true for their current dispute. 82
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Likewise, in one of his invectives against Poggio, Valla mocks Poggio for being punched by Trebizond.
His comment is another example of the public nature of humanist contests. See note 35.
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Camporeale, “Poggio,” 29-30. Poggio wrote his first Oratio against Valla after one of Valla’s students—
Franscesco Rossi—emended some of Poggio’s works. Poggio blamed Valla for the affront, wrote to defend
himself, and attacked the style of Valla’s Elegantiae. Camporeale writes that “Poggio’s move to Florence
ended his direct confrontation with Valla. Yet it also spread the controversy to other humanist centers, and
scholars from Naples to Venice joined the ranks of either ‘poggiani’ or ‘laurenziani.’”
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Cf. Poggio’s 1454 letter to Tommasi, in which he calls for Valla to be whipped and imprisoned. See note
49.
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Walser, 512-513. An credis forsan immemorem me esse adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili
vere in multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut vitam eius extinguere constitueris? Particeps ego
tum ut amicus eram consiliorum tuorum et hortabar, ut nihil curares, quoniam magnitudo animi in
negligendo non in ulciscendo perspicitur, vel si ulcisci velles scriptis id ageres. Equum esset si scriptis lesit
ut scriptis ledatur; ferro cum illo esse agendum non calamo exclamabas. Deinde cum ad scribendum versus
esses, laudabam te quod consilium mutasses. ‘Quid tu ita me credis quasi puerum moneri,’ cum
indignitatione respondisti. Iste papa, ex quo vita mea pendet, mihi iussit nequaquam tale facere audeam.
Hac ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem.
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Trebizond’s recollection of the Valla feud leads him back to consideration of
Poggio’s self-control and a contrast between their respective characters. He claims that
when he was threatened by Poggio—a reference to the assassination plot—he prayed that
his opponent be granted a more upright mind. Poggio, on the other hand, responded by
writing the February letter against him and circulating it publicly. Like Poggio, Trebizond
clearly expressed anxiety about public attacks on his honor. 83 Trebizond frequently
attributes Poggio’s behavior to his emotions. A man cannot write in the manner Poggio
has, he claims, unless he is without reason. Poggio’s perturbations are made clear by the
rage of his letters. 84 His resentment and the angry manner of his writing are evidence to
Trebizond that Poggio lacks restraint. This is the note on which he ends his letter, turning
to Poggio’s assertion that offenses ought to be forgotten rather than avenged. Trebizond
is incredulous and he counters by noting Poggio’s well-known reputation for conflict. 85
Trebizond’s account of Poggio’s resentment demonstrates the centrality of the
ideals of forgiveness and restraint to their dispute and suggests Trebizond’s own
difficulty upholding them. Like Poggio, he struggles to reconcile the need, in contesting
honor, to vilify his opponent with the moral imperative to forgive, or at least to reply
moderately. The act of writing the March letter is evidence. He had argued previously his
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Cf. Poggio’s allegation that Trebizond fabricated the assassination plot to harm his reputation. See note
72.
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Walser, 513. Vide differentiam animorum. Ita et prius ego tibi cum conditione minatus sum et deum
oravi, ut rectiorem tibi animum largiatur, tu omni conditione sublata, quod vero mihi minaris in calce
litteram scripsisti. Deinde opes tuas mihi iactas et cognatos et patriam in his temporibus ceteraque
huiusmodi quasi vero ad insidias presertim privatas multarum magnarumque copiarum sit opus. Non
videtur mihi possibile, Poggi sic posse quemquam loqui et maxime litteris deditum nisi duplici turbatione
insaniat.
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Ibid., 514. Quid quod precepta sapientum scribis et in aliis et in hoc te sequi, qui iubent oblivione potius
iniurias quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas. Oblivione tu? oblivione tu? o deus bone, pugnum unum
habuisti, omitto tua culpa, omitto subita commotione animi, que peccata multo leviora sunt. Sed pugno
percussus sis ex premeditatione, ex insidiis, quantum ultionem acceperis, nemo est Rome qui nesciat.
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willingness to reconcile, but had added that Poggio had refused to reconcile except in the
chancery. Poggio’s February letter offered Trebizond another chance to choose
forgiveness. He could have refrained from writing a second letter. Instead, he wrote a
response far longer and more abrasive than Poggio’s. He criticizes Poggio for insulting
language, but his own insults are only thinly veiled. He claims that he refuses to heap
insults, but then lists the insults he will not use: that Poggio is known and proclaimed to
be a lying thief, murderer, impudent, unjust, mad, an ingrate, an ass, and more. 86 He
likens Poggio to a child and describes his behavior during the Valla feud as childish. He
is prone to exasperation. To Poggio’s claim that his January letter was written
impudently, Trebizond replies, “O poor me, because I do not present my throat to you, I
write impudently and you claim I write lies.” 87
On both counts, then, Trebizond, like Poggio, fails to uphold the ideals he praises.
This is not to say that his criticisms of Poggio lack merit given the model of conflict
resolution both men articulate. If the ideal is to forgive, Poggio should not have issued a
response, as Trebizond argues and Poggio himself appears to understand. Likewise,
Trebizond makes a fair case in concluding that Poggio’s characterization of his letters as
insolent and insulting was, by extension, a criticism of Trebizond himself. Poggio’s letter
frequently sounds condescending, as when he claims he did not know whether Trebizond
was alive or dead. The issue is not whose violation of the norm is more egregious, but
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Ibid., 509-510. Non exclamabo hic O furem fradulentum, impudentem, stultum, amentem, mendacem,
vecordem, ignorantem nec accumulabo alia ut tu soles, truncum, stipitem, asinum, lapidum, hec ceteraque
similia: tibi relinquo ut in me dices. Nam me quidem pudet in alium hec dicere. Utrum vero actis et scriptis
meis hec magis quam tuis conveniant aliorum iudicium sit et conscientie tue ac mee; Ibid., 510. Falso me
scripsisse ais ergo…falsa me scripsisse dicis. See note 76.
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Walser, 510. Ais deinde: Tue littere satis impudenter scripte testuntur. O me miserum, quia iugulum tibi
non prebeo, impudenter scribo, falsa me scribere dicis.
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instead that they both violate for the same reason. Their ideal of forgiveness is difficult to
reconcile with a professional imperative to contest honor.
The Forged Letter
Forgiveness plays an important role in the February and March 1453 letters, but
also figures prominently in Trebizond’s final letter about his relationship with Poggio,
which he composed to his son Andreas in June 1454. Trebizond’s letter outlines the most
recent of Poggio’s alleged plots. He accuses Poggio and his associate Giovanni Aurispa
(1376-1459) of composing and circulating a letter to ruin his reputation and cause him to
be imprisoned again. He claims that the letter, addressed from Mehmed II to Nicholas,
was written insultingly but in such a manner that any Western reader would recognize
that a Western writer, not the Turkish ruler, was the true author. Their hope, Trebizond
contends, was that he would be blamed for having written the letter. 88 Nearly two years
after the chancery fight, he continues to blame Poggio for his subsequent imprisonment
and expulsion from the curia, and to proclaim his innocence in the fight itself. Here he
combines a discussion of forgiveness, prudence, and honesty to reiterate his description
of Poggio’s cruelty and his assertions that Poggio continued—even to that day—to craft
plots to ruin him.
Failed forgiveness serves as Trebizond’s stated reason for writing to his son
about the alleged forged letter plot. As in January 1453, Trebizond laments Poggio’s
treatment of him despite the substantial aid he had provided in the translations of
Xenophon and Diodorus. He presents himself as undeserving of such treatment, casting
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For the letter to Andreas, see Collectanea, 117-124. Monfasani cites one Renaissance copy of the letter,
the autograph. He preserves the orthographical inconsistencies including the spelling of Poggius as Pogius.
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himself as a loyal servant of the curia. In an interesting moment of reflection, he admits
that some will ask why he still protests Poggio’s mistreatment two years later. He seems
to recognize—like Poggio’s earlier admission that it may be more honorable to not
respond to the assassination charge—that his discussion of these old affairs exceeds the
bounds of propriety. Trebizond justifies his letter as Poggio had rationalized his, by
focusing on his opponent’s resentment. He complains, Trebizond explains, because
Poggio once again threatens him. As in his January 1453 letters to Nicholas V and
Poggio, Trebizond accuses Poggio of a consistent pattern of dishonesty and abuse. Even
with so much time having passed, he claims, Poggio’s insania—the madness of a an
ungrateful and shameless man—had not ceased, but instead threatened Trebizond with a
false crime and an extreme charge. A cruel mind, Trebizond adds, continues to contrive
accusations, as it is accustomed to do, and it does not refrain from the most extreme
measures to harm him. 89
Trebizond returns to a consideration of Poggio’s character at the end of the
letter, where he roots the reasons for his opponent’s hostilities in his lack of rational selfcontrol. It is perhaps the clearest articulation from Trebizond’s Naples correspondence of
89

Collectanea, 117. (1) Si unquam, fili carissime, patuit quam scelestus est ingratus animus, quam durus
atque perniciosus, quam denique in bene meritos crudelis et pestifer, his quoque temporibus cuilibet meas
recensenti fortunas planum aptumque esse potest. Nemo enim pene ignorat quot quantaque mea in
Florentinum Pogium merita extiterint. Universa enim apostolica cancelleria testis est quottidianis laboribus
meis tum Xenophunticam Cyri Disciplinam, tum Diodori Egyptiam Historiam e Greco in Latinum vel
vertisse illum vel pervertisse: illud, quod institutionibus meis factum est, quantum fieri quinquenio spacio
potuit; hoc, quia durum atque agrestem animum, ne in tam longo quidem temporis spacio, ad meliora
reducere potui. (2) Nec fui unquam ignarus malam illi mentem, malum animum inesse, sed pape Nicolao
quinto roganti atque adeo iubenti obtemperare volui. Non enim eram nescius tanto magis iubere principes
quanto vehementius rogant, sperabamque si etiam Pogius per ingratitudinem aliquando in furorem
verteretur, potestate tamen illius qui iussit innocentiam meam facile posse defendi. Quorsum hec? Aut quid
tandem tibi vis, quispiam dicet, qui biennio iam transacto post illius in te furorem quereris? Queror, queror,
inquam, fili, de fortunis nostris <non> quia tanto tempore illius ingrati atque improbi hominis insania non
cessavit, sed quia certior est quovis falso in nos ficto crimine, indicta causa extrema nobis imminere
pericula. Non potest atrox leniri animus, sed fingit, ut solet, crimina, nec summis parcit ut me solum capiat.
For Trebizond’s work with Poggio on these translations, see pages 109-111.
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the relationship between emotion, action, and character. He blames Poggio’s repeated
attempts to ruin him on anger, which itself was a result of Poggio’s shame regarding
Trebizond’s aid in the translations of Xenophon and Diodorus. To demonstrate this, he
begins with a general discussion of the nature of ingratitude—drawn, it seems, from
Xenophon and Diodorus—and then applies this to his relationship with Poggio. 90 When a
naturally ungrateful individual, he writes, has substantial kindnesses conferred upon him,
that individual struggles with the resulting obligation. The problem is bad enough if the
debt is owed to someone of a higher status but completely unbearable if owed to someone
of equal or lesser status. 91 The ungrateful man can try to deny the obligation, but
sometimes the kindness is so great it cannot be ignored or concealed. Believing his
ingratitude to be public knowledge, he will come to regard his benefactor with hatred.
The shame he feels regarding the debt will lead him to become more savage by the day
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Monfasani’s apparatus does not note the classical references, but Trebizond’s description of gratitude
seems to come from Xenophon and Diodorus. In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon identifies ingratitude as the
offense the Persians hate the most and notes “if they know that any one is able to return a favour and fails
to do so, they punish him also severely. For they think that the ungrateful are likely to be most neglectful of
their duty toward their gods, their parents, their country, and their friends; for it seems that shamelessness
goes hand in hand with ingratitude; and it is that, we know, which leads the way to every moral wrong.”
Xen., Cyr. 1.2.7. The translation is Miller’s. Xenophon, Cryopaedia, trans. Walter Miller (New York: G.P.
Putnam, 1914). Xenophon’s Memorabilia argues much the same—he who does not show gratitude for
benefits received is ungrateful, ingratitude is an injustice— and adds that the greater the benefits one
receives, the greater the injustice of not showing gratitude. Xen., Mem. 2.2. Diodorus likewise connects
gratitude and virtue when describing the Egyptian practices associated with benefactions, and Egyptian
treatment of benefactors. Diod., Hist. 1.70.5-6 and 1.90.2. I take Trebizond’s description of gratitude, if
drawn from Xenophon and Diodorus, as an implicit reminder of Poggio’s debt to him.
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Collectanea, 122. (26) Pogium vero quid vexat? Attende, queso. Nam opere precium est scire quibus
rebus usque ad effundendum bene de se meriti hominis sanguinem ingratus animus incitatur. Multos certe
fuisse huiusmodi homines historici narrant, et nos Pogium modo re ipsa cognovimus. (27) Sed causas
breviter aperiamus ut facilius cavere possis, quamvis ipse aut non potuerim omnino effugere aut nesciverim
qui hec non ignorabam. Tantum tamen mihi cavi ut adhuc vivam. Si ergo ad ingratitudinem magnitudo
beneficii primo accedat, deinde talis collatio ut nullo pacto negari possit, hec tria, ingratitudo, magnitudo
beneficii et aperta manifestaque collatio, si uno in animo coniunguntur, benemeriti homini sanguis semper,
quousque uterque vivit, petetur si condicio etiam eius qui contulit minor aut equalis vel certe non multo
maior sit quam eius in quem collatum beneficium est. Ingratitudo enim facit ut nequeat animus ferre alicui
non nimium maiori, sed aut minori aut fere equali valde obligatus videri. The following two notes continue
the argument.
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until he becomes unable to consider anything other than ending his benefactor’s life. By
doing so, the ungrateful man believes he will no longer be subject to the debt, and his
benefactor will no longer stand as a continued reminder of the obligation. 92 His problem
with Poggio, Trebizond argues, is the result of the man’s ungrateful nature and the
services he had done for him in the past. 93 He made Poggio famous, he declares, a man
ignorant of Greek letters who he claims had composed nothing in Latin except some
shameful stories and invectives. 94 In fact, Trebizond claims Poggio was so incapable of
handling Greek that he had to feed Poggio individual words as he would a child. For
92

Ibid., 122-123. (28) Magnitudo autem meriti nimium obligatum reddit. Quare si tantum est beneficium ut
non possit quasi minimum flocci pendi, nullum ingrato refugium relinquitur nisi negatio. Ubi hoc ille mihi?
Aut quando? Quod si res etiam sic manifesta est ut nullus celandi sit locus, tunc ingratus. Quousque vivit
ille qui bene de se meritus est, imaginem quamdam ingratitudinis sue, et quidem vivam atque loquentem
circumferri arbitratur. Et ita omnes qui benefactorem suum oculis cernant, de ingratitudine sua loqui
opinatur creditque subiectum se nimium esse obligatumque ei quem odio propter ingratitudinem animi
maximo habeat. (29) Hanc tantam ignominiam (summam enim putat minori aut equali nimium obligari)
cum fugere cupiat, atrocior in dies fit, nec aliud crudelis eius animus cogitare potest quam quomodo vitam
bene de se meriti eripiat. Hoc enim solummodo pacto nemini se subiectum putat, si nemo vivat cui debeat.
A vita enim benefactoris turpitudinem ingratitudinis sue predicari estimat. Nolo hic exempla priscorum
congerere ne historiam contexere videar. Multa possem narrare que nostra memoria acciderunt; sed vereor
ne aliquos ledam. Satis mihi res ipsa per se facit. (30) Nemo enim est qui nescit ingratos, cum impune
possint, bene de se meritos ad interitum usque persequi, presertim si magnitudo beneficii et manifesta, ut
diximus, collatio concurrerint.
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Ibid., 123. (30) Quid autem maius excogitari potest quam quod nos opera nostra Pogio contulimus?
Ignarum litterarum Grecarum hominem qui nihil Latine preter turpissimas conscripserat fabulas et
invectivas quasdam, quo quasi ad sentinam omnium turpium verborum que melius re ipsa quam vocabulis
novit multitudinem congessit, perpetuum nostris laboribus fecimus. Unde non parvam quoque pecuniam et
gratiam consecutus videtur. (31) Opera nostra et labore quinquenio pene sic abusus est, ut omnis id
Romana curia sciat, ne ipse quidem summus pontifex ignoret, primo Xenophontis Pediam Cyri pervertisse
illum, deinde Diodori Egyptiacam historiam, singula nobis verba illi sicuti puero ingerentibus. Is
impunitatem maleficiorum suorum nactus quiescet? Iusticia, credo, animique modestia movebitur. Estne
hodie usquam iusticia, ubi timor non sit? Priscis etiam temporibus, quot tu mihi recensebis iustos fuisse, qui
nullo timore id facerent? Perpauci, perpauci, inquam, iusti propter ipsum equum et bonum sunt sed alii
dedecus et infamiam, alii poenas timent, non nulli utrumque. Invidi autem nostri omnem semper in nos
peregrinos et habuerunt et habebunt impunitatem. Decus vero esse putant non servare inopem atque
peregrinum, sed opprimere atque conculcare. Illud enim deiecti, hoc magni animi opinantur.
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The “shameful stories” are Poggio’s Facetiae, jokes and anecdotes Poggio purportedly collected from his
curial colleagues. Though some, including Trebizond here, criticized the Facetiae as vulgar, Poggio’s work
was extremely popular. Greenblatt, The Swerve, 142-144. Trebizond’s reference to Poggio’s Latin
invectives is a gesture to Poggio’s reputation as a polemicist. Trebizond had already, in March 1453,
attempted to make use of Poggio’s feud with Valla, but Poggio clashed with other humanists as well. He
had a well-known feud with Francesco Filelfo, against whom he composed four invectives, during the
1430s in Florence. See Rao, 53-75.
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nearly five years, he laments to Andreas, his work had been squandered, and he had
received neither money nor thanks in return. All the features of Trebizond’s prior
characterizations of Poggio are evident here. The man’s character led him to yield to his
emotions—shame and anger—which manifested themselves as plots against his
benefactor.
Trebizond’s reiteration of Poggio’s cruel nature and resentment frames his
account of the forged letter plot. Poggio’s cruel mind could not be mollified and he was
unable to control his emotions. His plotting is a sign of resentment indicating his inability
either to forget offenses or to respond moderately. His willingness to wage a dispute by
means of deceit and dishonest actions signifies his failed restraint. Poggio, he tells
Andreas, had heard of Trebizond’s plans to return to Nicholas’s service and composed
the forged letter so that when he returned, he would be imprisoned once again. 95
Trebizond situates this new plot in a pattern of abuse, noting it would not be the first time
that Poggio would have succeeded with his deceit and managed to have him imprisoned
without a hearing. 96 The plot required that the letters be circulated so that Trebizond
95

Collectanea, 117-118. (3) Nam cum audisset redeundi Romam mihi animum esse, nec verisimile aliquid
posset excogitare quo me neci traderet, vide quo eius prorumpit improbitas! Litteras sane turpes summo
pontifici nefandeque contumelie plenas quasi a rege Turcorum ad pontificem ipsum missas composuit. Eas
sic conscripsit ut nemo sit mentis compos qui non intelligat non ab illo rege, sed a Christiano aliquo fuisse
confictas. Quare sic? Ut, cum vi litterarum et sensu ficte non vere Turchi littere videantur, in Georgium id
totum inferat crimen. Quod ita esse illi et hac racione factum ante oculos ponam si ordine per quedam
capita quasi per limites pergam. (4) Veritati enim omnia, ut ait Aristoteles, consonant; falso autem cito
dissonat verum. Tria ergo mihi docenda confirmandaque sunt: primum, quod huiusmodi littere non sunt a
rege Turcorum conscripte; alterum, quod Pogius scripsit et Iohannes Aurispa edidit; tertium, quod hec
omnia, ut ipse opprimar, conficta sunt.
96

Trebizond refers to his imprisonment without a trial after the chancery fight. See pages 118-121.
Collectanea, 120. (15) Ut cum omnes intelligant qui eas legunt non esse a regeTurcorum conscriptas,
Georgius, qui Neapoli habitat, scripsisse criminaretur, et indicta causa vel furca vel perpetuis vinculis
damnaretur. (16) Unde id patet? Coniecerunt me biennio antea Aurispa et Pogius in vincula et quidem
indicta causa. Liberatus ad optimum omnium regum Alfonsum Neapolim profugi. Redii Romam post
decem et octo mensibus ad pedes summi pontificis, cui iubenti ut ad servicium redirem suum spem dedi si
prospere hic negocia mea procederent, ad mensem Martium rediturum. Id Rome publicum fuisse scio. Nec
enim omnino ignotus sum. Pogius deinde scripsit Turquicas huiusmodi litteras, et Aurispa edidit. Quando?
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could reasonably be blamed for their authorship. Poggio and Aurispa conspired to make it
seem as if the letter had come from Constantinople to Noto, a city in Sicily. Trebizond
explains that he had hosted a student from Noto for the better part of a year, and that
Aurispa and Poggio intended that connection to allow the letter to be traced back to
him. 97 Trebizond’s description of the plot is an elaborate unraveling of the motives of his
alleged assailants. He presents it as another in a long list of Poggio’s hostilities, whose
animosity was the result of his ungrateful character. Even two years after the fight,
Poggio continued to fabricate lies. 98
Ultimately, as Trebizond tells Andreas, the forged letter plot failed because
Trebizond was in Rome when he was alleged to have sent the letter from Naples to
Rome. The case was rejected, and the claims against him declared fraudulent. 99 Still, he

Eodem ipso tempore quo ego Rome expectabar? Cur? Ut si Romam venissem, quod illi omnino credebant,
statim accusatus in vincula raperer. Nec dubitabant posse hoc se calumnia id facere, qui iam bis fallaciis me
suis indicta causa oppresserunt: primum, quando irruentem in me Pogium manu repuli; deinde, cum me
secretariatu privassent.
97

Collectanea, 121. (20) Idcirco nunc Noto Romam et Roma Neapolim littere ficte volant ut ego, qui
Neapoli sum quique Leonardum Notensem annum domi tenui, scripsisse videar. Non enim poterit vere
dicere ideo misisse Neapolim, quoniam edere ipsas cupiebat. Nam si publicas facere voluisset, in apostolica
cancellaria certe edidisset. Nullus enim est locus illo celebrior, nullus accommodatior editioni litterarum.
Ab omnibus Europe partibus homines ibi, et quidem clari, adsunt qui litteras illico singuli ad patriam
mitterent suam. Si edere igitur cupiebat, cur in cancellaria apostolica, vel cur omnino Rome non edidit?
Quia editionem hanc tunc fieri ad opprimendum Georgium opus erat quando ipse adesset Rome; Ibid., 121.
(22) Id enim maxime considerandum est cur fecit. Quia summopere fictioni sue ac oppressioni Georgii
conveniebat ut littere he a Neapoli, ubi Georgius moram trahit, alio tran<s>funderentur, et sic turpium in
pontificem litterarum conscriptio in Georgium redundaret. Sed sunt etiam alii in Neapoli, quispiam dicet,
qui scripsisse potuissent; quare non omnino ad te posset culpa impingi. Hec profecto ratio Aurispam
induxit ut primum originem litterarum Notensem fecerit, ubi nec aliquis est qui eas posset componere, et
quo misisse Notensis Leonardus, qui mecum erat, aperte videri poterat.
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Ibid., 122. (25) Illud non pretermittam nequis miretur cur Aurispa nunquam a me lacessitus, Pogius vero
summis etiam meis ornatus meritis, ita me prosecuntur ut expleri nequeant. In vincula me suis artibus
intruserunt, ex apostolica cancellaria eiecerunt, fortunas nostras dirripi Rome fecerunt, Neapolin usque
siccarios ad occidendum me miserunt. Et nunc, si Romam venissem, non dubito quin in perpetua me
vincula per litteras Turci fictas coniecissent. Cur igitur adeo furunt ut nullum preter figuram servent
hominis vestigium? Aurispam nulla re alia magis moveri credo quam invidia in me primum, deinde
affinitate mutua qua Pogio semper fuisse coniunctum constat.
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ends his letter by warning his son of his enemies’ continued animosity and the danger
they pose to the entire family. The warning comes just after one of Trebizond’s
complaints about Poggio’s ingratitude, and interestingly Trebizond even refers to his own
status as an immigrant. He suggests that Poggio had “obtained impunity for his crimes”
and laments the abuse of foreigners: “Our enemies, however, have always had and will
always have total impunity against us foreigners. In truth, they think it dignified not to
look after the needy and the foreigner, but to oppress and trample him.” Trebizond
amplifies his portrayal of Poggio’s ingratitude with an accusation characterizing him as
an abuser of foreigners and suggests that such abuse was common and accepted in
Italy. 100 He urges Andreas, who still worked in the curia as a scriptor, to leave Rome
before the rage of his father’s enemies turned against him. Trebizond’s reference to his
Greek origins is notable because it is one of only two such references he makes during his
dispute with Poggio. 101 Here though, his background functions in a concise summation of
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Ibid., 121-122. (24) Nolo rem verbis ampliorem reddere. Satis ipsa per se ipsam intelligenti faciet,
presertim cum usque a mense Octobri, quando ipse Rome fui, hanc fallaciam incusserint. Cardinalis enim,
scio quis et quidem in consistorio, litteras a me accepisse retulit a Turcorum rege ad summum pontificem
scriptas. Sed reiecta res fuit quoniam hinc me Romam misisse illis diebus affirmabat quibus ego Rome
eram. Id mihi cardinalis, vir omni virtutis numero excellens, Romane curie decus et dignitate cardinalatus,
que summo sacerdotio proxima est, dignissimus, cum risu simul et indignatione narravit.
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Ibid., 123. (31) Is [Poggio] impunitatem maleficiorum suorum nactus quiescet?...Invidi autem nostri
omnem semper in nos peregrinos et habuerunt et habebunt impunitatem. Decus vero esse putant non
servare inopem atque peregrinum, sed opprimere atque conculcare. Illud enim deiecti, hoc magni animi
opinantur. (32) Latius hec scripsi, quoniam, ut re ipsa video, nimium te delectat habitatio Romana. Alter
iam annus exactus est ex quo solus istic habitas sine tuis. Timeo ne inimici mei, cum rescierint previdisse
me insidias suas, nec animum ignorare, ideoque istuc nec rediisse nec rediturum, timeo, inquam, ne in te
omnem suum vertant furorem. Quid facis? Eia age. Rumpe moras. Nec natus nec educatus Rome fuisti.
Non sumus omnino peregrini quando simul sumus. Malis pauper vivere cum tuis quam vitam cum alienis
dives trahere. For the preceeding complaint regarding Trebizond’s aid to Poggio, see note 93.
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Trebizond also referred to himself as a peregrinus to Nicholas in January 1453. He expressed concern
that others—specifically Jacob Cremonensis—were claiming credit for his translation work: “For these
reasons, therefore, I yielded freely to Poggio, especially since I would be a foreigner [peregrinus] no less in
Rome than here [Naples]…” Walser, 505. See note 46.
Trebizond’s complaint suggests that he perceived, or at least found it rhetorically useful to
allege, a status difference between himself and Poggio rooted in his Greek background. I suspect the
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his overall depiction of Poggio. With that, Trebizond’s reflection on the chancery fight
comes to an end. His final word on his relationship with Poggio is another attempt to cast
his opponent as an individual who, in failing to forgive, in demonstrating imprudence,
and in his consistent contrivance of plots and deceptions, utterly lacked restraint.
Conclusion
In April 1455, nearly three years after the chancery fight with Poggio, Trebizond
returned to Rome and the curia. Nicholas V had died the previous month. The election of
Calixtus III offered Trebizond the chance to come back to Rome, which he did just
twelve days after the papal election. Many of his old colleagues had left the curia—
including Poggio—and Trebizond returned to his post of apostolic secretary and began
teaching publicly again. 102 By that time, Trebizond and Poggio had put their feud behind
them.
One of the purposes of the present analysis has been to examine the language and
oppositional categories that humanists used in contests of honor. The Trebizond-Poggio
dispute was undoubtedly such a contest. For Trebizond, it represented a crisis. Ousted
from the chancery, he spent the next few years trying to vindicate his behavior during the
chancery fight and discredit Poggio. Poggio, for his part, characterized Trebizond’s
accusations as slander intended to engender ill-will and harm Poggio’s reputation. The

passage is in part an outgrowth of Trebizond’s financial situation during his time in Naples. Monfasani
explains how, despite having achieved financial success in Rome, once in Naples Trebizond’s finances
began to suffer. His economic hardships were the result of bad business decisions and, according to
Trebizond himself, disreputable bankers. For Trebizond’s finances, see Monfasani, George of Trebizond,
114-115. Additionally, if Trebizond felt like he was not getting enough respect for his translations, which
was a popular task for Greek émigrés, he may have sincerely felt his status as a foreigner affecting him
negatively.
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dispute is an excellent example of how humanists contested honor by fashioning
presentations of themselves and of their opponents. Both men demonstrated an active
engagement in the framing of their identities, and each expressed an anxiety about and
sought to shape public opinion regarding their respective behaviors. The letters of each
indicate concern about their identities, particularly in how lies could negatively impact
public perception. In response to their anxiety, they mobilized a language of restraint to
defend themselves and to vilify their opponent. Their discussions of prudence, honesty,
and forgiveness were related to one another through a common motif: a cultural ideal
emphasizing restraint, the rational self-control of one’s emotions.
The preceding analysis contributes to a richer knowledge of humanist modes of
expression, but can also modify the current understanding of the Trebizond-Poggio
dispute and modern characterizations of Trebizond himself. During his own lifetime
Trebizond had a reputation for being difficult. Although admitting that Trebizond was
“somehow fair,” Lorenzo Valla described him as bitter and morose. Trebizond’s
reputation has not improved with time. Monfasani offers a softer appraisal, noting that his
opponents were the aggressors in many of his feuds, but subsequent scholarship has
retained much of the negative assessment of his character. 103 Stephen Greenblatt, for
example, characterizes Trebizond as “notoriously morose,” angry, bitter, and resentful.
None of this is necessarily incorrect, but it offers only a partial picture of Trebizond’s
experiences and of humanist culture. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence was
undoubtedly angry in tone and more than a little resentful, but not without, at least in his
mind, good reason. He had lost his privileged position in Rome and had to leave for
Naples. Alfonso’s patronage was hardly insignificant, but the chancery fight was a
103

Ibid., 104.
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considerable blow to his reputation. Moreover, current scholarship now knows enough
about the pressures involved with fifteenth-century professional life, particularly in the
curia, to normalize at least somewhat Trebizond’s resentment. The correspondence
between the two men suggests this as well. They both articulated their anxiety about
public perception, and both indicated a sense of self developed in the court of public
opinion. Trebizond was no different from Poggio in his anxiety about reputation. The
difference between the two, and likely what allowed Poggio to avoid seeming bitter and
resentful here, is that Trebizond had lost more as a result of their fight than Poggio had.
Beyond this, both men waged their dispute by means of a shared concept of
restraint. It is difficult to be too critical of Trebizond when his methods were so similar to
those of his opponent. That is not to say that the two men were completely alike in their
approaches. Poggio was not wrong when he argued that Trebizond had a habit of writing
too insultingly against his opponents. He does write insultingly, and is unable to abide by
the same principles of forgiveness that he espouses in his March 1453 letter. For his part,
Poggio engages with Trebizond on the broader issues of reason and restraint but does not
issue the same quantity or kinds of explicit criticisms or insults. It was all too common
for fifteenth-century humanists to lament the lies and hostility that came with being a
professional scholar, particularly in the curia. Trebizond was quite like his
contemporaries in this regard, Poggio included. His major problem was that he was less
successful at expressing himself during this feud in a culturally accepted manner. His
letters reflect the tension between humanist ideals, particularly regarding moderate
language and forgiveness, and the realities of an agonistic community devoted to
contesting honor. As Poggio noted in 1437, insults and abuse are typically not well
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accepted but are instead scorned, and tend to “render our cases less commendable.”
Trebizond seems not to have taken that lesson to heart.
Having examined separately Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio—one
early in his career as he sought to establish a reputation, the other later in his career after
having achieved financial success and renown—the next chapter analyzes these two
disputes together. The quarrels with Guarino and Poggio were waged under different
circumstances and the terms of those debates differed accordingly, resulting in one
conflict revolving around anti-Greek biases and the other around concepts of restraint.
Nonetheless, there were certain similarities in the strategies employed during these
distinctive encounters. Chapter Four focuses on one of these similarities, the use of
concepts of manhood in acts of self-presentation and, alternatively, denigration.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTRUCTING THE MAN:
MASCULINITY IN CONTESTS OF HONOR
Introduction
The previous two chapters have examined the roles that anti-Greek language and
the concept of rational self-control played in the verbal strategies used during George of
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino of Verona and Poggio Bracciolini. The present chapter
examines a third theme in these feuds: masculinity. The invective in both feuds makes
frequent reference to manhood. As in the preceding chapters, the present analysis
addresses how the language and concepts humanists used functioned in the acts of selfpresentation characteristic of contests of honor. During Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino
and Poggio, each author uses concepts related to masculinity to praise himself and vilify
his opponent. Authors cast themselves as the ideal man—rational, learned, and
moderate—and their opponents as unmanly, accusing them of childish, womanly, or
beast-like behavior. The current analysis revisits events and texts addressed in previous
chapters, but does so in new ways to explore additional themes that characterized
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio.
As an examination of the humanist concept of manhood, this chapter makes two
main arguments. First, humanists derived their understanding of manhood from classical
and medieval antecedents, and so understood reason as the identifying quality of
manhood. Second, Trebizond and his contemporaries used gendered language to verbally
emasculate their opponents in the public eye. As discussed in previous chapters, humanist
contests of honor were public affairs. Insults, including slurs on a rival’s manhood,
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spread by means of invectives and letters that passed hand to hand, from friend to friend,
and circulated through and between different cities. Friends, enemies, colleagues, and
patrons were read about, gossiped about, and sometimes took part in these quarrels.
Emasculation happened not just in the mind of the individual voicing the insult or of the
person slandered, but in public perception.
The first goal of the present chapter is to demonstrate that humanist concepts of
manhood were predicated on the use of reason. The invective in Trebizond’s feuds
illustrates how one had to be learned, knowledgeable, and skilled on the one hand and
moderate, prudent, and restrained on the other to be considered truly manly. Trebizond
and his opponents frequently contrasted manhood and reason with failed manhood and
ignorance or irrationality. They did not use the phrase “failed manhood,” of course, but
described those who lived up to the ideal of a fully rational manhood as masculine and
those who failed to do so as something other than masculine. Humanists followed
classical and medieval models in understanding there to be a connection between reason
and manhood.
The categories of failed masculinity involved groups deemed to be not fully
rational and included, but were not limited to, those whose behavior was disparaged as
womanish, as when Trebizond accused Poggio of fleeing during their chancery fight “like
a Florentine woman in flight.” Although discussions of early modern masculinity have
largely examined the construction of masculinity in contrast to femininity, the individuals
in the feuds considered here were far more likely to use other categories in defining
manhood. 1 Agaso and Trebizond used beast or monster images (asses, fish, wolves; the

1

Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 121. Celenza’s chapter on reputation is a fine example
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Charybdis) more often than they used feminizing imagery. Trebizond and Poggio were
more likely to cast each other as children than as women. Trebizond and his opponents
also frequently used multiple, overlapping characterizations of failed masculinity, as
when depicting an opponent’s beast-like behavior as childish. Both labels drew
distinctions between masculinity and failed masculinity to illustrate one’s own honor and
denigrate an opponent. These disputes reveal that there were many ways to use
masculinity in crafting presentations of others.
The second goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that the purpose of using
gendered language was to verbally emasculate an opponent, by which I mean to rob him
of his masculine identity and impose upon him an alternative identity conceived of as not
fully or truly masculine. For humanists this was a problem of definitions that reflected the
role that the audience of their fellow scholars and patrons played. As the previous
chapters have examined, humanist honor was won, lost, and contested in a public forum
wherein contemporaries rendered judgments about an individual’s learning and conduct
and verdicts concerning conflicts between scholars. The public forum to which scholars
appealed extended beyond the recipients of individual invectives and letters, and to the
friends and colleagues of those individuals who, as texts were copied and circulated,
heard and read about particular contests. 2 Humanists understood manhood, like other
aspects of their identities, as publicly negotiated and contested. Emasculation, then, was a
verbal strategy on the part of the attacker to reorder public perception and define his
of applying gender studies to a consideration of humanist honor. His analysis centers on the feminizing
antitype. Examples of additional studies examining masculinity and femininity include the works by Pitkin,
Milligan, and Finucci in note 6 and the collection edited by Milligan and Tylus.
2

The composition, presentation, and circulation of the letters for Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and
Poggio has been discussed in the previous chapters. For a discussion of the public nature of the TrebizondGuarino correspondence, see Chapter Two, note 2. For the letters of the Trebizond-Poggio quarrel, see
Chapter Three, note 1. For the public aspects of the feud, see Chapter Three, pages 135-136.
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opponent. It was a gesture that could succeed or fail based on how a broader audience
received it. Emasculation is certainly a provocative way of describing what was at stake
in these texts, but humanist invective was itself provocative. Challenges to masculinity
need not always entail an intended annihilation of the opponent’s masculine status, of
course. Challenges to masculinity ranged from mild censures of inappropriate, childish
behavior to allegations that an opponent’s cruelty and savagery indicated a sub-human—
that is, brutish or beast-like—character. Regardless of the level of challenge, the concept
of failed masculinity, with whatever oppositional categories and to whatever extent it was
expressed, was intended to sway the author’s audience and thus deprive his opponent of
his masculinity in whole or in part.
As a verbal strategy, emasculation was intended to shame a rival and cast into
doubt his credibility as a professional. Fundamental to this strategy is the implicit
assumption of a hierarchy, at the top of which, above the various types of failed
masculinity, stood the ideal, the man. Trebizond and his opponents negotiated this
hierarchy in two main ways, each of which emphasized the opponent’s failed exercise of
reason. The first was by attacking an adversary’s knowledge and capability as a scholar
and teacher. The second was by attacking a foe’s moral conduct. In the first case,
humanists presented themselves as having the intellectual capacities of an adult man with
a robust and polished understanding of complex subjects. In contrast, they characterized
their opponent’s level of learning as childish, womanish, or brutish. The implication of
this was that an opponent’s learning was rudimentary at best and far more often
unpolished and crude. In the second case, humanists depicted their own moral rectitude,
suitable to a true man, as a function of greater reason and restraint. They described the
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real man, whose behavior was guided by reason, as prudent, honest, and moderate, and
their opponents as failed men whose lack of emotional control led them to imprudent,
dishonest, and immoderate behavior. Attacking an opponent in either of these two ways
stripped him of reason and emasculated him. It also allowed a writer to assert his own
masculinity and reason.
An examination of masculinity in Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio
advances scholarship about early modern humanism in two ways. The first is by
indicating how humanists conceived of masculinity. Studies of early modern masculinity
are relatively few compared to the situation in medieval studies, although this scarcity has
begun to change in the last fifteen years. 3 Ruth Mazzo Karras and Derek G. Neal have
addressed concepts of masculinity in the late medieval period, roughly contemporaneous
with the early Quattrocento. 4 A number of studies emerging out of New Historicist
interest in self-fashioning have examined masculinity in England. They have considered
the construction of masculinity and the pressure men felt—often termed “anxious
masculinity”—to prove their manhood to others. 5 Studies of Italian masculinity have
been less numerous. The best received of these is Valeria Finucci’s The Manly
Masquerade, which examines how concepts of manhood were tied to paternity during the
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University Press, 1996); Michael Carl Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England:
Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (New York: Cambridge
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Italian Renaissance. 6 To a reader of the correspondence in Trebizond’s feuds, the relative
inattention to early modern masculinity, especially humanist masculinity, is surprising
given how gendered the language was that Trebizond and his competitors used. The
present chapter contributes to studies of early modern masculinity by focusing on
humanists, a category of individuals whose concept of manhood has thus far received
little attention.
A second contribution this analysis makes is to a richer understanding of humanist
experiences. Understanding the frequent references to manhood in these letters means
understanding some of the significant verbal strategies humanists used and better
understanding humanist texts. As Christopher Celenza has noted, studies of Renaissance
intellectuals have largely neglected social factors, including gender. He adds that gender
studies allow us to understand better Renaissance texts and authors, and an examination
of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio confirms his observation. A consideration
of humanist masculinity also allows us to bring humanist experiences into line with
existing studies of early modern masculinity. Trebizond and his correspondents
understood masculinity as their medieval and early modern peers did, as an aspect of
identity that was constructed and contested through interpersonal relationships. Insults
about manhood could be effective because humanists perceived masculinity as something
6

Valeria Finucci, The Manly Masquerade: Masculinity, Paternity, and Castration in the Italian
Renaissance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). See also Michael Rocke, “Gender and Sexual
Culture in Renaissance Italy,” in Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy, ed. Judith C. Brown and Robert
C. Davis (New York: Longman, 1998), 150-170. There are some interesting studies on masculinity and
Machiavelli as well, including Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the
Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and Gerry Milligan,
“Masculinity and Machiavelli: How a Prince Should Avoid Effeminacy, Perform Manliness and Be Wary
of the Author,” in Seeking Real Truths: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Machiavelli, ed. Patricia Vilches
and Gerald E. Seaman (Boston: Brill, 2007), 149-172. Milligan has also co-edited a collection of essays on
masculinity with Jane Tylus, The Poetics of Masculinity in Early Modern Italy and Spain (Toronto: Centre
for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2010). For an overview of anxious masculinity, see Sex Before
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that could be contested, gained, lost, and regained, just like other aspects of one’s
reputation. The result was an identifiable anxiety about how one’s manliness was
presented to and perceived by others, which suggests this correspondence can contribute
to existing studies of “anxious masculinity.” Even as Trebizond, Agaso, and Poggio
characterized each other as childish, brutish, or womanish, they articulated distress that
their opponent was challenging their own manhood and worked hard to demonstrate their
manliness in response.
The following analysis is divided into two main sections according to the primary
avenues of attack used by Trebizond and his competitors. The first half examines
masculinity in insults about an opponent’s knowledge and learning. These insults are
especially prevalent in the Trebizond-Guarino feud, which serves as the focal point of
this section but are also evident in the Trebizond-Poggio conflict. The second half
addresses masculinity and allegations about immoral conduct. Concepts of moral
rectitude sat at the center of the Trebizond-Poggio dispute because of their chancery
fight. That feud is the focus of the second half of this analysis, which then addresses
conduct in the Trebizond-Guarino feud. Each half examines how language of failed
masculinity—including childish, womanish, or beast-like imagery—functioned in these
two different kinds of attacks. I begin, however, with a discussion of the classical models
from which humanists drew when they discussed what it meant to be a man.
Reason and Manhood
In adopting verbal emasculation as a strategy for contests of honor, humanists
situated themselves in a tradition considering reason to be the identifying quality of
manhood. Erudite fifteenth-century scholars followed Greco-Roman and medieval
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precedents in linking maleness with reason and excluding others, including women,
children, and animals, from the category of those possessing the full capacity for
reasoning. This tradition had roots in Aristotelian thought. The De anima identified three
kinds of soul, the vegetative, sensitive, and rational, and specified that only humans
possessed the rational soul and therefore the capacity for reason. 7 The Politics argued that
although men, women, and children all possessed the rational soul, they did so in
different ways: “For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is
without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.” 8 The difference between man
and woman or child was the fully actualized capacity for reason present in men but
lacking in others. The Aristotelian model posited man as the perfect human and women
and children as imperfect, a distinction made implicitly or explicitly in other works. In
the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined the function of humans as rational activity in
pursuit of the good. True virtue depended on the exercise of reason, and since women
were not considered fully rational, the implication seems to be that they were unable to
attain true virtue or the fully human good. 9 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle describes youths as
captive to their emotions and desires, impulsive, and immoderate. 10
Roman and medieval authors maintained the link between reason and manhood.
In the De officiis, Cicero, like Aristotle, distinguishes man from beast by virtue of reason.
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For Cicero, man is the only animal with a sense of propriety and moderation. 11 Cicero too
differentiates men from youths and casts the young as devoted to the senses and the
passions. He emphasizes the importance of moderation through the exercise of reason
and identifies restraint as a marker of manhood. 12 The Aristotelian model influenced
scholastic figures such as William of Moerbeke, who translated the De anima, and
Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a commentary on William’s translation. In his commentary
on Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas follows Aristotle’s contrast between human slaves and
irrational animals, noting that although slaves lack sufficient reason to participate in
deliberation they do not completely lack reason as animals do. 13 He follows Aristotle as
well in his Summa theologiae arguing the reasoning capabilities of women and children
to be defective, as when he lists children and women among those groups whose
testimony is problematic. 14 Additionally, in discussing sobriety he remarks that the desire
for pleasure thrives in the young and that women lack the ability to resist desire. 15
Early modern scholars adopted the classical model linking manhood and reason
and excluding animals, women, and children from the ranks of those with full rationality.
The distinction between human and animal has been the focus of a growing number of
recent studies of Renaissance beasts. The central figure in this field is Erica Fudge, who
examines how animals featured in debates about reason in seventeenth-century
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England. 16 She argues that beasts served as an “other” against which Renaissance
individuals judged human status and that the Renaissance conception of beasts reveals the
fragility of human status. She identifies classical antecedents to early modern ideas,
including Aristotle’s identification of the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls. 17 The
concern, Fudge explains, was that if humanity was predicated on the exercise of reason—
a faculty that distinguished human from beast—then the lack of reason and the undue
influence of the passions could essentially transform a human into a beast. For the
authors Fudge studies, cruelty—a vice Trebizond consistently ascribes to Poggio—
“reveals the frailty of human reason; cruelty makes a human like a beast.” 18 Others also
examine the consequences of this notion. Kathryn Perry’s study of seventeenth-century
invective addresses how anxiety about the boundary between human and animal provided
structure to formal invective featuring “abusive animal epithets.” Anxiety could be
heightened, James Knowles argues, where particular animals such as apes were
concerned. Apes, he explains, “raised questions about the boundaries of the human and
animal, a highly uncertain and contested limen.” 19 The early modern concept of beasts
provoked considerable anxiety. Fudge notes how the animal became “a symbol of all that
humans should not be” and she argues that humanity was “a status achieved not merely
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through struggle within the individual but also through struggles between individuals.” 20
Although Fudge focuses on seventeenth-century England, the themes she and others
explore are also evident in the works of Italian humanists. Petrarch, for instance, used a
host of beast metaphors in his invectives, as David Marsh observes. 21
Quattrocento humanists situated both classical and medieval models at the heart
of their program of studies. Aristotle remained immensely popular during the
Renaissance, and a number of notable humanists translated different parts of the
Aristotelian corpus. Leonardo Bruni’s translations of the Ethics, Politics, and Economics
were widely circulated. 22 Trebizond translated some of Aristotle’s biological works while
in Rome, as did his fellow Byzantine émigré Theodore Gaza. 23 Aristotle’s works
informed one of the key components of the humanist educational program, which was the
assertion that educators could not only teach their students but help them become
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virtuous. 24 This assertion was rooted in an understanding of the differences between
youths and adults. Youths, so it was argued, were slaves to their emotions. Drawing on
Aristotle, Pier Paulo Vergerio (1370-1444) described youthful emotion and the weakness
of the rational powers among the young: “The young follow their passions above all and
do everything with great vigor because they have keen desires which their bodily heat
spurs on, while the rational powers and prudence that could moderate their desires are
weak.” 25 Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II (1405-1464), shared
Vergerio’s views. He added that devotion to pleasure was the hallmark of a beast: “We
ought to chasten the body and hold in check its violent urges as if it were a savage beast,
curbing with the rein of reason its reckless revolts against the soul.” 26 Battista Guarino
(1434-1513), the son of Guarino of Verona, echoed his father’s views about youths and
the duty of educators:
But if, owing to the feebleness of their age, young persons lack the discernment to
acknowledge this truth, it will be the duty of their parents to accustom their tender
ears to it with winsome words and to deter them from pleasure with threats, so
that the zeal (for learning and virtue) they have imbibed from infancy may grow
as they get older… 27
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noting, however, that whether educators could truly inculcate virtue, or whether they even wished to do so,
has been a topic of dispute. See Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities:
Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1986).

25

This and subsequent translations are Kallendorf’s. For all of the texts edited in this collection, I cite the
section numbers Kallendorf provides. Pier Paolo Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus
adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Craig W. Kallendorf,
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 14. Cf. Arist., Rh. 2.12.7.

26

Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed.
Kallendorf, 21.

27

Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed.
Kallendorf, 3.
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Humanist educators, contemporaries of Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio, thus organized
their curricula around a basic concept of manhood rooted in the exercise of reason.
The Renaissance debt to classical models of reason and manhood is also evident
in that fifteenth-century humanists advocated different methods to lead their charges to
exercise reason. Vergerio argued that “those who are good should be strengthened and
assisted through practice and precept, but those who are bad and blameworthy should be
corrected.” “Good behavior,” he explained, “must be acquired and bad behavior either
curtailed or entirely rooted out.” There were various ways of accomplishing this.
Vergerio, drawing on the De officiis, considered it “a good outcome whether we are led
to virtue by the hand of precept or compelled thereto by force and necessity; and
fortunate indeed is the necessity that drives one to the good.” 28 Following Quintilian and
Plutarch, Piccolomini stated that “boys must be led to honorable practices, not by wounds
or blows, but by admonitions and explanations.” Praise and blame functioned in
important ways: “the former incites [students] to virtuous deeds, the latter restrains them
from disgraceful behavior.” 29 Educators also believed instructors could cultivate reason
and virtue by serving as models to their students. Vergerio, relying on Plutarch,
emphasized the importance of the instructor’s character:
They [students] should only be entrusted to those whose character and entire life
has been thoroughly scrutinized, who do not present an example leading to sin but
possess the authority to deter them from it. For as stakes are bound to young
treeshoots to prevent them being bent over by their own weight or by the wind, so
also young people should depend on companions from whose advice they may

28

Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 11; 15; 29. Cf. Cic., Off. 1.32.118.

29

Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 10.
Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 12 and Quin., Inst. 1.3.14-17.
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learn, by whose conscience they may be restrained, and in imitation of whom they
may improve themselves. 30
Modeling appropriate behavior allowed instructors to guide good behavior and curtail
bad behavior. According to Vergerio, it was important to “maintain at all times a
consistent pattern of gravity and discretion,” as the young “are inclined to make mistakes,
and unless they are restrained by the example and authority of their elders, they will
always slip easily into worse conduct.” 31 Piccolomini, like Vergerio, argued the
importance of an instructor’s character: “the lives of teachers should be faultless and their
morals irreproachable: this is the best proof that they neither have nor tolerate vices.” 32
He echoed Vergerio on the role of the instructor and used the same Plutarchan metaphor:
Just as farmers place fences around their young trees, so it is the duty of your
instructors to encircle you with teachings in keeping with a praiseworthy life and
with admonitions from which the shoots of the most correct morals will
germinate, for to receive a proper education is the source and root of virtue. 33
Whether by admonition or modeling, educators—mature, rational men—were expected
to curb their students’ passions, remedy the natural deficiencies of their student’s rational
capacities, and help them cultivate and exercise their reason.
Humanist educators established a program that emphasized the role of
instructors in the attainment of virtue, but it was also a program that essentially made one
more manly. Educators such as Vergerio and Piccolomini, observing what they described
as a state of emotional disorder, likened children to beasts rather than men and identified
30

Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 17. Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 7.

31

Vergerio, De ingenuis moribus et liberalibus adulescentiae studiis liber, in Humanist Educational
Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 10.

32

Piccolomini, De liberorum educatione, in Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 9.

33

Ibid., 10. Cf. ps. Plut., De educ. 7.
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instructors as guides to proper behavior. For them, true manhood came at the end of the
program when, guided by a virtuous instructor and true man, one had acquired the
learning suitable of an erudite man and had reached a state of emotional maturity and
rational self-control. The characterizations of manhood outlined here are clearly visible in
the correspondence of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio and particularly in the
authors’ attacks against their opponent’s knowledge and learning.
The Knowledgeable Man
Some of the most explicit expressions of the humanist concept of masculinity
during Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio are found in attacks leveled against an
opponent’s knowledge. The attacks involved insults about an adversary’s learning,
understanding of complex issues, or general intellectual capacity and were framed by
language denoting failed masculinity. To label a rival as unlearned or lacking in his
intellectual capabilities was to label him as less of a man. Trebizond’s feud with Guarino
illustrates these points well. The feud began in the spring of 1437 when Andreas Agaso
composed a letter attacking Trebizond, whose Rhetoricorum libri quinque (RLV) had
contained criticisms of one of Guarino’s encomia. Agaso claimed to be a student of
Guarino’s, but Trebizond suspected Guarino wrote the letter himself, adopting a
pseudonym to attack the RLV anonymously. 34 Agaso and Trebizond used concepts of
failed masculinity to characterize each other as lacking knowledge and as unsuited to
teach rhetoric. Each author verbally emasculated the other by likening his opponent’s
34

For the figures Andreas Agaso and Paulus Regius and the origins of the dispute, see Chapter Two, pages
24-25. As in Chapter Two, I refer to the authors by the names provided by the texts. When discussing the
Agaso letter, I refer to the author as Andreas Agaso rather than Guarino because the authorship of that letter
and Agaso’s existence are in question. When discussing Trebizond’s response to Guarino, I typically
follow Trebizond and refer to “Agaso” as Guarino. Trebizond does occasionally discuss Agaso and
Guarino separately, usually when trying to prove the two were the same person, and in those cases I make
the distinction as well.
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intellectual capacities to those of a child, a beast, or a woman. Agaso repeatedly used
animal imagery to insult Trebizond’s learning particularly in comparison with Guarino’s,
which he exalted. Beasts dominate the Trebizond-Agaso correspondence more than any
other category of failed masculinity. Trebizond, fixated on Agaso’s language, used the
same images to attack Guarino’s learning. These were definitional acts that relegated an
opponent to a lower hierarchical status based on the portrayal of one’s level of learning.
The herd, the fish, and the ass
Agaso relies on an assortment of animal images to ridicule Trebizond’s eloquence
as crude and his teachings as commonplace. This is evident in the beginning of Agaso’s
letter to Paulus Regius, dated March 15, 1437, where a play on words becomes a
flashpoint for the feud. Agaso claims that Trebizond treats rhetoric not exceptionally [ita
egregie], but rather “from the herd” [e grege], in an ordinary or vulgar manner. 35 He
builds on this contrast to characterize Trebizond not as a master of rhetoric but as a brute.
Later in the letter he explicitly describes Trebizond as having the “inordinate audacity”
and stupidity of a herd animal [pecus] for suggesting Guarino should have used
scriptorum instead of scribentium in his encomium. 36 Agaso’s attack is more implicit
shortly thereafter when, in listing ancient authorities to support Guarino’s usage, he
introduces “an example more familiar to Trebizond,” a reference to flocks of sheep in the
35

Collectanea, 365. (2) Unum enim tuo vel cachinno vel stomacho dignum opus in manus incidit,
cazambanicam redolens loquacitatem verius quam eloquentiam, quo cum auctor Greculus Latinis dicendi
rationem aperire profiteatur (est enim De rhetorica liber inscriptus). Ita egregie, vel e grege potius, disserit
ut tam facile ei Latine sciendi consuetudinem ademeris quam eloquentie peritiam denegaris.
36

Ibid., 369. (26) Memini siquidem nuper me legentem id ab eo de Guarino reprehensum annotasse: ‘Cur
etiam scribentium, non scriptorum dixerit?’ O ingentem pecudis bipedis confidentiam-nisi excusandum
pingue illud duxeritis ingenium, quod mox non intelligere sese fatetur!
For the initial criticism in the RLV, see Ibid., 363. (8) Cur etiam “scribentium,” non “scriptorum”
dixerit non intelligo, nisi quod timidum in dicendi hominem, ne a “scripto” “scriptorum” dicere videretur,
inscitia deterruit. Sed hec infinita sunt atque idcirco pretermittenda. See also Chapter Two, pages 41-42.
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Aeneid written greges balantum, not greges balantricum. Trebizond, a stupid, brutish
animal who writes e grege, is sure to be familiar with a reference to flocks of sheep. 37
Agaso uses repeated references to the ass, another herd animal. An example follows the
reference to Virgil just mentioned. As Agaso marshals authorities to defend Guarino, he
notes that “books are filled with phrases of this kind, pleasing to the sense of learned
men, not the ears of asses.” 38 Agaso situates Trebizond, by virtue of his incorrect usage,
on the wrong side of this contrast, implying he too has the ears of an ass, and thus is an
ass himself. Shortly, he criticizes Trebizond’s style of composition by calling it the way
of rustics, who “are accustomed to hearing braying asses” and so “prefer the harsh sounds
of toads and cicadas to the music of Orpheus and Apollo.” 39
Agaso also employs fish metaphors to characterize Trebizond’s style as mediocre
and to establish a low-class theme he develops to denigrate Trebizond. The first example
occurs as Agaso casts Trebizond as a mere copyist of “many brilliant authors” and asks
why anybody would want to read Trebizond’s works. He draws a distinction between “so
many teachers and the most learned men [peritissimi viri] of this age” and those who
know “nothing great or difficult” beyond “mackerel [scomber], sardines [saperda], little

37

Ibid., 370. (28) Et quoniam pervicaces non facile cedere solent nisi multis obruantur exemplis, legisse
debet… (29) Virgilius: ‘et amans et femina Dido;’ utque Trapezuntio familiarius inducatur exemplum:
‘quinque greges illi balantum,’ non balantricum. Monfasani cites Verg., Aen. 4.95 and 101.

38

Collectanea, 370. (29) Quid plura? Referti sunt codices huius generis dictionibus peritorum sensum, non
asinorum auriculas, oblectantibus, usu etiam approbante, “quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma
loquendi.” Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 72.
39

Collectanea, 370. (31) “Dein quis risum teneat cum eiusdem orationis compositionem suis concinnat
auribus et per nares absone quadret. Verborum colligatio totum pervertit ordinem. Hic rusticorum mos est
ut, cum rudentes asinos audire soliti sint, rubetarum atque cicadarum stridones vel Orphei et Apollinis
cithare preferant, velut cum illam suo more concinnat seriem: ‘Nulla enim tam ingens, tam clara, tam
admirabilis res gesta est quam non vetustas obscuret et oblivio nisi litterarum splendor et scribentium
lumen accenderit.’”
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tunny fish [pelamis], and salted fish [tarichos].” 40 Each is a common variety of fish and
though Agaso does not state it directly, his use of fish metaphors seems designed to liken
Trebizond to a low-class fishmonger with mediocre wares, in this case his teaching and
the precepts of the RLV. The implication is that, like all of these ordinary fish,
Trebizond’s works are common, cheap, and not suited to the tastes of the truly learned
men of his age. This reading is upheld later in Agaso’s letter when he describes
Trebizond as a bellowing ass who prefers the sound of toads to the lyre of Orpheus, and
then laments the “callous taste, completely devoid of elegance, which thinks there is no
difference between ambrosia and salted fish!” 41 The passage paints Trebizond as ignorant
but also contrasts Guarino’s wares—the sweet style of his encomium—with Trebizond’s
by likening the former to luxurious, rich ambrosia and the latter to cheap, preserved fish.
The context of Agaso’s fish imagery indicates that he intends it to be insulting to
Trebizond, but his choice of words is especially meaningful because he refers to specific
fish commonly known as small, cheap, repulsive, and potentially harmful. The particular
fish to which Agaso refers are almost certainly drawn from classical Latin authors and
lend weight to his intended insults and depiction of Trebizond the Fishmonger. The
scomber appears in Pliny’s Natural History and is generally believed to be a mackerel. In
his notes on the text, John Bostock writes the scomber was “a very common fish of

40

Ibid., 366. (6) Sin in tanta dicendi copia, doctrina ordine, subtilitate, dulcedine tam preclara negliguntur
auctores, a quibus librarius ipse, si que eruditius ab eo dicta sunt, cuncta transcripsit verius quam
excogitavit, quis sua legere volet? An huic, qui inter tot huius etatis doctores et viros peritissimos vult solus
scire videri, nova quedam artis acumina et aptiora dicendi documenta perperit, usus aliquis et in perorandis
causis exercitatio quam in senatu vel in foro vendicaverit, qui preter scombros, saperdam, palamides,
tarichon nil magnum novit aut arduum?

41

Ibid., 370-371. (31) “‘Quam commodius hoc,’ inquit Trapezuntius, ‘et robustius ita diceretur: Nulla enim
tam ingens, tam clara, tam admirabilis res gesta est, quam vetustas et oblivio, nisi litterarum splendor et
scribentium lumen accenderit, non obscuret?’ O callosum vere gustum et mundiciarum prorsus expertem
qui inter ambrosiam et tarichon nil interesse sentiat!” See note 39 for the preceding text.
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Rome, of small size, and was in little repute.” 42 Persius’s first satire alludes to the fact
that bad poetry was typically used to wrap the scomber when it was put out for sale. 43
The fish had a reputation as the fate of bad poets. M. Terentius Varro casts the saperda as
repulsive and harmful: “We are jolly and jovial, so we think. Though in fact like rotten
fish, we stink.” 44 Varro also attributes to Lucilius a passage describing the death of L.
Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, a Roman consul in 156 B.C., as the result of different kinds of
fish, including the saperda. 45 Sextus Pompeius Festus, the grammarian, defines the
saperda as “a species of the worst fish.” 46 Modern commentators relying on these sources
describe the saperda as a “particularly cheap and nasty fish” and a “species of quite
dreadful fish, suggesting that it was far from fêted for its culinary qualities.” 47 Pliny
describes the pelamis, the third of Agaso’s fish, as a young tunny fish, “called mudfish or
pelamydes (from the Greek for ‘mud’).” 48 Festus identifies the pelamis similarly. The
connection to mud is enough to cast the pelamis as another lowly fish, but Pliny adds that

42

Plin., HN 9.49. The Natural History of Pliny, trans. John Bostock (London: H.G. Bohn, 1855).

43

Pers., 1.43. “an erit qui velle recuset os populi meruisse et cedro digna locutus linquere nec scombros
metuentia carmina nec tus?” Susanna Braund notes the comparisons to Cat. 95.9 and Hor. Ep. 2.1.269-270.
All translations of Persius and Juvenal in this chapter are Braund’s. Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans.
Susanna Morton Braund (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
Var., Men., 312. omnes videmur nobis esse belli festiui, saperdae cum/simus σαπροί. See Brian A.
Krostenko, Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001), 57.
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Var., Ling., 7.47. Apud Lucilium: ‘Quid est? Thynno capto cobium excludunt foras’ et ‘Occidunt, Lupe,
saperdae te et iura siluri’ et ‘Sumere te atque amian.’ Piscium nomina sunt eorumque in Graecia origo.

46

Fest., 324-325. Saperda, genus pessimi piscis.

47

Krostenko, 4; L.B.T. Houghton, “The Wolf and the Dog (Horace, ‘Sermones’ 2.2.64),” The Classical
Quarterly 54, no.1 (May 2004): 303.

48

The translation is Rackham’s. Pliny, Natural History, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1940). Plin., HN 9.47-48. Pelamys genus piscis dictum, quod in luto moretur, quod
Graece dicitur πηλός. Cf. Fest., 207.
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“they must be eaten only when they are quite fresh, and even then they cause severe fits
of flatulence.” The pelamis appears in Juvenal’s seventh satire as the reward advocates
attain for plying their rhetorical skill in court: “What reward does your voice get? A tiny
shoulder of dried-up ham and a jar of little tunnies.” 49 The last of Agaso’s examples, the
tarichos [τάριχος], seems to be a simple stock expression for any preserved meat, or in
this case salted fish. 50
There may also be a cultural component to Agaso’s fish imagery. In addition to
the negative depictions of the saperda, modern commentators also note that the fish was
associated with the east and with Greeks in particular. Persius’s fifth satire links the
saperda to the Black Sea as does Aristotle in discussing the σαπέρδης, and Varro
describes it as Greek in origin. 51 Brian Krostenko argues that the “presence of a Greek
adjective [σαπροί]”—meaning rotten or stale—with saperda in Varro suggests “not only
the meanness” of the fish, but also “the decadent Greek east.” L.B.T Houghton explains
that “the fact that it [the saperda] had to be imported from Greece (or even from Egypt)
might be taken to support its status as a recherché commodity, difficult to obtain and
costly to transport despite the poor return it offered when finally served up in Rome.” 52
All this hardly proves Agaso intended the saperda to be a slight of Trebizond as a Greek,
as he makes no such explicit statements, yet such a use would certainly be consistent with
49

Juv., 7.120.

Liddell and Scott define τάριχος as “anything preserved or pickled by artificial means” or “generally,
meat preserved by smoking, salting, or pickling, dried or smoked fish.”
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The Satires of Juvenal, Persius, Sulpicia, and Lucilius, trans. Lewis Evans and William Gifford (New
York: Harper, 1881), 253. The notes on Persius’ fifth satire contain a reference to Aristotle. The city of
Trebizond, of course, was on the Black Sea. George identified with the city of Trebizond throughout his
life despite having been born a Cretan. Monfasani reports that George stated his great-great-grandfather had
emigrated to Crete from Trebizond. George himself routinely signed his name “Georgius Trapezuntius
Cretensis,” an indication of his pride in both locations. See Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 4-5.
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Krostenko, 4; Houghton, 303.
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Agaso’s other anti-Greek language. Trebizond, an émigré rhetorician in Italy, came under
fire by Agaso as common. He was hardly a suitable instructor of youths, or so Agaso
contends by likening Trebizond to Heraclides in Cicero’s Pro Flacco. 53 One of Agaso’s
other main arguments, furthermore, is that Guarino expended too much time and money
on Trebizond after the latter’s arrival in Italy. Given Agaso’s other attacks, I suggest that
he chose the saperda as a fitting metaphor. The fish allow him to imply an image of
Trebizond as an émigré scholar who, lacking a sufficient knowledge of Latin, deals in
commonplace lessons just as a fishmonger peddles cheap mackerel and unappetizing,
though exotic, wares.
The manner in which Agaso employs his fish imagery also carries undertones of
classical Roman satirists who—like Lucilius, Varro, and Persius above—not only
identified some of Agaso’s fish as common, cheap, and rotten but incorporated them into
attacks against particular individuals and vices. Humanists appreciated authors such as
Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and Martial. Guarino’s commentaries on Juvenal were popular
and widespread, and Juvenal occupied a place in his curriculum. 54 Guarino was also
involved in the spread of Greek satire, including his translations of Lucian’s Slander, The
Fly, and The Parasite. 55 Agaso’s fish insults call to mind Juvenal’s fifth satire, which
features fish and other seafood at a dinner party as part of a commentary on the inequities

53

For Agaso’s comments on Trebizond as an instructor, see Chapter Two, pages 44-47.

54

On Juvenal’s place in the humanist curriculum, see Battista Guarino, De ordine docendi et studendi, in
Humanist Educational Treatises, trans. and ed. Kallendorf, 25. Battista Guarino pairs Juvenal, “the prince
of satirists” with Terence and argues “with these two authors at one’s disposal, one may be confident, not
only of being able to hold forth elegantly on any subject that arises in day-to-day speech, but also of having
some maxim suitable for every subject.”
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Guarino translated Lucian’s Slander and The Fly between 1403 and 1408 while in Constantinople. In
1418, he translated The Parasite. David Marsh, Lucian and the Latins: Humor and Humanism in the Early
Renaissance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 1998), xi.
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between the feasts of a rich man and the scant fare of a poor man. 56 While those of high
status feast on lobster, the poor eat crayfish garnished with half an egg. On the one hand,
the wealthy host Virro feasts on exquisite food, “a lamprey [muraena], the biggest that
comes from the Sicilian whirlpool.” On the other hand, the lowly guests such as Trebius
are presented with “an eel [anguilla], cousin of the long snake, or a Tiber fish spattered
with gray blotches, like you a slave bred on the banks, bloated from the gushing sewer.” 57
In Agaso’s insults, the quality of the fish illustrates the difference not between
rich and poor but between learned and unlearned. 58 The food motif remains, too, as
Agaso distinguishes Guarino’s eloquence from Trebizond’s by contrasting ambrosia, the
food of the gods, with common salted fish, the food of mere mortals, but more to the
point of low-class mortals, and by lamenting the taste that cannot distinguish between the
two. Like the food at Juvenal’s dinner party, one of these is exquisite and one is not. The
contrast bears even more weight because, as Agaso maintains throughout the letter,
Trebizond arrogantly believes that his own eloquence, his rhetorical taste, surpasses
Guarino’s. Trebizond did, after all, dare to correct Guarino’s encomium. The fish
metaphor thus functions as an assault on Trebizond’s arrogance, as well as his ignorance.
Trebizond’s response, addressed to Guarino himself, indicates that he was aware of the
implications of Agaso’s language and imagery.
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Emily Gowers, The Loaded Table: Representations of Food in Roman Literature (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 211-219; Kirk Freudenburg, Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to
Juvenal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 264-277; Maria Plaza, The Function of Humour in
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Freudenburg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124-125.
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Juv., 5.80-87 and 99-106.
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Plaza discusses the use of exaggeration in establishing “raised objects” in satirical humor. Plaza, 53-166.
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Trebizond’s response to Guarino in 1437 frequently mentions Agaso’s animal
images and reflects his anxiety about the metaphors and their intent. The opening
sections, in which he argues that Guarino had written as Agaso, offer an example of how
he too marshals the language of masculinity. Like Agaso, Trebizond challenges his
opponent’s eloquence. He claims that beyond the fact that nobody had ever heard of an
“Andreas Agaso,” Guarino’s authorship is evident given the letter’s rigidity, shallowness,
and contradictions. “The speech,” he continues, “is crowded with asses, mackerel, sheep
(and these two-legged!), tunny, salted fish, sea fish, 59 and others of these kinds suited to
your taste.” 60 Trebizond’s attacks are blunter than Agaso’s insinuations depicting
Trebizond as Fishmonger, but he uses the same images as his opponent, including asses
and all the varieties of fish. He even retains the food motif in reference to taste. Guarino’s
authorship is also clear, Trebizond adds, from the tone of the Agaso letter, which he
characterizes as typical of Guarino’s habits of attacking others, including “the most
learned Poggio.” 61 The mention of Poggio is a reference to the recent and well-known

59

Sus might mean swine, but Lewis and Short list a secondary definition, based on Ov. Hal. 132, as “a kind
of fish.” The Oxford Latin Dictionary cites Ovid and defines it as a “sea-fish, perh.=Greek ὗς, an unknown
fish of the Euxine.” Considering Agaso’s use of fish, I understand Trebizond to be referring to a another
type of fish.
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Collectanea, 381. (2) At primum, nullum in Italia qui litteraturam profiteatur hoc nomine appellari
constat; nec sane invenies aliquem preter te qui se ita velit vocitari. Deinde, si Agasones doctorum
hominum aliquos nuncupari constaret, quis tamen ea scripta Guarini esse non intelligat qui tantam orationis
duritiem, tantam sententiarum levitatem tantam argumentorum inter se repugnantiam videat? Nihil enim est
in ipsis commode, graviter, robusteque dictum; nihil non pueriliter atque inepte, ne stultissime dicam,
excogitatum. Asinis, scombris, pecudibus (et his bipedibus!), pelamidibus, taricho, suibus, ceterisque
huiuscemodi tuo stomacho dignis, imo vero Agasone dignissimis referta oratio est.Trebizond emphasizes
the bipes to make clear his response to Agaso. Cf. Ibid., 369, note 36. O ingentem pecudis bipedis
confidentiam… .
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Collectanea, 381-382. (3) Que res ita etiam in aliis Guarino factitata est ut et que ita scripta sint a
Guarino et qui sic scribat Guarinus esse videatur…. Quid enim illa “egregie vel e grege,” “suo vel suis,” et
que horum similia sunt tua negabis, Agasoniam hanc redolentia scurilitatem? Caperare vero frontem aut
detrahere tuum non est? At cum in doctissimum Poggium scriberes, tale quid tunc posuisti, ut et hic facis,
cum opus acrimonia esse videretur? Multa sunt quibus irretitus teneris. Cf. Ibid., 365, note 35.
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literary dispute, the Scipio-Caesar controversy, between Guarino and Poggio in 1435. 62
Trebizond then asserts that the name “Andreas Agaso” is further evidence of Guarino’s
authorship, since it is characteristic of Guarino “to think that you alone are a man, and
others whom you drive before you are asses.” Monfasani’s note on the text explains the
joke. He translates “Andreas Agaso” from the Greek Ἀνδρείᾳ ἀγάζω as “I rejoice
exceedingly in [my] manliness.” 63 Trebizond’s comments indicate that he perceived
Agaso’s animal insults as attempts to emasculate him verbally by robbing him of his
learning and eloquence. His reflection on Agaso’s name is an indictment of those
attempts.
As fervently as Trebizond criticizes Agaso’s animal imagery, he is more than
willing to use it himself to denigrate Guarino and to adopt the social status theme in the
Agaso letter. Whereas Agaso casts Trebizond as a fishmonger, Trebizond describes
Guarino as a donkey-driver to depict his opponent as lacking the eloquence, taste, and
learning of a true learned man. For example, in response to Agaso’s criticism of

Trebizond’s characterizations of Poggio would not always remain so positive. He later revised his
response to Guarino to reflect his changing opinions of Poggio. He changed doctissimus Poggius to
indoctus Poggius, skilled [peritissimus] to unskilled [imperitissimus], and famous [clarus] to infamous
[infamosus]. See Monfasani’s notes on the text, Collectanea, 407-408.
62

On the Scipio-Caesar controversy, see Chapter Three, note 24. Trebizond also accuses Guarino of
habitually attacking learned men in a cover letter accompanying the present response, composed in 1437
and addressed to Leonello. Leonello was familiar with Guarino’s participation in disputes, including the
Scipio-Caesar controversy. It was he who, during a trip to Florence, encountered Poggio’s piece defending
Scipio and attacking Caesar and alerted Guarino to its existence. Guarino penned his defense of Caesar
shortly thereafter. Mark Jurdjevic, “Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly
52, no.4 (Winter 1999): 1002-1003. Collectanea, 377-378. (1) Guarinus Veronensis, humanissime
princeps, vir etate nostra, ut credit, doctissimus, eloquentia sua fretus invectivam in me edidit, que his
diebus tandem in manus incidit. Letarer profecto, quoniam in plerosque doctos viros Guarinus scripsit, in
eorum acervo me quoque connumerari nisi peritorum hominum iudicio viderem non visum Guarino
dignum Georgium in quem nomine suo scriberet, quamvis et sui gratia non parum doleam quod videam
acuto in dicendo homini, si adversarius voluerit, idipsum, quod sibi indidit, nomen hesurum perpetuo.
63

Collectanea, 382. (4) Sed mihi id sufficit quod te Andream Agasonem inscripsisti (tuum enim est te
solum virum, ceteros quos agas asinos estimare) quodque apertissime Agaso litteratura se Greca infectum
ostendit, quam qui teneat, Georgio iratum invenies neminem. See also Monfasani’s note, ibid., 407.
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Trebizond’s addition of “cum amplificatione” to Cicero’s definition of demonstrative
oratory, Trebizond exhorts Guarino to learn from him or other learned men. If Guarino
thinks it too shameful for such a divine man [divinus homo] as himself to learn from
others, Trebizond urges him to leave “letters and teaching to others. You can watch over
asses.” 64 The comment implies that Guarino’s arrogant refusal to learn from others and
his view of himself as a divinus homo is evidence that he is suited only to teach asses.
Trebizond uses the ass metaphor again when describing Agaso’s criticisms as “braying,”
and when he suggests that if his arguments have failed to convince Guarino, it is because
Guarino is too occupied with “driving asses.” 65 He alludes to the Latin proverb purus
grammaticus purus asinus to cast Guarino as an ass and again encourages him to limit
himself to asses—to grow old in directing them. Both Agaso and Trebizond, then,
express their technical arguments through concepts of manhood, contrasting the learning
64

Ibid., 385. (19) Nam cum demonstrativum genus esse dicamus quod in alicuius certe persone laudem vel
vituperationem cum amplificatione attribuatur, “cum amplificatione” particula tibi, in diffiniendo
acutissimo, quoniam laus etiam cum amplificatione nobis esse asseratur, minime adiiciunda videtur. Nam
que formis insunt, in diffinitione generis ponenda non arbitraris. Disce a me, quousque tibi discendi tempus
conceditur, aut, si dedignaris, dialectice doctos interroga. Sin ab his etiam discere turpe divino tibi homini
putas, quoniam preter dialectum id docere te poterat nemo, litteras et doctrinam aliis omitte. Tu asinos
custodias.
Agaso had argued that Trebizond included the addition to Cicero’s definition to seem as if he had
contributed something of his own. See Chapter Two, page 40.
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Ibid., 386. (20) Quare nec ita se habere potest ad laudem ut ad consumptionem vite mortalitas, quod
Agaso rudit. Nam hec quidem idem possunt. Amplificatio tam laudem quam vituperationem, oppositas
formas, complectitur. Nam que toti insunt, eodem de subiectis partibus modo predicantur. Persuasimus
quod demonstravimus? An in agendis asinis occupatus, minus advertis? Crede mihi, crede, inquam,
Guarine, verum est quod vulgo dicitur, purus grammaticus, purus—nosti quod sequitur. Quare si sapis,
tabesces in casu, senesces in flectendis asinis. In schemate Agasonum, quod tute tibi elegisti, moraberis. In
promiscuo genere diligentissime te retinebis. Nam si terminos tuos egredere, cave ne, cum per ora virorum
ut doctissimus credas volitare, ut Agaso verius volites.
Lewis and Short define rudo as “to bray,” specifically in reference to asses, as well as “to make a
loud noise, roar or bellow,” as an orator might. Trebizond clearly relies on the former definition but the
insult probably encompasses part of the latter definition as well. He uses the word several times, and
elsewhere describes Guarino as grunting like a pig. Cf. Ibid., 388-389. (31) At Cicero (o, quomodo te
appellabo? Nihil enim habere hominis videre.) hanc ipsam concertationem dixit, cui tu contentionem
conferre videris. Si ergo recte Cicero, et nos non insulse; sin Cicero hec parum perspexit, dimitte nos qui
cum eo errare malimus quam cum Agasonibus rudere; Ibid., 399 (77) Tu nos iniuria queris occupare.
Utrum maiorem nobis hinc ex ingratitudine infamiam an tibi gloriam, quod tales docuisses conflare putasti?
Sed ne longior sim, hec aliud in tempus, si grun<n>ies, reserventur.
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of true men with that of those who teach only the common and lowly. This is a
definitional act that raises one man higher on a hierarchy of masculinity and relegates his
opponent to a lower position. The fishmonger and donkey-driver accusations imply the
same thing. By catering to the less educated crowd and offering only mackerel or salted
fish, an instructor reveals himself to be lacking true learning and thus true manhood.
Trebizond’s discussion of demonstrative oratory is not the only time he attacks
Guarino’s eloquence through animal images. He accuses Guarino of having been
educated in a donkey stable and makes multiple references to such stables. 66 He also uses
animal imagery when alleging that Guarino was so angry about the criticisms in the RLV
that “unable to mollify your anger, you turned to lies, and clothed neither in the pelt of a
lion…nor in the pelt of the fox…but in that of the ass, as all are familiar with your
dullness, you polished the Agaso invective against me.” 67 Here Trebizond uses the
animal metaphor not to advance the social status theme and describe Guarino as a
donkey-driver but more directly to liken Guarino to an ass. The description of Guarino
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Ibid., 390. (36) Unum illud oramus atque obtestamur, sicui harum rerum cura est, Partitionum Ciceronis
principium perlegat ut ad hec que dicta sunt Ciceronis quoque sententia valeat in asinorum Agasones
intrudere stabula, ubi qui in me invectivam scripsit educatus videtur. Cf. Ibid., 398. (71)…si hec preterea in
ultionem Guarini dicuntur, omnia que nemo teneat preter illum qui semper mihi invidit, quis mente sanus
dubitabit e libris atque scola in asinorum stabula prosiliisse Guarinum ibique Agasonem factum hanc in me
invectivam erudisse…
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Ibid., 387. (24) Tanto assumpto temporis spatio, cum sepe ac multum tecum quidnam scribendum in me
tibi esset volveres, tamen, quia nihil inveniebas et iracundiam lenire non poteras, conversus in mendacia es,
neque leonis, ut Hercules (nam id adversario reliquisti) neque vulpecule, ut fallax (nam id turpe tibi
existimasti), sed asininam indutus pellem, ut hebetudinem tuam omnes cognoscerent, Agasoniam in nos
invectivam erudisti. Verum mendacem te paulo post acrius arguemus.
Trebizond’s remark may be a response to Agaso’s mockery of Trebizond’s disparagement of
classical and medieval rhetorical authorities. Agaso had likened Trebizond to Aesop’s raven which, to fit in
among a group of peacocks, had dressed itself as one. For Agaso’s comment, see Ibid., 366. (7) At Espoi
meminisse corvi debuit, qui cum inter pavones simulata veste irrupisset, tanto mox ludibrio et irrisioni fuit
ut et pavonis et corvinis expilatus pennis vix tandem implumis effugerit… . Corpus Fabularum
Aesopicarum, ed. A. Hausrath and H. Hunger, 1.1, 129-130, no. 103 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970).
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adopting the dress—or behaviors—of the ass, especially in contrast to donning the dress
of a truly intimidating animal such as a lion, implies that Guarino is himself an ass.
The “dullness” Trebizond ascribes to Guarino reflects a lack of eloquence that he
contrasts with the learning of a true man. The contrast sits at the center of one of his most
boastful claims, that he will easily vanquish Guarino with the strength of his eloquence.
Here he casts himself among the “many and distinguished men” [multi praeclarique viri]
who defend themselves against the persecution of others. He claims that he does not at all
fear Guarino, listing the “copiousness of my speech,” the “flood of my genius, and “my
erudition in Greek as much as Latin” as reasons why “I, like a mailed knight, am able to
topple you, seated upon an ass.” 68 The vivid contrast between the virile knight on a
charger and the non-combatant seated on an ass identifies learning and eloquence as
essential components of true manhood. Trebizond presents himself as the better equipped
of the two for combat, given his skills in two languages. The description also fits
alongside another of Trebizond’s recurring claims, that Guarino had devised the Agaso
pseudonym because he feared Trebizond’s eloquence: “Indeed everyone sees and
understands that you have disguised yourself so cunningly because you cannot endure
George’s eloquence, at whose force of speaking you have now long trembled.” 69 Fear
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Ibid., 382. (7) Nam, Guarine, nec enim molestum cuiquam futurum puto, quod multi preclarique viri
natura ipsa duce fecerunt, si ad meam defensionem me laudavero, presertim cum tu in persequendo id
facias. Ea mihi orationis copia est ut te non pertimescam; id ingenii flumen ut contemnam; ea tam Greca,
quam Latina eruditio ut te facile possim exagitare; ea denique maiorum rerum doctrina ut, ne grande quid
dicam, tanquam catafractus eques, insidentem te asino non hasta, sed solo afflatu currendi precipitem
valeam deturbare. The passage is also an example of Trebizond’s response to Agaso’s anti-Greek language.
See Chapter Two, page 67.
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Collectanea, 382 (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem
Georgii ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses. Itaque credidisse te aiunt, si nomine inaudito
scriberes, vel nil scripturum Georgium vel, si ad te scriberet, deum hominesque testari posses magnam tibi
horum omnium ignaro iniuriam fieri. See also ibid., 381 (2) Nam ut latere possis, ne tibi respondeam, vel
inter asinos ita te intrusisti ut Agaso factus sis et posteris hoc te nomine tuis scriptis commendes. Quid enim
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drove Guarino to hide behind a pseudonym rather than to meet Trebizond in open battle,
armed only with their respective skills and eloquence, the weapons of a true man.
The child and the man
The beast imagery that Agaso introduced is the predominant expression of failed
masculinity during the Trebizond-Guarino feud, but it is not the only one. Each man
attempted to emasculate his opponent by likening his knowledge and eloquence to that of
a child and thus effectively giving him the status of a pupil or student. As with the beast
imagery, labeling an opponent childish typically situated the author as the true man—
learned and knowledgeable—above the failed man—the child who lacked knowledge and
skill—on a hierarchy. Agaso’s use of this strategy was more subtle than his beast
imagery, though Trebizond—sometimes but not always in direct response to the language
of the Agaso letter—employed it quite explicitly. It is worth noting too that age was no
obstacle to allegations of childishness. Trebizond (1395-1472) was the junior of both
Guarino (1374-1460) and Poggio (1380-1459) but accused both men of childishness and
cast himself as the learned master in contrast to his depictions of each of them as
students.
The contrast between manhood and childishness in the Trebizond-Guarino feud is
at times straightforward, as when Agaso criticizes Trebizond’s “childish diligence” in
correcting Guarino’s encomium. For Agaso, childish diligence means an excessively
ornamented style that is wordy and clumsy, and obscures meaning. It is ostentation for

celare nomen tuum, et Agasonem nescio quem, non te in Georgium invehi credituros homines putasti? See
note 60 for the following text.
I understand inscribo as another of Trebizond’s references to Guarino adopting the “Agaso”
pseudonym. In furnishing himself with the pseudonym, Trebizond accuses Guarino of disguising himself in
order to hide. See pages 194-195.
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the sake of ostentation, so that Trebizond can appear to be learned. 70 The result,
according to Agaso, is not that Trebizond appears learned but that his corrections appear
so contrived as to violate Cicero’s warning that “a speech especially loses its conviction,
and a speaker his authority” if it seems too pleasant. While Guarino laid “aside flattery of
his listeners” and was therefore “devoted to serious ideas and to gravity,” Trebizond’s
changes so obscured the sense of the text that it was nearly unrecognizable. 71 Citing
Cicero, Agaso argues that Trebizond’s flattery—his style, which he undertakes with
“truly childish diligence” [puerilis diligentia]—harmed his authority as a speaker and
rendered him suspect [suspectus], unintelligible [obscurus], and hateful [invisus]. He
characterizes Trebizond’s changes as needless, excessive, and error-ridden. He accuses
Trebizond of changing the arrangement—already so sweet and elegant—of Guarino’s
words for the worse, exhausting the manner of the speech—presumably a comment about
Trebizond’s wordy ostentation—and obscuring its sense “by a too lengthy and wandering
display.” Agaso’s contention that Trebizond’s changes were “childish” stands in contrast
to Guarino’s implicitly manly style, which he casts as carefully considered, more
restrained, and reliant on ratio.
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Cf. Agaso’s criticism of Trebizond’s definition of demonstrative oratory, note 64 above and page 182
below.
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Collectanea, 371. (35) Accedit quod Guarinus id diligenter ex artis institutione servavit ne festiva nimis
in principio et apparata sit oratio quoniam ea res, ut a Cicerone traditum est, ‘maxime orationi fidem,
oratori autem adimit auctoritatem.’ Et omissis aurium lenociniis, Guarinus sententiis gravitatique servivit.
Ab sententia namque duplici partes primas sumpsit exordii, utrique rationem aptam gravemque subiiciens.
At Trapezuntius ita suavem ita concinnum in peius permutat ordinem et longiore ac vitioso quodam
hyperbato pronuntiationem fatigat, sensum obscurat, et prolixiore ac errabundo tandem ambitu vix quid
dicat intelligitur et fucose cuidam vereque puerili diligentie intentus, priusquam receptus sit auditori
suspectum obscurumque se reddat et invisum.
Monfasani notes the comparison to Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.25. The translation is Hubbell’s. Cicero, De
inventione, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949). “The
exordium…should contain very little brilliance [splendor], vivacity [festivitas] or finish of style
[concinnitudo], because these give rise to a suspicion of preparation and excessive ingenuity. As a result of
this most of all the speech loses conviction and the speaker, authority.”
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Trebizond is often far more explicit than Agaso in his characterizations of his
opponent’s childish knowledge and style. He accuses Guarino of childishness, for
instance, when discussing the Scipio-Caesar controversy between Guarino and Poggio in
1435. During that dispute, Guarino had appealed to Livy to defend Caesar. Trebizond
claims that Guarino expounded Livy’s text like a schoolboy [discipulus]. His attack
presumes a link between undeveloped skills and childishness. “What is cruder,”
Trebizond asks, than Guarino’s handling of Livy’s text? 72 Trebizond again questions
Guarino’s manly knowledge when discussing how accusers and defenders frame their
arguments. Here he mocks Guarino for not knowing things that not only men but even
boys know. 73 This is a common refrain. Elsewhere, Trebizond pauses during a litany of
technical arguments to reflect. “Why do I go over all these things,” he asks, “You confuse
everything...Will you not consider it shameful if even boys understand, and you, veteran
orator, are ignorant?” 74 Trebizond later censures Guarino for Agaso’s comment about
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Collectanea, 386. (22) Quid enim rudius quam cum scribat Livius prestantem fuisse virum P. Scipionem,
belli tamen artibus quam pacis prestantiorem, his verbis, ‘pacis artibus,’ pusillanimem illum putare neque
videre prestantiam in omnibus attestatum homini Livium? Que cum in pacis et belli artibus ei partita sit, si
utraque in re qualis fuerit Scipio scire cupis, prestans, inquit; si in utra prestantior, in belli artibus, inquit.
Tu prestans illud, quod Livius quasi genus posuerat, pro pusillanimo interpretaris. Ita litteraturam tenes. Sic
textus discipulis exponis.
73

Ibid., 388. (27) Nam etsi docendi commoditate adducti, non nunquam pauca quedam separatim
exponamus, undique tamen apparet nullum ad refellendum excogitari posse preceptum quod confirmationi
reddi non possit. Et enim que quis observat in argumentatione adversarii diluenda, eadem ipse, nisi
diligentius ut vitet circumspiciat, fetor erit magis quam rhetor et tui similis. Lege Ciceronem ubicunque de
his tractat. An saltem que ad Herennium scribit, queque non viri tantum, sed pueri etiam intelligunt, infans
tu vidisti? A causa, vita, collatione, loco, tempore, ceterisque huiusmodi nonne tam accusator quam
defensor, ut suam stabilit, sic adversarii coniecturam labefactat?
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Ibid., 396. (63) Exornationes tanquam colores distingunt orationem. Eas occupare loco et modo non
vulgare, sed ubivis communissimum. Tu, qui primum probe factitare deberes, nec alterum quidem potes
attingere. Nihil enim unquam graviter repetis, nihil asseveranter concludis; nihil acute expedis; nihil
prudenter distribuis; nihil acriter subiicis. Cur cuncta recenseo? Omnia confundis. In omnibus heres.
Nullius naturam, nullius locum, nullius modum perspicis. Que orationis tue vitia ignorantiam vi, loco
imperitiam, modo hebetudinem, numero ruditatem, re dementiam pre se ferunt. Non igitur operies te atque
obvelabis, sed detecto capite in ora hominum amplius aspicere audebis? Non turpe duces sique vel pueri
sciunt, veteranus tu rhetor ignorabis?
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“childish diligence:” “Surely these comments, if they were said thus to women or
children or real ‘Agasos,’ would still seem unbecoming to them. You, who think yourself
learned, will boast about them. You are ignorant, completely ignorant of the art of
speaking, Guarino!” This comment also offers one of Trebizond’s few attempts to
feminize his opponent. 75 Alongside another reference to children, it is clear that
feminization functions as another expression of failed masculinity, as a means of
emasculating an opponent. Indeed, Trebizond then describes again Guarino’s arguments
in the Agaso invective as childish [argumentum puerile]. 76
Even as Trebizond characterizes Guarino as childish, he condemns Guarino for
doing the same to him. As with the beast imagery, Trebizond’s protests indicate his
recognition that attacks on masculinity could be employed to great effect, and that
humanists experienced—or at least articulated—anxiety as a result. An excellent example
is when Trebizond is bristling at the long list Agaso compiled of the supposed errors in
the RLV. Trebizond describes the compilation as frivolous and childish [leve et puerile],
not to say “Agasonian.” It is likely not a coincidence that Trebizond casts Agaso’s
behavior as leve, given that, as discussed in Chapter 1, accusations of levitas featured so
prominently in Agaso’s attacks on Trebizond’s conduct. Emasculating Agaso’s
behavior—and thus Guarino’s—gave Trebizond access to criticisms of levitas that he
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Ibid., 401. (85) Ad haec festivam nimis et apparatam appellas permutationem meam, et fucosam,
puerilem diligentiam… Si festiva lenociniisque referta oratio est, quomodo longiore hyperbato
prolixioreque ambitu obscura et pronuntiatione fatigas? Hec enim robuste nimis sunt compositionis. Que, si
vera sunt, quomodo rursus fucose ac puerilis diligentie? (86) Hec profecto, si aut mulieribus aut pueris aut
veris Agasonibus sic dicerentur, tamen eis indigna viderentur. Tu qui te doctum putas, his gloriaberis.
Ignorans, ignorans omnino es dicendi artis, Guarine! For the importance of the feminizing antitype, see
pages 151-152.
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Collectanea, 401. (87) Nam et hanc invectivam, quamvis absonam et deiectam et tam verbis squalentem
quam sententiis et argumentis puerilibus et repugnantibus sordidam, meliusculam tamen quam soleas
edidisti. See note 86 for the rest of the section.
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could not advance, as Agaso had done to him, through cultural stereotypes. He chides
Guarino for assuming the errors in the RLV to be a sign of ignorance rather than assuming
that Trebizond does, in fact, know “those things most familiar to children.” 77 The truth,
Trebizond explains, is that his alleged errors were the fault of a copyist, “since it is
impossible for a man to note down so great and so many volumes without error.” He
suggests that the implicit assumption that he does not know what even boys know is itself
a childish strategy, unjust, and an indication of Guarino’s levitas.
Aside from their explicit accusations of childishness, both Agaso and Trebizond
incorporate the contrast between childishness and manliness in more complex, implicit
arguments. The most prevalent of these involves the distinction between students
(portrayed as poorly informed and childish) and instructors (portrayed as mature and
manly). This distinction is evident in Agaso’s attempts to label Trebizond a false
magister and childish upstart who challenges learned authorities, who are of course the
true men. 78 Here too, we can perhaps see the impact of the fact that Trebizond was nearly
twenty years younger than Guarino. Agaso condescendingly describes Trebizond as a
77

Collectanea, 383-384. (12) Illud quale sit consideremus, quam leve ac puerile, ne Agasonium dicam, quo
me carpis, quod non nulla in tanto codice minus Latine dicta te offendissent. Quid ais, Guarine? Si mea
manu transcripta tam multa magnaque forent volumina in quibus litterarum quadam additione vel
detractione corruptius, que dicis, reperirentur, cogitatione scribentis alio rapta, “egritudinem” pro
“egrotatione,” “ad presentiarum” pro “ad presens,” “exorditus” pro “exorsus,” “doctrinas” pro “doctrine,”
ignorantie id signum putares? Nec vel gravitate orationis vel preceptorum multitudine, subtilitate, ordine
motus, infantibus hec communissima nobis concederes? Adeo rudis atque agrestis es ut te fugiat accidere
homini posse, quod plerumque tibi evenisse certior sum, ut querat quod teneat, postulet quod in manibus
habeat? Nisi forte tu deus sis aut deum te credi velis? ...(13) Animadverte igitur quam iniquus es: que si
manu mea scripsissem, non ignorantie dares, hec aliena manu confecta mihi non pudet ingerere. Quod si
ego quoque levitatem tuam sequendam ducerem, quam plurima huiusmodi ex tuis presto sunt! Nihil enim
est integrum, nihil non absonum, nihil non barbare scriptum. Verum nos ita tibi omnia condonamus ut que
fortassis etiam tu committis librariis. Tu, siquid in nostris transcriptorum culpa mendosum est, nobis
attribuis. Nos etiam magna tibi vitio non damus. Tu minima hec et aliena non vereris colligere, quamvis et
qui nostra, quod tot tantaque volumina impossible sit absque lapsu hominem exarare, deprecari errorem, et
qui tua transcribunt, librarii propter tuorum paucitatem iure in te reiicere culpam possunt, nisi tam breves
epistolas scopulose orationis fastidio se affectos minus attendisse in transcribendo dicant.
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Chapter Two examines Agaso’s false magister argument as a part of his depiction of Trebizond as an
arrogant Greekling who, though unqualified, purported to teach the art of speaking. See pages 40-45.
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“young doctor” [novellus doctor]. 79 He is a magister who, so that he might seem to
contribute something of his own, added “so foolishly and stupidly ‘cum amplificatione’”
to Cicero’s definition of demonstrative oratory. 80 He is a “Neptunian magister” who
misunderstands the number of parts of an oration. 81 He is a magister whose practices run
counter to those of Servius, “no less an eloquent rhetor than a learned grammarian.” 82 He
is a “new Cicero, or chickpea” who creates thousands of new doctrines. 83 Agaso
amplifies these insults by explicitly characterizing Trebizond not as a master, but as a
student: “Therefore let the Greekling go and learn how to be a student, since he does not
know how to be a teacher.” 84 Each of these is part of Agaso’s portrayal of Trebizond as
arrogant and unlearned, particularly in contrast to true authorities.
Naturally, Trebizond responds to Agaso’s false magister argument by reversing
roles and presenting himself as the learned instructor and Guarino as the student. To
Agaso’s contention that he was an ungrateful student of Guarino’s Latin instruction,
Trebizond recalls his lessons to Guarino on Pindar and Greek meter, lessons for which he
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Collectanea, 366. (7) …quamquam quid dicet doctor ipse novellus, quod tot eruditos, peritos, suaves in
dicendo tulit hec etas sine ipsius preceptione ut priscis illis haud dissimiles dixerim, sicut multifariam
illorum scripta et dicta testantur?
80

Ibid., 366 (9). See note 64.
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Collectanea, 366. (11) Inde non longe post Neptunius hic magister inventionem divisurus contra veterum
omnium et posterorum auctoritatem atque sententiam, quattuor tantum partes enumerat, cum sex esse nemo
sanus eat inficias. Sic enim partitur in exordium, narrationem, contentionem, et perorationem.
82

Ibid., 370. (29) Accedit et Servius, non minus rhetor facundus quam grammaticus eruditus, qui in tertio
Georgicorum commento: ‘scimus,’ inquit, ‘esse concessum scribentibus ut iteratione prohemii legentium
reficiant interdum laborem,’ magis quam scriptoribus et lectorum, ut magister imperat Trapezuntius…
The passage is a part of Agaso’s response to Trebizond criticizing Guarino’s use of scribentium
in his encomium. See note 36.
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Collectanea, (2) …id est, doctrine doctrinas, et alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel cicer, magis sua
quadam usurpat inscitia? De nomine si queris, quod ad tuas aures pervenisse non arbitror, dicam postea.
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Ibid., 367. (15) Eat igitur Greculus ipse, et discipulus esse discat qui magister esse nescit. Alioquin
dimidio stultiores redditurus est discipulos quam accepit. Et intercepta salaria revomenda.
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claims Guarino was quite grateful. Trebizond’s assertion is an important part of his
defense against Agaso’s anti-Greek language, but it also demonstrates his attempts to
emasculate Guarino by placing him in the schoolroom. He describes his lessons on Pindar
and meter as topics far more complex than those Guarino claimed he had taught
Trebizond. He adds that Guarino had given him only those rudimentary lessons, “which
women rather than men usually give,” and had done so poorly. 85 Trebizond’s verbal
emasculation of Guarino is also evident in his contention that his criticisms in the RLV
had improved Guarino’s style. He suggests that as squalid and childish a piece as the
Agaso invective was, it was still an improvement over Guarino’s typical offerings. Here
he implores the “noblest men, and finally whoever follows Guarino,” to compare what
they know of Guarino’s past teachings and speech to what they hear now. They will find,
he declares, that Guarino treats issues differently and writes more ornately and sweetly.
“George made you more learned,” he concludes, adding that the changes in Guarino’s
practices are “easily conferred on you by George’s teaching.” 86 Trebizond makes a
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Ibid., 398. (72) Vix duorum mensium illa tua fuit doctrina in transcribendo, non in discendo me penitus
occupato, si tamen doctrina sit appellanda primorum elementorum confusa cognitio… Quo quidem tempore
memini tibi Pindarum legenti ac a me petenti quidnam aut de illo poeta aut de metris suis sentirem, biduo
me de metrorum omnium genere disseruisse, teque subinde flagitasse ut siquid haberem de his rebus,
scriptis traderem quoniam tot tantaque memoria tenere non posses. Fecimus et obtulimus. (73) Videntur
hec magna, preceptor, que abste accepimus? Communisima quedam, que femine magis quam viri
monstrare solent, tradidisti. Oleum ac impensam amisisse quereris. Ego (ita me deus amet) pluris unicum
ex his verbulum que tibi de metris subieci quam universam illam elementorum cognitionem facio. Hoc
enim vulgo habetur; illud antequam invenies, et oleum multum profecto et impensam expones. On
Trebizond’s spelling of abs te as abste, see Chapter Two, note 138.
This is another of the few times he feminizes Guarino, although again the characterization serves
the same purpose as beast imagery or accusations of childishness, to demonstrate a lack of learning that is
expected of men. On the trend in Renaissance studies to examine masculinity in opposition to femininity
see page 151-152. The passage is also likely a slight against Guarino as a grammarian. For the changing
perception of grammarians during the fifteenth century see Chapter Two, note 140.
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Collectanea, 401. (87) Nam et hanc invectivam, quamvis absonam et deiectam et tam verbis squalentem
quam sententiis et argumentis puerilibus et repugnantibus sordidam, meliusculam tamen quam soleas
edidisti. Quasobres tyrones omnes tuos et veteranos discipulos ego appello. Vos, vos, inquam, nobilissimi
viri, quicunque tandem estis qui Guarinum sectamini, tenete, obsecro, memoria quecunque de arte Guarinus
ad hunc usque diem vobis preceperit. Revolvite vobiscum que in dies audietis. Videbitis, mihi credite,
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similar proclamation in a cover letter to Leonello d’Este that he appended to his
Responsio to Guarino: “See, please, how much more honorable my actions are. I
criticized Guarino rightly, as I see it…Indeed, I believe you noticed how much better he
writes since he read the books of my Rhetoric.” 87
For both Agaso and Trebizond, the instructor-student contrast emasculates an
opponent by attacking his learning, but it is also a way to portray oneself as learned and
manly. In other words, the instructor-student contrast allows one to argue “I know more
than you, child” and to exhort someone with the knowledge of a child to “learn from me.”
The sparring in the Agaso and Trebizond letters is thus quite meaningful. Arguments
regarding who taught whom, or who is even capable of teaching whom, are crucial points
of contention over learning and reputation. The link between learnedness and masculinity
is a means of expressing one’s superiority and of situating two figures at different places
in a clearly conceptualized hierarchy of manhood.
The instructor-student contrast also has a conspicuous place in Trebizond’s feud
with Poggio beginning in May 1452. The pivotal moment in that feud was the fight in the
chancery, which began as Trebizond was speaking with a colleague and said something
derogatory about Poggio, who was walking nearby. What he said likely dealt with his aid
to Poggio in the Latin translations of Xenophon and Diodorus. A consistent contention of
pleraque a Guarino aliter atque antea vobis callidius subiici. Quod cum sentietis, siqua vobis cura veritatis
est, exclamate illico: doctiorem te fecit Georgius, Guarine! Vos etiam appello qui eius aliqua scripta
diligentius perlegistis. Si ornatius, gravius, suavius aut omnino meliuscule quicquam scripserit Guarinus
quam nunc scribat, eam facilitatem preceptione Georgii sibi collatam arbitramini. Que si facietis, et
veritatem magis quam Guarinum amabitis et eum ipsum licentius ac ardentius ad meliora dicendi studia
incumbere facietis.
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Ibid., 380. (10) Vide, queso, quam honestiores mee partes sint. Carpsi Guarinum vere, ut puto. Id ei
quoque ipsi perutile fuerat. Nam quam melius scribat ex quo meorum Rhetoricorum libros legit teipsum
animadvertisse arbitror.
For the cover letter to Leonello, see Chapter One, page 5. I discuss the letter to Leonello in more
detail below, pages 194-196.
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Trebizond’s correspondence during the feud is that he never received proper recognition
or gratitude for his assistance. Writing to Poggio in January 1453, Trebizond complains
that even though Poggio gained “both money and everlasting honor” from the
translations, he expressed his thanks with a letter “in which you write that I am a man too
little prudent and am provoked easily and without reason.” 88 Writing to his son Andreas
in June 1454, Trebizond declares that the translations were “completed by means of my
instruction.” “What greater service can be imagined,” he asks, “than that which we
bestowed by our work on Poggio?” 89 Trebizond laments again that he made Poggio
“famous” by his labors, “a man ignorant of Greek letters, who composed nothing in Latin
except the most shameful stories and some invectives.” Poggio so lacked skill, he
continues, that Trebizond had to supply him with “individual words as he would a
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Trebizond’s letters during this dispute, with the exception of the June 1454 letter to his son Andreas
quoted in the following note, are all found in Ernst Walser, Poggius Florentinus: Leben und Werke
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), 501-515. His January 1453 letter to Poggio is in Walser, 501-504. For a brief
overview of the Trebizond-Poggio conflict see page 96. The conflict is discussed at length in Chapter
Three. Walser, 501. Nunc autem econtra si conscientiam tuam scrutaberis aut si ab universa Cancellaria
apostolica quesieris maxima invenies beneficia in te a Georgio profecta fuisse. Quis enim eorum qui cum
locum petere hunc solebant, ignorat et Xenophontem et Diodorum te magnis meis ex Graeco in latinum
laboribus vertisse? Unde tibi et pecunia accessit et honor sempiternus. Quibus pro maximis beneficiis quid
retulisti, edidisti epistolam que ad manus meas pervenit, ubi scribis parum me consultum hominem esse et
leviter et absque ulla ratione moveri.
Trebizond is referring to Poggio’s letter to Christopher Cauchus in September 1437, in which
Poggio wrote that he thought Trebizond had acted inappropriately in writing his invective against Guarino
earlier that year. Trebizond’s criticism of Poggio in January 1453 is another indication of the public nature
of humanist disputes. Trebizond is not accusing Poggio of writing an insulting letter to him, but of having
written insultingly about him in a letter to another. Not only had Poggio heard about the Trebizond-Guarino
dispute, he had discussed it with a friend via his personal correspondence which then itself circulated,
making its way back to Trebizond. The letter to Cauchus is discussed below, pages 204-206.
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Collectanea, 117. (1) Nemo enim pene ignorat quot quantaque mea in Florentinum Pogium merita
extiterint. Universa enim apostolica cancelleria testis est quottidianis laboribus meis tum Xenophunticam
Cyri Disciplinam, tum Diodori Egyptiam Historiam e Greco in Latinum vel vertisse illum vel pervertisse:
illud, quod institutionibus meis factum est, quantum fieri quinquenio spacio potuit; hoc, quia durum atque
agrestem animum, ne in tam longo quidem temporis spacio, ad meliora reducere potui; Ibid., 123. (30)
Quid autem maius excogitari potest quam quod nos opera nostra Pogio contulimus? Ignarum litterarum
Grecarum hominem qui nihil Latine preter turpissimas conscripserat fabulas et invectivas quasdam, quo
quasi ad sentinam omnium turpium verborum que melius re ipsa quam vocabulis novit multitudinem
congessit, perpetuum nostris laboribus fecimus. Unde non parvam quoque pecuniam et gratiam consecutus
videtur. I discuss Trebizond’s argument to Andreas about Poggio’s debt in Chapter Three, pages 140-143.
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child.” 90 As during the feud with Guarino, Trebizond challenges his opponent’s
masculinity to demonstrate his own learning. Doing so allows him to strengthen his
argument for the value of his aid and the debt Poggio owes him.
In both of Trebizond’s feuds, concepts of masculinity functioned as attempts to
cast an opponent as unlearned. The purpose was to define an opponent—as a child, a
woman, a fishmonger, or donkey-driver—in a way detrimental to the other’s attempts to
cultivate a reputation. These definitions also expressed one’s own intellectual superiority.
When Agaso cast Guarino as Trebizond’s instructor, when Trebizond boasted he
improved Guarino’s style, or when Trebizond lamented his aid to Poggio, these were all
expressions of one man’s dominance over another. Masculine language was an effective
tool because humanists conceptualized an ideal man and set that ideal over and above a
host of alternatives that represented in one way or another failed masculinity. Attacks
against an opponent’s learning were only one avenue for demonstrating one’s superior
reason, however. Equally significant were insults about an opponent’s moral conduct, in
which immoral behavior was described as the result of a lack of reason and restraint.
The Moderate Man
Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio illustrate how the humanist
understandings of masculinity and restraint, indebted to the classical and medieval
models discussed at the beginning of the present chapter, were fundamentally
connected. 91 Manhood was defined by the markers of restraint examined in Chapter
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Collectanea, 123. (31) Opera nostra et labore quinquenio pene sic abusus est, ut omnis id Romana curia
sciat, ne ipse quidem summus pontifex ignoret, primo Xenophontis Pediam Cyri pervertisse illum, deinde
Diodori Egyptiacam historiam, singula nobis verba illi sicuti puero ingerentibus.
91

For the tradition identifying reason and restraint as indicators of manhood see pages 156-164.
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Three, including prudence, honesty, and forgiveness. The expectation was that the true
man governed his emotions and used reason to identify and make virtuous choices.
Defining an opponent as overly emotional and lacking restraint on the one hand and
demonstrating one’s own reasoned behavior on the other allowed an author to express his
dominance over another. Like attacks against an opponent’s learning, insults about
conduct also situated individuals within a hierarchy of masculinity.
Perturbationes animi and Failed Masculinity
Trebizond’s feud with Poggio is a natural place to begin an examination of
masculinity and moderation. The fight in the chancery, Trebizond’s use of the sword, and
his imprisonment and expulsion from the chancery placed moral conduct squarely in the
center of their dispute. 92 In letters from Naples between January 1453 and June 1454,
Trebizond was intent on proving that he, not Poggio, had acted moderately in the
chancery and during the following two years. To do so, he constructed a detailed portrait
presenting Poggio’s behavior as lacking restraint and a result of “disturbances of the
mind” [perturbationes animi]. The concept of perturbationes animi, used by Trebizond
and his opponents either implicitly or explicitly, refers to the passions and stands in
opposition to one’s reasoning faculties. 93 It is a separate issue from learnedness, as it
deals not with the rational capabilities associated with knowledge but with the exercise of
reason in decision-making and in action. Trebizond’s Naples correspondence begins by
casting Poggio as the less rational of the two during the chancery fight, but over time his
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Arguments about moral conduct certainly play an important role in the Trebizond-Guarino dispute as
well. I suggest, though, that moral conduct plays an even more significant role thematically in the
Trebizond-Poggio correspondence given the acts and accusations of physical violence and harassment in
that feud. For this reason, I begin a discussion of conduct with the Trebizond-Poggio feud.
93

The phrase has classical roots. See for instance Cicero’s discussion of “disturbances of the mind,”
emotions, in books three and four of the Tusculan Disputations.
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description of Poggio becomes far more negative. He describes Poggio as less rational,
and more angry, jealous, and emotional in detailing the assassination plot to Poggio in
March 1453 and the forged letter plot to his son Andreas in June 1454 than he had in his
initial letters to Poggio and Nicholas V in January 1453. At the same time, his depiction
of Poggio becomes increasingly dependent on imagery denoting failed masculinity. His
attacks thus transition from allegations of immoderate, unjust behavior to accusations of
an underlying childish character that completely lacks reason and thus manhood.
In his January 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond employs the language of
masculinity to criticize Poggio’s immoderate behavior at three critical points in his
account of the chancery fight. The first occurs during Trebizond’s description of the
beginning of the fight. Angered by what Trebizond had said about him, Poggio shouted
that he was lying and charged across the chancery to confront him. Trebizond’s
presentation of his response challenges Poggio’s masculinity: “If only you had heaped up
other things of this kind, I would have paid no mind. Instead, I would have listened to
your slander with great patience, like a parent’s.” 94 Poggio, of course, did more than
simply shout, and Trebizond then explains how he braced himself against the other’s
charge. Like the typical youth, Poggio’s emotions impelled him to action. Trebizond
deliberately contrasts his own restraint and patience, and thus manhood, by likening
himself to a parent coping with a child’s outbursts.
The second overt reference to masculinity occurs when Trebizond justifies his use
of the sword in their fight—which had been a significant part of the decision rendered
against him—by framing it as a rational act of self-defense. He argues that he intended to
94

Walser, 502. Quod certe non putavi ad aures tuas perventurum, audisti tamen et: Mentiri me magna voce
respondisti. Utinam alia quoque huiusmodi congessisses nihil ego penitus replicassem. Sed maledicta tua
magno animo quasi parentis audissem.
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scare Poggio away with the weapon, and that he selected that course rather than to bite
the man’s fingers or crush his testicles, implying that he had chosen the least violent and
most responsible method of ending the confrontation. He notes that his plan worked, for
Poggio “immediately hurried away from that place like a Florentine woman in flight.” 95
Feminization allows Trebizond to stress Poggio’s inability to control his emotions, in this
case his fear. The contrast between each man’s decision-making process is notable too. If
Poggio’s emotional flight is womanish, Trebizond’s rational thought-process is implicitly
manly.
Trebizond returns to the contrast between man and child in the conclusion of his
letter, adding that childish emotion is a sign of a bestial nature:
God knows, Poggio, I never intended to harm you. And for this reason I resolved
to engage with you in letters now so that I might put aside my distress in writing
and find peace. For believe me: If, provoked by your injuries against me, I imitate
your bestial character, I shall not settle the matter as you have, like a child.
Instead, I shall dispatch you without the least difficulty, even if you were far
greater and far more powerful than I. 96
Trebizond labels Poggio’s handling of their dispute as both bestial and childish to address
the concept of rational self-control. He declares that he never intended to harm Poggio
but implies that Poggio did mean him harm. The difference between the two rests in their
respective characters, one bestial and childish, and the other indicative of the true man.

95

Ibid., 503. Potui digitum in os immissum meum dentibus iure concidere: non feci. Venit in mentem, cum
ego sederem et tu stares, utrisque manibus testes tuos comprimere ac te ita prosternere: non feci. Gladium a
circumstantibus quesivi, ut eius timore te pellerem. Nec me fefellit opinio. Illico enim ut Florentina femina
fuga inde te rapuisti. Quid ergo mali feci si gladium petii, ut te fugarem? This is another of Trebizond’s few
attempts to feminize his opponents. See pages 151-152 as well as pages 179-180 and 183 for additional
examples.
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Walser, 503-504. Deus scit Poggi nunquam me induxisse animum ad nocendum tibi. Ac ideo literis
modo agere tecum constitui, ut perturbatione animi in scribendo deposita quiescam. Nam crede mihi: si tuis
iniuriis commotus bestialem animum tuum imitabor, non ut tu quasi puer rem ordinabo. Sed facillime te
conficiam, si etiam multo maior atque potentior esses.
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Trebizond’s portrayal of Poggio’s lack of manly moderation features prominently
in his description of their relationship after the fight as well. His account of Poggio’s
perturbationes animi becomes an indication not of one instance of childish behavior, as
when he let his emotions sweep him away in the chancery, but of a recurrent theme, and
therefore of his intrinsically childish, and sometimes implicitly beast-like, character.
Trebizond’s allegations of childishness thus take on new features, and his verbal
emasculation of Poggio becomes more pronounced. In his January 1453 letter to Nicholas
V, Trebizond describes Poggio’s relentless hostility, reporting his repeated efforts to send
assassins to Naples to kill him. He never explicitly characterizes Poggio’s actions or
character as beast-like, but he attributes to him a cruelty and savagery that invokes that
imagery. Trebizond builds an implicit argument that like an animal, Poggio lacks the
rational capacity for restraint and his passions lead him to savage behavior. 97 Trebizond
tells Nicholas that he left Rome after the chancery fight because he feared Poggio would
“devise something more cruel and savage against me.” 98 He cites Poggio’s continued
anger as the reason why the two never reconciled and why he fled the chancery again
forty days after their fight—alleging that Poggio had turned the cardinals in the curia
against him. 99 It was Poggio’s arrogance—his superbus animus—that led him to send
assassins to Naples on three occasions. Trebizond casts Poggio’s failure to forgive, his
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For the link between beast imagery and cruelty, see Erica Fudge on Renaissance beasts, pages 158-160.
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The January 1453 letter to Nicholas V is in Walser, 504-506. Walser, 504. Ego sanct. Pater, nulla re alia
magis istinc abii quam timore ne durities Poggii Florentini quicquam durius atque asperius adversus me
innovaret.
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Ibid., 504-505. Deinde cum propter peccata mea nullus mihi aditus ad S.T. daretur nec aliquis
cubicularius vellet me cum aliis secretariis admittere, post XL dies experiri volui si iam furor in me suus
deferbuisset…Nam quoniam vidi animum eius implacabilem vidique nonnullos cardinales omnia dicere ac
facere, que ipse vellet, magni animi esse putavi, cedere.
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refusal to reconcile, and his continued harassment as signs of his immoderate nature and
of the cruelty, arrogance, and obstinacy of his animus. 100
In the March 1453 letter to Poggio, Trebizond reiterates his portrayals of Poggio’s
animus, perturbationes, and failed manhood. 101 He explains that he wrote to Nicholas
about the assassination plot so the pope would help return Poggio to his senses. As
Trebizond tells it, he feared Poggio’s anger would lead him to resort to violence. The
assertion is a criticism of Poggio’s proclivity for childish, emotional, and violent
outbursts. Trebizond underlines this allegation by recalling Poggio’s feud with Lorenzo
Valla, a “childish affair” [puerilis res] by Trebizond’s estimation, during which Poggio
threatened to murder Valla. 102 Trebizond’s depiction of the dispute as childish, alongside
the claim that Poggio needed to come to his senses in their own feud, casts Poggio’s
immoderate, emotional actions as a function of his very nature. Against the backdrop of
the Valla feud, Trebizond suggests, Poggio’s childishness represents not an isolated
incident or a momentary lapse of judgment but a flawed character.
Trebizond also finds evidence of Poggio’s childish character in what he argues are
the frequent contradictions in Poggio’s February 1453 letter to him. Poggio composed his
letter in response to Trebizond’s two January letters, the one addressed to Poggio in
which he reframed the chancery fight and the other addressed to Nicholas describing the
alleged assassination plot. In March, Trebizond explains Poggio’s February letter as a
100

Ibid., 505. His ergo rationibus libenter Poggio cessi, presertim cum non minus Rome quam hic essem
peregrinus, sed non sufficiunt hec omnia Poggio. Nec semestri et ultra spatio temporis superbus hominis
animus potui mitigari, sed mittit satellites hucusque ad occidendum me quam rem ter iam tentavit.
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Trebizond’s March 1453 letter to Poggio is in Walser, 506-515.
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Walser, 512. An credis forsan immemorem me esse adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili vere in
multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut vitam eius extinguere constitueris?; Ibid., 512-513. Hac
ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem. For
a discussion of the Poggio-Valla feud, see Chapter Three, pages 135-139.
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sign of its author’s perturbationes animi. 103 He notes the supposed inconsistency between
Poggio’s denials that he had ever written anything derogatory about Trebizond and his
admission that he had once rebuked Trebizond’s conduct during the Guarino affair. 104 He
asks of Poggio—sarcastically referring to him as a “most learned and prudent man”—
whether this is not a clear contradiction and suggests such an obvious inconsistency was
the result of Poggio having been “stirred up, like a child or a reed blown by the wind.” If
Poggio had written consistently like a man, he argues, he would not have to instruct him
as he would instruct a child. 105 Trebizond presents Poggio’s inconsistency as an
indication of a fundamental disconnect between what Poggio’s conscience tells him is the
truth, that he had disparaged Trebizond, and what he claims to be the truth. It is an
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Walser, 513. Non videtur mihi possibile, Poggi sic posse quemquam loqui et maxime litteris deditum
nisi duplici turbatione insaniat. Nam cum animus modo huc modo illuc varietate turbationum feratur, tunc
necessario verba etiam que imago animi sunt herere inter se non possunt. Certe verba inconstantissima sunt
et aliena penitus ab omni humanitate, que modo huc modo alio tendentia turbationes animi produnt,
conscientiam occidendi hominis bene de te meriti cupiditatem, qua fiebat ut dum licere quasi tibi sperares
scriptis te contendere nolle diceres, indignationem quoniam animum tuum explere nequis timore pontificis.
Que ita esse satis iam tuarum litterarum furore mihi produntur.
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Cf. Poggio’s February 1453 letter in Poggii Epistolae, ed. T. Tonelli, 3 vols. (Florence, 1832-1861),
3:49-52. Tonelli’s edition is reprinted in Poggio, Opera Omnia, vol.3, Epistolae (Turin: 1964). I cite
Poggio’s sources as Poggii Epistolae. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet
offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non litteris tibi unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam
obstiti…Arguis me ob rem antiquam, quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans, parum bene
consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam contumeliam scriptum putas. Poggio’s letter about the TrebizondGuarino affair to Cauchus in September 1437 and his February 1453 letter to Trebizond are discussed
below, pages 204-206.

105

Walser, 508-509. Sed mirum est quomodo nunquam te modo litteris detraxisse scribis, deinde paucis
interiectis, sicut insanus, scripsisse te olim in me fateris. Semel enim scripsisse et nunquam scripsisse
contradicunt o vir doctissime tu atque prudentissime? Ignosce mihi oro si, quicquam apertius in te dico. Res
enim ipse ita cogunt facere. Nam si tu constanter ut vir scripsisses, neque ut puer aut calamus vento
concussus agitareris, nec ego quasi puerum docens hoc docendi genere uterer. Culpa ergo tua est, qui
repugnantia scribis, non mea, qui levitatem scriptorum tuorum aperiens congruis cogor nonnumquam
verbis exclamare.
Trebizond’s use of the reed analogy may be a biblical reference. Cf. Matt 11:7 and Luke 7:24.
Vergerio and Piccolomini also use this language in discussing emotions and inconstancy. See pages 162163. Vergerio writes that instructors should help prevent youths from “being bent over by their own
weight,” perhaps their own character, “or by the wind,” by circumstance and their emotional responses.
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example of how Poggio’s emotions impel him to dissimulation—he was “stirred up”—
and therefore of a childish lack of rational self-control.
Trebizond’s strategies during the dispute with Poggio are strikingly similar to
those Agaso and Trebizond used in the earlier Trebizond-Guarino feud. Both individuals
made ample use of the links between moderation and manhood on the one hand and
perturbationes animi and failed manhood on the other. Agaso does not explicitly refer to
perturbationes animi in casting Trebizond as an arrogant assailant of rhetorical
authorities, but he does portray him as a slave to his emotions. At times, this argument
contains an anti-Greek component. Asking his reader if he wants to know “who he is who
so demolishes men deceased and living,” Agaso identifies Trebizond as a Cretan and
suggests that a Cretan “is a liar, an evil beast [mala bestia].” 106 The likening of Cretans to
beasts leads into a discussion of Trebizond’s dishonorable and emotional behavior. Here
Agaso recalls a story of how Trebizond had slandered Guarino in the presence of
Guarino’s former students. Hearing these men praise their instructor, Trebizond was
furious. Agaso indicates Trebizond’s emotional upheaval by describing him as animosus.
Trebizond then disparaged Guarino, who was not present, and “vomited forth these
slanderous statements against him.” Trebizond’s actions were the result of his emotions:
he was “vexed by the stings of jealousy and incensed by the flames of rivalry.” 107 In light
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Collectanea, 368. (19) Scire vis quisnam is est qui sic mortuos ac viventes exossat homines? E Creta
dudum advectus, quo pruna et cotana, vento. (20) De cuius insule hominibus et eorum ingenio tacebo ipse,
ne homini litterato conviciari videar, sed beatum Paulum audies, qui acceptum ab vetusto poeta versum
hexametrum de illis breviter explicat: “Cretensis mendax, mala bestia, segnis, et alvus.” Cf. Titus, 1:12.
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Collectanea, 368-369. (22) Tum frequentes ad eum, ut ad pharmacopolam, auditores accurrebant,
recentem adhuc Guarini cum caritate memoriam disciplinamque retinentes. Proinde audire erat varias de
Guarino predicationes: alius prudentiam, ille comitate conditam gravitatem, nonnulli ingenium et legendi
suavitatem ac evidentiam, quidam scribendi facundiam nec minus orandi dulcedinem extollebant, cum ex
eius lingua, ut de Nestore dixit Homerus, melle dulcior flueret oratio. Quas ob laudes animosus in primis
homo Trapezuntius eum sibi parem ferre non valens absentis honori detractare cepit et invidie stimulis
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of the preceding passage suggesting such behavior is typical of Cretans, Agaso is clearly
saying that Trebizond’s dishonorable behavior was beast-like.
Agaso follows his depiction of Trebizond as a Cretan beast slandering Guarino
with a characterization of Trebizond’s behavior as childish. Here he argues that
Trebizond should recant what he had written about Guarino. Claiming Trebizond was too
ashamed to do so, Agaso maintains that to recant is not only right but the proof of a good
man [vir bonus] who corrects error rather than persisting in it. Trebizond could prove
himself a good man by recanting, since, as Agaso explains, the path to good mores is
“never too late.” To emphasize the point, he appeals to Cicero, who in De oratore cast
aside his earlier De inventione: “But to return to the point, does not Cicero castigate his
own errors and correct his writings…?” 108 Agaso’s appeal to an author correcting the
errors of his youth portrays Trebizond in a childish light. Like a child, Trebizond wrote
“unfinished and crude essays”—a description consistent with Agaso’s assault on the
RLV—and in this case, also shameful insults. He is clearly not a good man, at least by
Agaso’s estimation. To correct one’s errors, particularly the errors of youth, is evidence
of manhood. Instead, Trebizond, driven by emotion and shame, refused to recant and
proved himself a boy.

agitatus et emulationis facibus incensus ista in eum maledicta scriptis evomuit… Agaso is reporting a story
he claims was told to him by an unnamed patrician. See Chapter Two, page 50-51.
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Collectanea, 369. (23) “Cur,” inquam, “Trapezuntius probra non retractat cum maius viri boni
argumentum sit sese ab errato deterrere quam in errato perstare, et nunquam sera sit ad bonos mores via?”
“Verecundia,” inquit, “impedimento est et, cum tot exscripta sint sue Rhetoric volumina, emendandi labor.”
“Alia quaedam via restat,” dixi, “ut parvam per epistolam impia revocet mendacia, que in ipsum tandem
conviciatorem retundentur. An quispiam existimet, cum tot etiam docti quidem viri auditores Guarini
vigeant, hac impunita relicturos esse maledicta, quin par pari referant quod Trapezuntium remordeant? Sed,
ut redeam, nonne Cicero propria interdum castigat errata et per lapsum etatis scripta saniore lima corrigit,
que, ut ait ille, ‘pueris aut adolescentulis nobis aut ex commentariolis nostris incohata aut rudia
exciderunt’? Cf. Cic., De. or. 1.5.
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Trebizond, like Agaso, expresses his arguments via the connection between
perturbationes animi and failed masculinity. One of his most consistent contentions is
that Guarino used the Agaso pseudonym in an inherently dishonorable and childish way
and that his emotions compelled him to do so. In the cover letter to Leonello, he
comments that Guarino’s response to the RLV’s criticisms, the Agaso letter, was
unwarranted. He describes Guarino as “agitated against me more than is proper for a
learned man [doctus vir]” and motivated “by an excessive perturbation of the soul” “to
feign a fight under the name Agaso.” 109 Trebizond maintains the argument in the letter to
Guarino, albeit without explicit reference to perturbationes animi. By attacking “not
openly under your own name…but secretly and timidly” as Agaso, Trebizond explains,
“you attacked too childishly and attacked yourself more than me.” 110 He adds later that
Guarino adopted the pseudonym because he “cannot endure George’s eloquence, at
whose force of speaking you have now long trembled.” 111
Trebizond’s portrayal of Guarino’s childish emotional response to the RLV stands
in contrast to how he describes his own reasonable and therefore manly treatment of
Guarino. The strategy is similar to how he later reframes the chancery fight with Poggio.
109

Collectanea, 378. (1) Credo eum nimia pertubatione animi, quoniam genus orationis sue in Rhetoricis
carpsimus, non vidisse quid sibi accidere posset si pugnam sub Agasonis nomine dissimularet. Ego id, etsi
magis quam doctum virum deceat in me commotus sit et indignum quocum certet putaverit, tamen cum sui
ipsius causa (est enim clarus vir) tum et maxime reverentia erga te mea, quoniam eum non parvi facis,
condonare sibi constitui.
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Ibid., 381. (1) Postquam vero ad me tua oratiuncula vix delata est, non his que scripsimus tantum, hoc
est, communi utilitati, indigne detrahi, sed librorum quoque auctorem contumeliis peti abste iniuria
perspexi, quodque iniquissimum est et tibi vel tuorum iudicio turpissimum, non tuo in me aperte sed, ne
commodius me defendam, occulte ac timide sub Agasonis nomine invectus es. Acriter quidem, ut tu putas;
ut vero ii sentiunt qui hoc altius intelligunt, pueriliter nimis ac in te magis quam in me, Guarine, invectus
es.
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Ibid., 382. (5) Vident enim omnes atque intelligunt versute sic te inscripsisse quoniam orationem
Georgii ferre non posses, cuius vim dicendi iam exhorruisses. Itaque credidisse te aiunt, si nomine inaudito
scriberes, vel nil scripturum Georgium vel, si ad te scriberet, deum hominesque testari posses magnam tibi
horum omnium ignaro iniuriam fieri.
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In both cases, he emasculates his opponents by emphasizing their emotions and presents
his own masculinity by relating his reasoned moderation. Trebizond maintains that he
never insulted Guarino but had always honored him. 112 In the cover letter to Leonello, he
argues that Guarino will never convince anyone that Trebizond had provoked him.
Instead, he claims that his grievous offense was that “although we commended him to
posterity as an honest and learned man [probus et doctus vir],” he did not yield to
Guarino alone the composition of eloquence. Trebizond’s portrayal focuses on his
opponent’s purported arrogance and is hardly flattering. Trebizond continues to explain
to Leonello the difference between himself and Guarino, noting that it was his
“considerable esteem for the man” that led him to limit his censures of Guarino’s
encomium. 113 Far from having provoked the other man, Trebizond proclaims that he
actually exercised restraint in his criticisms.
In each of these passages, Trebizond also hints at his changing perception of
Guarino. He once thought Guarino to be a good, honest, and learned man—and he places
an emphasis on the vir—but Guarino’s emotion-driven behavior has led him to believe
otherwise. Writing to Guarino, whom Trebizond claims he believed “to be a good man
[bonus vir] and learned,” Trebizond explains that he initially refused to believe Guarino
had “condemned those books [the RLV] that we wrote.” 114 Later he defends the criticisms
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For Agaso’s various accusations that Trebizond slandered Guarino see pages 192-193.
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Collectanea, 378. (2) Non enim quia carpsimus iure se unquam commotum cuiquam persuadebit, nisi
adversarius taceat. Nam cum ipsum et probum et doctum virum posteritati commendaverimus,
compositionem solam orationis sue doctrine idoneam non concessimus. …Non eram adhuc reprehendendus
si ita locutus sum ut et sensi et sentio, presertim cum maiora sui gratia tacuerim et minima que ad
propositum de compositione orationis scribenti occurrerant perstrinxerim. For the preceding text, see note
109.

114

Collectanea, 381. (1) Cum multorum sermonibus iam ante percrebruisset eos libros quos de ratione
dicendi conscripsimus non verbis te solum, ut prius, verum etiam scriptis vehementius improbare, quamvis
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in the RLV as an acceptable scholarly practice and argues that “this can happen to men
more learned than [Guarino]…[and] does not indicate for certain a lack of skill in
Guarino’s speaking.” Guarino’s response, however, was decidedly unreasonable. The
criticisms “vexed” him, and he “becomes inflamed, he becomes angry.” 115 These
arguments establish two personas. Guarino appears passionate and irrational, a nature that
leads him to childishly adopt the Agaso pseudonym, while Trebizond appears reasonable
and even respectful.
Trebizond further advances the contrast between himself and Guarino with a
passage that is highly sarcastic, more than a little arrogant, and that contains some of the
most overtly masculine language in the letter. He suggests that he ought to treat his
dispute with Guarino like the play fighting he engages in with his two little sons, during
which “I turn over my weapons so they may attack their unarmed father more boldly, I
think I ought to do the same with you, an inarticulate child in speaking.” “Behold how I
tremble,” Trebizond continues, rebuking Guarino’s immoderate behavior, “You become
angry. I teach you. You slander me. I suffer you.” Just as he arms his children, Trebizond
urges Guarino—an inarticulate child—to “read our books about elocution” and to find the
weapons of the orator with which he can then attack Trebizond. 116 The passage is as

non satis credidi te, quem bonum virum et doctum putabam, ea vilipendere, que et multi et clari viri
precipuis laudibus efferunt, tamen tanto maiore tue vidende orationis cupiditate ardebam quanto melius de
tua eruditione faciebam iudicium. Nam quoniam me hominem esse qui errare facile ac decipi posset
cognosco, tua doctrina (que utinam fame respondeat!) revocari ab erratis cupiebam. For the rest of the
passage, see note 110.
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Collectanea, 404. (97) Verum unum illud velim mihi respondeat. Immutavi non nulla suorum in melius.
Quod et doctoribus quam ipse sit hominibus accidere potest. Quare id imperitiam in dicendo Guarini certo
signo non indicat. Momordit hec res eum. Tumescit, irascitur, pati non potest.
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Ibid., 404. (98) Tu te ipsum defendis et leviora persequeris. Letale hoc fame existimationisque tue telum
ne quidem unico verbo avertere audes. Erat enim maiorum virium huius loci, quam tue sunt, deprecatio
atque depulsio, quam ego tibi nunc adaperiam ut te recte queas tutari. Nam quod sepe cum filiolis ludendi
causa nostris facimus ut ad pugnandum nobiscum incitemus, tela nostra eis concedimus quibus in inermes
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evocative as Trebizond’s contrast between himself, the virile knight, and Guarino, seated
upon an ass. 117 Like that contrast, it firmly defines the identities of each combatant, one
as masculine and the other not. It also builds upon one of Trebizond’s major recurring
arguments, that he, not Guarino, is the true knowledgeable man. Trebizond again strikes
the pose of the instructor, exhorting Guarino, whom he again thrusts into the role of
student and child, to learn from him.
Trebizond’s language of masculine conduct is also a key part of his assertion
that Guarino had acted dishonorably in claiming himself to be Trebizond’s Latin
instructor. 118 Trebizond’s assertion contains some of the most expressive and vitriolic
language in the letter, particularly during his apostrophe to Vittorino da Feltre, whom he
credits as his true instructor. Reframing the terms of the dispute, Trebizond suggests that
Guarino’s attacks on him are by extension attacks on Vittorino. He calls upon Vittorino
to defend and protect what is his, the credit for Trebizond’s instruction. Trebizond notes
Guarino’s belief that since he taught Trebizond a few of the basics of the language,
Trebizond “imbibed [from him] the knowledge of all the advanced issues as well.” 119 On

nos audatius irruant, id mihi tecum puero in dicendo atque infanti faciundum censeo. Vide quam
perhorrescam. Irasceris. Ego te doceo. Maledicis. Ego te fero. Insurgere cupis. Congredi et luctari non
potes. Ego pedem confer et armis te instruo. Quod in te misimus telum evitare vis. Non potes. Taces.
Nullam de hoc facis mentionem ne ulcus, quod curare diffidis, exagites. (99) Non vides remedium, quod
unicum est. Confundere te omnia temeritate diximus: quid forense dicendi genus, quid quietum, quid
historicum unica verborum parte ignorare te penitus. Si calumniati sumus, tu de his dissere breviter
quomodo hec fiant. Si declarasses, me quoque ipsum penituisset tale in te ementitum fuisse. Non facis
quoniam ignoras. Admonuimus que sint arma. Que si invenire cupis, de elocutione libros nostros lege.
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See page 176.
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Chapter Two examines Trebizond’s claim as a response to the anti-Greek language of the Agaso letter.
See pages 75-77.
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Collectanea, 398. (74) Sed te nunc appello, Victorine. Defende ac protege partes tuas. Siquid Latine
lingue in me est, te doctore post deum est. Insurgit Guarinus et, quoniam prima elementa monstravit,
maiorum quoque rerum scientiam se duce nos imbibisse proclamat. Habes multos testes patritios ac
integerrimos homines qui te illis temporibus Venetiis adolescentes audiebant, quibus audaciam huius
monstri facile comprimes. Habes omnes huius florentissime urbis claros litteris viros quibus ora exertantis
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the contrary, Vittorino has “many witnesses, patricians and the most honorable men
[integri homines]” who can attest to Vittorino’s instruction of Trebizond, “by means of
whom you will easily subdue the audacity of this monster [monstrum],” “by which you
will beat back the speech of this clear Charybdis,” and the “firm reputation of so many
years…with which you will crush the hard face of that monster [prodigium] as though
against a stone.” The monster imagery and violent language is a much heightened form of
expression compared to Trebizond’s likening of Guarino to an ass or a donkey-driver
elsewhere. The image also contrasts strongly with the honorable and good men described
as witnesses on Vittorino’s behalf. Trebizond continues, repeating to Vittorino that
Guarino “struggles to claim your glory…for himself” by stealing credit for Trebizond’s
Latin instruction. 120 He calls upon Vittorino to defend him from Guarino and to lay claim
to Trebizond and therefore to his rightful glory. In doing so, he positions himself as
defending Vittorino and casts himself as a son protecting his father’s glory. 121 Beyond
this, Trebizond links Guarino’s monstrous behavior to madness [amentia] and asks
Vittorino to castigate his impudence, obstinacy, arrogance, temerity, and shamelessness.
The passage contains all the hallmarks of failed masculinity. Guarino is compelled by
envy and amentia, not reason, to impudent, brash, and obstinate behavior. He is not a
huius Charybdis contundes. Habes tot annorum constantem famam, quod ego semper non discipulus modo,
sed filius tuus habitus sum, qua duram huius prodigii faciem sicuti saxo collides. This passage and the ones
in notes 120 amd 122 are consecutive.
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Ibid., 398. (75) Guarinus tibi magis quam mihi invidet. Imo vero tibi soli hoc loco iniuriatur. Tuam enim
in se, non meam, transferre gloriam nititur. Ego, Grecus homo, Latinas didici litteras. A quo nihil ad me.
Quanto ab imperitiore didicerim, tanto mihi maior laus debetur, si bene didici. Ego te Guarino doctiorem et
quidem multum duco, vel potius te doctissimum, illum ignorantissimum. Si fallor, mea hec est culpa. Nihil
ad modestiam tuam. Illud dico: maiori mihi futurum laudi, si bene Latinitatem teneo, cum a Guarino, non
abste me doctum dixero. Mentiri non est meum. Tacere honeste possum. Non taceo. Pietate in te mea
cogor, qua non aliter ac parentem sancte te colui.
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The relationship between instructor and student was of vital importance to early modern educators, as
discussed above, pages 160-164. See also the discussion in Chapter Two, pages 71-73 of how instructors
were to function in loco parentis.
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man but a monster. Trebizond also cautions Vittorino with an explicit image that
identifies what is at stake in all of this. If Vittorino does not castigate Guarino and
forsakes his student, others would likely be “torn to pieces by your courteousness.” “If
you had fathered sons,” he asks, “would you leave them to rapacious wolves? Would you
not protect them?” 122
The apostrophe to Vittorino is Trebizond’s attempt to establish himself as the
arbiter of Guarino’s humanity. The savagery he ascribes to Guarino, the rapacious wolf,
is an attempt to strip his opponent of his reason and depict him as other than a man and
other than human. This is a substantial challenge to Guarino’s moral conduct and
masculinity. He is not simply mildly censuring Guarino but exploiting the Renaissance
anxiety about man and beast essentially to dehumanize Guarino. 123 It is an indication
that, at times, humanist challenges regarding masculinity could stand as attempts to
annihilate an opponent’s masculine status and impose upon him another. It is also likely
that classical satire influenced Trebizond’s language. Satirical tropes such as monsters
were naturally suited to humanist invective and the denigration of one’s opponents. 124 In
depicting Guarino as a monster, Trebizond raises the stakes for each of the main figures
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Collectanea, 398-9. (76) Tu tacebis et Guarini amentiam non redargues tua rapientis, si non re, at minis,
litteris, nuntiis? Si de hoc, cum ipso non egeris, si de hoc non questus fueris, si tantam huius impudentiam
non castigabis, si contumaciam, si arrogantiam non infinges atque retundes, cave ne omnes quos doces
facilitate tua distrahantur. O confidentiam hominis inauditam! O temeritatem incredibilem! Quod multi
sciunt—multi? quin vero omnes ferme qui me cognoscunt et te, Victorine, in se transferre impudens homo
conatur hinc atque illinc per maiorem invective partem. Hoc in loco moratur. Preceptorem se Georgio
fuisse mentitur. Tu veritatem tacebis ac me deseres? Si liberos genuisses rapientibus traderes lupis? Non
protegeres? Natura impulses, dices? Nunc quos doctrina filios tibi peperisti, qui, cum liberi non sunt, liberis
etiam ipsis, maxime si quicquam de se pollicentur magni, cariores atque iocundiores esse solent, destitues
et parvipendes?
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See the scholarship on Renaissance beasts discussed above, pages 158-160.

124

Maria Plaza notes that Juvenal’s satires “are swarmed with monsters” which add “a touch of the literally
inhuman and supernatural” and heighten the author’s indignation against particular individuals or vices.
Plaza, 305-310.
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in his apostrophe to Vittorino. The Charybdis reference amplifies Guarino’s savagery,
audacity, and passions, which Trebizond describes as substantial a breach of good
conduct as the Charybdis is a dreadful monster. The Charybdis raises the stakes for
Vittorino as well, a man Trebizond describes as his intellectual father and portrays in an
heroic manner: Vittorino should smash the monster’s head against the rocks, lest others
be torn to pieces by his courteous refusal to act and the unchecked appetite of the
rapacious wolf. Vittorino’s actions would not only protect Trebizond but also others
whom the monstrous Guarino might otherwise savage. The imagery casts Vittorino as the
hero of the story and furthers Trebizond’s depiction of himself as the victim. He presents
himself not as the victim of mundane insults but of attacks so reprehensible they can only
be adequately expressed in mythical terms.
One final observation remains: Trebizond employs the imagery of failed
masculinity to accuse Guarino of levitas. Chapter Two examined the concept of levitas as
a key component in the classical Roman model for anti-Greek language upon which
Agaso drew in attacking Trebizond’s Greekness. Trebizond struggled with Agaso’s
accusations of levitas and looked for ways to turn those charges back against Guarino.
Surely, charges of levitas were not limited to attacks against Greeks. As a term of
disapproval, levitas could be and was wielded against Italians as well, as Trebizond
himself does. Against Greeks however, levitas carried the added weight of long-standing
cultural biases that provided Italian authors modes of expression to which Trebizond did
not have access. Agaso could criticize Trebizond’s Greekness as the reason for his poor
moral conduct. Trebizond could accuse an Italian of levitas, but lacked the ability to
make the charge through the kinds of ethnic slurs in the Agaso letter. The language of
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failed masculinity offered Trebizond an alternative means of charging Guarino with
levitas and its attendant concepts—arrogance, dishonesty, obstinacy, and the like.
Trebizond’s strategy is explicit when he attacks Guarino for nitpicking errors in the RLV
that he contends were the fault of copyists. “Let us consider how dishonorable [leve] and
childish [puerile]” this tactic is, Trebizond states, adding that if he himself “followed
after your levitas,” he could find many such examples in Guarino’s writings. Worse,
those would be due to the author’s incompetence, not the copyist’s. 125 Nearly all of the
moral failings Trebizond attributes to Guarino—hiding behind the Agaso pseudonym,
attacking a man who had commended him to posterity, being envious of Vittorino and
falsely claiming Trebizond as his own student—are presented as indications of Guarino’s
levitas. In the above passage, that dishonorable behavior is defined as an indication of
levitas and childishness. Trebizond later argues similarly, though implicitly, when
criticizing Guarino for attacking Greece: “But if Greece had deserved well from any
Italian, from you certainly it had deserved the best, you who, if you had not been
instructed by Greeks, would have languished in the dark. Do you, faultless man [integer
homo], reprove the levitas, the deceit of the Greeks?” 126 Guarino is neither faultless nor a
true man because of his hypocrisy. His actions prove his levitas and reveal him to be a
child, a rapacious wolf, and a Charybdis.
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See pages 180-181.
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Collectanea, 406. (107). Verum huc loci factus, non possum non dolere quod in Greciam homo tu
omnium, in Greciam, omnium bonarum artium inventricem, in Greciam, deorum olim domicilium, non
Iovis dico et Iunonis (non ad fabulas refugio), sed multorum heroum et sanctorum virorum (sive
vetustissimos ac remotissimos a nostra etate consideres sive nostre, idest, vere, religionis cultores, quos
numero plures, doctrinis subtiliores, eloquentia graviores, moribus probatiores, religione sanctiores quam
ex reliquo terrarum orbe invenies), in Greciam, inquam, unus omnium, quo te inscribis nomine
dignissimus, in Greciam inveheris. Atqui si de aliquo Italo bene merita est Grecia, de te certe optime est,
qui, nisi a Grecis institutus fuisses, in tenebris iacuisses. Levitatem, fallaciam integer tu homo Grecie
increpas?
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The preceding discussion indicates how humanists used the tropes associated
with children, beasts, monsters, and women as verbal weapons to express arguments
about moral rectitude and immoderate behavior. These authors not only used these
strategies against one another, but, as examined in the first half of this analysis, often
chafed at having them used against themselves. There is at times an almost palpable
anxiety in this correspondence about being cast and perceived as less than a man. That
anxiety speaks to an aspect of humanist masculinity that deserves further attention: its
inherent instability. The way these authors talk about manhood suggests that they
understood it to be a contested and negotiated part of one’s public identity and believed it
could be lost, won, gained, and regained through interactions with others.
Masculinity Lost, Masculinity Regained
The notion that masculinity could somehow be lost is evident in the letters of each
of the authors of these two feuds, who use the idea in their acts of self-presentation. The
underlying assumption in these strategies is that actions demonstrate manhood or,
alternatively, that manhood is contingent upon actions. Immoderate, irrational behaviors
certainly indicate unmanly conduct but can also indicate a loss of manhood itself, most
often portrayed as the result of out-of-control perturbationes animi. 127 Trebizond
expresses these ideas when he argues to Guarino and Leonello that he had always thought
of Guarino as a “good man and learned” and an “honest and learned man.” 128 As
Trebizond asserts throughout the response to Guarino, though, his estimation of the other
had changed because of what he perceived to be the unjust attacks of the Agaso letter. He
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See the scholarship regarding Renaissance beasts, which argues a similar position, pages 158-160.

128

See pages 195-196.
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now viewed Guarino not as a man, but as a child, beast-like, and so forth. Agaso similarly
claims that Guarino continues to honor Trebizond because he does not know of
Trebizond’s attacks against him. He says that when Guarino finds out that Trebizond is a
“deceitful brigand,” his opinion of the man will change—perhaps Guarino might even
consider Trebizond less of a man—and he will be roused to defend himself. 129 In each
case, Agaso and Trebizond suggest that masculinity was contingent on actions.
Poggio articulates a comparable, though far more measured, argument about the
contingency of manhood in his comments to Christopher Cauchus regarding the
Trebizond-Guarino dispute. Written in 1437, that letter long predates Poggio’s conflict
with Trebizond. Poggio was simply a bystander offering his perspective on the
controversy. He writes that he believes Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino was not that of
a prudent man nor was it suitable of a man of his learning. He adds that Trebizond acted
rashly by assuming Guarino had written the Agaso letter—an assumption Poggio claims
was baseless—and then composing such a virulent response. Poggio’s comments are
notable because of how he qualifies his criticism. He makes clear that he still believes
Trebizond to be a “most learned man and exceedingly eloquent” and that he wishes only
that Trebizond had “spent his effort on a more honorable endeavor.” 130 On the one hand
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Collectanea, 371-372. (36) “Plura refellenda restabant, viri patricii, que Guarino remittenda sunt.
Namque ut ea rescierit, suam rem, si mihi audierit, suo, ut dicitur, marte decernet. Is enim, horum ignarus
omnium, Trapezuntium commendare non desinit, ab quo et laudes expectare debuit, cum interim insidiosi
more latronis Trapezuntius suum preceptorem, suum, inquam, preceptorem excipit incautum et maledictis
insectatur.”
130

The letter to Cauchus is in Poggii Epistolae, 2:125-128. Poggii Epistolae, 2:127. Trapezuntium vero
doctissimum video hominem, et admodum eloquentem, cujus scripta mihi admodum placent. Sed mallem
eum impendisse operam in causa magis honesta, magisque accomodata ad explicandas ingenii vires.
Conjectura vult assequi, ut Guarinus auctor et scriptor extiterit epistolae conscribendae. At hoc neque me
judice, neque quovis alio, qui recte Guarinum norit, unquam probabit, cum absint plurimum a scripturis
suis; scribere tam multis verbis, tam contumeliose, tanquam in reum manifesti criminis, de quo nihil afferas
praeter opinionem quamdam, et quidem ab aliorum opinione et sententia disjunctam, non recte consulti
hominis esse videtur.
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Poggio acknowledges Trebizond’s learning, one aspect of manliness, and on the other
hand he expresses concern about Trebizond’s behavior, another aspect of manliness.
Although he considers Trebizond’s actions unjust, he does not claim they amount to a
loss of masculine status. The links between prudence, restraint, and manhood essentially
force him to clarify that he does not consider Trebizond’s actions unmanly, just an
instance of inappropriate behavior. I suspect Poggio so carefully phrased his comments
because of how often authors expressed allegations of imprudence and the like by the
language of failed masculinity, allegations which could be construed ipso facto as attacks
against another’s manhood. Poggio, as an outside observer of the Trebizond-Guarino
dispute, had no real reason in 1437 to make a stronger attack against Trebizond’s
behavior by impugning his masculinity, a strategy he would later employ during their
own dispute in 1453.
Unsurprisingly Poggio articulates a much different estimation of Trebizond’s
masculinity in his response to Trebizond’s account of the chancery fight and alleged
assassination plot in February 1453. 131 Although less explicit than Trebizond’s arguments
against Guarino, Poggio now strongly implies that he thinks Trebizond less of a man
because of his behavior. Protesting that he had “never done anything hostile” to
Trebizond, that “neither orally nor in writing have I ever disparaged you,” and that he has
“never stood in the way of your interests,” Poggio claims instead that “I thought highly of
you as a learned man.” 132 Both the denial that he had provoked his opponent and the
131

Poggio’s February letter is discussed at length in Chapter Three. Trebizond’s response to it in March
1453, as well as Trebizond’s letters to Poggio and Nicholas in January 1453, which were the occasions for
Poggio’s February reply, are discussed above, pages 187-192.
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Ego nihil umquam, quod jure te deberet offendere, contra te egi; non verbo, non
litteris tibi unquam detraxi; non commodis tuis unquam obstiti, sed dilexi ut virum doctum usque ad eam
diem, qua tu acceptam de communi pecuniam per fraudem denegasti, quae nostri discidii causa fuit.
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counter claim regarding his high esteem for him are similar to what Trebizond had
written about Guarino. Poggio continues to deny having provoked Trebizond by
appealing to the hypothetical “good man”: “I never planned anything regarding you that
ought to displease you… or any good man.” The argument casts Trebizond as
unreasonable, but the appeal to “any good man” also implicitly portrays him as unmanly.
A good man would not be upset by Poggio’s conduct, and by being upset, Trebizond
proves he is not a good man. Poggio even ascribes to Trebizond the same motive
Trebizond ascribed to Guarino, anger. According to Trebizond, the criticisms in the RLV
had so angered Guarino that he lashed out in the Agaso letter. According to Poggio,
Trebizond was so upset about the comments to Cauchus—comments for which Poggio
insists he had apologized both verbally and in writing—that he fabricated the
assassination plot. 133 Poggio chastises Trebizond’s inability to forgive and argues that if
Trebizond cannot admit he is capable of making mistakes, then “by the judgment of all
you claim too much for yourself.” The charge of imprudent behavior, he explains, is
sometimes leveled against even the wisest men [sapientissimi viri]. 134 Poggio implies

Nunquam aliquid de te cogitavi, quod non solum tibi, quamvis iniquus sis judex, sed cuiquam bono viro
debeat displicere: tu an idem feceris, tuae litterae satis impudenter scriptae testantur.
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Poggio’s claim that he had apologized for the Cauchus comments is a reference to the letter he
composed in 1450. Poggii Epistolae, 3:21-24. Poggio thanked Trebizond for his aid with the Xenophon and
Diodorus translations and assured him that he had intended no insult or dishonor in commenting on the
Guarino feud. He still maintained that Trebizond’s treatment of Guarino had been inappropriate. For
Poggio’s 1450 apology, see Chapter Three, pages 109-111.

134

This section continues the passage in note 132. Poggii Epistolae, 3:49-50. Arguis me ob rem antiquam,
quod olim scripserim in quadam epistola, te nominans, parum bene consulti hominis videri; idque in tuam
contumeliam scriptum putas. Quam rem alias et verbis, et per epistolam apud te purgavi; scribens multa in
tuam laudem, quae rectius tacuissem, credebam tibi ex mea defensione abunde satisfactum. Sed animus
tuus, ut video, exulceratus, quoniam alia desunt, ex inanire jurgandi causam quaerens, conceptum contra
me odium nequivit continere, ne dum in Trapezuntio, sed ne in Catone quidem fuissent ea verba
contumeliosa. Si tantum in te consilii esse putas, ut errare nequeas, nimis tibi omnium judicio arrogas; si
errare te posse fateris, non mireris id de te dictum, quod sapientissimis quoque viris aliquando videmus
objici, cum dicantur ea egisse, quae non bene consulti hominis esse videantur.
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here that wise men accept their mistakes. Since Trebizond has not done so, he is neither
wise nor truly a man. Poggio does not characterize Trebizond in childish or beast-like
terms, but his arguments suggest a distinction between the actions of good men and those
of Trebizond. Compared to the Cauchus letter and alongside Poggio’s protests that he had
hitherto always esteemed Trebizond, Poggio’s February letter strongly suggests that
Trebizond’s less-than-manly actions had damaged his masculine status. He had lost his
manhood.
The connection between conduct and manhood meant not only that masculinity
could be lost but also that it could be regained, and humanists employed this facet of their
concept of masculinity to their advantage as well. Immoderate behavior was frequently
described as a leaving or losing of one’s senses—as a result of furor, madness,
perturbationes animi—and characterized as evidence of failed masculinity. On the other
hand, regaining one’s senses—exercising reason and acting reasonably—could restore
manhood. The idea that one’s masculine status could be regained served multiple
purposes. First, it allowed an author to criticize his opponent as lacking reason and thus
manhood. An individual had to lose his masculine status before it could be regained, after
all. Secondly, that initial criticism allowed an author to express his superiority—by virtue
of his reason and masculinity—over his opponent. Thirdly, the notion that masculinity
could be regained allowed an author to present himself as a means of restoring an
opponent’s senses and manhood. The regaining of masculinity is one of the clearest
examples in these letters that humanists conceptualized masculinity as a hierarchy. Not
only did they relegate their opponents to lower positions in this hierarchy, but they
offered hope that they, higher in the hierarchy, could help their foes become true men.
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Trebizond argues that he can help both Guarino and Poggio regain their respective
masculine statuses. During the feud with Guarino, he writes to Leonello that Guarino
suffered an “excessive perturbation of the soul because we critiqued the style of his
oration,” and was “agitated against me more than a learned man is permitted.” 135 In other
words, Guarino had lost his senses. Trebizond proceeds to ask Leonello to arrange a
public contest to demonstrate to everyone, especially Guarino, that Trebizond was the
more learned of the two. The contest would also help return Guarino to his senses. It
would convince him to abandon his anger and dishonorable attacks—hiding behind the
Agaso pseudonym, for instance—in favor of an open competition befitting learned men:
…it was always most pleasing to those who labor at the good arts to write, to
read, and to handle competitions and conflicts of this kind not with hatred, but
with love, not with anger, but with affection, not with any spite, but with
benevolence… For this reason learned men declaim; poets debate against one
another; dialecticians, philosophers, doctors pass their days in disputation; and all
of these men try to prove themselves more learned than others… not by abuse,
nor by fraud, nor by deceit… 136
Trebizond maintains that public disputation is the proper field of battle for scholars. It is a
perversion of mores, obstinacy and insolence, he explains, that leads some to fight with
swords, spears, and torches instead. 137 It was Guarino’s anger about RLV’s criticisms that
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See pages 194-195.

136

Collectanea, 379. (7) Nam omnibus qui bonis artibus insudarunt iocundissimum semper fuit
contentiones huiuscemodi ac concertationes non odio, sed amore, non ira, sed caritate, non livore aliquo,
sed benivolentia scribere, legere, pertractare. Nec enim eos fugiebat quantum ea re sua studia excitarent.
Hac de causa diserti declamabant; poete versus suos conferebant; dialectici, philosophi, medici dies suos in
disputatione transigebant; cunctique re ipsa nullo convicio, nullo dolo, nulla fallacia doctiores se ceteris
prestare conabantur adeo ut non nulli vel cum periculo in huiuscemodi certamen descendere non
dubitaverint.

137

Ibid., 379-380. (9) Itaque ut clarius omnes sopitam iam multis seculis eloquentiam tua diligentia
excitatam intelligant, si ad regiam gloriam accedere tibi videtur non gladiis, non telis, non facibus pugnare,
sed oratione disceptare, si multis etatibus omissum pravitate morum et ignorantia declamandi usum, ut
debes, revocare cupis, me tibi dedo. Paratus adero quandocumque iusseris. Hortare Guarinum ad hoc tam
preclarum munus subeundum, quod apud maiores tanti fuit ut etiam seniores iam et defuncti non nunquam
honoribus oratores domi ad excitandum ingenium declamarent. Atque utinam tua magnificentia extinctam
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turned him to insults instead of disputing Trebizond honestly and openly. 138 At the same
time, Trebizond notes that unlike his opponent he was not affected by any perturbationes
but instead responded to Guarino to defend the value of the RLV and to protect both
Greece and Vittorino from the slander of the Agaso letter. 139 Trebizond’s cover letter to
Leonello is an appeal for aid in returning Guarino to his senses. It enlists Leonello to help
him lead Guarino from his path of irrational action to the behavior of learned, honest
men. In that way, it is a call to restore Guarino to manhood.
Trebizond’s suggestion to Leonello that they could restore Guarino’s senses and
the implication that they could restore his manhood bear the hallmarks of Quattrocento
humanist education. 140 His arguments are even more meaningful viewed through the lens
of humanist pedagogy which argued that learned, virtuous men could lead youths to
rational and moderate behavior, and thus to manhood. The notion that masculinity can be
regained offers him further means of denigrating Guarino. He does so by using the
methods of inculcating virtue—praise, blame, the modeling of appropriate behavior—that
humanist educators such as Vergerio and Piccolomini advocated. His censures of

eloquentiam suscitasse mores hominum, qui huic rei impedimento sunt, correxisse per Guarinum atque
Georgium in posterum predicetur! Crede mihi, princeps illustris, nemo est qui non regiam hanc et te
dignam laudem existimet. Quam ut facilias per Guarinum et Georgium consequi possis ceterique imitari
rectius queant, omittamus convicia que hanc rem tam utilem funditus evertunt. Contumacia enim hominum
ac insolentia effecit magis quam ignorantia ut rem agendam contemnant et ad iniuriandum rapiantur.
138

Ibid., 380. (10) Cur ergo rem suam non agit? Cur de generibus dicendi non disserit? Cur scribendo non
efficit ut posse videatur, quod eum posse negavimus? Ad convicia conversus est, qui mos declamandi usum
destruxit.
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Ibid., 379. (6) Nam que modo ei respondimus, non odio aut ira aut quavis alia perturbatione affecti
respondimus, sed partim propter utilitatem communem, nequis Rhetoricorum nostrorum libros, quos
posteritati et humanitatis studiis consulentes edidimus, verbis eius deceptus negligat; partim pietate, tum in
patrem, tum in patriam, quoniam et Greciam vituperare et a Victorino in se nos traducere callidus homo
ausus est.
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I discuss the humanist educational model in the introduction, pages 162-164, including the belief that
instructors could lead their charges into manhood by inculcating virtue. The instructor-student paradigm
also played an important role in arguments about learning and knowledge. See pages 181-185.
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Guarino’s perturbationes animi and so-called childish behavior are an example of
wielding blame to improve conduct. Trebizond also casts himself as a model of virtuous
behavior. His appeals to Leonello to help him coerce Guarino into a public declamation,
the appropriate means of conflict resolution for scholars, can be viewed as attempts to
present himself as a positive role model for Guarino. He was suggesting that with
Leonello’s help he could correct Guarino’s behavior and teach him to act like a man.
Trebizond was striking the pose of an instructor guiding a student’s behavior. It is
doubtful that his attempts were sincere, but the educational model and the contingency of
masculinity provided convenient means to attack Guarino’s honor.
Trebizond articulates a similar desire to return Poggio to his senses and help him
regain his manhood during their feud. His March 1453 letter to Poggio illustrates this
well. The letter responds to Poggio’s accusation of the previous month that Trebizond
fabricated the assassination plot and wrote to Nicholas V about it to tarnish Poggio’s
reputation. 141 Trebizond denies this and argues that he wrote to Nicholas partly out of
self-defense and partly out of concern for Poggio himself. Here he cites Poggio’s
“childish affair” with Lorenzo Valla, whose life Poggio had threatened. 142 Although
Trebizond argues that he had counseled Poggio to exercise restraint, he adds that it was
only Nicholas’s intervention that had stopped Poggio from violence. Poggio’s anger
toward Valla, Trebizond explains, had compelled him to write to Nicholas about the
assassination plot: “I brought this complaint to the pope to free your mind from plots and
free myself from danger.” When he received Poggio’s February letter, he explains, he
141

Poggii Epistolae, 3:50-51. Non intelligebam, neque enim expresseras in litteris ad me tuis, quae causa te
ad me lacerandum impulisset… Nam quid opus fuit, nisi ad malivolentiam et infamiam adversus me
excitandam, falsam et ridiculam querelam ad Pontificem deferri?

142

See page 191.

211

knew “that you had been commanded by the pope to completely cast aside from your
mind thoughts of this kind [violence]… that he had turned you to writing.” 143 Trebizond
uses the Valla affair to cast Poggio as childish and himself as rational and manly. The
story bears another suggestion as well, though. First during the Valla affair and then
during their own conflict, Trebizond claims he had tried to guide Poggio to proper
behavior, in effect to return him to his senses. The implication is that Poggio’s behavior
could be corrected, he could regain his senses, and his actions would cease to be childish.
Trebizond situates all three men in a hierarchy. Poggio is the child whose perturbationes
animi compel his actions, and Trebizond and Nicholas are the men who can “free his
mind from plots” and teach him how to act like a man.
Trebizond’s account of the Poggio-Valla feud also offers another indication of the
humanist anxiety regarding masculinity. As Trebizond tells it, once Poggio had
abandoned his plans for violence and written to Valla—as Trebizond had counseled—
Trebizond praised him for changing his mind. Poggio, again according to Trebizond,
“replied with indignation… ‘Why do you think to admonish me as if I were a child?’”
Poggio may not have actually said this, of course. It may simply be Trebizond’s
rhetorical attempt to make his opponent seem foolish and childish, since he frames the
response as an overreaction. That humanists could resent insinuations of childishness is
certainly plausible, however, as this chapter has shown. At the same time, there are
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Walser, 512-513. Alia de causa detuli nisi ut iussu eius resipiscas. An credis forsan immemorem me esse
adeo ut non meminerim quando in re puerili vere in multis a Valla fuisses reprensus: ita te exarsisse ut
vitam eius extinguere constitueris? Particeps ego tum ut amicus eram consiliorum tuorum et hortabar, ut
nihil curares, quoniam magnitudo animi in negligendo non in ulciscendo perspicitur, vel si ulcisci velles
scriptis id ageres. Equum esset si scriptis lesit ut scriptis ledatur; ferro cum illo esse agendum non calamo
exclamabas. Deinde cum ad scribendum versus esses, laudabam te quod consilium mutasses. ‘Quid tu ita
me credis quasi puerum moneri,’ cum indignitatione respondisti. Iste papa, ex quo vita mea pendet, mihi
iussit nequaquam tale facere audeam. Hac ergo de causa querelam ad pontificem detuli, ut et tuum ab
insidiis animum et me a periculo liberarem.
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numerous indications that appropriate scholarly behavior required accepting fair criticism
from one’s peers. Trebizond held this standard against Guarino when defending the
criticisms in the RLV in March 1437. Likewise, Poggio offered Trebizond’s assassination
plot allegation as evidence that he was unjustly angered about the Cauchus comments.
Here Trebizond describes his advice as good counsel and evidence that he had tried to
lead Poggio to the path of good conduct. In that context, Poggio’s alleged anger at
Trebizond’s so-called admonishment stands as further evidence of his unmanly behavior.
The comment leaves a strong impression at the end of Trebizond’s story. Even after
Nicholas’s intervention, when Poggio had in theory returned to his senses, he was still
childishly defensive toward Trebizond’s praise. That impression fits well in Trebizond’s
argument that he feared Poggio’s irrational behavior because of the prior feud with Valla.
The Agaso and Poggio letters add further evidence of how humanists understood
the loss and restoration of masculinity. Their arguments against Trebizond are
substantively similar to, but also stylistically different from, his. They tend to lack
explicit references to masculinity—Agaso is more explicit than Poggio, but less than
Trebizond—but still rely upon the same attendant concepts. Agaso, for instance,
repeatedly casts himself and Guarino’s patrician students in the role of rational, moderate
men in contrast to Trebizond, the arrogant, shameless Greekling. 144 The contrast
criticizes Trebizond’s failed masculinity and insinuates that he had lost all or part of his
masculine status. Like Trebizond’s account of the Poggio-Valla feud, at times Agaso
offers advice to Trebizond to recant his lies, apologize for them, and retract what he had
written in a short letter. He notes that it is never too late to choose the path to good
mores. The advice is Agaso’s attempt to improve Trebizond’s behavior, which he
144

See for instance the discussion of Trebizond “slandering” Guarino, pages 192-193.
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elsewhere characterizes as typical of arrogant Greeklings, children, and beasts. 145 This is
his effort to cast himself, as Trebizond does, as an aid to restoring another’s senses, and
helping another regain his manhood. Agaso frequently admonishes Trebizond’s bad
behavior, but his admonitions are framed by an expressed interest—genuine or not—in
improving his conduct. To that end, Agaso discusses “repairing [Trebizond’s] mores,”
and leading him to the proper gratitude he owes to Guarino. That change, Agaso adds,
would gain him glory and praise. 146 Agaso’s letter, like Trebizond’s, thus incorporates
the instructor-student paradigm into arguments about masculine conduct. This is the case
as well when Agaso exhorts his reader to “encourage Guarino…to put down this
Trebizond’s obstinacy and chasten the student with an instructor’s authority.” 147 As
severe as Agaso’s assessment of Trebizond is, it includes a sense that Trebizond’s
childish and beast-like behaviors can be overcome and, by extension, that he can regain
his manhood through proper conduct.
Poggio too appropriates the role of humanist educator and claims to teach his
opponent modesty, prudence, and the markers of manly restraint. His chosen method of
instruction is to offer his own behavior as worthy of imitation. This is not to say that he
145

See note 108.
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Collectanea, 371. (33) “Homine enim imperito et inepto nunquam quicquam iniustius est, qui nisi quod
ipse fecit nil rectum putat. Quod si tanta Trapezuntium cura solicitat ut inepta coaptare, turbata disponere,
male posita struere conetur, queso ut discordem totamque sub arma coactam componat Italiam. Que si
maiora viribus abnuat, hominem rogate, viri patricii, ut portus vestri latiorem reddat alveum et ituris
rediturisque navibus utiliora concinnet hostia. Quod si rursum maius humeris opus respuet, suos concinnet
mores et obliquam linguam dirrigat et ingratum sese preceptori discipulum gratum observantemque formet
ac reficiat, que sibi decus laudemque parient.”
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Ibid., 372. (38) Habes peregrinationis mee redditam tibi rationem, non autem repertorium, ut confidebas
et ego sperabam, librorum. Non desinam tamen interea tabernas quasque librarias odorari ut et tue faciam
satis cupiditati et mee pro tuis mandatis diligentie testimonium reddam. Tu vero Guarinum pro tua in eum
fide et consuetudine hortare, immo urge, incende, anima ut huius Trapezuntii contumaciam confutet et
discipulum preceptoris auctoritate castiget ne pro innata sibi modestia, qua velut asinos solet conviciatores
parvi facere, tam honoris et fame negligens, huic ipsi Greculo maledicentiam, temeritatem, contumaciam
sinat increscere quod studiorum non mediocre dedecus avertendum est.
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does not explicitly criticize his opponent, because he does. He is far less likely, though, to
call Trebizond childish or beast-like, and his arguments seem more moderate as a result.
They are, however, no less an effort to challenge Trebizond’s masculinity and to suggest
that Poggio can guide him to a state of true manhood. His modeling tactic is first evident
when in 1437 he laments Trebizond’s contempt of Guarino and argues that the better path
is the one he followed in his own dispute with Guarino: offend your opponent as little as
possible and respond more moderately than the one who offended you. After all, he
explains, our cases are rendered less commendable when made with insults and abuse. 148
Poggio is more explicit in response to the assassination plot. Having rejected the plot as
absurd, he claims that he follows the ancients in believing that offenses ought to be
forgiven rather than avenged. He argues that if Trebizond had simply imitated his own
moderate behavior, he would have saved them both from having to deal with the
annoyance of the assassination charge. 149 In both examples, Poggio offers his own
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Poggii Epistolae, 2:127-128. Quod autem is me suis verbis honorat, esset mihi gratius, si non vergeret in
contemptum Guarini, cujus honori a me semper consultum fuit, et praesertim in nostra controversia, qua ei
respondi, cum is me paulum lacessisset, quod Scipionem suo praetulerim Caesari. Egi tamen ita meam
defensionem, ut eum minime offenderem, nisi ubi causa id necessario postularet. Hoc certe recte videor
posse dicere, me parcius quam acceperim, nonnulla retulisse. Ubi enim ratione pugnandum est et
argumentis, sunt omnino rejiciendae voces contumeliis et jurgiis refertae, quae et auditoribus sunt ingratae,
et causam nostram minime reddunt probabiliorem. See also pages 204-206.
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This is part of Poggio’s argument that he had heard a rumor that Trebizond had both requested and
procured from Alfonso of Aragon Poggio’s property in Naples. See Chapter Three, pages 128-129. Poggio
contends that even in light of the rumor he exercised restraint in his treatment of Trebizond. Poggii
Epistolae, 3:51-52. An vero ita me stultum putas, ita imprudentem, ut nescio quibus vanis hominibus, qui te
inani ostentione terrerent, meam famam et existimationem, ut de animae salute omittam, committere
voluisse? Absit a me talis cogitatio, nedum opus. Est moris mei, tum reliquis in rebus, tum in hoc sequi
praecepta sapientum, quae jubent oblivione potius, injurias esse, quam manu aut viribus ulciscendas.
Persuade tibi quod libet: futurum tempus te ostendet male sensisse, et incertam suspitionem pro certo
maleficio accepisse. Tuum est credere ut voles; ego mea conscientia contentus ero: si tamen modestiam a
me praestitam, in qua me laudo, fuisses imitatus, et te, et me inani labore et molestia liberasses. Nam cum
ad me, dum essem nuper Florentiae, a pluribus scriptum esset, te possessiones meas a rege inclito
Aragonum dono postulasse, atque impetrasse, non sum tecum eam injuriam questus, neque quicquam ad te
scripsi contumeliosum, existimans famam, quae ferebatur, non esse veram, et id factum a prudentia tanti
principis alienum.
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behavior as worthy of imitation, a posture he adopts throughout the letter. His protest at
the outset that he will “reply in a few words, and somewhat more moderately than you” is
an implicit invitation for Trebizond to moderate his speech and act with dignity. 150 The
letter as a whole can be taken as Poggio’s attempt to act out the ideal he voiced in the
letter to Cauchus, that one should return less to one’s opponent than one first received.
Given that dictum, it is unsurprising that Poggio casts his response as reasoned and
moderate. Beyond that, Poggio’s tone suggests that he, like Trebizond and Agaso, wants
to present himself as a guide to virtuous behavior and thus to true manhood.
The second half of this analysis has examined how humanists incorporated
imagery depicting failed masculinity into attacks against an opponent’s conduct.
Trebizond, Agaso, and Poggio each linked concepts of restraint and moral rectitude to
manhood, and by contrast, a lack of restraint and immoral behaviors to failed masculinity.
They expressed the latter through references to children, women, beasts, and monsters,
each of which was conceived in opposition to men whose actions were reasoned and
moderate. These authors also understood manhood to be fluid rather than a static state, a
view that made possible creative uses of the instructor-student paradigm as a vehicle for
insults. At the same time, their letters also reveal an anxiety about being cast as a failed
man, for instance as a child whose behavior needed correction.
Trebizond later denies Poggio’s tale, arguing that the lie was another of Poggio’s plots against
him. Walser, 513-514. Deinde paulo post te laudas, quod mecum non fueris questus, cum tibi nuper
Florentie moram trahenti complures amici scripsissent, me possessiones tuas a rege inclyto dono postulasse
atque impetrasse… Nam cur saltem non explorasti si quicquam hic tale dictum est, nec veritus es dicere ab
inclyto rege, me postulasse; an pertimuisti pondus testimonii eius? immo nec cogitasti quidem. Cur quia
cupiditas perpetrandi facinoris te exagitat quia exarsisti iussus non facere. Quid quod fateri videris ad
terrendum me insidias te struxisse?
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Poggii Epistolae, 3:49. Recepi tuas litteras, ultraquam mores tuos et doctrinam deceat, contumeliosas
nimium ac petulantes: ignosco naturae tuae et animi perturbationi, in qua ex tuis verbis intelligo te versari.
Sed ne videar tacendo, vel assentiri, vel contemnere quae scribis, et ut me purgem in eo, quo me inique et
falso accusas, respondebo paucis, et paulo modestius quam tu, ne in quo es reprehendendus te videar
imitari.
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Conclusion
An examination of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino and Poggio reveals the rich,
varied language and categories related to masculinity that these figures had at their
disposal. Their letters indicate how they understood manhood and folded a language of
masculinity into their contests. They used categories of masculinity in oppositional ways
to praise their own learning and conduct and to attack that of their opponent. In doing so,
they challenged the masculine status of their opponents. These challenges—depending on
the author and the argument at stake—could range from mild censures of individual
instances of inappropriate—childish or beast-like—behavior, to stronger accusations that
essentially verbally emasculated an opponent, annihilating or effacing his masculine
identity and replacing it with something else. Agaso used his concept of manhood to
amplify his depiction of Trebizond as a Cretan beast and as an ungrateful student by
casting his treatment of Guarino as childish. Trebizond used accusations of failed
masculinity to criticize Guarino’s rhetorical style as childish and unlearned, and to
describe Poggio as having an emotional, violent, and childish nature. Lastly, this chapter
has argued that the humanist language of masculinity presumed a hierarchy that
distinguished the true man from the failed man. The man was defined by his use of
reason, measured both by his learnedness and by the rational control of his emotions.
Beneath him were the various iterations of the failed man—the child, the woman, the
beast. In some ways, these categories stood on equal footing. They were all defined
primarily by their contrast with true manhood. In certain cases, though, humanists made
distinctions between them. Those who violated cultural norms more frequently were seen
as less manly and more childish, beast-like, or womanish than those who erred less often,
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acknowledged their mistakes, and repented. Given this hierarchy, the concept of
masculinity allowed an author to proclaim his superiority over another by virtue of his
reason. In the end, masculinity represents another example of the verbal strategies
available to humanists to self-present and contest honor.
The previous three chapters have given ample attention to Trebizond’s feuds with
Guarino and Poggio and assessed their shared verbal strategies, acts of self-presentation,
and modes of expression. The next and final chapter expands the examination of
humanist contests to consider the larger community of scholars of which Trebizond was a
part. My analysis shifts from a study of Trebizond to one of Guarino, Poggio, and their
feuds with other scholars. In considering two new feuds, the focus of the investigation
will be not on the themes that each author relied upon, although those will be discussed,
but on the vehicle for their acts of self-presentation: invective as a literary genre.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HUMANIST INVECTIVE
AND SELF-PRESENTATION
Introduction
Quattrocento humanists contested honor through written acts of self-presentation
that allowed them to fashion desirable identities for the purpose of professional
advancement and individual glory. George of Trebizond’s feuds with Guarino of Verona
and Poggio Bracciolini demonstrate how acts of self-presentation had concrete
consequences for scholars and how humanists used a variety of shared categories and a
common language of honor —involving concepts of restraint and manhood, for
example—in their disputes. The preceding chapters have examined this language of
honor both to assess how and why humanists engaged in disputes as they did and to
develop a richer and more accurate understanding of humanist social practices. The
letters of Trebizond and his opponents, however, are also examples of invective, a literary
genre that was often the favorite vehicle for humanist self-presentation. The present
chapter illustrates how Trebizond’s experiences with self-presentation and invective were
typical of Quattrocento humanism. To discuss such typicality and humanist culture more
generally, the chapter will step back from a deep reading of Trebizond’s feuds to consider
two other examples of how invective functioned as a tool for the rhetorical presentation
of self. The first involves Guarino’s invective against Niccolò Niccoli in Florence in
1413, and the second Poggio’s first of four invectives written against Lorenzo Valla
between 1452 and 1453 in Rome. These contests are of value to a study of Trebizond
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because they show his opponents engaging in similar means of self-presentation and
expressing the same kind of anxiety regarding audience, reputation, and honor as he did.
The analysis here argues three main points. The first is that invective was one of
the primary modes of expression available to humanists for the rhetorical presentation of
self and that scholars understood invective to have discernible limits. The second is that
the guidelines for humanist invective were indebted to the classical Latin oratorical
tradition and then adapted to contemporary contests of honor. The third is that an
understanding of humanist invective as a literary genre with classical antecedents
demonstrates a clear need to reevaluate how existing scholarship regards fifteenthcentury invective and those who wrote it.
The Latin rhetorical tradition had developed clear guidelines for verbal and
literary abuse. Classical theorists situated invective in demonstrative oratory as a part of
the rhetoric of praise [laus] and blame [vituperatio] and used it to argue court cases. The
purpose, “rather than supplying logical proofs,” was to add “pathos [emotion] to logos
[reason] and turn the audience against the orator’s opponent and toward his own cause.” 1
1

Valentina Arena, “Roman Oratorical Invective,” in A Companion to Roman Rhetoric, ed. William J.
Dominik and Jon Hall (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 149-151. The scholarship on classical invective is
substantial. The same cannot be said for the scholarship on Renaissance invective, the limitations of which
I discuss below, pages 225-230. For useful monographs addressing classical invective see Amy Richlin,
The Garden of Priapus: Sexuality and Aggression in Roman Humor (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), 96-104; Anthony Corbeill, Controlling Laughter: Political Humor in the Late Roman Republic
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Brian A. Krostenko, Cicero, Catullus, and the Language
of Social Performance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Catherine Steel, Roman Oratory,
Greece and Rome. New Surveys in the Classics 36 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the
Classical Association, 2006). For useful articles, see Corbeill, “Ciceronian Invective,” in Brill’s Companion
to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric, ed. James M. May (Boston: Brill, 2002), 197-217 and Corbeill,
“Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire,” in A Companion to
Roman Rhetoric, ed. Dominik and Hall, 69-82; C.P. Craig, “Audience Expectations, Invective, and Proof,”
in Cicero the Advocate, ed. J.G.F. Powell and Jeremy Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004): 187-213 and Craig, “Self-Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s ‘First Catilinarian
Oration,’” The American Journal of Philology 128, no.3 (Autumn, 2007): 335-339. See also Anna A.
Novokhatko, The Invectives of Sallust and Cicero: Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, and
Commentary (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). Novokhatko’s first three chapters discuss the
invectives, their context, and their manuscript tradition.
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As Antonius remarks in Cicero’s De oratore, “nothing in oratory…is more important
than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to
be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by
judgment or deliberation.” 2 Orators accomplished this by ad hominem attacks and used
ethical preconceptions to accuse opponents of unacceptable behavior. 3 The strategies
they used were laid out in Cicero’s De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium.
“Praise and censure,” the De inventione explains, “will be derived from the topics that are
employed with respect to the attributes of persons…these may be divided into mind
[animus], body [corpus] and external circumstances [res externa].” The Ad Herennium
expands on this division and details the kinds of considerations the orator must make.
The orator must “consider his [opponent’s] virtues and defects of character… [and ask]
‘Has he been rich or poor? What kinds of power has he wielded? …With what loyalty,
goodwill, and sense of duty has he conducted his friendships?’” 4 Personal attacks were

2

Cic., De or. 2.178. This and subsequent translations are Sutton’s. Cicero, De oratore, trans. E.W. Sutton
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). Antonius goes on to explain how an orator can “excite
in the minds of the…audience…love, hate, wrath, jealousy, compassion, hope, joy, fear or vexation…”
Cic., De or. 2.205-211. See also the discussion of the very important role that humor played in winning
favor for an orator. Cic., De or. 2.236. I provide a more specific sketch of the classical consideration of the
rules and limits of humor below, pages 267-268.
3

Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 17-20; Novokhatko, 12-15.

4

I discuss these categories in greater detail below, pages 248-249. See Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.34-36 and 2.177178; Rhet. Her. 3.10-15. The translations from De inventione, unless otherwise noted, are Hubbell’s.
Cicero, De inventione, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949). The
translations from the Rhetorica ad Herennium are Caplan’s. Rhetorica ad Herennium, ed. Harry Caplan
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964). For the rhetoric of praise and blame in Quintilian see
Quint., Inst. 3.7, especially sections 19-22. On the important place of the De inventione and Rhetorica ad
Herennium—the latter commonly attributed to Cicero in the fifteenth century—in early modern education
see Paul Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 212-213. For an overview of their role in Quattrocento invective see
Ennio I. Rao, Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon: 101 Years of Invectives (1352-1453) (Messina: EDAS,
2007), 13. Martin Davies explains that humanists also relied on the De oratore, Cicero’s speeches—
particularly In Pisonem—and the exchanges with Sallust attributed to Cicero. M.C. Davies, “An Emperor
without Clothes? Niccolò Niccoli under Attack,” in Maistor: Classical, Byzantine, and Renaissance Studies
for Robert Browning (Canberra: Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1984), 274.
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crucial since “there can be little foundation for a motive for a crime unless such suspicion
is cast on the character of the accused that it will seem not to be inconsistent with such a
fault…Therefore the prosecutor ought to discredit the life of the accused.” If unable to
demonstrate that the accused has the character to perpetrate a particular crime, Cicero
suggests the orator should “show that other vices are not foreign to his nature, and that it
is no wonder if one who in that other affair acted basely, passionately and wantonly
should have transgressed in this case also. For everything that detracts from the
defendant’s honour and repute, lessens in so far his chance for a complete defense.” 5
Roman forensic models appealed to humanists because reputation was critical to
their careers. Humanists viewed their peers and patrons as Roman advocates viewed their
juries, used ad hominem attacks, and engaged in the public acts of censuring and
denigrating another based on societal ethical preconceptions to sway their audience. Their
insults were carefully constructed arguments they assumed would be made public via an
active third party who would read and spread them to new people and places. Invective
was often composed as a letter to a friend, enemy, or interested third party, a medium that
reflected the general humanist use of letter-writing as a means of self-presentation. By the
early Quattrocento, letter-writing had become the main “means by which
scholars…disseminated their ideas and made their case in scholarly controversy.” 6
Petrarch was an early figure in this development. After the discovery of Cicero’s letters
to Atticus and Quintus in 1345 he composed his own Familiares. Guarino taught Cicero’s

5

Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.32-33.

6

Surpassing the oration, according to Cecil H. Clough, “The Cult of Antiquity: Letters and Letter
Collections,” in Cultural Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Essays in Honour of Paul Oskar Kristeller,
ed. Cecil H. Clough (New York: A.F. Zambelli, 1976), 33.
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Epistolae ad familiares, discovered in 1345, in Verona in April 1419. 7 Humanists also
took an interest in the publication of their letters, a venture that “was beginning to serve
as a sign that one was a serious scholar.” Leonardo Bruni edited his own letters, recalling
them from his correspondents to do so, and arranged them into an eight book collection in
1440. Poggio arranged his own collection as well, as did Francesco Filelfo. Guarino did
not, but approximately one thousand of his letters survive nonetheless, an indication of
their value among his contemporaries. 8 Each of these activities were typical of a period
“when humanists labored to compose their letters in Ciceronian Latin; when these letters
were transcribed for dispatch in humanistic script; when a letter writer himself edited his
letters into a collection of the classical models.” Their letters were “written and
dispatched by means of messengers” and composed “not only for their correspondents
but with a view to the publication of some, at least, of their correspondence during their
lifetime.” As a form of self-presentation the writing, collection, and publication of letters
was aimed at “the preservation only of that which was meritorious” about an author. 9

7

Ibid., 36; Elizabeth May McCahill, “Finding a Job as a Humanist: The Epistolary Collection of Lapo da
Castiglionchio the Younger,” Renaissance Quarterly 57, no.4 (Winter 2004): 1309-1310. On the use of
Cicero’s letters in the early modern classroom see Grendler, 222-229 and Robert Black, Humanism and
Education in Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Tradition and Innovation in Latin Schools from the Twelfth
to the Fifteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 352-355. On Guarino’s school see
William H. Woodward, Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600 (New York:
Russell & Russell, 1965), 40 and 42-43.

8

Letters, especially Bruni’s, were valued as models for students to follow in their studies. Clough, 37-39;
McCahill, 1309; Davies, 287. The advent of printing aided the circulation of these collections. Clough
reports that Filelfo’s self-edited letter collection appeared in print around 1472 in Venice, and was reprinted
eighteen times before 1501. Bruni’s collection was reprinted five times during the same period, while
Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini’s—the future Pope Pius II—collections were reprinted twenty times. Clough,
41-42. Guarino did not collect and edit his letters. Leonello d’Este, however, did pay to have some of
Guarino’s letters bound in 1437. Ian Thomson, “Studies in the Life, Scholarship, and Educational
Achievement of Guarino da Verona (1374-1460)” (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 1969), 301,
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2965.
9

Clough, 34-35. On the script Clough describes, invented by Poggio and Niccoli, see B.L. Ullman, The
Origins and Development of Humanistic Script (Rome, 1960).
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As a means to cultivating one’s reputation, letter-writing was naturally suited to
invective. 10 Humanists exercised great care in crafting, revising, and disseminating their
invectives and making sure they were public knowledge, as they did with all their letters.
Petrarch, for example, adapted the letter model to the writing of invective and took the
enterprise seriously. David Marsh comments that Petrarch “evidently viewed them [his
invectives] as important, since he took the trouble to revise and publish them.” Ennio
Rao, author of an important recent overview of fifteenth-century invective, adds that
Petrarch “showed towards the texts of his invectives the same care that he showed
towards his other writings. His invectives were always considered an integral part of his
literary output and were copied and bound with manuscripts of his works.” 11 The figures
examined in the present chapter also composed their invectives as letters. Guarino wrote
against Niccoli first in a letter to Blasio Guasconi before revising his piece for a wider
distribution. We have also seen multiple examples in the preceding examinations of
Trebizond’s feuds indicating the public nature of invectives, how they circulated hand-tohand, among friends and patrons, and passed from city to city, and how they were
commonly composed as letters. Trebizond issued his Responsio to Guarino in the spring
of 1437, for example, and later that fall Poggio had not only received both the Agaso

10

On the value of printed letter collections to humanists, Clough comments “scholars are often known for
their sharpness rather than for their humility and kindness…the second half of the fifteenth century
witnessed excessive acrimony and vituperation…frustrated and bitter scholars criticized one another as
rivals. Scholars were quick to appreciate the value of the press as a means of bringing their work and
criticisms to notice.” Clough, 46.

11

David Marsh, introduction to Francesco Petrarca: Invectives, ed. and trans. David Marsh (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), viii; Rao, Curmudgeons, 17. For Petrarch’s care with his letter
collections see the articles by Aldo S. Bernardo, “Letter-Splitting in Petrarch’s Familiares,” Speculum 33,
no.2 (April 1958): 236-241 and “The Selection of Letters in Petrarch’s Familiares,” Speculum 35, no.2
(April 1960): 280-288. John M. Najemy includes a brief discussion of Petrarch’s letters in his Between
Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513-1515 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993), 25-30. See also McCahill, 1309.
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letter and Trebizond’s response but had written to a friend about the dispute. 12 As a
vehicle for self-presentation, invective was a crucial part of the construction of the
humanist persona and flourished because it was a tool that could influence public
perception. Moreover, the consequences of humanist insults were often far more prosaic
than the often-mentioned pursuit of glory. Invective that successfully persuaded its
audience could lose a person his job or force him to relocate, as in the case of Trebizond
after his fight with Poggio in the curia.
To support the first two arguments, the chapter is structured around three topoi
common to humanist invective that reflect the fifteenth-century debt to classical models.
The goal is to examine how and why Guarino, Poggio, and ultimately Trebizond wrote as
they did and to understand the rules associated with invective as its purveyors understood
them. The idea that invective has rules at all may at first seem difficult to believe given
how aggressive and insulting the texts themselves often are. Reading past that aggression
explains how humanists articulated a sense of when and how it was appropriate to attack
another. The first trope examined is the concept of provocation. Humanist invective is
littered with claims that an author had been provoked into defending himself. The second
trope involves the use of a set of standard categories—divided according to classical

12

On invectives as letters see Rao, Curmudgeons, 24. When Trebizond wrote to Guarino in response to
Andreas Agaso’s letter, he sent a copy with a cover letter to Leonello d’Este. His invective against Guarino
was also a letter. As Monfasani notes, the manuscripts of the Agaso letter and Trebizond’s response were
frequently bound together, providing an indication on how they were circulated and read. Collectanea
Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond, ed. Monfasani
(Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1984), 364. See also Chapter Two, note 2.
Likewise, Trebizond and Poggio exchanged letters with one another. As to the public nature of humanist
disputes, when Trebizond wrote in March 1453 to Poggio, he criticized Poggio’s behavior towards Lorenzo
Valla, indicating his knowledge of the very public Poggio-Valla dispute. On the Poggio-Valla dispute and
on its status as a cause célèbre in and beyond Rome, see Chapter Three, pages 135-136. The Scipio-Caesar
controversy between Poggio and Guarino in 1435 was another public dispute carried out and later discussed
via letter. For Trebizond’s criticism of Guarino treatment of Poggio during that conflict, see Chapter Four,
pages 172-173. Poggio used the Scipio-Caesar conflict as an example of his moderation when commenting
on the Trebizond-Guarino conflict in 1437. See Chapter Three, pages 108-109.
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models into insults of animus, corpus, and res externa—from which humanists drew.
Many of these pertained to an opponent’s moral behavior—including accusations of
pretentiousness, arrogance, avarice, abuse of family and friends, and sexual
misconduct—and learning. 13 The third trope involves wit and mockery as forms of
humor. The purpose in examining these topoi is not to reduce invective to a list of
mechanical tropes or humanist contests to mere formal rhetorical exercises. These tropes
were crucial to wielding invective successfully and negotiating honor.
The third argument of the present chapter, underlying the examination of the topoi
just outlined, is that it is necessary to reconsider how fifteenth-century invective and its
authors are characterized in existing accounts of humanist conflicts. I argue there is an
analytical problem in Renaissance studies, a tendency towards moralizing and
condemnatory views of humanist invective that has created distorted and sometimes
undeservedly negative portraits of individual humanist scholars. This tendency is evident
in classic nineteenth-century works that struggled to reconcile the idea of erudite
humanist scholars writing scurrilous, vitriolic compositions. William Shepherd, whose
Life of Poggio Bracciolini (1802) is still the major English language biography of the
humanist, viewed invective and its practitioners in a decidedly negative manner. He
characterized the invectives exchanged between Poggio and Francesco Filelfo in the
1430s as “exhausting every topic of obloquy,” an “odious mass of…allegations,”
13

The use of these categories by classical writers has been amply studied, as in the works listed in note 1.
Renaissance studies rarely explore them in a detailed manner, as in Davies, 272; Marsh, xi-xvi. Diana
Robin addresses some of these categories in her consideration of sexual misconduct and avarice in the
invectives against Francesco Filelfo. See her “A Reassessment of the Character of Francesco Filelfo (13981481),” Renaissance Quarterly 36, no.2 (Summer 1983): 204-214. The most substantial treatments of these
categories in humanist invective are in Rao, Curmudgeons, 99-120 and David Rutherford, introduction to
Early Renaissance Invective and The Controversies of Antonio da Rho (Tempe: Arizona Center for
Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 2005), 1-40. Rutherford’s introduction is particularly useful
but his analysis of the tropes he identifies in the texts he examines is limited.
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“virulent and foul abuse,” and as acrimony that “defeated its own purpose.” 14 Shepherd
expressed disappointment at Poggio’s participation in such exchanges: “[Poggio]
unfortunately indulged, to the latest period of his life, that bitterness of resentment, and
that intemperance of language, which disgraced his strictures on Francesco Filelfo.” 15
John Addington Symonds also lamented the Poggio-Filelfo invectives in his Renaissance
in Italy (1897):
Raking that literary dunghill, it is now impossible to distinguish the true from the
false; all proportion is lost in the mass of overcharged and indiscriminate
scurrility. That such encounters should have been enjoyed and applauded by
polite society is one of the strangest signs of the times; and that the duelists
themselves should have imagined they were treading in the steps of Cicero and
Demosthenes is even more astounding. 16
He made similar remarks about the later Poggio-Valla dispute, describing it as a
“disgraceful fray” and Poggio’s orations as “disgusting compositions.” He added that
“there is no sort of vituperation which the antagonists do not vomit forth against each
other, no obscenity and roguery of which they are not mutually accused.” 17
Surprisingly, some modern studies continue to draw moralistic conclusions as
they too seek to make sense of the aggressive and sometimes savage tone of humanist
invective. 18 Marsh speaks to this trend, writing, “the violent language of [Petrarch’s]

14

William Shepherd, The Life of Poggio Bracciolini, 2nd ed. (Liverpool: Harris, 1837), 252.

15

Ibid., 439. On Shepherd’s disappointment with humanist invective and polemicists see David Rundle,
“Un amico del Roscoe: William Shepherd and the First Modern Life of Poggio Bracciolini (1802),” in
Roscoe and Italy: The Reception of Italian Renaissance History and Culture in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, ed. Stella Fletcher (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 192-193.
16

John Addington Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, vol. 2, The Revival of Learning (London: Smith, Elder,
1897), 173-174.
17

Ibid., 174-175.
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I do not mean to suggest that modern authors read nineteenth-century accounts such as Shepherd’s and
Symond’s uncritically. Even so, both works were important in their own right and are cited in modern
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invectives will shock readers who are more familiar with Petrarca as the sweet celebrant
of his love for Laura.” Marsh’s remark indicates that even today some readers are
“shocked” by the violent language of invective. 19 Rao’s Curmudgeons in High Dudgeon
(2007) is indicative of this and frequently condemnatory of humanist polemicists. 20 In
labeling the subjects of his study “curmudgeons,” Rao provides a glimpse into his views
about humanist polemicists. One of his key arguments is that invective became
increasingly severe as the Quattrocento progressed, a development he attributes to the
characters of particular humanist authors. He describes Leonardo Bruni as a “prickly”
figure with an “irritable nature” and credits him as an early “transitional figure in the
development of the genre from a sober, restrained accusatory or defensive oration to a
merciless, vicious catalogue of crimes” featuring the use of “unsolicited, unjustifiable
objurgations.” 21 Rao likewise attributes the quarrels of Filelfo to “Filelfo’s character and
that of his antagonists. He was a man of uncommon arrogance… [and] it was inevitable
that he should find in [Niccolò] Niccoli, given the latter’s prickly disposition and
patronizing attitude, his chief adversary.” 22 Not unlike Shepherd and Symonds, Rao is
critical of the Poggio-Valla feud and struggles to reconcile the “seriousness” of humanist
scholarship with Poggio’s attacks. Rao remarks that Poggio was “resentful of anyone
else’s good fortune” and “actively connived to discredit any potential competitor. The
studies. Shepherd is the first source Ennio Rao, discussed below, cites when offering his own short
biography of Poggio. Rao, Curmudgeons, 53.
19

Marsh, xi. Marsh’s own surprise—if not shock—is evident shortly thereafter when he notes Petrarch’s
preference for “abusive epithets to denigrate his opponents. Quite strikingly, Petrarca employs far more
abusive language than the Latin models he cites as precedents.”
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Rao’s overview of fifteenth-century invective is an important, recent contribution to growing field of
Renaissance invective scholarship which I discuss below, pages 229-230.
21

Rao, Curmudgeons, 10 and 39-41.
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Ibid., 60-61.
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more brilliant his would-be competitors…the more ruthless his methods.” 23 Of Poggio’s
fifth invective against Valla, Rao comments “One would expect Poggio to…treat some
equally serious subject. Instead…he resorted once against to base ad hominem insults.”
Rao’s condemnation of polemics is evident in his characterization of the midQuattrocento. The Poggio-Valla contest represented for him the “high water mark of the
humanist invective” after which “the first generation of humanists gave way to a second,
more refined and better suited for sober debates on sophisticated questions.” “The cruel
age of dagger and poison,” Rao concludes “was yielding to a milder one (though still
cruel by our modern standards).” 24 In Rao we find an example of a modern reader who,
like nineteenth-century accounts, condemns the “base ad hominem” insults of humanist
invective and favors conduct he describes as more sober, restrained, and serious.
Although some recent accounts including Rao’s remain focused on the question
of character, others have begun to situate humanist conflicts in their professional context.
Of particular note are recent studies of the Roman curia and the anxiety humanists
experienced in competing for highly coveted, lucrative positions in the papal service. In
The Lost Italian Renaissance (2004), Christopher Celenza writes of humanist contests
that “we cannot properly understand these seemingly exaggerated, immensely vitriolic
Renaissance polemics between cultivated individuals…unless we situate the debates
where they belong: in the social, political context of the acquisition, protection, and

23

Ibid., 54. See also Benjamin Kohl’s brief comments. He describes how criticism of Poggio’s Latin style
led him to “fume” and try to have Valla assassinated, “but the quarrel soon settled down to a series of
bloodless, though savage, invectives on correct Latin style.” Kohl describes Poggio as “not popular with
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Kohl and Ronald G. Witt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978), 237.
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maintenance of masculine honor.” Likewise, commenting on the Poggio-Valla dispute,
Stephen Greenblatt writes: “the extravagance and bitterness of the charges—in the course
of a quarrel over Latin style…discloses something rotten in the inner lives of these
impressively learned individuals…These intellectuals were committed to pleasing their
masters, on whose patronage they utterly depended, but they were cynical and
unhappy.” 25 Celenza and Greenblatt both read humanist contests as an outgrowth of the
competitive nature of professional life. In their analyses, humanist disputes are not a
reflection of an individual’s nature, but instead, humanist anxiety and anger are functions
of the demands imposed on scholars by the realities of professional life.
Following recent scholarship on humanist anxiety, I propose to shift the focus of
invective studies from a consideration of humanist character to a consideration of
humanist context. This shift positions the present chapter to make two primary
contributions to the growing field of invective studies. First, although modern readers are
certainly reading invective more critically than their predecessors, Rao’s work
demonstrates that there is still a tendency to draw moralizing conclusions. Second,
Renaissance scholarship has not thoroughly or adequately examined humanist invective
as a literary form. 26 This is partly because the sources themselves have remained largely
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Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 130; Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World
Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 146. Rao’s Curmudgeons offers a surprising treatment
of professional context. In his introduction, Rao writes: “The invective’s peak in popularity and artistic
quality coincides exactly with the struggle of humanists to win acceptance and respect for their movement
and for their personally held ideas.” Rao, Curmudgeons, 7. Although Rao gestures towards the demands of
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individual character, losing sight of his initial and promising framework situating invective in its socioeconomic context.
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Martin Davies argues that although “the invective was a favorite form of the fifteenth-century
humanists…The spadework for a full treatment of Renaissance invective remains to be done.” He intends
his article to “cover a small part of the ground” associated with invective. Davies, 270. In his work on
Facio’s invectives in the 1970’s, Ennio Rao wrote of his intention to produce a monograph on humanist
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unavailable—unedited, untranslated, or in manuscript form—before the middle of the
twentieth century. Scholars since the 1970s have begun to remedy this and there have
been some important recent editions of particular texts, but analyses of these texts or of
the genre as a whole have been few. Martin Davies’s article on the invectives against
Niccolò Niccoli is an important exception, as are David Rutherford’s introduction to the
invectives of Antonio da Rho, Marsh’s introduction to Petrarch’s invectives, and Rao’s
Curmudgeons. 27 These works have identified some of the important tropes that gave
humanist invective substance and structure and represent growth in a field of study that,
although lagging behind the robust and comparative wealth of studies of classical
invective, has begun to recognize and advocate for the value of invective as historical
evidence. 28 Although scholars are addressing the structure and content of invective more
directly than in the past, the field can benefit from additional analyses that not only
identify classical tropes but examine them at work in humanist contests.
Guarino’s invective against Niccoli and Poggio’s against Valla offer an
opportunity to reframe the conversation about invective as one not of humanist morality
but of humanist literary activity, and thereby to assess invective on its own terms. This

invective, which he published in 2007. In the roughly thirty years between the two works, no other such
analysis had appeared. Bartolomeo Facio, Invective in Laurentium Vallam, ed. Ennio I. Rao (Naples:
Società Editrice Napoletana, 1978), 9. In the introduction to Curmudgeons, Rao echoes Davies in noting
that “despite the invective’s popularity, the remarkably frequent use which the humanists made of it, and
the high regard which they held their compositions in the genre, before the 1950’s the invectives were little
known and rarely read, as with a few exceptions they were available only in manuscript form or in rare
sixteenth-century editions.” Rao, Curmudgeons, 7.
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For an account of the major editions of Renaissance invective see Rao, Curmudgeons, 7-10. For Marsh
see note 11. For Rutherford see note 13.
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See also W. Scott Blanchard’s review of Early Renaissance Invective and the Controversies of Antonio
da Rho, by David Rutherford, Renaissance Quarterly 59, no.4 (Winter 2006): 1167-1169. Blanchard writes
about the great value of humanist invective to literary and social historians and notes his surprise that it has
garnered so little attention. He credits Rutherford with providing “the groundwork for a more
comprehensive investigation” and describes invective as an “understudied genre.” Blanchard, 1168-1169.
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analytical shift can help us reconsider our understanding of humanists whose use of
invective has resulted in their being cast as bitter, angry, and morose. It has been a
recurring argument in previous chapters that Trebizond’s character requires reassessment
because his attacks on others have been viewed as signs of his personality. 29 Trebizond is
not the only figure for whom this moralizing analytical tendency is an issue, as the
assessments of Poggio above attest. In addition, Diana Robin has argued that Francesco
Filelfo’s character ought to be reassessed insofar as our historical understanding of him
has been unduly influenced by the invectives of his rivals. 30 A focus on the literary genre
Guarino and Poggio used to make their accusations, including the rules and limits of
invective, can help us reassess traditionally distorted humanist portraits. To be clear, I do
not contend that individual humanists were not angry or bitter or that assessments of them
as such are necessarily incorrect. Instead, I argue that attention ought to be paid to why
they may have been so, rather than reducing their actions to a simple problem of
character. Humanists were living under a set of circumstances that compelled them to use
language in particular ways to meet professional needs. To further contextualize and
normalize the language of Guarino and Poggio, and to incorporate some of the newly
available translations of humanist invective, I will also occasionally draw parallels in my
notes between the invectives of Guarino and Poggio and those of Petrarch, Antonio da
Rho, and Trebizond. I will not provide in-depth analyses of these texts here—I have dealt
with the Trebizond material in previous chapters—but will refer to them to better
29

Monfasani addresses the problem of Trebizond’s reputation. John Monfasani, George of Trebizond: A
Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 75 and 104.
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Robin explains that all scholarship on Filelfo has relied on the invectives written against him by his
enemies. The result has been an unbalanced assessment of Filelfo’s character. Robin, “Reassessment,” 211214. See also her monograph, Filelfo in Milan: Writings 1451-1477 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991).
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illustrate how humanists used shared literary strategies when they used invective as a
vehicle for self-presentation. Guarino, Poggio, and Trebizond were hardly unique in how
they crafted their depictions of themselves, a point made clearer by the addition of the
voices of Petrarch and Rho. Ultimately, we should be less surprised—or “shocked,”
following Marsh—by the language of these erudite, fifteenth-century men. Instead,
through continued analysis of newly available sources, we should come to understand
that being an erudite man in the competitive environment of early fifteenth-century Italy
required the use of strategies that deemed the denigration of an opponent’s honor a key
part of audience persuasion.
Guarino’s In auripellem poetam (1413/1414)
To begin, I offer a brief overview of each of the two feuds under consideration,
the details of which are discussed in my analysis below, to establish time, place, and the
individuals involved in each dispute. Guarino wrote his invective against Niccolò Niccoli
(1364-1437) in Florence in 1413. Niccoli was a preeminent Florentine intellectual who
had dedicated his career to classical antiquities. He was so dedicated that he exhausted
his personal wealth and afterward relied on his Medici supporters to finance his
pursuits. 31 He is perhaps most famous for his friendship with Poggio and their joint
ventures, which Niccoli frequently funded, to recover lost works of classical writers. 32
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Mark Jurdjevic, “Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici,” Renaissance Quarterly 52, no.4 (Winter
1999): 1009-1012.
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For Niccoli’s friendship with Poggio, see Two Renaissance Book Hunters: The Letters of Poggius
Bracciolini to Nicolaus de Niccolis, trans. Phyllis Walter Goodhart Gordan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974). See also the recent discussion in Greenblatt, 126-134. Poggio wrote excitedly to
Niccoli about his discoveries, including Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria and Lucretius’ De rerum natura. On
the latter, see Greenblatt, 180-181, 203-204. Niccoli transcribed a copy of the Lucretius for himself that
served as the basis for “dozens” of further copies.
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Niccoli had a reputation for collecting other items as well—art work, goblets, glassware,
cameos, and the like—and contemporary accounts describe his home as a museum. 33 His
judgment in scholarly matters was highly valued by many, for which reason he enjoyed a
position of authority in Florence. In 1410, he invited Guarino to come to the city to
teach. 34 Guarino was to be the virtual successor to his old instructor Manuel Chrysoloras,
who had inaugurated Greek studies in Italy at the end of the fourteenth century. Niccoli
controlled the funds for Guarino’s position and made similar invitations to Giovanni
Aurispa in 1424 and Francesco Filelfo in 1429. 35 Guarino began teaching in Florence in
March 1410. For Guarino, who became one of the foremost schoolmen of the fifteenth
century, it was his first foray into education.
The relationship between Guarino and Niccoli had soured by 1413 when Guarino
was unable to accept an offer for the university chair of Greek studies at the Florentine
Studio because of Niccoli’s opposition. 36 We can only rely on Guarino’s accusations—
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Greenblatt and Alison Brown both discuss how Poggio’s copy of Lucretius almost became a piece in
Niccoli’s collection. He held the copy for twelve years. Greenblatt, 208-209; Alison Brown, “Lucretius and
the Epicureans in the Social and Political Context of Renaissance Florence,” I Tatti Studies in the Italian
Renaissance 9 (2001): 11-12. Poggio expressed his discontent in a letter to Niccoli in December 1429.
Poggio Bracciolini, Lettere, ed. H. Harth, vol. 1 (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1984), 89.
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For an overview of the Guarino-Niccoli feud see Rao, Curmudgeons, 29-31.
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Trebizond taught briefly in Florence as well. Monfasani reports that when Trebizond was in Venice in
1433 he so impressed Ambrogio Traversari that Traversari recommended him to Niccoli for the chair of
Greek studies in Florence. The chair was currently held by Filelfo, but Traversari wrote that he considered
Trebizond the superior scholar. Monfasani, George of Trebizond, 24. It should be noted that Traversari was
also one of Filelfo’s main detractors, which may have influenced his glowing recommendation. See Robin,
“Reassessment,” 203-204. Monfasani adds that Trebizond taught in Florence during the period 1440-1442.
He may have taught between the years 1438-1439 as well, though Monfasani is skeptical of the evidence
for that period discovered by Park. See Collectanea, 856 and K. Park, “The Readers of the Florentine
Studio According to Communal Fiscal Records (1357-1380; 1413-1446),” Rinascimento 20 (1980): 296.
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The feud is discussed in Remigio Sabbadini, Vita di Guarino Veronese (Genoa: Instituto Sordo-Mutti,
1891), 19-21. Martin Davies, note 4, drew new attention to it and others have followed him. See Marianne
Pade, The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy, vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press, 2007), 167-169 and Anthony Grafton, Commerce with the Classics: Ancient Books and
Renaissance Readers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 39-40.
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that Niccoli was jealous of a fellow student and blamed Guarino for not expelling the
other man and that Niccoli was angry that Guarino would not loan him books—to
account for Niccoli’s campaign against Guarino. 37 The loss of the position indicates the
socio-economic consequences of humanist quarrels. Guarino left Florence in the summer
of 1414—Davies speculates this may have been because Niccoli was appointed as one of
the annual officials of the Florentine Studio that May—and travelled to Venice with
Francesco Barbaro. Guarino’s troubles with Niccoli inspired him to pen a letter addressed
to his friend Biagio Guasconi expressing his complaints in either 1413 or 1414. 38 Guarino
later expanded and revised the piece for a wider audience, reflecting his concern in
crafting his public image, and titled it In auripellem poetam. 39 The title offers a sense of
Guarino’s criticisms. Auripellis, as Rao notes, is gold-leaf, “an alloy made of copper,
zinc, and tin leaf used to give base substances the appearance of gold.” The title can thus
be read as Against the Fake Poet. 40
Guarino’s invective is a clear sign of humanist anxiety regarding reputation and of
the pressures of scholarly life in Florence. Letters such as his are filled with complaints
about the damage rumor and insult could do to one’s reputation. Looking back in 1423 on
his time in Florence Guarino lamented how “there was no day in Florence when I wasn’t
tormented by insults, arguments, and petty quarrels.” He added that there was “such
37

Guarino’s accusations are discussed in detail below, pages 255-256 and 261-263.
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Davies, 271-273. Davies writes that although “the date of the redactions is not ascertainable with
certainty,” evidence in both versions points to them both having been written sometime in the period 14131414. For Guasconi see Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426-1434 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978), 319-321.
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Unless otherwise noted, my analysis is of the revised version. I cite letter as IAP and provide the line
numbers according to Sabbadini’s edition. The IAP is ep. 17 in Epistolario di Guarino Veronese, ed.
Remigio Sabbadini, vol. 1, Testo (Venice: A spese della società, 1915), 33-46.
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Rao, Curmudgeons, 32.
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wicked madness, such avarice for glory…that in order to get it people have no regard for
the reputations of others.” Describing the animosity among those in Florence, Guarino
described how “rather than friendships, there are political alliances” between people.
Guarino was not alone in his complaints. Giovanni Aurispa (1376-1459), who taught in
Florence for one year, 1425-1426, echoed Guarino’s sentiments in 1426: “here feuding
and intriguing go on everywhere; I can find no peace of mind at all. The whole place is
full of hostility and petty jealousies: here all the literati, all the elite are engaged in
backbiting, and there is paranoia everywhere.” 41 For Guarino, invective offered a means
to address his anxiety, appeal to his peers, and exercise a measure of control over his
conflict with Niccoli.
Poggio’s Invectiva in L. Vallam Prima (February 1452)
No account of humanist invective can be complete without Poggio, one of the
most accomplished polemicists of the early Quattrocento. He made observations about
the professional environment in the Roman curia similar to those Guarino and Aurispa
made about Florence. Poggio’s Facetiae, a collection of anecdotes and jokes told in the
curia, describes how “at the Roman Court, good Fortune generally prevails, and there is
but seldom room for talent or honesty; everything is obtained through intrigue or luck,
not to mention money.” 42 It was in the curia that Poggio waged his famous campaign
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The translations of both letters are Robin’s. Robin, “Reassessment,” 217-218. For Guarino’s letter, see
ep. 245 in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 382-384. Guarino and Niccoli had long since reconciled by 1423.
Guarino writes that Niccoli was trying to draw him back to Florence. For Aurispa’s letter, see Carteggio di
Giovanni Aurispa, ed Remigio Sabbadini (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1931), 41. For Aurispa’s
appointment in Florence see Paul Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 209.
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Poggio Bracciolini, The Facetiae or Jocose Tales of Poggio, 2 vols. (Paris: Isidore Liseux, 1879), 1:4950. In Curia Romana ut plurimum Fortuna dominatur, cum perraro locus sit vel ingenio, vel virtuti; sed
ambitione et opportunitate parantur omnia, ut de nummis sileam, qui ubique terrarum imperare videntur.
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against Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457). His first invective against Valla was the initial volley
in a feud that lasted from early 1452 through the first half of 1453. 43 The cause of the
conflict was Poggio’s discovery that Francesco Rosi—a Catalan pupil of Valla’s—had
criticized Poggio’s style, claiming that it included barbarisms. Poggio blamed Valla for
the affront and responded with his first oratio in February 1452, defending himself and
attacking Valla’s Elegantiae. Valla replied with the first three “books” of his Antidotum
against Poggio, addressed to Nicholas V, between May and June 1452. 44 Six months
later, Poggio had written three more orations while Valla was trying to keep pace,
working first on his Apologus against Poggio and then a second Antidotum. Poggio
released a fifth oration before Valla could publish his second Antidotum. 45 Their quarrel
began in the curia but spread after Poggio left Rome to become chancellor in Florence in
1453. The dispute was public knowledge and divided humanists into camps supporting

The theme is repeated in 1:57-58. For secondary sources on humanist anxiety in the Roman curia, see
Celenza, Lost, 123-133; Celenza, Renaissance Humanism and the Papal Curia: Lapo da Castiglionchio the
Younger’s De curiae commodis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Greenblatt, 135-154.
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Omnia, ed. T. Tonelli, 4 vols. (Basel, 1538; rpt. Turin, 1964-1969), 1:188-205. In the secondary literature,
the standard account is Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanessimo e Teologia (Florence: 1972).
For Camporeale’s analysis from Poggio’s perspective, see “Poggio Bracciolini versus Lorenzo Valla: The
Orationes in Laurentium Vallam,” in Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern Intellectual History, ed.
Joseph Marino and Melinda W. Schlitt (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press), 27-49. See also
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each man. The Poggio-Valla invectives have historically been recognized as some of the
most virulent of the Quattrocento. 46
The feud with Valla was far from Poggio’s first foray into invective. Unlike
Guarino, who largely avoided conflicts and so cultivated a reputation as relatively
restrained, Poggio frequently engaged in literary duels, including one with Guarino
himself. 47 The so-called Scipio-Caesar controversy in 1435 about the merits of the
respective generals attracted attention in Florence and Ferrara. The controversy was mild
by Poggio’s standards. 48 Far more virulent were Poggio’s four invectives against Filelfo
begun in 1433 in Florence. 49 Their dispute was an extension of the political struggle
between the Medici and the oligarchic republicans led by the Albizzi. 50 When Filelfo
wrote against Cosimo de’ Medici he incurred the man’s wrath, for which he was left
scarred by a knife attack and forced into exile, both of which indicate the possible
consequences of humanist literary activity. 51 He also brought upon himself the anger of
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See the descriptions of the dispute by Symonds and Rao above, pages 226-228.
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Two, pages 30-31.
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the Florentine elite who supported Cosimo, including Poggio. 52 Poggio still bore ill-will
against Filelfo after relocating to the curia, as is evident in Poggio’s reporting more than
one story mocking Filelfo in his Facetiae. 53 One story tells how a demon visited Filelfo
in his dreams and offered him a magic ring which, if Filelfo kept it on, would assure his
spouse’s fidelity. 54 Filelfo awoke with his finger in his wife’s vagina. “That ring is indeed
a first rate preservative for jealous husbands,” joked Poggio, “and secures them against
their wives being unchaste without their knowledge.” The tale cast Filelfo as a foolish
cuckold, a common early modern form of slander. 55 Elsewhere, Poggio targeted Filelfo’s
family with a story about how his father “wore silk in the morning.” Not content to let the
joke go unexplained, Poggio clarified that this meant Filelfo was the bastard son of a
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priest, since morning is when “officiating priests are generally clothed with silk.” 56 The
very next story criticized Filelfo’s sexual misconduct, specifically his “kidnapping” of his
wife, the daughter of his Greek instructor John Chrysoloras, and his “having taken with
him to Greece, on account of his handsome form, a certain young man of Padua.” 57 These
were common accusations against Filelfo, whose opponents ably wielded classical tropes
of sexual misconduct to denigrate him. 58
Poggio was, as his public affair with Filelfo demonstrates, a practiced polemicist
by 1452 and his quarrel with Valla. To understand the function of his polemics, however,
and not simply to view them as an expression of the author’s character or his subject’s
behavior, I turn now to the shared tropes humanists used. First is an examination of an
oft-repeated claim in fifteenth-century invective, the provocation defense.
Provocation and Reluctance: A Defense of Invective
Humanist invectives often began with the author’s protest that, although
reluctant to do so, he had been provoked into writing against an antagonist. The
provocation-reluctance defense was no stale topos but the foundation of humanist attacks
56
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Traversari and Poggio both criticized Filelfo’s affair with Chrysoloras’s wife, the mother of his bride-tobe. In his fourth Invective, Poggio writes that Filelfo “abominably betrayed his own host, John Chrysoloras.
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“Reassessment,” 213.
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and an illustration of how invective had discernible rules. 59 Writers could not afford to be
viewed as unjust. In order to use language that their peers might otherwise judge too
abusive, they had to demonstrate that their opponents had violated accepted ethical
norms. Invective was surely a weapon, but the battle was not “carried on without ground
rules.” Nor was the aim “to overcome the enemy by any means.” 60 Humanists who issued
insults without demonstrating sufficient cause exposed themselves to ridicule, as
Poggio’s letter to Christopher Cauchus in 1437 illustrates. Poggio chastised Trebizond’s
behavior as imprudent precisely because he thought Trebizond had written too harshly
against Guarino and had done so without proof. 61
Humanist declarations of reluctance and provocation had classical antecedents.
Cicero’s trial speeches often included claims of reluctance, followed by an apologia in
which he detailed the social obligations—such as the friendship of his clients—that
compelled him to speak. The technique required establishing an obligation sufficient to
overcome the advocate’s initial reluctance to speak against another. 62 For humanists, that
obligation derived from an opponent’s provocation and the writer’s concern for his own
reputation. For both the classical and early modern orator, the goal was to contrast an
opponent’s arrogance with one’s own modesty. The De oratore addressed arrogance
59
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when discussing the damage to an orator’s case if he attacked without care. The treatise
noted how the public “dislikes mockery of the wretched, except perhaps if these bear
themselves arrogantly” and added as well that “there is a rule excluding remarks made in
bad taste.” 63 Humanists justified invective by casting opponents as arrogant provocateurs
and themselves as reluctant and therefore modest defenders of their reputation and honor.
Guarino begins his In auripellem poetam (hereafter, IAP) with a provocation
defense that establishes the two main personae of his invective, his enemy an arrogant,
immoral slanderer and himself a long-suffering, reluctant victim. 64 His argument
contrasts themes of reasoned restraint and an emotional lack of control. 65 He writes to
Guasconi that he “often wished to report to you the behavior of this boisterous
[animosus] man” but had not yet because “I was indeed always eager to honor, observe,
and venerate him.” Times had changed, however, and he could no longer remain silent
because his patience [patientia] with Niccoli had only allowed a “more unbridled
impudence in slander” to emerge. Worse, his silence had led others to believe Niccoli’s
claims that Guarino had harmed him. Guarino demonstrates concern about his reputation
because of Niccoli’s slander and laments “absolutely nothing in human affairs will you
find more deceitful than reputation [fama].” It is because of Niccoli’s abuse that Guarino
begs [oro] Guasconi, and entreats [obsecro] his humanitas, to listen to his story.
63

Cic., De or. 2.237-239.

64

The strategies of Guarino and Poggio were not unique, as I argue above, pages 230-232. Claims of
provocation and reluctance are evident also in Petrarch, Invectives against a Physician, in Francesco
Petrarca: Invectives, ed. Marsh, 1.1. “The struggle between us is not fair, I confess. There are places
where you may strike me, but none where I may strike you back…you force me into a contest that I would
never have entered willingly, and I must therefore speak. …If I remained silent in my contempt for your
affairs—as occurs to me at times—you might take pleasure in my silence. So I shall reply to several
charges, asking the reader’s forgiveness, but not yours, if I say anything that runs counter to my nature.”
All translations of Petrarch are Marsh’s. I refer to the section numbers Marsh provides.
65

These themes are explored in Chapter Three and relative to a discussion of masculinity in Chapter Four.
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Guarino’s invective is a direct appeal to those who would read the letter, whose verdict
regarding the dispute would determine how the reputations of both men would fare.
Niccoli, Guarino explains, provokes [provoco] him with shameful letters, which justifies
the writing of an invective: “Truly, just as I consider it petulant and arrogant to insult and
revile, so I consider responding and ‘returning insult for insult to be civil and lawful.’” 66
The main components of Guarino’s provocation defense—patience, silence, and a
concern for his own reputation—are also evident in Poggio’s attacks against Valla. Like
Guarino, Poggio justifies his invective by painting his adversary as an arrogant slanderer.
He first remarks on the danger that abuse holds for the reputation of the abused: “It ought
to be the duty of a prudent man to drive off injury, to repel abuse, in which the glory of
66

IAP, 1-34. Volui saepenumero animosi mores hominis ad te perscribere…Ceterum veritus ne, quae
toleratu pergravia erant, auditu quoque fastidiosa fierent, destiti; quippe cum ob conceptas de illo virtutes
eum adeo colere observare venerarique semper studuerim, ut indignum censuerim eius acerbissimam et
sibimet intolerandam consuetudinem ferre non posse, ne parum constans et vere puerilis nostra diceretur
amicitia; sed profecto nihil humanis in rebus fallacius fama reperies. Verum cum hoc in dies malum
crescat, diutius agere silentium nequeo, praesertim cum ipsum cernam ex patientia mea effrenatiorem
maledicendi petulantiam comparasse et tacente me suspiciari aliquos intelligam ipsum a me insigni quadam
lacessitum iniuria, conscientiae obiectantes quod venerationis existebat. Audias igitur oro non omnia, sed
pauca de multis, quoniam apud peritissimas aures tuas haud prolixioribus agi convenit, qui nostrum
utrunque pernosti. Qua quidem in re si quid tuas forsan aures offenderit, humanitatem tuam maiorem in
modum obsecro, ne mihi qui coactus ad respondendum venio, sed ipsi qui tam procacem primus sermonem
introduxit succenseas; qui postquam indignissimis me modis habuerit, ne hoc quoque iniuriarum genus
intentatum omitteret, probrosis et vere eo dignis me tacitum quidem ac latitantem provocat epistulis. Ego
vero ut convitiari et maledicere petulans superbumque arbitror, ita respondere et ‘remaledicere civile fasque
iudico.’ Cf. Suet. Vesp. 9.
Leonardo Bruni makes the same justifications in his 1424 Oratio in nebulonem maledicum against
Niccoli. Like the IAP, Bruni’s invective was originally composed as a letter and addressed to Poggio, a
friend he shared in common with Niccoli. For a discussion of Bruni’s Oratio, see Davies, 282-283.
Leonardo Bruni to Poggio Bracciolini, 1424, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini Epistolarum Libri VIII, ed.
Lorenzo Mehus (Florence, 1741), 5:17-25. Bruni had responded to Niccoli’s abuse, he explains, with
mildness [lenitudo, patientia] because of their friendship, but Niccoli’s slander [maledictum] had provoked
him and he warns that Niccoli’s rejection of his patience will be reason enough for him to “draw the sword
of speech against this provocateur.” Ibid., 5:17-18. Sed quoniam ille est lingua procaci, & odiosa, nec in
extremo quidem mundi angulo quietum esse te ab iis molestiis passus est, ac maligna quaedam, ut sentio,
diversaque a vero fugessit…; Ibid., 5:18-19. Respondebo maledictis ejus, qui me tam acerbe, &
intolerabiliter provocat?; Ibid., 5:24-25. Sed ego certa ratione id feci: vel quia contemno hominem
praesertim insanum & furentem, vel quia rationem habere malui superioris amicitiae, quam justi doloris
mei. Id vero difficilius michi fuit, quod ille nichil pensi habet, nullo respectu superioris conjunctionis
retinetur, sed in maledictis continue perseverat, ut verear jam, ne lenitudo ista mea ad ignaviam &
socordiam michi imputetur. Tu es primus, ad quem de his rebus scripserim, & hoc excitatus litteris tuis.
Nam ipse tacere constitueram. Quod si tandem rejecta patientia gladium orationis in hunc provocatorem
strinxero; faciam ut omnes intelligant, quantum sibi lucrum fuerat in istam dimicationem non descendisse.
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honor and esteem or the reputations of genius seems to be led into danger by enemies.”
As for silence and patience, however, he explains that some will say it is more honorable
to “think nothing of the words of a stupid and plainly insane man, who in the manner of a
demented person and madman rashly attacks all learned men.” 67 “I would admit,” he
continues, that “it is better to remain silent now and then against those possessed in spirit
and mind” if not for the opinion of Sallust that “wickedness may become more flagrant
whenever you disregard it.” 68 Poggio thus maintains that “it is very often necessary to
castigate the insane,” for which reason “I follow the opinion of the people who think it
just that he who has been provoked by an injury return the favor.” 69 Poggio’s language is
more inflammatory than Guarino’s, particularly regarding his opponent’s irrational
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Oratio I, 188. Si quibus in rebus honestum est consensusque omnium permissum, iniuriam propulsare, in
his maxime prudentis officium hominis esse debet, ut contumeliam depellat, in quibus honoris &
existimationis laus aut ingenij fama a maliuolis in discrimen adduci videatur. Conscium enim eorum quae
obijciuntur se facere existimatur, qui taciturnitate utitur pro defensione, quoniam censentur quasi
conscientia ductus non esse ausus improborum maledicentiae respondere. Quod si dissoluti esse hominis
Cicero inquit, spernere quid de se quisque sentiat & loquatur, multo dissolutionis uideri potest, ea
contemnere, quae in suam ignominiam & contumeliam sint descripta. Dicet forte aliquis, honestioris officij
fuisse futurum, pro nihilo ducere stulti palamque insani hominis uerba, qui dementis ac furiosi more in
omnes doctos uiros, baculo nescio quo stulticiae proteruaque iactantia temere incursat.
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Ibid., 188. Faterer satius esse quandoque tacere aduersus animo & mente captos, nisi secundum Salustij
sententiam: malus fieret improbior ubi negligas. Et satis compertum est saepius ex reticentia animos illis
adijci ad contumeliam inferendam. Itaque existimans persaepe necessarium esse castigare insanos, quo
caeteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores, sequar uulgi opinionem, qui iustum putant lacessitum iniuria parem
gratiam referre; Cf. Sal. Bel. Iug. 31.
Poggio made this argument in his February 1453 letter to Trebizond, who accused him of
sending assassins to Naples. He dismissed the accusation and countered “I will regard your words as much
as those of an irascible man…I will certainly neither betray my standards because of your false accusations,
nor will I vie with you by means of disgraceful words, but instead by virtue.” He added “since the whole
thing [the assassination plot accusation] is nothing, it may be honorable that I also offer you no response.”
Poggii Epistolae, 3:50. The argument became a point of contention. Trebizond replied that Poggio could
not feign silence since he issued a reply: “You received letters, you now return letters.” Walser, 507.
69

Cf. Guarino’s similar argument about returning insults, note 66. Antonio da Rho uses the same language
in his Philippic against Panormita. See The Philippic of Antonio da Rho against Antonio Panormita, in
Early Renaissance Invective, ed. Rutherford, 51-189. Hereafter, I cite the text as Philippic and provide the
section numbers of Rutherford’s edition. Philippic, 58. Aeque nunc tu, si lubet, quantum ad nos attinet, par
pari referto, uel si excisionem timet, deponat ipse gladium; ego scutum abiiciam. Rutherford cites the
reference to Ter., Eun. 445 and a comparison to Cic., Fam. 20.19.
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nature, but his argument remains the same. Poggio claims Valla’s provocation justifies
his own attacks and that it is fair to respond to an injury in kind.
A common way of framing the provocation argument was to accuse an opponent
of maledicta—that is scurrilous language and false accusations—a strategy both Guarino
and Poggio used. The intent was to amplify an opponent’s arrogance and to make more
acceptable one’s criticisms of him. 70 Alleged scurrilous language, of course, typically
concerned another’s reputation. Humanists also distinguished between true, fair
accusations, and slander, maledictum or convicium. 71 Guarino accused Niccoli of the
latter. 72 He claimed that he knew Niccoli had written against him and that Guasconi had
read the letter. 73 Guarino attacked Niccoli’s manhood by accusing him of a childish lack
of restraint, noting “these are the things he imbibed after the very long labors of his
70

Cic., De or. 2.237. See for instance the claim that the public “dislike mockery of the wretched, expect
perhaps if these bear themselves arrogantly.”

71

Rutherford, 21. “In the Roman court, an invective that went too far would be regarded not as legitimate
invective (accusatio) but malediction (maledictum or convicium), that is, as mere insulting or cursing one’s
opponent.” Cf. Trebizond’s invective against Guarino. Trebizond argues that if he does not defend himself
and his work, Guarino will simply hurl accusations [convicia] unopposed. He describes the attack on his
Christianity as evidence of Guarino’s maledicendi libido and ends his invective by calling on him to repent
his maledicta against Greece. Collectanea, 392-393 and 407.

72

IAP, 15-34. …praesertim cum ipsum cernam ex patientia mea effrenatiorem maledicendi petulantiam…
Ego vero ut convitiari et maledicere petulans superbumque arbitror… See note 66.

73

IAP, 42-59. Et ne longius vager, legisti scio quandam ex sapientissimo illius vertice contra me
depromptam nuper epistulam, eam perinde ac alteram ex cerebro Iovis oriundam Minervam admiratus.
Cum ibi lacteum eloquentiae fluxum et singularem hominis modestiam contemplabare, plusne salis an
leporis inter legendum offenderis, haud facile dixeris. Quas res post longissimos studiorum suorum labores
ad quinquagesimum aetatis annum hausit. Non usquequaque verum est quod aiunt: ‘secundo puerascere
senes?’ An legendo potius homini succensebas, propterea quod cum hospes philosophiae credi velit cuius
tamen acerbissimus hostis est non nisi contra philosophiae praecepta eructantem animadvertebas? Ubi eius
vitam et ingenium linguae procacitas, ni fallor, indicat; a praesentibus enim praeterita declarantur et
manifestis occulta produntur. Nec qui tam sordidis verbis utitur, non spurcus esse potest; quoniam,
quemadmodum ait Isocrates, ‘mentis effigies extat oratio.’ Erumpentem aspiciebas iram invidiam avaritiam
et aestuantis stomachi spumantem ab ore rabiem…
On Guarino’s charge that Niccoli wrote against him first, I know of no such letter and suspect this
may be a false claim. Niccoli rarely responded to his opponents. When Filelfo wrote against him it was
Poggio who defended him, sparking the Poggio-Filelfo exchange. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204. Davies
writes “It is characteristic that he [Niccoli] never published any reply to these attacks, nor does he seem
even to have considered doing so.” Davies, 270.
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studies into his fiftieth year. Is it not altogether true what they say: ‘old men become boys
a second time’?” He charged Niccoli with being the first in the quarrel to use shameless
[procax] language, and to write with a “shamelessness [procacitas] of language,” that,
“unless I am mistaken, indicates his life and character.” 74 “He who uses such sordid
words,” he explained, can only be foul because “as Isocrates says, ‘speech is the likeness
of the mind’.” Niccoli’s abuse, he continued, derived from his passions: “You observed
anger, envy, avarice, and madness bursting forth from the mouth of one in a roiling
temper.” Guarino later charged Niccoli with a variety of abuses: he obstinately opposes
those who correct him, he refuses to yield to instructors, he disparages students,
enviously attacks learned men with maledicta, slanders men in their absence, and insults
his friends with convitia. 75 Convinced that he cannot win glory for his own
accomplishments, Niccoli has turned instead to winning fame for his maledicta, like “the
man who, it is said, burned down the Temple of Diana.” 76 These allegations, scattered
throughout the invective, are natural extensions of the provocation argument. They justify
Guarino’s invective and are key components of his portrait of Niccoli.

74

For the accusation that Niccoli was the first to use shameful language see note 66. Cf. Panormita’s
“second childhood.” Philippic, 50. Aut si fortasse, quod liquet, repuerescit rhetorumque coniecturas oblitus
est, dignus iam fit, qui obolum accipiat, ad emendas nuces et migret.
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IAP, 177-195. Immo qui his hominibus morbus est iste noster emendaturis contumacius adversatur,
cedere monitoribus indignatur, discentis obtrectat, doctos per invidiam maledictis insectatur, eos absentis
tamen lacerat et cum ipsis capitalis exercet inimicitias….Omitto pietatem in suos, amicitiam et caritatem in
universos. Ei profecto delicatus est sensus; amicos ut pisces amat, quos e vestigio nisi recentes aspernatur
et convitiis insultat.
76

Ibid., 205-210. Quanquam quid de huius mirandum est latratibus, cui singula passim mordere propositum
perstat, ut qui bene agendo gloriam nequit aucupari, saltem maledicendo famosus evadat, sicut olim qui
Dianae templum Ephesiae concremasse dicitur…?
Cf. Valerius Maximus 8.14 ext.5. Cf. Philippic, 42. “You look a lot like the fellow who, since he
was a nobody and incapable of a good deed that would bring him renown, burned the Temple of
Diana…When the rulers of Ephesus asked why he’d done it, he responded: ‘Since I was incapable of good,
I might become famous through evil.’”
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Poggio, like Guarino, substantiated his provocation argument through a
discussion of maledicta and convicia, though again he was more aggressive than Guarino.
For example, he often labeled Valla a conuitiator, but he was also far more likely than
Guarino to cast Valla as irrational by likening him to a madman or his actions to those of
a violent beast. Valla was, according to Poggio, not only a very ignorant slanderer
[imperitissimus conuitiator], but also a mad bawler [latrator furibundus], demented
slanderer [conuitiator demens], and frenzied slanderer [vesanus conuitiator]. 77
Elsewhere, Poggio accused Valla of attacking Aristotle, Varro, Cicero, “and the other
most distinguished men in teaching and in eloquence,” tearing them apart with his
snarling teeth. 78 Delivering his own apologia, Poggio cited Valla’s violence as the reason
why he “thought it necessary…to check…the disgrace of this depraved detractor.” Valla
was no true, rational man but instead demented. Poggio also repeatedly described him as
an insane beast [insana belua]. 79 Poggio counted himself among Valla’s victims. He
recalled how when “the most dishonorable and petulant man” had come upon some of his
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Oratio I, 200. Valla imperitissimus conuitiator…; Ibid., 197. Valla latrator furibundus, conuitiator
demens, rabula foraneus…; Ibid., 203. Iste vesanus conuitiator, superorum omnium autoritate semota, nova
sensa verbis indidit… I discuss Poggio’s use of latrator below, pages 259-260.

78

Oratio I, 188. Non me esse maioris doctrinae, non autoritatis quam fuerit Aristoteles, Varro, Marcus
Cicero, Salustius, Lactantius, Boethius, caeterique praestantisissimi doctrina & eloquentia uiri, quos amens
ille dente suo canino & in rabiem uerso petulanti nimium lacerat ac reprehendit, praeterundos esse aequo
uultu publice insanos & eorum incursus leuiter perferendos… Hac ego fretus opinione, nequissimi
detractoris infamiam (qui liuore & inuidia commotus solita dementia in me prosiliuit) saltem uerbis
necessario mihi censui refrenandam.
79

Ibid., 194. …in quem inuehere insana haec belua non praesumat… See note 93 below; Oratio I, 194.
Nunc quoniam ignorantis beluae exhalantem foetorem paulum compressimus… See note 167; Oratio I,
204. Elephanti currum ducent, quo beluae ingentes ingentiorem trahant… See note 174; Oratio I, 205.
Gloriatur insulsa belua, se Bartholomeaum Fatium, & Antonium Panormitam uiros doctissimos suique
dissimilimos, qui in eum scripserunt, respondendo compescuisse.
Poggio uses beast language in other ways. He describes Valla variously as a “stupid young ass,
born to the pasture and to shame,” as “a beast grazing on the fields of stupidity,” and as a “beast driven by a
fanatical spirit…[who] out of a lust for censuring slips where even boys are accustomed to stand firm.”
Oratio I, 191. Quid ageret hic stultissimus asellus ad pastum & ignominiam natus…; Haec belua profecto
agrum stulticiae depasta…; Sed haec belua fanatico spiritu ducta…pueri consistere solent. See note 117.
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own work, he dared to criticize and correct it. Poggio returned again to the language of
irrationality and animal undertones, describing Valla as fanatical and a “senseless
hallucination” who “poured out his insanity against me” and as one who “despises,
reproaches, and blames all ancient learned men with a certain wild [fera], immense
impudence.” 80 According to Poggio, this was a constant problem. Despite Valla having
been admonished many times by others, he continued to use scurrilous language. In
criticizing Poggio, however, he had assailed—with licentia maledicendi—not one of the
many deceased men of learning, but one alive, who could return like for like. 81 Poggio
used the language of either mad or beast-like irrationality and characterizations of
scurrility to denigrate Valla, substantiate his provocation argument, and legitimate his
own use of abusive language.
The invectives of Guarino and Poggio indicate how deeply concerned humanists
were with demonstrating provocation. 82 When demonstrated, provocation allowed an
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Oratio I, 188-189. Scripsi olim postquam redij ex Britannis, plures uarijs de rebus epistolas, quas
postmodum multorum suasione eas legere cupientium, in quoddam uolumen redegi, quod cum in manum
leuissimi atque petulantissimi hominis Laurentij Vallae (quem ignominiae causa nomino) incidisset, multis
in locis illas carpens, pro earum uitijs suam ignorantiam expressit, quae qualia sint paulo post discutiemus.
Non miror hallucinatorem quendam fanaticum ac dementem in me insaniam suam euomuisse, qui propter
innatam mentis imbecillitatem, propter infixam cordis uesaniam, propter insitam animi peruersitatem,
omnes priscos illos doctissimos viros, quorum memoria omnibus seculis summa laudis celebratione
uenerata est, fera quaedam immani proteruitate contemnit, reprehendit, culpat, aspernatur, tanquam
fortunae rotam in manu tenens sursum deorsum voluit & versat omnia, & ad suum arbitrium trahit.
81

Ibid., 190. A multis admonitus, a multis reprehensus, a quibusdam etiam scriptis castigatus, tamen in sua
scurrili dicacitate perseuerat. Facillime patiar hunc nostrum fanaticum oratorem in mortuos inuehere, qui
respondere non possunt, cum non illorum, sed suam inscitiam & ignorantiam testetur, in eum uero qui
uiuat, qui par pari queat referre, maledicendi licentiam sumere nequaquam aequo animo est ferendum.
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The same concern is evident in Trebizond’s feuds. Andreas Agaso expressed shock that Trebizond had
criticized Guarino’s encomium precisely because Trebizond “had not been harmed [lacessitus] by
Guarino.” See Chapter Two, page 70. Trebizond responded by writing to Leonello d’Este that Guarino
would never be able to prove that Trebizond had provoked him because his criticisms of Guarino’s style
been fair and consistent with scholarly practices. See Chapter Four, pages 195-197. During his feud with
Poggio, Trebizond justified his letter to Nicholas V regarding the alleged assassination plot and his letter to
his son Andreas detailing the forged-letter plot by framing them as responses to Poggio’s continued
hostility. For his part, Poggio responded to the assassination charges by arguing he had never done
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author to denigrate his opponent freely. When paired with claims of reluctance, as
Guarino did, the effect was amplified and the author could claim the mantle of restraint.
The concept of provocation also indicates that the authors of humanist invective could
not simply deride their opponents, much less savage them, without good reason. The
topoi of reluctance and provocation were necessary framing devices because humanist
arguments depended on audience, the public arena in which honor was won or lost. The
provocation defense, even if only uttered explicitly at the beginning of invectives, was
also the foundation for subsequent accusations of irrational or immoderate behavior. It is
evident, for example, in all the different kinds of categories of insults humanists wielded.
Categories of Insults
Humanist invectives tended to derive their accusations from a standard set of
categories valued for their effectiveness in manipulating an audience’s passions. These
categories provided a structure for characterizations—or caricatures—of an opponent and
indicate the rules associated with invective. 83 Renaissance scholarship has tended to deal
with these categories in a cursory fashion. 84 David Rutherford, though, offers a useful
overview, identifying a “standard” set of themes following the De inventione and the
Rhetorica ad Herennium: external circumstances (res externa), physical attributes
(corpus), and mental traits (animus). The themes encompass a host of more specific

anything to provoke Trebizond. For Trebizond’s claims see Chapter Three, pages 118-124 and 139-146.
For Poggio’s response see Chapter Three, pages 125-129.
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Rho devoted a section of Rhetorical Imitations to words used in “vilifying,” and cited Cicero’s speeches
In Verrem, In Catilinem, and In Antonium as exemplars. “For those who have been provoked,” he
explained, these categories also determined “the vocabulary of invectives” [invectivarum vocabula].
Rutherford, 19 and 300-313.

84

Davies and Marsh acknowledge but do not discuss these categories in detail. Davies, 272 and Marsh, xixvi.
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categories, including slurs about physical appearance (corpus), accusations of avarice,
impudence, audacity, libido, and madness (animus), and jokes about birth, education—
including “uncouth speech” [oratio inepta]—and friendships (res externa). 85 The purpose
of such attacks was to discredit the opposition, to make use of “everything that detracts
from the defendant’s honour and repute, lessening his chance for a successful defense.” 86
The categories resulted in some of the most severe and salacious insults and can seem
absurd or even shocking to modern readers. As aggressive as these insults could be,
however, there were guidelines governing their use. Successful caricatures required
choosing the appropriate category for the particular individual. Mere allegation was not
enough. 87 If a scandalous offense was well known or strongly suspected, as was Filelfo’s
relationships with his instructor’s wife and daughter, the individual in question drew
specific criticisms regarding libido and animus. 88 As their provocation defenses suggest,
Guarino and Poggio were both primarily concerned with indicating their respective
opponents’s arrogance. Beyond the opening of their invectives, they do so primarily by
means of classical loci related to the animus.
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Rutherford, 4-7. Ennio Rao identifies the De compositione of Gasparino Barzizza (1423) and Trebizond’s
Rhetoricorum libri quinque (1433/4) as examples of humanist rhetorical manuals that follow this model.
Rao, Curmudgeons, 110-111. Robin’s reassessment of Filelfo leads her to a consideration of the categories
of sexual misconduct and avarice. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204-214. Poggio’s anecdote about Filelfo’s
father is an example of an attacks against family (res externa). On the classical divisions, see Rhet. Her.
3.10-15 and Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.34-36, 2.177-78. In the secondary literature, see C.P. Craig’s list of the
seventeen classical loci of invective favored by Greek and Roman speakers in “Audience Expectations,
Invective, and Proof” and “Self-Restraint, Invective, and Credibility in Cicero’s ‘First Catilinarian
Oration.”
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Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.33.
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The De inventione counsels that “If you charge that the man whom you accuse acted from avarice and
cannot prove that he is avaricious, you should show that other vices are not foreign to his nature…” Later,
the treatise specifies that “praise and censure will be derived form the topics that are employed with respect
to the attributes of persons.” Cic., Inv. rhet. 2.33 and 2.177.

88

For Filelfo’s supposed sexual misconduct, see note 58. Similarly, Niccoli’s relationship with his
housekeeper was popular gossip, so his opponents used it against him. See pages 263-265.
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Boasts, Frauds, and False Glory
Guarino and Poggio attacked what they alleged to be the disparity between their
opponents’ boastfulness and arrogance and their actual abilities and moral conduct. They
used a vocabulary of mental traits (arrogance, audacity, temerity) and external
circumstances (primarily oratorical ineptitude) to cast their adversaries as frauds. The
resulting portraits reinforced the initial provocation defense. Guarino frequently and
explicitly accused Niccoli of boasting. 89 Niccoli, he explained, “wants to be believed the
host of philosophy, of which nevertheless he is the most bitter adversary.” 90 He is so
concerned with public accolades that he rants “about any subject, however paltry, to give
the common people the impression that he is saying something worthwhile.” 91 To
convince others of his architectural expertise, Niccoli “commends ancient buildings,
examines city walls, and diligently expounds at length about the ruins of fallen cities and
half-demolished arches.” 92 He even knows the number of steps in ruined theaters, how
many columns have fallen or remain standing, how many feet wide pedestals measure,
89

See the frequent use of glorior and iacto. IAP, 142-145. …et sicuti frumento Ceres, Chiron medicina
simul et Phoebus, ita et hoc iste suo gloriatur invento…; Ibid., 164-167. Nam cum erudire pueros per
quandam inanem iactantiam concupiscit, rudem sese magis puerum patefacit…; Ibid., 243. Gloriari saepius
solet quod is, famae custos et ianitor…; Ibid., 376-377. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis
singularem!
Likewise, Rutherford remarks how “Rho rarely chose between ‘gloats’ or ‘brags,’ preferring
instead to wrote ‘gloats and brags’ (gloriatur et iactat).” Philippic, 109. Musas etenim Sicelidas, tametsi
agrestes et impudicas, et Panormitam Apollinem quendam, Hermaphroditum imprimis uel ipsum suum,
quod sibi honores olim amplissimos immortalemque sui nominis famam policeantur, deos suos esse
gloriatur et iactat.
90

IAP, 50-55. …hospes philosophiae credi velit cuius tamen acerbissimus hostis est… See note 73.
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IAP, 97-101. Meministi, ut arbitror, quanta cum adstantium derisione saepe ut aliquid vulgo dicere
videatur, quavis de re et contempta quidem obiurgare nitatur.
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Ibid., 222-232. Quis sibi quominus risu dirumpatur abstineat, cum ille ut etiam de architectura rationes
explicare credatur, lacertos exerens, antiqua probat aedificia, moenia recenset, iacentium ruinas urbium et
'semirutos' fornices, diligenter edisserit quot disiecta gradibus theatra, quot per areas columnae aut stratae
iaceant aut stantes exurgant, quot pedibus basis pateat, quot obeliscorum vertex emineat. Quantis
mortalium pectora tenebris obducuntur! His ipse placere et os populi meruisse se putat, quae ubique de eo
iocularia festivitatemque pariunt.
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and how many obelisks retain their tops. The many descriptions of the man’s boasts, and
particularly the last comment, speak to a consistent theme in Guarino’s invective:
foolishness, and his presentation of Niccoli as Fool.
Poggio also emphasized Valla’s “boasting and verbal ostentation” but situated it
in a narrative of Valla’s madness and beast-like savagery instead of foolishness. He
argued that the boasts of Valla, this insane beast [insana belua], were so considerable that
it would lead people to think him “born an Apollo of Minerva and brought up in the care
of the Sibyls and on the milk of the muses, as though a new wonder of the world.” Later,
Poggio described Valla as so swollen “that you would believe he is in labor with the
earth.” 93 Like Guarino’s Niccoli, Poggio’s Valla is arrogant, boastful, and savages
learned authorities, despite the fact that he neither understands his subject matter nor the
authorities whom he criticizes or cites. Poggio was critical of Valla’s attacks on Boethius
and Albert before accusing Valla of believing himself to be the only one who truly
understood words and their meanings. To demonstrate Valla’s ignorance, and to
juxtapose it with Valla’s alleged arrogance and boasting, Poggio cited Valla’s misuse of
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Oratio I, 194. Denique nullus est aut fuit unquam quantumuis doctus & eloquens, in quem inuehere
insana haec belua non praesumat, ut qui non nouerint hunc satyrum foeculentum, obstupescere cogantur ad
tantam uerborum iactantiam atque obtentationem, & aliquem Appollineum foetum ex Mineruae partu in
Sibyllarum gremio ac musarum lacte educatum, ueluti nouum orbis prodigium putent… Ipse certe ita
tumet, ut terram parturire credas, ita se iactat, ac si maxima febri aestuaret, ita exultat, quasi ex Arabia
nouum aduexerit foenicem. For the intervening text and Poggio’s additional descriptions of Valla’s
boastfulness see note 167.
Poggio makes many such comments about Valla’s boasts, some of which, like Guarino’s,
employ glorior and iacto. Cf. Ibid., 189. Eorum autem qui nostra aetate fuere, praeclarissimos viros esse
dicebat Leonardum Aretinum, Guarinus Veronensem, se tertium Italiae lumen, cum tamen primum locum
mereret, nisi illis paulum humanitatis gratia cedere uellet. Sed quid mirum si duobus illis se praeferat. Cum
seipsum maioris esse doctrinae quam M. Varro fuerit palam praedicet, seque nulla in facultate illi cedere,
quem Cicero & beatus Augustinus omnibus latinis praeferunt sapientia & doctrina; Ibid., 193-194. Nam ut
a leuioribus ordior: Priscianum, Donatum, Seruium, Pompeium Festum, Nonium Marcellum, Aullum
Gellium, ipsum Marcum Varronem latinae linguae principem in grammaticis probro insectatur, & infinitis
fere in rebus sua furibunda praesumptione innixus redarguit. Aristotelis, Boetij, Augustini, Hieronymi,
Lactantij inscitiam fastidit. Ciceroni se praefert in elegantia. Salustij verba ut non latine posita immutat;
Ibid., 205. Gloriatur insulsa belua…respondendo compescuisse. See note 79.

252

Cicero. Valla “says praeclarum sometimes signifies bonum” and “brings forth as a
witness Cicero, whom he does not at all understand.” Poggio then mocked Valla for
misunderstanding Cicero’s use of irony and proceeded to number it among a host of
things he argued ought to be condemned by learned men. 94 In the case of both Niccoli
and Valla, their alleged arrogantia, considered a problem of the animus, provided the
basis for the attacks against them.
Guarino and Poggio each claimed their opponent’s sense of self was so inflated
that they considered themselves to be not just learned but the sole arbiters of learning.
The accusation helped advance characterizations of foolishness and madness
respectively. Niccoli appeared throughout as a man who interjected himself into scholarly
matters to appear learned when in truth he was anything but. “Don’t you see,” Guarino
asked, “how whatever unbecoming thing has been said or done wrongly by this monster
of a man, he wants to seem proper and be approved and he longs for them to be received
with applause like a thought of Plato’s?” 95 Worse, Niccoli “is accustomed often to boast
because he, the custodian and doorkeeper of reputation, makes more or less famous those
whom he wants.” In disputes of history or literature, “he will be the chosen arbiter, so
that he may declare victors those whom he prefers.” 96 Guarino’s remark smacks of
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Oratio I, 201. Primo Boetium (quem Albertus philosophum Latinum appellat) tum ipsum Albertum
redarguit homo accutissimi ingenij, qui plus somniando didicerit quam reliqui legendo, hic solum se
uerborum conscium interpretem somniat, cum ipse in multis aberret. Verbum praeclarum, bonum
quandoque significare dicit. Affert testem Ciceronem, quem minime intelligit. O praeclarum custodem
ouium, lupum. Non claritas in custode ait, desideratur, sed probitas. Ergo praeclarum pro bono posuit. O
praeclaram crassamque dementiam. Etiam pueris hoc patet, praeclarum per ironiam dictum, cum contra M.
Antonium loqueretur, at id ignorantiae magister in laudem dictum putat. Infinita sunt praeterea quae
damnanda essent a doctis uiris. Cf. Cic., Phil. 3.11.
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IAP, 71-76. Nonne vides ut, quicquid ab hoc hominis monstro indignum ac perperam dictum factumve
sit, decere ac probari velit et ut Platonis sententiam plausu excipi cupiat?
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Ibid., 243-250. Gloriari saepius solet quod is, famae custos et ianitor, quos velit pro personarum
discrimine plus minusve nobilitat, sicuti copia nunc pleno nunc medio locupletare cornu traditur. Si quid
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frustration, as Niccoli did have a great deal of influence in Florence, including the
authority to hire individuals such as Guarino to teach. Guarino intended similarly colorful
depictions of Niccoli’s boasts to demonstrate the extent of the man’s arrogance, as when
he relates Niccoli to a “class of people:”
who although little different from the unlearned multitude, assume the false name
of knowledge and authority, whereby that herd [ista pecus] is misled by such a
degree of persuasion that they believe they say nothing except ideas fit for bronze
and whatever they may have spit out is a rose.” 97
Elsewhere, Guarino told his reader that if he wanted Niccoli to love him tell him to his
face that he possessed “not just Attic, but all Greek and Latin eloquence; and he won’t
take it amiss if you add Hebrew as well.” 98 Guarino also mocked how Niccoli “carefully
weighs syllables…and carps at the letters—this one is distorted, that one uncultivated, yet
another is plain, here is something superfluous, there is something omitted—forgetting
that ‘It is the habit not of eagles but of spiders to catch flies.’” 99 Each criticism was an
example of Niccoli’s foolish pretense but also an example of his arrogant belief that he
was the arbiter of learning and learned men.

igitur de rebus cum gestis tum scriptis disceptabitur, is eligendus arbiter erit, ut quos ille maluerit more
pastoris Alexandri victores declaret ac aureo donet malo.
97

Ibid., 81-95. Quam periculosum igitur hoc hominum genus sit, vides; qui cum indoctae multitudini
parum intersint, falsum scientiae et auctoritatis nomen induunt; per quam eo suasionis pecus ista deducitur
ut non nisi dignas aere sententias eloqui se credat et rosa sit quaecunque expuisse contigerit, cum interim
risus de se iocosque praebeat: laudatur coram lingua, iocatur a tergo…
98

Ibid., 263-268. Vis te diligat, vis te amet? ei coram dicito non atticam modo sed graecam omnem
latinamque inesse eloquentiam; nec moleste feret si hebraicam insuper addideris.
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Ibid., 102-108. Iste Ciceronis Amassanius, ‘qui nulla arte adhibita vulgari sermone disputare solebat,’
syllabas perpendit, quarum tamen tempora mensurasque simul ignorat, et quasi in provincia sua constitutus
litteras carpit: haec intorta, crassa illa, gracilis alia, hic supervacua, illic omissa, immemor quod ‘non
aquilae sed aranearum mos est muscas aucupari.’ Cf. Aristoph. Av. 1110. Guarino alludes to Cicero’s
Academicus Primus. See Terence J. Hunt, A Textual History of Cicero’s Academici Libri (Boston: Brill,
1998), 32.
Agaso also likens Trebizond’s criticisms of Guarino’s style to a spider catching flies.
Collectanea, 369. “Nam que illius carpende orationis ratio extitit in Franciscum Carmegnolam…
quamquam inexpertus homo Trapezuntius minima carpat, araneas imitatus que muscis aucupandis inhiant.”
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Poggio censured Valla’s claims of superiority by explaining them as a function of
his opponent’s faulty animus. “Because of an innate perversity of the soul,” he wrote,
Valla “despises, reproaches, and blames all ancient learned men with a certain wild,
immense impudence just as if he, holding the wheel of fortune, turns and twists all upside
down and drags them as he pleases.” 100 Likewise, Poggio deemed Valla’s claim that he
will rescue Latin letters to be “fanatical boasting [fanatica iactantia].” “He [Valla] says
that he is about to imitate Camillus, so that just as Camillus restored a city captured by
the Gauls, so Valla himself will restore Latin letters, banished, refugee, and wandering, to
the city.” 101 Poggio’s descriptions of Valla’s mad boasts included a number of
increasingly vivid remarks. He likened Valla to a Delphic prophet, “devoid of every
sense,” and questioned the wisdom of responding to him. “Truly I am stupid,” Poggio
declared, “who judge his loquaciousness, his buffoonery, as anything of weight, [him]
who is driven by a continual mental spin like a bacchant.” 102 In one of his more
intentionally absurd passages, Poggio likened Valla and his “many and immoderate
promises” to a “ridiculous man” who, drawing a crowd to himself at a particular date and
time by promising to fly off a tower, keeps his crowd in suspense into the evening by
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Oratio I, 189. Non miror hallucinatorem…ad suum arbitrium trahit. Quoted in note 80.
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Oratio I, 195. Dicit insuper se imitaturum esse Camillum, ut sicut ille urbem a Gallis captam restituit, ita
ipse literas latinas exules, profugas, atque aberrantes urbi restituat. O caput insulsum. O cymbalum
resonans sine sensu. Comprimat os insanum, & istam suam fanaticam iactantiam conterat.
Marcus Furius Camillus (446-365 B.C.), who defended Rome against the Gauls, received four
triumphs. Later, Poggio declared a triumph for Valla in honor of his victory over all learned authorities. I
discuss Valla’s triumph in detail below, pages 275-278.
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Oratio I, 193. Et certe effrenate nimium ac petulanter effertur Delphicus noster uates, tanquam illa sua
sensa omni sensu uacua, ex Apollinis Pithij sacrario, non ex armentario uolitantis cerebelli, ac ex fanatici
dementisque uesano capite promere uideatur. Cuius insaniae respondere ad singula quae sint inconcinniora
prioribus stultissimum uideretur. Verum stultus ego, qui quicquam pensi faciam garrulitatem,
scurrilitatemque eius, qui continua mentis uertigine agitur debacchantis ritu.
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flailing his arms before simply baring his backside to the crowd. 103 Poggio extended the
madness metaphor to the end of the invective. Here he decreed a triumph for Valla, a
celebratory parade in the classical Roman tradition, “as though for the conqueror of all
learned men,” just as “the Florentines are accustomed to do for madmen during their
festivals.” He compared Valla to the kind of demented man who wanders through cities
declaring himself to be an emperor or a pope. Like this madman, Valla thinks himself
superior to all, and by virtue of his great wisdom, thinks others ought to favor him over
the ancients. 104
Guarino and Poggio added to their caricatures of their opponents’ boasts a
discussion of oratorical ineptitude, which classical oratory categorized as an example of
res externa. 105 That Guarino expected the combination of arrogance and ineptitude to
persuade his audience is made clear when he explicitly asks if his reader felt annoyed
with Niccoli’s posturing. The question implies that everybody should be irked with men
who, in the pursuit of glory, are boastful and attack others but lack the skill to defend
103

Ibid., 195. Persimilis est Valla noster homini ridiculo, qui cum aliquando se ex quadam turri uolaturum
certo die profiteretur, ac populus ad id spectaculum conuenisset homines suspensos uarijs alarum
ostentationibus usque ad noctem detinuit. Deinde omnibus uolatum cupide expectantibus, populo culum
ostendit. Ita Laurentius noster, post multas atque ingentes verborum pollicitationes, post tantam
expectationem promissorum, tandem non quidem culum ut ille, sed uolantis cerebri insaniam, uertiginem &
pergrandem ignorantiae suppellectilem ostendit. For the preceding text, see note 101.
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Oratio I, 203. Sed ut homo leuis ex his fatuis qui uulgo per urbes discurrentes se Imperatores esse aut
Pontifices asseuerant, sibi persuasit omni scientiarum facultate esse caeteris superiorem, tantamque sibi
inesse sapientiam, ut omnibus priscis non solum sit comparandus, sed etiam anteponendus. Quod perinde in
animo illius est infixum ac si id esset uerissimum. Et postea quoniam tanta aliorum est negligentia, ut hanc
plenissimo cornu thesauri copiam absconsam non cognoscant, necesse est ut ipsemet suam insaniam
ostentet, praedicet, & se grammaticorum, rhetorum, philosophorum, caeteraumque disciplinarum doctorem
unicum praesentis seculi, & stultorum principem apertissime profiteat. Nil nunc restat, nisi ut quod sibimet
persuasit, & alijs quoque persuadeat. Sed quoniam nonullorum aemulatione maliuolorum atque inuidia
factum est ut tanta uirtus sit multis ignota, nos ut ipsam palam omnibus faciamus, decernemus ei
triumphum & lauream coronam, ne amplius addubitari possit Vallam nostrum stultorum atque insanorum
principatum possidere. Itaque ut Florentini solent in festis suis aliquando curru triumphali insanos uehere,
quod est iucundissimum spectaculum. Ita nos isti triumphum decernamus tanquam doctorum omnium
uictori, ob omnes gentes ingenij acumine superatas.
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See the division between animus, corpus, and res externa discussed above, pages 219-221 and 248-250.
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their braggadocio. 106 Guarino characterizes Niccoli’s oratorical ineptitude in two ways,
the first of which, prefaced with a comment about Niccoli’s emotional immaturity,
concerns his failures in Latin and Greek. He claims that irrational and emotional
factors—madness, suspicion, gall, envy, and rash desire—instead of reason motivated
Niccoli’s treatment of him. One of the reasons for his dispute with Niccoli, Guarino
continues, was Niccoli’s jealousy of a fellow student who after a few short months of
studying Greek under Guarino was on the verge of surpassing Niccoli, who had studied
the language for fourteen years. Guarino attributes Niccoli’s lack of progress to “his
stupidity, his thick skull, and his natural ill-will,” by virtue of which “he could get a taste
of nothing but the shapes” of the Greek letters. Niccoli, according to Guarino, so resented
the other pupil that he demanded Guarino expel the young man from his tutelage. 107 The
story is an attack on Niccoli’s manhood as Guarino implies that Niccoli lacks both the
rational abilities for his studies and the emotional self-control to handle the competition
with his fellow student in an adult and therefore manly way. 108
Guarino offers a number of other anecdotes to amplify his presentation of
Niccoli’s failures in Latin and Greek and therefore his oratorical ineptitude. For example,
he accuses Niccoli of knowing nothing about the books he collects, of being unable to
comment on them without first checking the inscription— a situation Guarino claims
106

IAP, 50-55. See note 73.
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IAP, 274-297. Sui tam rabiosi clamoris in me causas fortasse dudum intentus expectas et rationem
quaeris? Quid in hoc Horeste ratione opus est? est pro ratione furor, suspicio, bilis, livor, et inconsulta
voluntas, violenta atque tyrannica. Nam cum in condiscipulatu quendam sui certe amantissimum paucis
adeo mensibus proficere cerneret, ut non dubium esset quin ipse, qui iam anno quarto decimo huic
litterarum generi operam dare coepisset, superaretur, immo vero propter ingenii crassitudinem, pingue
cerebrum et innatam malivolentiam nihil praeter characteres gustare posset, veteri stimulatus invidia ut ille
continuo reiceretur imperiosus edixit, minas insuper et ingenitam addens magniloquentiam… On Niccoli’s
demand that Guarino expel the other man see Davies, 272 and Rao, Curmudgeons, 32-33.
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For a discussion of reason, the emotions, and manhood see Chapter Four, pages 156-164 and 186-187.
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happens often—and even then being unable to say anything meaningful about them.
Audience plays an important role in these stories. Guarino maintains that Niccoli’s
failures are well-known—the stuff of gossip and ridicule—but also that they occur in
public settings. He explains, for instance, how, “in a meeting of learned men,” when
Niccoli had read aloud a large page of a Latin codex, he was asked about the meaning of
the text. Niccoli betrayed his own ignorance by responding that he thought he had read
Greek. 109 It is, of course, difficult to believe that any humanist of repute would make
such a mistake. The story is intended as a humorous example of a basic fact: Niccoli is
not as learned as he wants others to think he is. Even Niccoli’s physical appearance gives
him away, according to Guarino, who mocks the size of his ears as a sign of Niccoli’s
loquacity and stupidity. 110
Guarino’s second means of characterizing the oratorical ineptitude of “Niccoli
the Fool” is by mocking Niccoli’s interest in a variety of studies Guarino casts as largely
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IAP, 376-405. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis singularem! ornamentum vendicat quod eius
inscitiam magis magisque detegat. Nam dum hos in manu codices contrectat, si quis illum interea
conspicatus id enim saepius obvenit quisnam unus aut alter sit percontetur, iste non nisi inspecto prius
epigrammate respondebit nec tuto satis; tum si rogetur, ut unum locum et mox alterum exponat, obmutescet
certo scio aut rubore suffusus ignorare se fatebitur quos tantopere perquisierit. Cuius rei nec longe exempla
petantur. Nam cum in coetu doctorum aliquando virorum latini codicis grandem sane paginam accurata
pronuntiatione perlegeret eiusque lectionis sententiam dicere rogaretur, suam in utraque re ignorationem
incaute detexit. Dum enim excusationes imprudens quaeritat, se graece lectitasse videri respondit: quam
paucis vera prodere immemor ipse coactus. Nam quid ab eo aliud expressum est, quam latine scire nihil et
graece tantundem? For the preceding text, see note 127.
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IAP, 233-242. Profecto si huis hominis effigiem accuratius intueare, tantam in eo levitatem
imprudentiamque mirari desines: aspice in eo auricularum magnitudinem, quae, nisi gravissimo testi et
verissimo auctori Trogo fidem deroges, loquacitatis et stultitiae est nota, sicut Plinius refert. Cf. Plin., HN
9.276.
The insult is the only example of Guarino drawing from the corpus category. See pages 248-250.
Big ears feature repeatedly in Rho’s invective against Panormita. Philippic, 85. For the Bible says that
Balaam’s ass spoke and that the ass articulated almost in a human voice words that it did not understand.
So our ass here (My! What ears he has!) quoted words to me that he could not understand…; Philippic, 88.
Does he tremble and shudder? ‘Did his hair stand up or his voice stick in his throat?’ He certainly absorbs
the words since his ears have not yet shrunk…
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inconsequential. 111 As the title In auripellem poetam indicates, Guarino distinguishes
between real scholars and “false poets” like Niccoli. 112 “When little goats cannot taste the
kernel” of true learning, he explains, “they nibble at the shell.” 113 Instead of being skilled
in Latin and Greek, Guarino jokes that Niccoli might better be called a “geometer…since
the duty of his art consists in points and lines and surfaces.” 114 Niccoli sets aside the
other parts of books as superfluous and “claims as his the skill and acumen in placing
prickings in books.” 115 Guarino remarks “how precisely and copiously and elegantly
[Niccoli] argues about lines…when he demonstrates how they should be drawn with
great sharpness, not with a lead instrument but an iron one.” He adds that the fruit of
Niccoli’s life has been a consideration of “the shapes of letters, the colors of paper, and
111

Guarino was not alone in doing so. Just as Filelfo’s personal life drew charges of sexual misconduct, so
did Niccoli’s interests draw criticisms of superficiality. As Anthony Grafton explains, several of those who
wrote against Niccoli described him as “someone who cared only for the commercial, not the aesthetic or
intellectual, value of his library….” Grafton, 39-40.
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On the title, see page 234.
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IAP, 108-112. Quapropter Caesarem Augustum doctissimum in primis virum non usque adeo
orthographiam idest formulam rationemque scribendi a grammaticis institutam observasse constat. Capellae
cum medullas gustare nequeant, cortices obrodunt. For the preceding text, see note 99.
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IAP, 122-157. Summum ego hunc geometram vocitare nihil expavesco; nam cum eius artis officium
circa puncta lineas superficies ceteraque id genus versetur, nulli magis quam isti festivissimo vel
fistulissimo in primis viro eam adiudicari disciplinam posse contenderim, qui omissis reliquis librorum
partibus ut supervacuis, in constituendis codicis punctis solertiam et acumen suo iuri vendicat. De lineis
vero quam accurate quam copiose quam eleganter disputet, operae pretium est, quasi Diodorum aut
Ptolomaeum, audire cum eas acutissime non plumbeo stilo sed ferreo potius deducendas esse demonstrat; et
sicuti frumento Ceres, Chiron medicina simul et Phoebus, ita et hoc iste suo gloriatur invento. Circa chartas
idest superficies non parum sua valet sapientitudo in hisque laudandis aut improbandis suam ostentat
eloquentiam. O consumptam per tot annos inaniter aetatem, cuius is denique decerptus est fructus, ut de
litterarum formis, chartarum coloribus, atramentorum varietate disputandum sit. Hoc vere Horatianum illud
est: 'parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.'

115

Given the other references in the passage to the construction of manuscripts, I translate the phrase “…in
constituendis codicis punctis solertiam…” as “the skill in placing prickings in books.” I take puncta to refer
to the small holes or prickings made in pages to guide copyists in the ruling of manuscripts. For an
explanation of pricking and ruling see Barbara A. Shailor, The Medieval Book (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1991), 12-13. Alternatively, puncta may refer to punctuation. Ian Thomson translates the
line as “the skill...to determine punctuation marks in a manuscript. Thomson, 632. Interpreting puncta as
punctuation fits well with Niccoli’s interests in orthography, which Guarino criticizes elsewhere. See page
271. For Niccoli’s role in Quattrocento orthography see Grendler, Schooling, 169 and 324-325.
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the different kinds of ink.” Clearly, Guarino does not consider these activities marks of
true scholarship. Nor does he consider Niccoli’s book-hunting and the construction of his
library as evidence of true learning. He diagnoses Niccoli’s “anxiety of book collecting”
as a symptom of the man’s “despair that they [the books] will ever be a help to him”
given his “unteachable mind,” and of his belief that posterity will consider him
knowledgeable for having built his library. 116 These are some of the most belittling
passages in the invective, but they are hardly gratuitous. Guarino uses criticisms of
education and aptitude, described in the Rhetorica ad Herennium under the category of
res externa, to rouse his audience against his opponent.
For Poggio, drawing upon the classical locus of oratorical ineptitude was less an
issue of mockery and more the construction of an exhaustive list of Valla’s alleged errors.
Poggio composed his oration in the belief that Valla had emended his work, so he spent a
great deal of time responding to a host of technical issues. In a characteristic passage,
Poggio defended his use of ex Britannis instead of Valla’s suggested ex Brittania and his
use of affectio and destinatum and countered Valla’s claim that he ought to have used
apud instead of coram. Like any good humanist, Poggio appealed to Cicero, Livy, Virgil,
and others to defend his style. 117 Elsewhere, Poggio distinguished between true orators
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IAP, 440-450. Scio equidem, scio quorsum haec aggregandorum sollicitudo codicum et libraria, ut ita
dicam, consilia evadant; nam cum eos per animi indocilitatem adiumento sibi futuros desperaret,
magnificum quiddam confecisse cogitat si bibliothecam instruxerit, quam intuentes posteri ei opinionem
scientiae conservent.
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Oratio I, 191. Arguit insuper cum scripsissem me ex Britannis redijsse, ex Britannia oportuisse dici. At
tritum est ab Indis, Hispanis, Aphris, Germanis dici nos esse reuersos. Affectionis nomen a me scriptum
culpat, & ait id uerbum in Tullio minime reperiri. Quid ageret hic stultissimus asellus ad pastum &
ignominiam natus, si Tullij opera non extarent. Hic aperte stuporem cordis ostendit, & parum se habere
commertij cum scriptis Ciceronis, cum uerbum ab eo totiens usitatum ignoret. Nam cum in manibus essent
libri ad Herennium, inter legendum in quarto animaduerti libro posita esse uerba haec: Ad demonstrandum
quaeuis sit eius affectionis qua impulsus aliquid reus commisisse dicitur. Pauloque post: Ipsa diligenter
natura eius affectionis quam leuissimae &c. Et deinde: Nam affectionis quidem ratio, & reliqua. Sed multis
quoque in locis eo uerbo Cicero utitur, quae satietatis causa omisi. Coram pontifice, cum scripsissem
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and “wranglers” or “bawlers,” language suggestive of Quintilian’s distinction between
the orator as a vir bonus and morally bankrupt, loquacious figures such as the latrator or
rabula. 118 In criticizing Valla’s suggestion that he ought to have used existimo instead of
aestimo, Poggio described Valla as a “teacher heavy with the loquacity of ignorance” and
likened him to a “tiresome, stupid, and contentious” grammarian who obstinately clings
to his interpretations. Valla, “this ridiculous barker [latrator ridiculus],” Poggio
continued, also criticized his use of pridie instead of postridie. “The impudence of this
wrangler [rabula] is completely insane,” he added, labeling Valla “a quack [circulator]
who teaches boys” and, again, an “insolent beast.” 119 Poggio spared little in the way of
abusive epithets focused on his opponent’s oratorical ineptitude, which, of course,
defended his own competence against Valla’s emendations. Like Guarino, he used these
soloecismum esse ait, & apud scribi debuisse. Haec belua profecto agrum stulticiae depasta, nihil intelligit
in latinis quid differant coram & apud. Legat Liuium qui ait, magis apud quos quam coram quibus
loqueretur. Et si mentis imbecillitas patitur, confideret quid haec distent inter se uerba. Coram quem
quaeritis adsum Vergilius ait: Sed haec belua fanatico spiritu ducta, cui sola detrahendi facultas est nota,
impetu quodam uesano fertur in praeceps, & prae libidine detrahendi labitur, ubi etiam pueri consistere
solent. Qui ad te destinatum legerent, scripsi. Id culpat censor noster Valla, in stulticia ac coecitate Vallae
uersatus, & non inueniri destinatum ait promissum. Neque uero ego missum intelligi uolui, sed
quemadmodum Virgilius destinat arae, inquit, a quo & destinatum descendit, ut decretum, addictum,
adiudicatum uolui significari.
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Quint., Inst., 12.9.12. In a passage identifying self-restraint as that which “gives weight and credit to his
[an orator’s] words,” Quintilian warns against the dangers if an individual “debased himself from an honest
man [vir bonus] into a snarling wrangler [rabula latrator].” All subsequent translations of Quintilian are
Russell’s. Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001). The distinction is far more common in Poggio’s invective but is not entirely absent
in Guarino’s. See IAP, 205-210. Quanquam quid de huius mirandum est latratibus, cui singula passim
mordere propositum perstat… Quoted in note 76.
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Oratio I, 192-193. Vbi aestimaui, ille existimaui. Multaque praeterea inepta garrulitate grauis
ignorantiae praeceptor culpat, & tanquam grammatici molesti, insulsi, & contentiosi solent in uerborum
interpretationibus haeret. Illud uero absurdum, cum uisitassem pridie abbatem, cuiusdam epistolae
principium fecissem, ille latrator ridiculus postridie fuisse dicendum scripsit, qua in re magnam inscitiam
prae se fert omni pudore uacuam. Etenim pridie, cum tempus praeteritum significet, hoc est qui proxime
praecessit diem, postridie uero futurum, quomodo conuenisse aliquem poteram die qui esset futurus.
Perinde ac si dicas, cum te cras conuenissem. Insana profecto huius rabulae impudentia est, qui libidine
detrahendi tanquam uentris crepitus inconsulto nimium uerba effert. Scripsi, urbis omnium celeberrimae.
At ille circulator disseminare uerba inter pueros solitus, ciuitatis ascripsit, tanquam male a me esset positum
urbis nomen. Sed quam lata euagatur peruicacis hominis stulticia. Quis crederet hanc insolentem bestiam in
tanta rerum ignorantia uersari.
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insults to amplify his caricature of Valla’s arrogance: not only was Valla a vile slanderer
of learned men, he was an inept fraud as well.
Cruelty, Avarice, and Sexual Misconduct
In addition to charges of arrogance and ineptitude, Guarino, whose attacks were
more varied than Poggio’s, amplified his caricature of Niccoli with charges of avarice
and cruelty, additional flaws of the animus. Such was the case in his claim regarding
Niccoli’s treatment of his fellow student—who Guarino carefully noted “was certainly
very fond of Niccoli”—and his demand that Guarino expel the man from his tutelage. 120
The tale indicates Niccoli’s ineptitude but also his jealousy and cruelty, particularly
toward someone who had given him no reason for either. In an example of praeteritio,
Guarino elsewhere claimed he would “omit his [Niccoli’s] duty to his family, and his
friendship and affection to all.” 121 “He loves friends as he loves fish,” Guarino clarified,
“which unless they are fresh he immediately spurns and attacks with insults.” Guarino
maintained that Niccoli’s cruelty was common knowledge and that there were
“innumerable letters…in which he inveighs” against his older and closer friends and
“brands their lives and morals with marks of the deepest shame.” 122 The charge is
interesting since contemporary scholarship regards Niccoli as remaining silent in
response to the invectives written against him. True or not, it was the charge itself that
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IAP, 274-297. For Guarino’s story, see pages 255-256 and note 107.
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Praeteritio is the rhetorical device of passing over certain information “through a feigned sense of
modesty or propriety.” Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 93. See Rhet. Her. 4.37 and Quint. Inst. 9.2.75.
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IAP, 192-204. Omitto pietatem in suos, amicitiam et caritatem in universos. Ei profecto delicatus est
sensus; amicos ut pisces amat, quos e vestigio nisi recentes aspernatur et convitiis insultat. Et ut me ipsum
facilius consoler, innumerabiles visuntur vulgo litterae suo more dictatae, quasi quaedam 'farrago loquendi,'
quibus eos quos maiori caritate et antiquiore consuetudine complectitur probris insectatur, moribus ac vitae
turpissimas inurit maculas. For the surrounding text, see notes 75 and 76.
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mattered. Classical oratory allowed for fabrication to amplify a characterization, as long
as it could not be disproven easily. 123
Guarino often derived his examples of Niccoli’s cruelty and avarice, of course,
from Niccoli’s alleged treatment of Guarino himself. In the first draft of the invective,
Guarino accused Niccoli of avarice [avaritia], charged him with “cheating and robbing
me,” and claimed that Niccoli never paid him for his services as an instructor. 124 This
was not the only allegation of avarice he made. Guarino later recalled how Niccoli
“turned greedy [cupidus] eyes on several of my manuscripts” and demanded they be
turned over to him. 125 Worse, Niccoli did not “hesitate to call me his slave in crowded
gatherings of the noblest citizens.” 126 The audience added a layer of humiliation to the
story, as it made Niccoli’s abuse, wrong in and of itself, a public affair. Guarino then
linked Niccoli’s avarice and cruelty to his ineptitude. He explained that his opponent did
not demand his books because “he expected they would be of any use or assistance to
123

See for instance the discussion of Crassus’s speech against Memmius. Cic., De or. 2.239-241. For a
warning regarding the use of fabrication in support of narratio, see Rhet. Her. 1.16. As for whether the
claim could be disproven, Niccoli had enough enemies among Florentine humanists who, like Guarino,
wrote about his cruelty. See Bruni’s invective, notes 66 and 129. Niccoli’s reputation for cruelty, fair or
not, was widely enough alleged that it provided a reliable means to attack his manner and character.
Davies, 270.
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IAP, 344-357. Et ut nihil officii et humanitatis relinqueret inexpertum, me contra ius et fas omni pacta
mercede spoliat. Quantum in eo possit avaritia vel hinc cognosci licet, quod me calcato fidei et aequitatis
numine fraudat expilat ac populatur; extat conventorum et datae inter nos dexterae chirographum
gravissimi et doctissimi et certe humanissimi cuiuspiam manu communi consensu et voluntate perscriptum.
The passage was omitted from the later draft of the letter. Thomson speculates this was because
the accusation had lost its point, as Guarino no longer taught under Niccoli’s auspices. Thomson, 644-645.
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Charges of avarice were not uncommon. Robin notes the many such charges against Francesco Filelfo
by Traversari and Poggio. Robin, “Reassessment,” 204-212. Trebizond faced similar charges from Poggio
and Giovanni Aurispa. In February 1453, Poggio wrote that he had considered Trebizond a friend until the
Cretan stole from the common monies in the curia. See Chapter Three, note 55. Likewise, in June 1454
Trebizond wrote to his son Andreas that he thought Aurispa’s part in the forged-letter plot was a result of
the man’s anger with him for having accepted fees in the curia in his place. Collectanea, 120; Monfasani,
George of Trebizond, 123 and 126.
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IAP, 303-307. Inde cum nonnullis codicibus meis cupidos adiecisset oculos, eos a me sibi tradi
depoposcerat, peculiolum meum suo fisco patronatus iure repetens; nec enim dubitavit modestissimus
homo in frequenti nobilissimorum civium conventu me suum vocitare mancipium.
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him”—he argued Niccoli lacked the ability to understand them—but because “he wanted
them to adorn his library.” The recollection led Guarino to lament again—“O the inane
superficiality [levitas] and singular boasting [iactantia] of the man!”—the disparity
between his opponent’s boasts and his aptitude. 127
Guarino added to his list of classical loci a consideration of Niccoli’s relationship
with his “housekeeper,” characterized as a muliercula, a comment on his opponent’s
libido intended to demonstrate sexual misconduct. The story was a digression—Guarino
later steered the conversation back to Niccoli’s theft of his manuscripts “from whence it
had slipped”—following classical models designed to amplify a narrative. 128 Stories of
sexual misconduct were common in humanist invective. 129 For Guarino, the story was
another anecdote that was “common knowledge and gossiped about on every street with
laughter, ridicule, and scorn.” Here again, the audience was in on the joke with Guarino.
The premise of the story was that while Niccoli demanded Guarino’s books and treated
127

Ibid., 363-379. Nec illum a me codices idcirco repetisse credas, quod eos ulli sibi futuros usui aut
adiumento speraverit, cum ad illos velut 'asinus ad lyram' existat futurusve sit et sicut in proverbio est
'oleum perdat et impensas,' nisi partae forsitan disciplinae non quinquennale quemadmodum Pythagorei sed
sempiternum agit silentium. Ceterum eos ad suae ornamentum bibliothecae vel ut melius loquar tabernae
librariae concupierat. O inanem levitatem et iactantiam hominis singularem! ornamentum vendicat quod
eius inscitiam magis magisque detegat. See note 109 for the following text.
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For digression as a means of attack see Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.27 and 1.97. The De oratore counts digression
as a means of moving the audience. Cic., De or. 2.311. Quint., Inst. 4.3.1-17. For digressions in ancient
rhetorical theory see Peter S. Perry, The Rhetoric of Digressions (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 112-146
and H.V. Canter, “Digressio in the Orations of Cicero,” The American Journal of Philology 52, no.4
(1931): 351-361.
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Lorenzo Benvenuti and Leonardo Bruni both told the story of the housekeeper in their invectives against
Niccoli, another indication of how certain figures drew particular kinds of insults. See Davies, 283-284.
Charges of sexual misconduct were frequently made against Francesco Filelfo. See pages 238-239 and
Robin, “Reassessment,” 212-214. Charges of sexual misconduct abound in Antonio da Rho’s Philippic,
particularly related to Panormita’s same-sex relationships and because of the content of Panormita’s The
Hermaphrodite. First circulated in Bologna in 1425/6, The Hermaphrodite features a variety of topics some
humanists perceived as vulgar, the most controversial of which was sodomy. See especially the useful
introduction by Holt Parker to Antonio Beccadelli, The Hermaphrodite. See Philippic, 89 and 92 where
Rho speaks about or alludes to Panormita’s male lover. See Philippic, 133 and 189 where Rho puns on
Beccadelli with “Lecherelli” and Panormita with “Gomoritta” to cast Panormita as a lecher and accuse him
of sodomy.
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him like a slave, Niccoli was the real slave. He was the slave not only of a number of
base moral practices but also “of the most depraved maidservant and most sordid little
slut whose command he follows and zealously carries out in such a way that nothing
influences him more than the lust and judgment of this very stupid woman.” 130 The
anecdote was an attack on the manhood of one who was utterly dominated by his
mistress. “She shouts,” Guarino elaborated, “and he has to be quiet; she demands…and
the demand has to be met; she hates any friends or family he has, and they have to be
thrown out.” Guarino stacked loci one atop another, arguing that Niccoli’s libido and the
influence of his muliercula led him to treat his friends cruelly. 131 The relationship also
led Niccoli to mishandle his property, another example of res externa, insofar as he had
let his muliercula take over his affairs. Niccoli “has been reduced to such a state of
madness,” Guarino continued, that “rumor has it she has been made heiress to a large part
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IAP, 308-343. Nec vero mirandum est ut me liberum ignoret qui se mancipium esse nesciat non dico
libidinum, ventris, iracundiae, inanis gloriae, arrogantiae, invidiae ceterarumque animi turpitudinum,
quibus infinitis paret servit obsequitur; sed nequissimae ancillae et sordissimae mulierculae, cuius imperia
ita exequitur navatque, ut nihil apud eum magis valeat, quam huius stultissimae mulieris libido atque
iudicium. Non ancillam, sed dominam diceres; clamat illa: taceat hic oportet; poscit, immo ultro corripit:
assentiendum est; amicos et familiares si quos habet odit, eiciundi sunt. Nota renarro, quae in tota sunt
vicinia cum risu ioco et contemptione fabulamenta. Quid plura? eo redactus est insaniae, ut magna ex parte
bonorum institutam heredem rumor sit; quae si marem forte pepererit infantem, ei tota speranda possessio.
Tales ego non servos sed nequissimos servos iudico. Sed revocetur unde dilapsa erat oratio. In his autem
rebus cum eius imperio minime paruissem, quae turbas, quae convitia, iurgia, probra! Nosti hominem; nihil
illum ab se degenerasse diceres. For the preceeding text, see note 126.
On the sexual connotation to muliercula, see Cic., Catil. 2.10.23. Cicero discusses Catiline’s
“bodyguard of prostitutes.” Ian Thomson translates Guarino’s phrase as “filthy little slut.” Thomson, 638.
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Bruni also blames the muliercula as the source of Niccoli’s madness and the reason why, Bruni alleges,
Niccoli had “savaged [him] with snarling teeth.” Bruni to Poggio, 1423, in Leonardi Bruni Arretini
Epistolarum Libri VIII, ed. Mehus, 5:19. Si causam quaeris, Poggi, & initium hujusce mali, respondebo
cum Ennio: Utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus caesa cecidisset in terram abiegna trabes, & reliqua,
quae sequuntur. Una siquidem muliercula, Poggi, una inquam muliercula, & ea ipsa turpissima causa est
illius amentiae, de qua dicam breviter; Ibid., 5:21. Denique ut Circe illa hospites suos diversas in figuras
convertisse dicitur, & alios leones, alios sues fecisse; sic ista venifica in hospitium, atque adeo in thorum
Nicolai recepta filtris, & veneficiis hominem exuit, ac belluinam feritatem, amentiamque induit…Ego unus
supereram: me quoque ferino dente lacerandum putavit. Coepit enim jampridem sic adversari michi, ut
palam prae se ferret pati non posse, celatim carpere, detrahere, insectari denique, & succensere,
contentiones avidius captare, lites ultro exposcere, ut manifeste appareret non esse illum, qui prius fuerat,
sed in truculentam aliquam bestiam esse conversum.
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of his estate.” The story reads like tabloid gossip but Guarino used it, stacking classical
loci atop one another, to amplify his portrait of Niccoli as a fool and an abuser of
friends. 132
Humanist invective was often wide-ranging in its ample use of classical
categories and denigrating language, but it could also be humorous. Early modern readers
would certainly have considered some of the passages examined thus far to be humorous.
Guarino’s depiction of Niccoli as a big-eared, loquacious fool rambling on about
architecture, diphthongs, and types of paper, and Poggio’s description of Valla as a wildeyed, Bacchic beast as demented as the man who believes himself an emperor or a pope
were intended to draw a laugh. Humor, though, was an important structural component to
invective, complete with its own guidelines and worthy of its own discussion.
Wit and Mockery
Humor, aside from its specific use in invective, was an important part of the
humanist experience in general. Humanists took pride in being considered faceti and
actively cultivated a reputation as wits. Guarino’s correspondence illustrates how his
peers praised him for his wit. Whether that praise was sincere or mere flattery, it indicates
the importance of humor to humanists. 133 Gasparino Barzizza wrote to Guarino in
December 1415 while compiling a book of examples of rhetorical usage modeled on
Cicero. He acknowledged the persuasiveness of jokes but did not consider himself
capable of addressing the material in his advice to future orators. He deferred to Guarino,
132

For the mishandling of property, see Cic., Inv. rhet. 1.35 and Rhet. Her. 3.14. Antonio da Rho used the
trope as well. Philippic, 132. “Are we really envious that on the heels of becoming an heir he became a
prodigal, indeed a squanderer and devourer of his own patrimony? that he has frittered away, destroyed,
and consumed amid sodomites and whores the very substantial dowry of his wife, a most chaste Penelope?”
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See Thomson’s chapter “Guarino and Humour.” Thomson, 410-428.
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whom he called a facetissimus homo. 134 Francesco Barbaro likewise praised for
Guarino’s wit when he requested examples, in prose or poetry, of his humorous
writings. 135 Poggio made his interest in humor clear in the title of the Facetiae. In his
introduction, he defended the levity of the book by noting, like classical authors, the
importance of refreshing the spirit through humorous tales and fables. 136 Both he and
Guarino congratulated Panormita for his collection of entertaining tales, The
Hermaphrodite, though each tempered his praise so as not to appear to condone some of
the more scandalous stories. 137 Even tempered, their praise reflects their appreciation for
the humorous.
Humanists, valuing humor in general, followed classical models that recognized
the utility of humor in persuading an audience. Wit had clear appeal to the Roman
advocate, and so humor received ample attention in a number of classical rhetorical
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Gasparino Barzizza to Guarino of Verona, 19 December 1415, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 100-101.
Non curavi autem ut pars ea exemplorum ad te mitteretur que ad id genus attinet quo animi iudicum lassi
audiendo lusu aliquo aut alia ratione recreantur; magis enim in gestu quodam quam in verbis ea ratio est
posita et ego ita ineptus ad facetias sum ut cum ad cetera tardo sim ingenio, in hac re nullo prorsus existam.
Prudenter ergo cavi mihi ne hanc unam particulam ad te hominem facetissimum mitterem, ne dum futurum
oratorem de risu excitando admonere studeo, ipse magis irridendus videar.
135

Guarino of Verona to Francesco Barbaro, 12 June 1408, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 11. Demum
instanter oras ut meas, ‘he he he ha ha’ ridiculum! epistulas vel metro vel soluto sermone contextas tibi
destinem, quibus delectaberis plurimum…Tu quoque, mi Francisce, cave ne dum aliqua mei duceris
existimatione, quam tu tibi fingis, frustratus redeas. Quid me aridum imploras pro fonte rivulum? Ego si
qua olim condiderim, ut rudiusculum quandoque exerceam ingeniuim, non repono…Desine igitur et dignas
latebris nugas ne sub lucem retrahe.
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Bracciolini, Facetiae, 1:1-6. Poggio argues that though “there will be many, I presume, inclined to find
fault with these tales of ours, either as being frivolous [leves] or unworthy of a serious man [viro gravi
indigna]” nonetheless “it is proper, and almost a matter of necessity commended by philosophers, that our
mind, weighed down by a variety of cares and anxieties, should now and then enjoy relaxation from
constant labour, and be incited to cheerfulness and mirth by some humorous recreation.”
Panormita likewise claimed to follow “the example of the learned poets of old, who, it is clear,
composed trifles,” and exhorted Cosimo da’ Medici to read them when he had a break “from your care and
concern for the senate of our country.” Antonio Beccedelli, The Hermaphrodite, ed. Parker, 7.
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Rutherford, 27.
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works. 138 The De oratore described the use of “a certain humour, flashes of wit, the
culture befitting a gentleman, and readiness and terseness alike in repelling and in
delivering the attack.” “Jesting too and shafts of wit [facetiae],” the De oratore
explained, “are agreeable and often highly effective.” Reasons for this were offered:
It clearly becomes an orator to raise laughter, and this on various grounds; for
instance, merriment naturally wins goodwill for its author; and everyone admires
acuteness, which is often concentrated in a single word, uttered generally in
repelling, though sometimes in delivering an attack; and it shatters or obstructs or
makes light of an opponent, or alarms or repulses him; and it shows the orator
himself to be a man of finish, accomplishment and taste…[and] dispels
suggestions not easily weakened by reasonings. 139
Humor could make an orator appear charming and agreeable and win him goodwill while
weakening goodwill toward an opponent. Cicero listed wit as an important attribute in his
history of famous orators, the Brutus. 140 Later authors echoed these ideas. Quintilian
praised Cicero’s “remarkable quality of urbanity,” which he used in court to produce
“more witty remarks than anybody,” and wrote that humor “possesses perhaps the most
commanding and irresistible force of all…[and] often turns the scale in very important
matters.” 141
Roman authors advocated the use of humor but also acknowledged its dangers
and outlined guidelines for its use. The De oratore identified two kinds of humor, wit
[facetia] and “raillery” [dicacitas], the latter more caustic. The combination of both was
138

For the classical use of humor in invective see especially Corbeill, Controlling Laugher, 5; Richlin, 96104; Krostenko, 202-232. See also Francis W. Kelsey, “Cicero as Wit,” The Classical Journal 3, no.1
(Nov. 1907): 3-10; Mary A. Grant, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable: The Greek
Rhetoricians and Cicero (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924); Barbara C. Bowen, “Ciceronian
Wit and Renaissance Rhetoric,” Rhetorica 16, no.4 (Autumn 1998): 409-429.
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Cic., De or. 1.17-18 and 2.236. Humor is the point of a long discussion. Cic., De or. 2.216-291. See also
Rhet. Her. 1.10. The role of humor in oratory was not a Roman invention. Cf. Arist., Rh. 3.1419b.
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See Cicero’s discussion of P. Scipio, L. Crassus, Scaevola, and L. Philippus. Cic., Brut. 128, 143, 164,
173.
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Quint., Inst. 6.3.4, 9-10.
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to be reserved for those whom the orator “detests and deems deserving of invective
[contumelia].” Comparatively severe uses of humor were to be limited to particular
situations, which left orators in a tricky position. 142 Humor would only succeed if it
appealed to the audience’s emotions. It would fail if the audience considered the speaker
repugnant. Quintilian addressed these problems, noting the difficulties in assessing the
causes of laughter. Jokes are judged, he explained, “not on rational principles, but by a
feeling which cannot be put into words.” “Totally foreign” to the personality of the
orator, he continued, “is the rough humor [dicacitas scurrilis] of the buffoon or the
stage.” 143 The De oratore likewise recommended restraint in jesting [in iocando
moderatio] and cautioned that the orator “must not let his jesting become buffoonery or
mere mimicry.” 144 Plutarch acknowledged the hazards of humor in writing that “the
readiness and sharpness of such wit [Cicero’s] seemed clever and well suited to the
courts…[but] by giving it too free exercise he hurt the feelings of many and gained the
reputation of being malicious.” 145 Humanists followed their classical models by
recognizing the perils of language that others might construe as dicacitas scurrilis.
Scurrilous language was, of course, one of the frequent accusations leveled in the
provocation and reluctance topos. 146 Understanding the classical antecedents of humor in
denigrating speech can help us move beyond shock at the way humor was used in
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Cic., De or. 2.221-223. Nicolino Applauso, “Curses and Laughter: The Ethics of Political Invective in
the Comic Poetry of High and Late Medieval Italy” (PhD diss., University of Oregon, 2010), 21-22,
Proquest (ID: 749938952).
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Quint., Inst., 6.3.7 and 29.
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Cic., De or. 2.237-239.
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Plut., Cic. 5.
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See pages 244-247.
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sometimes savage ways. 147 Classical models left humanists with options. They could, as
Guarino did, skewer their opponents with charming, clever wit, or they could, like
Poggio, argue that their opponents warranted a more abusive form of humor.
In keeping with his reputation as a wit, Guarino injected facetia into his writing
both to make himself appear pleasant and clever and to amplify his depiction of Niccoli
the Fool. His invective was undoubtedly critical but, insofar as it tended to poke fun at
Niccoli’s expense instead of savaging him, was relatively mild. Guarino’s wit was
evident from the outset, when he expressed his desire to make his invective enjoyable
reading. 148 He even opened with a joke: “You will recognize a philosopher of our time
abounding in buffoonery (Whew! What did I say? No, you will recognize a pantomime of
philosophers)! For as the Greek proverb says: What is funnier than that monkeys behave
like humans?” 149 The gibe blurred the line between rational man and irrational beast, and
Guarino used the contrast to frame his caricature of Niccoli as a fraud imitating—or
aping—true scholars. 150 The ape imagery casts Niccoli as a buffoon worthy of mockery
and indicates the playful tone Guarino maintained throughout the invective.
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See my discussion of the limitations of existing studies of invective, pages 225-230.
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Cf. Agaso’s letter to Regius. Agaso writes that he is sending his friend something suitable for a jest.
Collectanea, 364. Nihil adhuc quod nostra magnopere studia postulent comperi cum aut vulgaria sint aut
illis abundes. Ne tamen vacuam et inanem sumpsisse legationem videar, aliquid quo iocari aut subirasci
liceat audias interim faxo.
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IAP, 34-41. Dabo autem operam ut haec tibi ioco voluptatique sint, dum ridiculosum nostri temporis
philosophum hui quid dixi? immo philosophorum histrionem recognoscas. Nam ut in Graecorum proverbio
est: quid iocundius, quam quod hominum est factitare simias? See notes 62 and 73 for the surrounding text.
Cf. Philippic, 21. Rutherford explains that pantomimes were often used as euphemisms for
sodomites. Rho clearly attacked Panormita’s sexuality, see note 129, but there is no evidence that Guarino
intended that meaning against Niccoli.
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Early modern individuals, as discussed in the previous chapter, frequently expressed anxiety about their
humanity and manhood through a consideration of an animal-other. The ape was a problem because of its
closeness to humans. James Knowles, “‘Can ye not tell a man from a marmoset?’: Apes and Others on the
Early Modern Stage,” in Renaissance Beasts: Of Animals, Humans, and Other Wonderful Creatures, ed.
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Guarino’s wit is perhaps most evident in his use of puns and word play. 151 His
intent was to demonstrate a command of language which, as Cicero argued, could help
raise a laugh and persuade the audience. 152 Guarino frequently used puns in his personal
letters, one of his favorites being the play between Cicero—the orator, as well as a sign of
excellence—and cicer, the common chickpea. 153 He also toyed with the distinction

Erica Fudge (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 138-163. Guarino also used the ape metaphor
against an unnamed humanist who may have been Trebizond. See note 154.
Humanists had a precedent for the ape metaphor in Juvenal’s fifth satire, where the lower-class
characters are likened to monkeys dressed up like soldiers and forced to perform for rotten apples. Juv.,
5.146-155. “The insignificant friends are served fungi of dubious quality…Your treat is a scabby apple—
like the apple gnawed by the creature [a monkey] dressed up with shield and helmet on the Embankment,
that in terror of the whip learns to hurl a javelin from the back of a shaggy she-goat.” The translation is
Braund’s. Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans. Susanna Morton Braund (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004). In her notes, Braund explains that the passage refers to a performing monkey, one
of the various kinds of entertainment on the Embankment between the Esquiline and Colline gates. See also
Kirk Freudenburg, Satires of Rome: Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 274-275; Ralph M. Rosen, Making Mockery: The Poetics of Ancient Satire (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 241-242.
151

For a discussion of word play see Cic., De or. 2.253-257 and Rhet. Her. 1.10. Corbeill cites the oration
against Verres as an example of Cicero’s use of puns. Cicero likened Verres to a pig, noting the connection
between his name and verres, an uncastrated boar. Cic., Verr. 2.4.57. Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 78-80
and 91-96. Thomson writes at length about Guarino’s use of puns. Thomson, 417-420.
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Cic., De or. 2.235.

153

A typical example occurs when Guarino hears that another had praised him as a “successor of Cicero.”
He replies jokingly that while Cicero is honey, he himself is a cicer. Guarino of Verona to Ugo Mazolato,
Venice, 3 January 1416, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 93. Quod Parmensis noster, alter aetatis nostrae
Priscianus, plurimam mihi salutem nuntiat, gaudeo magnopere idque non parvae adscribo gloriae meae
‘conspicuis placuisse viris’ eisque caritate ac benivolentia devinciri. Mi Ugo mi Ugo, ‘tu das epulis
accumbere divum,’ quod illius viri iudicio et assertione Ciceronis successor sum; credo equidem ut qui ei
maximum per intervallum succedam, ita tamen ut non minus quam a sole tenebrae distem. Desine credere
ut quicquam mihi sit cum Cicerone commune; ego vere cicer, ille mel, ille suavitas, ille dulcedo.
Sometimes the pun appears without an explicit comparison to Cicero. Guarino of Verona to
Omnebono Scola, Florence, 9 August 1412, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 29. Vale suavissime mi
Omnebonum. Antonius Corbinellus hinc tibi salutem plurimam nuntiat. Habeo de Iuliario nostro Caesare,
ut ipse iactat, sed potius Oleario Cicere lepidissimam narrationem, qui iudicia sua non legibus modo sed
etiam ense discutit, clientes non verbis sed gladio castigat.
The Cicero/cicer pun appears in Agaso’s letter against Trebizond. The use of one of Guarino’s
favored puns may lend credence to Trebizond’s suspicions that Guarino had composed the letter.
Collectanea, 364. Videre licet “adpresentiarum” pro “impresentiarum,” “egritudinem” pro “morbo,”
“exorditus” pro “exorsus est,” “infinitionem” pro “causa infinita,” “a iuventute” pro “iuventa,”
“humanitatis doctrinas,” id est, doctrine doctrinas, et alia milia que novus hic Cicero, vel cicer, magis sua
quadam usurpat inscitia?
The pun had classical antecedents too. Plutarch wrote that Cicero’s friends recommended he
change his name because of it. Plut., Cic. 1.6; Corbeill, Controlling Laughter, 78-79.
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between orator, the polished speaker, and arator, the common plowman. 154 Guarino’s
word play against Niccoli was almost gleeful. While mocking Niccoli’s occupation with
the window-trimmings of true learning, Guarino wondered whether he ought to call him a
“man of books” [librorum] or “a librarian” [librarius], whether he was a man “imbued
with letters” [imbutus] or “stupid” [imbrutus]. He quoted Horace to cast Niccoli’s
pursuits as foolish and worthless: “The mountains are in labor, and an absurd mouse will
be born.” 155 He then mocked Niccoli’s “trifling work [opusculum], which he compiled to
teach youths.” Although entitled an orthographia, Guarino joked it could more accurately
be called an orbographia, a compound suggesting the work was bereft [orbus] of
value. 156
Guarino’s initial joke likening Niccoli to a pantomime of philosophers also
illustrates his humorous use of slipped speech. 157 This strategy involved first an author’s

154

Sabbadini and Rutherford note the word play in Cic., Phil. 3.9.22. Guarino used the pun to criticize an
unnamed humanist in 1423. Thomson speculates that Guarino, who was in Verona at the time, was talking
about Trebizond, who was in Venice. Guarino joked that the individual was “nearer a plowman than an
orator.” Note also another reference to the ape. Guarino of Verona to Hieronymus, Verona, 1 November
1423, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 384. Risum commovisti illius hominis vel potius simulacri
commemoratione, qui non tam summus quam simius doctor fieri cupit; est autem aratori quam oratori
propior. Cf. Philippic, 156. Perabsurdum quidem! Non enim quantula uel ex parte orator sed arator
(intellegin?) nominandus es quippe qui malus uir, immo sceleratus, atque dicendi imperitus es…

155

IAP, 113-122. Intelligant alii et sensa pernoscant; huic satis est picturas depasci. Quanam hominem
istum professione dignabimur? quem tandem appellabimus? librorum virum an librarium? litteris imbutum
an imbrutum? Quanquam quid dissimulo proprium ei referre nomen et artis suae vocabulum? Cf. Hor., Ars.
P. 139. See notes 113-114 for the surrounding text, including the reference to Horace.
Cf. Philippic, 132. “Are we really envious that he promises daily to be on the verge of generating
the highest mountains, Caucasus and Olympus, and then straightaway gives birth to croaking frogs or funny
little mice?” Rutherford notes the connection to Horace.
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IAP, 158-171. Proxime venit in manus ab eo editum in lucem opusculum, quod ille ad erudiendos
compilavit adulescentes; inscribitur autem orthographia, cum verius orbographia possit appellari. Nam cum
erudire pueros per quandam inanem iactantiam concupiscit, rudem sese magis puerum patefacit, tot in ea
contra artis praecepta describuntur vocabula, ut correptas a natura syllabas diphthongis annotare non
pudeat. See note 114 for the preceding text.

157

As an example of the classical use of the device, Thomson cites Cic., Cael. 32. Quod quidem facerem
vehementius, nisi intercederent mihi inimicitiae cum istius mulieris viro—fratre volui dicere; semper hic
erro. Thomson, 633.
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claim that he inadvertently used the wrong word, a mistake with amusing consequences,
and then an immediate correction. Guarino used slipped speech to label Niccoli a
slanderer: “Let this Solon say, if he can, which learned men of his age he has not harried.
What a snake [coluber]—I meant to say ‘pillar’[columen]—of learning, and reviver of
returning letters.” 158 The insult relied on similar-sounding words, like his puns, but added
a component, the feigned accident of pronunciation. Guarino used the device again to
make light of Niccoli’s book-collecting:
Certainly, if I saw that by the acquisition of many books erudition is also
acquired, I would say these libraries ought to be called most learned and I would
encourage this most excellent poison [virus]—whew! I meant to say “person”
[vir]—not only to have several at home but to stroll around wrapped up in a cloak
sewn of commentaries, so that he will be esteemed not only learned in letters
[litterosus] but even book-laden [librosus]. 159
The image of Niccoli wandering about clothed in the pages he thought made him wise is
humorous in its own right and well-suited to Guarino’s caricature of Niccoli the Fool.
The manipulation of language added another layer of humor for a humanist audience that
viewed clever word play as a part of being facetus. Guarino was not content to leave this
image just yet, though, and proceeded to imply that everyone was aware of Niccoli’s
foolishness [ineptiae]:
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IAP, 183-192. Dicat Solon iste, si potest, quos aetatis suae litteratos viros non carpserit et aureo idest
ventoso illo suo dicendi genere non detractarit. O studiorum colubrum, columen 'volui dicere,' et
redeuntium instauratorem litterarum. See notes 75 for the surrounding text.

159

I follow Thomson’s rendering of librosus as book-laden to denote the image of Niccoli wearing his
manuscripts. IAP, 411-425. Verum enimvero si parta librorum multitudine simul et eruditionem suscipi
cernerem, ipsas in primis bibliothecas eruditissimas appellari dicerem oportere huncque bellissimum virus,
hui! virum volui dicere, cohortarer ut non modo domi compluris haberet sed et conserto sibi ex
commentariis amictu circumsaeptus ambularet, quo non modo litterosus, verum etiam librosus putaretur.
Quamvis quid simulatione opus est? undique se produnt ineptiae. Nam si quis Timothei tibias habuerit, cum
nihil ex artis instituto modulari sciat, non idcirco hunc tibicinem esse dices; quin si quid canere aut
ostentare conabitur, 'Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum.' Thomson, 640. Cf. Hor., Ars. P. 113.
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Indeed if someone possesses the flutes of Timotheus, though he knows how to
play nothing from instruction in the art, you would not for this reason call the man
a flute player; no, if he tries to play anything or show off, “the Roman nobles and
mobs will bellow with laughter.” 160
Merely owning the tools of an expert—whether books or flutes—does not make one an
expert. The passage situated Niccoli at the center of another joke that everyone was in
on. 161 Guarino’s word play thus also reiterated the idea that it was only right to laugh at a
foolish braggart and invited his audience to enjoy a good laugh at the expense of a fool.
Poggio’s use of humor was far more aggressive than Guarino’s playful caricature
of Niccoli as a silly—albeit arrogant and abusive—monkey of a man. While Guarino’s
humor was the wit of facetia, Poggio’s was the mordant dicacitas. 162 The distinction is
notable because Poggio accused Valla of the very same thing: scurrilous speech. 163
Poggio, however, framed his dicacitas as a deliberate response to the alleged abuse of his
opponent. He claimed he was returning like for like, an implicit argument that he deemed
Valla worthy of the harshest abuse. 164 To justify his own use of mordant humor, then,
Poggio had to prove his opponent’s use of it. The concept of provocation was especially
meaningful for Poggio, whose humor runs the gamut of insults to demonstrate how
egregious were Valla’s breaches of propriety. In a characteristic passage, he accused
Valla of levitas, temeritas, and impudentia before attacking him for daring to correct
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Ostentare could simply mean to display a piece and a have a similar meaning to cano. Given Guarino’s
numerous accusations about boasting I take ostentare to indicate that Niccoli is showing off. LSII.A.

161

Guarino had already established Niccoli’s public—or so he claims—failings, including his mistaking
Latin for Greek and his inability to converse about the books in his collection. See pages 255-257.

162

See pages 267-269. Cic., De or. 2.218-219.

163

See Poggio’s provocation defense, pages 246-247.

164

See page 242-244. See too the account of Scaevola Crassus who “when encountering Brutus, whom he
detested and deemed deserving of invective,” used more aggressive humor. Cic., De or. 2.222-223.
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Cicero’s eloquence with false and mordant wit [falsa dicacitas]. 165 Like many of
Poggio’s characterizations of Valla, the passage focused Valla’s madness and likened
him to a latrator or rabula instead of true orator. On another occasion, Poggio criticized
Valla’s attacks on learned authorities as the foolish dicacitas of a “most indecorous
rabula.” 166 Amplifying Valla’s cruelty freed Poggio to denigrate his opponent in creative
ways. Some of his insults involved Valla himself, who boasts as if he were “boiling with
the greatest fever” and “rejoices as if he had brought a new Phoenix from Arabia.” 167 The
phoenix, a symbol of exceptionalism, stood as a testament to Valla’s arrogance. 168 In the
same passage, Poggio ridiculed Valla’s Elegantiae as “his bulwark and citadel” filled
with verbosity and foolish loquacity. Poggio’s humor reads as hyperbole designed to

165

Oratio I, 197. O uesanam leuitatem. O temeritatem non ferendam. O impudentiam manifestam. Adeo ne
Ciceronis fama, doctrina, eloquentia in extremum discrimen redijt, ut nescio quis furibundus, demens,
insanus, indoctus, petulans audeat Ciceronis eloquentiam sua falsa dicacitate corrigere. Quod esse potest
expressus, quod manifestius stulticiae signum, quam cuipiam Ciceronis eloquentiam non placere, quam
audere ab eo dicta commutare, tanquam eloquentius dici possint. Atqui nullus hactenus hominum memoria
repertus est qui id auderet, qui id tentaret. Valla latrator furibundus, conuitiator demens, rabula foraneus
tandem nescio e quo gurgustio emersus, impetum facit in Ciceronem, quem omnes aureum fuisse flumen
eloquentiae confitentur.
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Ibid., 203. Recensui pauca ex infinitis pene locis, in quibus illius iactatoris insania & uerbositas
temeraria, uelut equus sine freno aut ratione uagatur, non quidem ut mihi desumerem defendendorum
priscorum uirorum munus (quippe qui etiam taciti se defendunt, illorumque autoritas satis ex seipsa munita
sit omnia gentium consensu, aduersum stultam rabulae importunissimi dicacitatem) sed ut tanta audacia,
tanta impudentia stultissimae pecudis non esset ignota.
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Ibid., 194. Nunc quoniam ignorantis beluae exhalantem foetorem paulum compressimus, sua si libet
paulum consideremus, discutientes eos potissime libros, in quibus absque ulla aut uerborum, aut
sententiarum elegantia huius abiectissimae pecudis stulticia est uagata. Opus aedidit Valla noster, uel potius
castrorum dementiae Vallum, quod de elegantia, uel ignorantia potius latinae linguae appellauit, quod sibi
tanquam propugnaculum & arcem constituit. In quam omnes suas copias, omnia sua praesidia inclusit, quo
eius stulticia firmior ac tutior redderet. Multa illud uerbositate & stulta loquacitate tanquam boatu quodam
ingenti repleuit, ut qui librum non legerint, existiment in eo aliquid tanta expectatione dignum contineri.
Ipse certe ita tumet, ut terram parturire credas, ita se iactat, ac si maxima febri aestuaret, ita exultat, quasi
ex Arabia nouum aduexerit foenicem. For the preceding text, see note 93.
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For similar imagery see pages 250-251. Cf. Philippic, 49. Would you like us to analyze and explain this
error? Since he is called Antonio, the silly, insipid man gloats that these lines were just now sent to him as
if (like a Phoenix) he were the only Antonio in the whole world.
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demonstrate just how unforgivable were Valla’s actions, to raise the stakes of the dispute,
and to justify his own use of equally harsh language.
The chief example of Poggio’s dicacitas and the culmination of his portrait of his
opponent’s arrogance and insanity is his description of Valla’s triumphal parade. 169 The
description of the triumph is filled with evocative imagery typical of Poggio’s brand of
humor and invective. It is also a sign that Poggio’s humor is in the vein of classical
satirists who employed the grotesque and ridiculous in denigrating others. 170 The premise
is simple: if Valla thinks he is superior to all learned authorities, then Poggio is ready to
“decree for him a triumph and laurel crown.” 171 Poggio intends the triumph to be both
humorous and depressing. He places Valla “on a chariot constructed from the bones of
giants, so that this immanis man will be carried on the strength of immanes bodies.”
Immanis may refer both to the physical size of the giants and to the monstrosity they
share with Valla. Elephants will pull the chariot, “so that giant beasts will draw an even
more giant beast.” The emphasis on size is a tribute to Valla’s overinflated ego and,
perhaps, his monstrous treatment of others. The chariot must be made of the bones of
giants, Poggio explains, because Valla deems the alternative, ivory, vulgar. 172 Valla
himself bears all the marks of the madness Poggio describes elsewhere. He will stand
garbed in stinking pelts of goats, holding a sphinx in one hand and a phoenix in the other,
169

Poggio returns to the triumph in subsequent invectives. In the third Oratio, Poggio chronicles Valla’s
march through Hell—where “he is invited by Satan and his demons to proclaim himself the grand
heresiarch of Christianity, receiving from them lordship over all earthly knowledge and sciences.” In the
fourth Oratio, Valla “aspires to be counted among the immortals, to share in the glory of the blessed,” but
is expelled from the Elysian fields. Camporeale, “Poggio,” 36-37. See also Rao, Curmudgeons, 92-93.
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Camporeale writes that Poggio’s “need to dramatize this triumph of lunacy leads him to parody, to
depict Valla as a full comical personage, bordering on the grotesque.” Camporeale, “Poggio,” 36.
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Oratio I, 203. See note 104.

172

On the use of beasts and monsters to elevate satire see Maria Plaza, The Function of Humour in Roman
Verse Satire: Laughing and Lying (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 305-310.
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“casting his mad eyes here and there.” 173 He will wear a laurel crown, a classical and
humanist sign of excellence, on which is written in gold letters, “I am born of Folly.” 174
The attendants at Valla’s triumph are equally important parts of Poggio’s portrait
of the triumph as both celebratory and funereal. Owls fly about, a sign of impending
disaster, singing their funereal song [carmen suum ferale]. 175 As befits his arrogant
nature, Valla forces gods and mythological creatures into service, grand figures whom
Poggio uses to throw into greater relief Valla’s arrogance. Valla is a conquering hero, but
his victory comes at the expense of all the gods and goddesses, learned men, and learning
in general. 176 Those in attendance clearly do not want to be there. “All the muses stand
around the chariot like slave girls speaking a hymn,” although “they seem to grieve the
great insanity of the man rather than to sing.” Apollo is there, “melancholy, because he
cannot make use of his art in honor of the triumph.” Athena is present, but only to drive
away flies “lest they are a bother to her prophet [Valla].” She carries a very large book
“stuffed with the riches of the conqueror” and entitled ‘The Riches of Folly’.” 177 Next
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Another example of the use of mythical beasts to denote exceptionalism. See notes 167-168.

174

Oratio I, 203-204. Currus itaque erit non ex ebore (nam id quidem uulgare uidet) sed ex Gigantum
ossibus compactus, ut homo immanis immanium corporum robore uehatur. Non tepetibus, sed pellibus
sternetur hircinis, triumphantis naturam redolentibus. Ipse adstans alteraque manu sphungem, altera
foenicem gestans hallucinanti persimilis, oculosque fanaticos hac illac circumferens. Coronam gestabit in
capite ex folijs lauri, decoctis lucanicis immixtis, ut aliquo suaui odore nauseantis comitum fastidio mens
fessa reficiatur. Folijs inscriptum literis aureis erit, stulticiae alumno. Elephanti currum ducent, quo beluae
ingentes ingentiorem trahant…Ipse egregius Imperator grauitate illa elephantina, qui inanem laudem
respuat, manu omnes admonebit, ut de suis laudibus parcius loquantur, remittant aliquid de cupiditate
laudandi. I take Poggio’s spelling of sphungem as sphingem, the accusative singular of sphinx.
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Ibid., 204. Noctuae ac bubones circumaduolabunt, carmen suum ferale canentes.
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Cf. Plaza’s discussion of elevation and the use of grand personages. Plaza, 90-91 and 101-105
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Oratio I, 204. Circumstabunt in curru musae omnes uelut ancillae hymnum Apollini educatori gnati sui
dicentes, sed uoce rauca & submissa, ut potius gemere ob tantam uiri insaniam quam canere uideantur. His
aderunt proximiores cum cithara absque fidibus, quod eas mures correserint. Phoebusque moestus, quod
arte sua uti nequeat in honorem triumphi. Pallas cum scuto & ense, quo muscas abigat, ne sint uati suo

277

come the most revered men of learning, “all the grammarians, the historians, the poets,
the theologians, who on account of this demented triumph will cry out in grief.” Mythical
creatures follow, including centaurs who, in keeping with the themes of madness and
folly, bear banners identifying the procession as the “Roving Kingship of Fools.”
Understood in a pejorative sense and fitting with Poggio’s conqueror motif, though, the
participants of the triumph clearly consider Valla’s regnum a tyranny. The liberal arts are
there as well, though unhappily “will complain they were pimped.” Perhaps the most
depressing attendants, particularly for the early modern reader, are the boys spouting a
variety of Valla’s barbarisms and solecisms. 178 These children represent for Poggio the
consequences of Valla’s arrogance. If left in Valla’s hands, the future for learning is
bleak indeed. The universal disapproval evident in the attendants adds dramatic tension to
Poggio’s invective. The triumph is both comedic and tragic, laughable and disheartening.
The ridiculous triumph is Poggio’s analysis of Valla writ large and epitomizes the
methods he uses in wielding invective. The description of the triumph is at first shocking
in its savagery. This likely accounts for the moralizing, condemnatory conclusions of
Poggio’s character evident even in recent accounts of the Poggio-Valla conflict. 179

molestae. Minerua librum pergrandem super humeris gestabit opibus triumphantis refertum, cuius inscriptio
erit, stulticiae copia.
178

Ibid., 204. Aristoteles in primis, Albertus magnus, caeterique philosophi ab hoc uno emendati. Tum M.
Varro, M. Tullius, Salustius, Lactantius, Grammatici omnes, Historici, Poetae, Theologi, qui ob
triumphantem dementiam lamententur. Post hos curru proximiores satyri faunique sequentur: Sileni sui
auribus in psalterio & cymbalis plaudentes. Hos inter psallentium modo permixti erunt asini, tibicinum loco
rugitu magno sonoroque, ac etiam uentris crepitibus triumphantis famam & gloriam tollentes, ut & plausu,
risuque gestire & laeta esse omnia videantur. Centauri quoque aderunt uexilla deferentes, in quibus
inscriptum erit: Stultorum regnum peruagatum. Hunc longe post comitabuntur liberales artes, quae se ab
hoc uesano non ornatas, sed prostitutas querentur. Puerorum quoque turba aderit balbutientium nescio quid
rusticum magno comitatu barbarismorum ac folcecismorum, quorum inueniendorum hic autor fuerit
permaximus.
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See for instance Ennio Rao’s description of the Poggio-Valla feud as the “high-water mark” of humanist
invective and his assessment of Poggio. Rao, 96-97.
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Indeed, Poggio’s description of Valla’s triumph is far more scathing than Guarino’s
caricature of Niccoli or any of Trebizond’s invectives. Beneath the vitriol, however,
Poggio’s strategies were consistent with classical models of blame. Instead of reading his
invective as evidence of his bad character, a more accurate reading situates the piece in a
consideration of the classical guidelines that governed the use of humor. To do otherwise
is to judge the work by standards foreign to those of its author and audience.
Conclusion
As fiery and savage as humanist quarrels could be they eventually all found their
end. In the case of Guarino and Niccoli, there is evidence of their reconciliation as early
as September 1417. Guarino’s letters indicate the public nature of their dispute as well as
their public reconciliation made possible by the intervention of mutual friends. To
Niccoli, Guarino wrote that he had heard from various sources, including a letter Niccoli
had written to Francesco Barbaro, that he no longer bore Guarino ill-will. While his 1413
invective had emphasized Niccoli’s cruelty and abuse of friends, Guarino now fondly
remembered Niccoli’s courtesy [comitas] and humanity [humanitas]. He articulated his
desire to put the quarrel, which he attributed to ill fate more than to the fault of either
man, behind them, and to preserve and strengthen their friendship in the future. 180 The
letter was Guarino’s attempt to reengage with Niccoli by means of the language of
friendship [amicitia], language he used the following month as well in a letter to
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Guarino of Verona to Niccolò Niccoli, Venice, September 1417, in Epistolario, ed. Sabbadini, 149-150.
Superioribus diebus primum <ab ***>, deinde ab Antonio Cor <binello> nostro et nunc denique litteris tuis
vere ‘melle dulcioribus,’ quas ad Barb<arum> meum dedisti, certior factus sum, et maxima quidem laetitia,
me tecum in gratiam redisse; quod mihi facillimum persuasu extitit tuam illam summam comitatem ac
humanitatem pari coniunctam benivolentiae recordanti…Adeo ut quicquid turbulentum interciderit, invido
magis cuidam fato amori nostro impendenti, quam ulli nostrae culpae imputari obsignarique
conveniat…Enitar, ‘pro virili parte’ ut ingravescentibus annis et noster una ingravescat amor et simul
auctius consenescat. Cf. Cic., p. Sest. 138.
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Ambrogio Traversari. He assured Traversari, a mutual friend, that he would work to
make his friendship [amicitia] with Niccoli “endure inviolate,” and that “as much as I am
able, [I] will apply every care, the hardest work, and eagerness to not only conserving this
friendship, but in fact growing it.” 181 Guarino wrote again to Niccoli in November 1417,
expressing disappointment that his friend had not visited him in northern Europe. He
grieved that they could have toured the landscape together and that he could have
benefitted from Niccoli’s expertise in ancient ruins and histories. 182 Guarino praised in
this November letter the very things he had criticized in his 1413 IAP as superficial. In
December and January, Guarino, who had earlier mocked Niccoli’s self-appointed role as
arbiter of learning, even appealed to Niccoli to lend his support for a friend, Gian Nicola
Salerno, to become chief magistrate of Florence. He asked Niccoli to look after Salerno
“as you are accustomed to do for friends,” commenting that the man is “worthy of your
friendship [amicitia].” 183
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Poggio and Valla enjoyed no such reconciliation. The direct conflict between the
two ended when Poggio became chancellor of Florence in 1453, but he continued to
seethe even though the two were no longer colleagues. To Bartholomeo Ghiselardi,
Poggio wrote of his hope that the insania of Valla—a petulant ass and detractor of all
learned men—was public knowledge. He maintained his earlier accusation that Valla
“boasts so about himself that he places himself ahead of all ancient writers,” and wrote of
his hope that his orations against the man be seen by all. 184 In 1454, he made clear to
Pietro Tommasi, one of a handful who tried to bring the two together, that reconciliation
was impossible: “What good man can be a friend to Valla, that fanatic, buffoon,
slanderer, boaster, heretic, that insulting detractor of the learning of all the most brilliant
men, present and past?” 185 Poggio added that his words were not sufficient to subdue
Valla—a perverse animal, stubborn, and stupid—and recommended prison and whips
instead. Poggio even suggested that Valla deserved to be burnt at the stake. 186 Both men
died a few years later, Valla in 1457 and Poggio in 1459.
This chapter has demonstrated that invective was one of the preferred vehicles
for humanist self-presentation and that authors drew from classical models to help
dignus est amicitia. Commendo rem suam tibi ac tuis in maiorem modum, ut iam nunc de ea sermones
spargere incipias.
184
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negotiate fifteenth-century life. As a literary genre, invective allowed humanists to
construct positive, praiseworthy accounts of themselves and to denigrate their opponents.
Self-aggrandizement and denigration were primary concerns because of the significance
that public perception had on humanist careers. Humanist literary attacks were
fundamentally about audience and invective had very real consequences. Guarino’s feud
with Niccoli, for instance, led him to leave his teaching position at the Florentine Studio.
The present chapter also marks a fitting conclusion to the broader study of George
of Trebizond’s disputes with Guarino and Poggio. Like Poggio, Filelfo, and others,
Trebizond has long had a reputation as bitter, resentful, angry, and morose. Previous
chapters have challenged this reputation by demonstrating how Trebizond used the same
kinds of verbal strategies—related to restraint and manhood, for instance—as his
opponents. The actions for which he is often negatively characterized were in fact more
consistent with how scholars comported themselves in the fifteenth century than has been
acknowledged. The present consideration of the form and function of invective brings
this argument into sharper focus and the addition of new voices helps contextualize
Trebizond’s career and modes of expression.
I have argued that Marsh’s observation that “the violent language of [Petrarch’s]
invectives will shock readers” is indicative of a long-term analytical problem in
Renaissance studies. 187 The shock that Marsh describes has colored the reading of
Renaissance source material and our understanding of the humanist experience for
centuries. This was certainly the case for nineteenth-century figures such as William
Shepherd and John Addington Symonds, who viewed the savagery of humanist invective
as a puzzling practice difficult to square with a movement that articulated goals ranging
187
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from eloquence to virtue. Even some recent accounts, for example that of Ennio Rao,
continue to express surprise at and criticize humanist polemicists. Today, as invective
receives greater attention and the texts themselves become more readily available, it is
time to move past the shock that has shaped portrayals of humanism and humanists.
Doing so can help us situate invective in its proper context, the socio-economic realities
that defined the competitive, professional world of humanist scholars. It can also help us
revise our understanding of particular authors, Trebizond included. Trebizond was hardly
unique in the kinds of literary attacks he waged, and others were more than his match in
terms of vitriol. Though relatively restrained during his conflict with Trebizond, Poggio
was far less restrained in his feuds with Filelfo and Valla. His lengthy description of
Valla’s triumph is a hyperbolic portrayal of his opponent that not only adopts themes also
evident in Trebizond’s quarrels, but takes them to new lengths.
Ultimately, the problems associated with reading humanist invective and the
impact these problems have had on the portrayal of specific humanists as historical
figures suggests that, on some level, humanists were successful in their use of invective.
They managed to make their opponents appear dishonest, dishonorable, immoderate, and
imprudent. They were so successful in defaming each other, in fact, that posterity still
remembers them as a contentious, angry, disenfranchised bunch. To lean too heavily
upon this impression, however, flattens our understanding of the pressures exerted upon
scholars, the anxiety they dealt with on a daily basis, and the expectations that guided
their actions as inheritors of the classical oratorical tradition. Reducing invective to a
mere matter of objective morality obscures the nuances of the broader humanist
experience.
Copyright  Karl R. Alexander 2013
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CHAPTER SIX
EPILOGUE

As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, humanists of early Quattrocento
Italy were perpetually concerned with honor. Their correspondence was rife with
discussions about reputation. They consistently strove to present themselves as erudite,
eloquent, and virtuous. They were also a contentious bunch that frequently engaged in
literary quarrels over perceived offenses and supposed damage to their reputations. Early
fifteenth-century humanism was, as Christopher Celenza has noted, naturally agonistic. 1
Competition for patronage increased as the studia humanitatis gained in popularity.
Competition bred anxiety and conflict, and for good reason. Scholars who succeeded in
cultivating a reputation reaped the financial rewards. Guarino of Verona enjoyed years of
success under the Este family and its scion, his pupil Leonello. He earned a salary of 300
ducats once he became a public lecturer in Ferrara in 1435. In the 1450s, Poggio owned a
family palazzo, a country estate, nineteen pieces of land, several farms, two houses in
Florence, and significant banking deposits. 2 Monfasani reports that after George of
Trebizond entered the papal service in 1440 “one result of his new found financial
security was the purchase of a young female slave…for the relatively high price of 60
florins.” Trebizond was not wrong in thinking that his new position afforded him
financial flexibility. Between 1440 and his departure to Naples in 1452 Trebizond
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Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy
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Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 22;
Lauro Martines, The Social World of Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1963), 123-127.
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amassed 4,000 florins. He returned to Rome in 1455 and within three years he had
purchased a large house in the center of the city. 3 Nor were the individuals examined in
the present study alone in their success. Coluccio Salutati’s wealth was in the “upper 2
per cent of the city’s [Florence] population” in 1427. Leonardo Bruni was worthy 2,700
florins at that time, not including his town and country homes. When Bruni—who had
served as Florentine chancellor and apostolic secretary during his life—died in March
1444, his family controlled nine farms and seven houses. 4 There were certainly socioeconomic benefits for scholars able to navigate patronage systems and thus concrete
consequences for humanist contests of honor and reputation.
The present study has investigated humanist contests of honor to determine how
and why humanists engaged in disputes as they did and to establish a richer understanding
of humanist social practices. What, then, does a study of Trebizond’s feuds—and the
feuds of his rivals, Guarino and Poggio—tell us about the means at humanists’ disposal
when competing with their rivals? There was a shared language and set of verbal
strategies scholars used, as Celenza has noted, in an oppositional manner to praise
themselves and denigrate others. Humanists employed a language of honor that was
dependent upon ethical considerations. Allegedly immoral behavior provided fodder for
attacks against an opponent. Contrary to many modern accounts—ranging from the
nineteenth-century to the twenty-first century—humanist quarrels were not all-fornothing free-for-alls. Humanists adapted the Roman forensic model to contemporary
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needs. 5 They replaced the courtroom with the court of public opinion where individual
honor was won or lost and where their contemporaries played the role of judge and jury.
Humanists adapted classical models for different purposes. Sometimes they tried to
establish a reputation by casting themselves as more learned than current respected
educators, as Trebizond did in his RLV criticisms of Guarino. Sometimes they tried to
mitigate damage done to their reputation or to regain lost honor, as Trebizond did after
his chancery fight with Poggio. They often employed the language of honor in response
to perceived slights, as Andreas Agaso’s defense of Guarino or Poggio’s oration against
Lorenzo Valla illustrate. The present study makes clear that scholars understood the
challenges facing them as professionals. They were well aware that reputation played a
crucial role in their pursuit of financial success and popular approbation, and they
believed themselves capable of influencing public perception. Humanists viewed
themselves as active agents in the construction of their public identities.
The feuds of Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio also reveal the wealth of concepts
and language available to humanists in contesting honor. An analysis of their use of
language deepens our understanding of humanist social practices. The similarities in the
modes of expression these three men used are striking. Chapters Two, Three, and Four
have demonstrated how the Trebizond-Guarino and Trebizond-Poggio feuds each had a
language of their own unique to the circumstances of each dispute that each author
wielded as part of a public battle for status and reputation. The Trebizond-Guarino
dispute was defined by the anti-Greek language of the Agaso letter which led to Agaso—
Guarino?—and Trebizond issuing insults contrasting eloquence and loquaciousness as
5
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well as gravitas and levitas. The chancery fight defined the Trebizond-Poggio dispute,
which was fought via a language of restraint. Categories related to prudence, honesty, and
forgiveness dominated the conversation. The use of gendered language was notable in
both feuds. Casting an opponent as childish, womanly, or beast-like in their learning or
behavior allowed an author to denigrate his opponent as unlearned and irrational while
demonstrating his own rational manhood. The themes that emerge from each of these
feuds provides insights into the kinds of issues humanists targeted in their invective—
learning and moral conduct—and the language and paired categories they used to access
those issues—eloquence and loquaciousness, gravitas and levitas, prudence and
imprudence, honesty and dishonesty, man and child, woman, or beast.
Humanists surely relied on similar concepts but they also structured their
invectives in similar ways. The structural components of invective explored in Chapter
Five—provocation, the standard classical categories of insults, wit and humor—are
evident in the Guarino-Niccoli and Poggio-Valla conflicts as well as in Trebizond’s
compositions. Guarino and Poggio justified their use of denigrating language by arguing
they had been provoked by their opponents. Functionally, Trebizond’s claims to Leonello
d’Este or Guarino himself that Guarino’s composition of the Agaso letter had provoked
him are no different. Guarino, Poggio, and Trebizond all used insults reflecting the
classical categories of corpus, animus, and res externa. Insults of an opponent’s animus
were particularly abundant. Guarino and Poggio attacked Niccoli and Valla for boasting
and arrogance. Agaso accused Trebizond of believing himself a new Cicero. Trebizond’s
allegations against Poggio were rooted in his opponent’s alleged perturbationes animi.
Wit and humor abounded in each of these feuds, whether in the milder humor of Guarino
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casting Niccoli as a big-eared monkey of a man or the harsher satirical humor of Poggio’s
triumph for Valla. For his part, Trebizond boasted his eloquence was so great that he, like
a mailed knight on a charger, would topple Guarino.
The similarities in the content and structure of the verbal strategies of
Trebizond, Guarino, and Poggio ultimately suggest the importance of carefully
considering how we read humanist polemics and talk about their authors. In the end, what
are we to make of those humanists who composed invectives and quarreled with others?
Trebizond engaged in a number of feuds during his career and developed a reputation as
bitter, morose, and angry that remains with him to this day. Might we consider
Trebizond’s reputation well-earned given his proclamation that he would topple Guarino
with the force of his eloquence, as though he were mounted on a charger and Guarino
were seated on a donkey? Might we condemn Trebizond for calling Guarino a “donkeydriver” or likening Poggio to a beast? Perhaps. The present study has indicated, though,
that Trebizond’s interactions with Guarino and Poggio were largely consistent with the
customs of fifteenth-century letter-writing, invective, and self-presentation. Maybe, then,
Trebizond simply went too far in his attacks. Certain humanists were surely milder than
others, as a comparison of the Guarino-Niccoli and Poggio-Valla invectives indicates.
Even on a comparative basis, though, Poggio’s use of beast-like imagery against Valla
was far more evocative and aggressive than Trebizond’s attacks of Guarino or Poggio.
Poggio frequently characterized Valla as an insana belua, called him a beast forever
grazing on the fields of stupidity, and devoted a significant portion of his first Oratio to
detailing Valla’s mad triumph.
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I have argued that a more fruitful way of reading humanist invective and
understanding scholarly quarrels is to view them against a backdrop of humanist anxiety
and professional competition. Accusations of loquaciousness, a lack of learning, or of
immoral conduct, such as those that Guarino and Poggio leveled against Trebizond,
carried a great deal of weight among erudite scholars and their patrons. They were all
serious charges that could do real damage to an individual’s reputation. Such charges
provoked responses from humanists eager to defend their honor. Moreover, scholars
articulated their responses in as forceful a language as the charges themselves were
delivered. To read humanist invective as a function of the nature or character of
individual humanists limits our insights into the contextual factors that compelled authors
to compose invective and that guided the tools they used to do so. It distracts from the
fact that humanists were drawing on a wealth of classical models to appeal to a public
audience and influence popular perception. It oversimplifies the meaning in invective
texts and ultimately flattens our understanding of humanism and humanists in the early
Quattrocento.
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